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Abstract 
One of the striking features of modern globalization is the rising prominence of 
international law as governing institution for state-market relations. Nowhere has 
this been as pronounced as in the international investment regime. Although 
hardly known to anyone but specialized international lawyers merely 15 years 
ago, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have today become some of the most 
potent legal tools underwriting economic globalization. This thesis seeks to 
explain why developing countries adopted investment treaties as part of their 
governing apparatus.   
 
The study combines econometric analysis with archival work as well as insights 
from more than one hundred interviews with decision-makers in the international 
investment regime. On this basis, it finds ‘traditional’ explanatory models of 
international policy diffusion insufficient to account for the BIT-movement. 
Instead, both qualitative and econometric evidence strongly indicates that a 
bounded rationality framework is best suited to explain the popularity of BITs in 
the developing world. Although careful cost-benefit considerations drove some 
developing countries to adopt investment treaties, this was rare. By overestimating 
the benefits of BITs and ignoring the risks, developing country governments often 
saw the treaties as merely ‘tokens of goodwill’. Many thereby sacrificed their 
sovereignty more by chance than by design, and it was typically not until they 
were hit by their first claim, officials realised that the treaties were enforceable in 
both principle and fact.   
 
The thesis is relevant to a wide range of literature. Apart from being the first 
comprehensive international relations study on investment treaties, its multi-
method approach provides a robust and nuanced view of the drivers of 
international policy diffusion. Moreover, the study is the first major work in 
international political economy literature applying insights on systematic – and 
thus predictable – cognitive heuristics found in the behavioural economics 
discipline.  
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Preface: The curious case of Pakistan  
In October 2001, Pakistan’s Secretary of Law received a letter relating to a 
dispute between the Pakistani government and a Swiss company, Société 
Générale de Surveillance (SGS). The dispute had begun in 1996 after the Sharif 
government terminated a contract with SGS due to suspicions that it had been 
obtained through bribes. SGS objected to the cancellation of the contract and 
began a series of legal proceedings in both Switzerland and Pakistan. All failed.  
The letter received five years after the dispute had begun was not from 
Switzerland or Pakistani courts. This time it was from Washington DC. It came 
from a World Bank institution called the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which said SGS was claiming more than US$110 
million in compensation based on a so-called bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 
This puzzled the Secretary, as neither ICSID nor the BIT was mentioned by SGS 
while the contractual dispute had lasted.1 He therefore called up his Attorney 
General, Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, to ask what he knew about ICSID, and how 
SGS could possibly use a BIT to make such a claim. Although a leading expert on 
international public law, Mr. Khan couldn’t give him an answer. ‘To be perfectly 
honest,’ he later said to me, ‘I did not have a clue.’2  After hanging up, Mr. Khan 
therefore logged on to Google. Here he typed in two words: ‘ICSID’ and ‘BIT’. 
That is how he learned of these instruments for the first time.  
It didn’t take long before the Attorney General realized that the letter from ICSID 
was serious indeed. Unlike the contract with SGS, which involved specific 
commercial rights, the BIT apparently provided SGS a right to compensation for a 
wide range of regulatory conduct based on very vague treaty language. In essence, 
it provided SGS an ‘economic constitution’ while operating in Pakistan that was 
independent from Pakistan’s own national laws and enforceable in both principle 
                                                          
1 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August, 2003, par. 63.  
2
 Interview, Karachi, January 2009. See annex II for interview details. See also, L. Poulsen and D. 
Vis-Dunbar, ‘Reflections on Pakistan’s investment-treaty program after 50 years; an interview 
with the former Attorney General of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali Khan,’ Investment Treaty News, 16 
March 2009. 
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and fact. It thus gave Swiss investors the right to settle disputes with the Pakistani 
government outside Pakistan’s own legal system, for instance by using ICSID as 
the arbitration forum. Here, the tribunal had the authority to admit SGS’ claim, 
rule on its own jurisdiction, as well as award damages binding upon Pakistan and 
with limited options for appeal. And if Pakistan refused to participate in the 
proceedings, or chose not to comply with a potential arbitral award, the ICSID 
Convention allowed SGS to confiscate Pakistan’s commercial property in most 
corners of the world, with only limited options for courts in enforcing states to 
refuse execution.  
Surely, this was not a claim that should be taken lightly. Yet, when inquiring with 
the relevant ministries, Mr. Khan was unable to trace any records of BIT-
negotiations having ever taken place with Switzerland. There were no files or 
documentation in any of the responsible ministries, and no indication that the 
treaty had ever been discussed in Parliament. For a treaty with such a considerable 
scope, this was somewhat of a mystery. Yet, Mr. Khan later learned that this was 
no exception, as hardly any records existed of Pakistan’s past BIT-negotiations. 
This was not because they were considered too sensitive to document in written 
form. On the contrary. When foreign delegations had come to the country, or the 
Pakistani leadership went abroad, BITs had merely been considered ‘one of the 
doables.’3 According to the Attorney General everyone simply considered the 
treaties a piece of paper, something for the press - a token of goodwill.  
The claim by SGS made it obvious to Mr. Khan that this view was clearly 
mistaken. For while Pakistan was no stranger to allowing individual investors a 
right to international arbitration based on specific contracts, its BITs had provided 
a ‘standing offer’ to international arbitration to foreign investors as a group. 
Combined with their vague and broad treaty language, this not only gave investors 
a second chance at adjudicating contract disputes, as in the SGS case, but also 
                                                          
3
 Ibid. 
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implied a potentially infinite number of claims involving Pakistan’s regulatory 
conduct.4  
At the time, SGS was but one of many multinationals increasingly resorting to 
treaty-based investor-state arbitration when disputes arose. Claims covered both 
tangible and intangible investments - including intellectual property, bonds and 
shares, and concessions - and related to a wide range of state measures in virtually 
every economic sector. As such, investment-treaty disputes often involved key 
areas of public regulation, including measures taken for public safety, the 
provision of key utilities, as well as environmental regulation. The size of SGS’ 
claim was not unusual either. After interest, one dispute led to more than US$350 
million in damages against the Czech Government,5 for instance, which was equal 
to the entire health budget of the Czech government and effectively doubled the 
public sector deficit for that year.6 When adjusted for population size and gross 
national income, it was equivalent to an award of US$131 billion against the 
United States.7 Similarly, in 2006 the 30 pending cases against Argentina for 
measures taken during its 2001 financial crisis amounted to an estimated US$17 
billion in claims, which almost equalled the entire annual budget of the 
Argentinean government, and in 2007 alone Argentina was asked to pay a total of 
US$615 million in damages excluding interest.8 Quite clearly, BITs were more 
than mere diplomatic ‘tokens of goodwill.’ In fact, in the absence of a multilateral 
investment protection treaty, they were by far the most important treaties 
governing investor-state relations. Yet, despite being one of South Asia’s most 
notable experts on international public and commercial law, this was all news to 
Mr. Khan until he followed up on the phone-call from his Secretary of Law.  
                                                          
4
 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), at 63, 99-100; A. Parra ‘ICSID and Bilateral Investment Treaties’ 17 ICSID News 1 (2000), 
at 12. 
5
 CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (March 14, 2003). 
6
 T. Kellner ‘The Informer: Call it the Ronald Lauder tax’, Forbes Magazine, April 28, 2003; L. 
Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making (Winnipeg: International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004), at 25-6.  
7
 Van Harten, op. cit., at 7.  
8
 Note that some of these have later been successfully annulled in appeal.  
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In recent years, Mr. Khan has told his story in speeches around in the world, 
warning other developing countries against the mistakes made by his country. Yet 
for many, it probably sounds a little too convenient. Now that Pakistan had to 
adhere to her international legal obligations, it appears slightly opportunistic to 
claim ignorance on behalf of his former colleagues. So to corroborate Mr. Khan’s 
story, I contacted a considerable number of officials involved in Pakistan’s BIT-
program in the past. Surprisingly, all confirmed more or less the same narrative,9 
and today even government files admit to this view: ‘BITs were initially 
instruments that were signed during visits of high level delegations to provide for 
photo opportunities…’10 It was thereby not until Pakistan was hit by a multi-
million dollar arbitration claim that officials actually realized the implications of 
treaties signed by shifting governments since 1959. So while embassies, 
politicians, and investment promotion officials are still pushing for Pakistan to 
sign BITs today, some corners of the bureaucracy are now aware that the treaties 
involve serious and far-reaching obligations.  
This thesis will ask whether Pakistan’s experiences have been unique. Did 
governments in developing countries often fail to carefully consider the costs of 
one of the most important legal instruments underwriting economic globalization? 
Did they sacrifice their sovereignty more by chance than by design? And if so, 
does that tell us anything about the level of rationality we as observers should 
assume about the decision-making process, when developing countries pursue 
certain economic policies over others? 
                                                          
9
 See Annex II. 
10
 Communication between Pakistan’s Board of Investment and Ministry of Law concerning re-
negotiation of German-Pakistan BIT, November 23, 2009. On file with author.  
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1. International policy diffusion and bilateral investment 
treaties 
 
The adoption of BITs, not just by Pakistan but practically all countries in the 
world, illustrates one of the striking features of modern globalization, where 
governments have pursued largely similar market oriented reforms despite diverse 
institutional contexts. Removing restrictions on capital and current accounts; 
selling off state-enterprises; ensuring central bank autonomy; implementing 
neoliberal tax-reforms – all examples of policies which have also diffused across 
borders over the last decades. This presents a puzzle for studies on international 
relations, comparative politics, and international political economy (IPE). For 
while similar countries occasionally respond to similar conditions independently 
of each other,1 economic policies and institutions have often become remarkably 
alike, even among countries with vastly different social, economic, and political 
institutions.  
 
This is the subject of a growing literature on international policy diffusion, which 
is when ‘government policy decisions in a given country are systematically 
conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries.’2 Policy diffusion 
across borders is of course is not a new phenomenon. The use of quasi-sovereign 
trading companies from the 17th century onwards, for instance, the wide-spread 
adoption of the gold-standard in the 19th century, sudden waves of 
democratization in the 19th and 20th centuries – all are difficult to see as anything 
but interdependent political developments, however diverse.3 Yet in recent 
                                                          
1
 Z. Elkins and B. Simmons, ‘On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework,’ 598 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 33 (2005), at 34; C. 
Volden, M. Ting, and D. Carpenter, ‘A Formal Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion,’ 3 
American Political Science Review 102 (2008).  
2
 B. Simmons, F. Dobbin, and G. Garrett (eds.) The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For a discussion of the (occasional) link between 
diffusion as a process and policy convergence as an outcome, see; F. Gilardi, ‘Transnational 
Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies,’ in: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. Simmons (eds.), 
Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE Publications, forth. 2012). 
3
 See generally; M. Ross and E. Homer, ‘Galton’s problem in cross-national research,’ 29 World 
Politics 1 (1976).  
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decades, decreased communication and transportation costs have augmented the 
level of interdependence, and facilitated ample opportunities for inspiration across 
borders through greater links between decision-makers.4 In turn, this has made it 
increasingly difficult to focus solely on domestic politics, when understanding 
why governments choose some policies and institutions over others.  
 
A potential explanation for policy clustering could simply rely on coordination. If 
so, this would not be considered international policy diffusion.5 To the extent 
similar trade policies are the result of policy coordination in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), for instance, this would not be characterized as diffusion. 
Similarly, when economic policies pursued in Europe stem from European Union 
(EU) harmonization, this too would fall outside the scope of international policy 
diffusion as understood here. Also, while international policy diffusion may surely 
be the result of softer forms of coercion, policy clustering due to outright 
imposition is a distinctly different process, as diffusion requires governments to 
have a real choice, when determining which policies to pursue.6 So if poor and 
aid-dependent governments have absolutely no choice but to enact certain policy 
templates promoted by powerful states or the international financial institutions, 
this would not be considered policy diffusion. Similarly, when in different 
historical periods governments have allowed foreigners to reside in their 
territories and have full jurisdiction over their own affairs, this was often the result 
of capitulation treaties imposed on host states and thereby not adopted by choice.  
 
When coordination and imposition are not the driving forces for policies 
spreading across borders, it has typically been associated with four related yet 
analytically distinct processes. These are coercion, norm-emulation, competition, 
and rational learning. With respect to coercion, certain policies may not have been 
imposed by dominant states or other actors, yet nevertheless diffused due to 
coercive or quasi-coercive means. International financial institutions like the 
                                                          
4
 See generally; J. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003). 
5
 Elkins and Simmons, op. cit. 
6
 Ibid.  
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World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, have been 
able to promote a number of market oriented reforms through conditionalities 
attached to their structural adjustment programs. To the extent developing 
countries didn’t actually welcome such reforms, this could be considered 
coercion. In other cases, socialization processes may have made governments 
pursue similar policies based on a ‘logic of appropriateness.’ Here, countries 
might have followed international trends because of their normative connotations 
rather than functional necessity, and often to signal membership of a certain group 
of nations. Alternatively, policies may diffuse because of governments’ need to 
compete for scarce economic resources, be they tax bases, exports, tourism, 
foreign investments, and so forth. In most accounts, this is explained as a rational 
process (at least for the individual government), where strategic cost-benefit 
considerations lead to similar economic policies in a race to attract footloose 
capital or other resources. Finally, an explanation for policy diffusion could rely 
on the fact that governments do not have full information about the costs and 
benefits of their policies, and therefore tend to learn from each other. In many 
accounts, this too is considered a rational process: based on notions of Bayesian 
updating, governments seek information about successful policies abroad, and on 
that basis adjust their own strategies.  
 
1.1. Bounded rationality and policy diffusion 
 
Although a gross simplification of a diverse literature, it is possible to group the 
vast majority of explanations for international policy diffusion in one of the four 
analytical classifications mentioned above. In a series of recent notable 
contributions, however, Kurt Weyland has developed a novel explanation for 
policy diffusion.7 Weyland argues that even if assuming that international policy 
diffusion results from a goal-oriented process, and is thereby rational in the 
broadest sense of the word, we cannot be sure that governments behave according 
                                                          
7
 K. Weyland, Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); K. Weyland, ‘The Diffusion of Revolution: ‘1848’ 
in Europe and Latin America,’ 62 International Organization 3 (2009); K. Weyland, ‘The 
Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830-1940,’ 43 Comparative 
Political Studies 8/9 (2010).  
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to the dictums of ‘comprehensive rationality.’8 Based on studies on public sector 
reform in Latin America as well as the diffusion of European revolutions and 
democratic reforms, Weyland argues that policy diffusion can be explained by 
insights from experimental literature on bounded rationality.  
 
In particular, Weyland conjectures that rather than comprehensive cost-benefit 
calculations, policy diffusion is often driven by systematic – and thus predictable - 
cognitive shortcuts, consistently found in experimental studies on human 
cognition and judgments. These guide individuals’ inferences and judgments, for 
better or worse. For better, because certain cognitive ‘rules of thumb’ facilitate 
decision-making in spite of limits on information processing, and for worse, 
because the lack of attention and concern with relevant information can cause 
significant and lasting biases in human inferences. This, Weyland argues, is 
important, to understand why, and how, policies diffuse. For instance, decision-
makers are often disproportionately influenced by policies, which are immediately 
available to adopt, rather than carefully considering alternatives that may be 
superior. Similarly, when learning about policies abroad, they often ignore 
important information, not because it is costly to obtain but rather because it is not 
particularly ‘vivid’.   
 
Weyland is of course not the first to apply insights from experimental psychology 
to the study of politics. In recent years, political scientists in the United States, in 
particular, have followed the behavioral economics discipline in studying how 
(political) behavior often fails to meet the standards of comprehensive rationality.9 
In international relations as well, a number of foreign policy studies have applied 
                                                          
8
 ‘Comprehensive rationality’ is understood as decision-makers’ having a set of fixed, transitive 
preferences for alternatives, and the ability to calculate the trade-offs of their choices, both future 
and present; B. Jones, Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and 
governance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), at 35. 
9
 Seminal is the work of Bryan Jones; Jones (2001), op. cit.; B. Jones and F. Baumgartner, The 
Politics of Attention (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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these insights, particularly in the security realm.10 As such, it may be natural to 
also extend the bounded rationality approach to the study of policy diffusion.  
However, the literature on policy diffusion does not suffer from a lack of 
theorising but rather a lack of detailed empirical insights.11 And unpacking the 
concept of rationality inherently opens a Pandora’s Box of complex hypotheses on 
how policies diffuse, potentially at the expense of theoretical parsimony. Also, a 
major challenge with all political science studies on bounded rationality is that 
variables isolated in experiments may be difficult to even identify in the complex 
setting of politics.12 So while the application of a bounded rationality approach is 
undoubtedly innovative in the diffusion literature, the ‘null-hypothesis’ should 
perhaps still be that it is unnecessary. If ‘traditional’ explanations are sufficient in 
elucidating the key characteristics of the international diffusion of a particular 
policy, there is no inherent need to engage with the complexities of a new 
cognitive approach.  
 
1.2. Bilateral investment treaties 
 
Using the BIT-movement as its point of departure, this thesis will investigate in 
more detail whether a bounded rational framework is able to explain important 
and systematic variation in policy diffusion processes. Developing countries’ 
pursuit of the almost 3,000 BITs in existence today (see Figure 1.1) is a hard case 
for proponents of a bounded rationality framework. For unlike revolutions, major 
democratic or social welfare reforms, or other path-breaking policy innovations 
studied by Weyland, the decision to enter into BITs has not been a one-off event 
for the individual country, but rather a sequential, or evolutionary, process taking 
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 R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
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place over decades.13 Here, developing country governments have had to decide 
time and again, whether to sign an investment treaty or not. The time pressure has 
been minimal, and if not satisfied with their initial decision, they didn’t have to 
continue since there is no convincing evidence they were coerced into joining the 
BIT-movement.14 The conditions to make an informed choice were thereby 
considerably greater than the ‘single-events’ governments were faced with under 
great uncertainty studied by Weyland, or foreign policy analyses applying insights 
on bounded rationality to the study of military conflicts.15 The diffusion of BITs is 
as such a useful case for the bounded rationality model to be exposed to. For if it 
has predictive qualities in an area with such ample opportunities for rational 
learning, it will almost certainly also have it with respect to other policies. 
Figure 1.1. The spread of BITs 
 
 
Secondly, given the far-reaching scope of BITs, developing countries have had 
strong incentives to carefully consider their implications along the lines suggested 
by rational choice accounts. For even though claims against a few developed 
countries, show that countries with prudent and stable investment climates are not 
insulated from investment-treaty adjudication,16 the overwhelming majority of 
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BIT-claims involve Western investors suing governments from the developing 
world. So surely, one would assume that developing countries must have had 
strong reasons for signing the treaties. If they didn’t, like in the case of Pakistan, 
that would be surprising. Also, the vast majority of BITs are exceptionally similar 
in their treaty-language, so we would also in this respect intuitively assume that 
developing countries must have had strong reasons for continuing to adopt BITs 
for decades with little, and often no, variation.    
 
Based on the assumption that BITs were a rational solution to strategic problems 
faced by developing countries, a number of powerful hypotheses do indeed exist 
to explain these puzzles. Some treaties may have been used to ‘tie in’ liberalizing 
reforms or intended to make general improvements in the rule of law. Some may 
have been signed as an alternative to diplomatic protection (espousal) of 
investors’ rights by powerful Western governments. Some may have been signed 
to retain existing investments; and so forth. Yet, the most widely-accepted 
explanation for the popularity of the treaties is much simpler: without BITs, 
developing countries would lose much-needed foreign investment. In this view, 
BITs are seen as ‘credible commitments’ to convince risk-averse multinationals 
that their investments will be safe post-establishment.17  
 
In theory, these are all powerful reasons why governments would want to pursue 
the treaties. In traditional accounts of the diffusion of BITs, governments are thus 
always assumed to have made an informed choice based on a careful 
consideration of the treaties’ costs and benefits. Even if they didn’t, BITs may still 
have been signed by developing countries merely to signal their adherence to neo-
liberalism for instance. Just as developing countries have often signed up to legal 
obligations in the human rights regime mostly to adhere to international norms of 
political liberalism, they may also have used BITs as acts of political 
                                                                                                                                                               
ARB/97/7, Award on Merits, November 13, 2000; D. Vis-Dunbar, ‘Indian lawyer pursues claim 
against the United Kingdom under the India-UK BIT,’ Investment Treaty News, November 28, 
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 While followed in many accounts, this view was originally put forth by Andrew Guzman; A. 
Guzman, ‘Why LDC’s sign treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularity of bilateral 
investment treaties,’ 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 640 (1998). 
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symbolism.18 Similarly, while existing accounts of BIT-diffusion typically assume 
that developing countries have been aware of the costs of the treaties when 
signing them, a rational learning framework could potentially explain if they 
initially underestimated their risks due to imperfect information. If so, that could 
potentially explain the growing hesitation against the treaties in many corners of 
the developing world today.  
 
There are, in other words, reasons to expect that a bounded rationality framework 
is not necessary to explain the diffusion of BITs among developing countries. As 
such, it presents a useful test-case to investigate, whether the international policy 
diffusion literature has much to lose by sticking with its traditional explanatory 
models. The overall research question of the thesis will therefore be: 
 
 Why, and how, have developing countries entered into bilateral 
 investment treaties? 
This is of course an exceptionally broad question, given the diverse motives and 
ideas that are bound to have been involved, when developing countries have 
entered into BITs.19 With almost 3,000 treaties in existence signed over 50 years, 
any monocausal view is bound to ignore considerable variation and diversity, and 
surely it would fall outside the scope of any research project to explain why every 
single developing country has signed and ratified BITs. However, as with 
traditional accounts of the BIT-movement, the aim is here to explain those ‘big 
and important things’, as Kenneth Waltz would say,20 when developing countries 
decided to sign up to BITs. For although considerable legal and economic studies 
have been done on BITs, hardly any empirical work exists on how developing 
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 See; S. Jandhyala, W. Henisz, and E. Mansfield, ‘Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion 
of Foreign Investment Policy,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution (forth., 2011.). 
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countries have pursued investment treaties, and the political foundations for the 
international investment regime is thereby understudied.21 
More generally, a detailed study of international policy diffusion, which does not 
only engage with one particular theoretical framework will provide much needed 
empirical ‘flesh’ to a nascent literature, much of which fails to consider alternative 
explanations fully. Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett are worth quoting at length, 
‘… often, these theorists suggest different mechanisms to explain diffusion 
processes but fail to prove, in the quantitative studies that are emblematic of 
diffusion research, that their favored mechanism is at work. Too often, they test 
only their own theory or simply show evidence of diffusion and impute that their 
favored mechanism is at work. Perhaps the most frustrating empirical tendency 
across these studies is that champions of each theory often take simple evidence of 
diffusion to be adequate to prove their particular theory.’22 
 
This study will take a different route, and seriously engage with a number of 
potential explanations for the diffusion of BITs. By using more, stronger and more 
varied evidence than existing accounts of BIT diffusion, it will conclude that a 
bounded rationality approach is in fact useful to explain why developing countries 
have signed investment treaties.  
This should have implications for other areas of foreign-policy studies as well, 
and particularly so in IPE, which unlike other corners of international relations 
have hardly ever engaged with a bounded rationality framework.23 Also, while 
sporadic references to bounded rationality can be found in studies on legalization 
of world politics, when discussing incomplete contracting for example,24 the 
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approach is generally considered unorthodox.25 So also for that literature, the 
results could potentially point to new avenues of research.  
 
1.3.  Methodological strategy 
 
But how does one ascertain why developing countries have entered into BITs? 
One approach typically taken by legal scholars is to rely primarily on comparing 
treaty-texts.26 Yet, this approach has obvious limitations, as it does little to 
identify policy processes or actor motivations. Also, the negotiating history of 
BITs is hardly ever documented: with the exception of the ICSID Convention 
itself and BITs signed with the United States, even tribunals wanting to resort to 
investment treaties’ traveaux often go away empty handed.27 Whether this is 
because negotiations have been considered too sensitive to document in written 
form, or they have simply not been considered important enough to merit careful 
documentation (as with Pakistan) is unknown. In any case, while access to official 
negotiating histories would certainly not have been sufficient to understand why, 
and how, governments pursued BITs, the absence of written documentation does 
present a considerable challenge.  
As an alternative, political scientists have tended to rely on statistical 
techniques.28  This follows the dominant trend in studies on international policy 
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diffusion, which almost solely uses econometric models as their methodological 
foundation.29 Yet, while such an empirical strategy can undoubtedly be helpful if 
the right data is available, it is risky indeed when it is not. And a general problem 
in the diffusion literature is the often considerable gap between underlying 
concepts, such as emulation or learning, and the quantitative indicators actually 
available.30 The literature on BITs is no exception. Here, the increasing 
complexity of the statistical models used stands in stark contrast to the dearth of 
quantitative data needed to investigate why, and how, developing countries have 
entered into the treaties. Also, even if they had the necessary data, econometric 
studies are mostly useful to suggest causal effects based on patterns of co-
variation, whereas they have difficulties in identifying plausible underlying causal 
mechanisms. For that reason alone, the glaring absence of studies with inputs from 
officials themselves is clearly problematic. At a minimum, it is necessary to 
triangulate inferences based on econometrics with other types of evidence to 
conduct a ‘reality check’ of the validity of the model specifications. This study 
will therefore use a multi-method approach to get a deeper understanding of the 
drivers of policy-diffusion, combining econometrics with archival work as well as 
insights from more than one hundred interviews with decision-makers ‘on the 
ground.’31  
 
1.4. Outline 
 
The thesis will progress as follows. The following chapter will briefly outline the 
historical roots of the BIT-movement. On this basis, chapter three will outline the 
explanatory models for international policy diffusion in more detail. Apart from 
presenting the empirical expectations that follow from ‘traditional’ frameworks, it 
will present a novel theory for the BIT-movement based on insights from the 
bounded rationality literature. As already mentioned, it will conclude that we need 
to carefully engage with existing hypotheses from the policy diffusion literature in 
order to evaluate the necessity of a new approach.  
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The empirical chapters will therefore begin by seeing the investment regime 
through the lens of coercion, emulation, competition, and rational learning 
frameworks. Chapter four will ask if developing countries have been coerced into 
signing BITs. The focus here will be on the role of the IMF, the World Bank, and 
dominant Western states. Chapter five will ask whether BITs were justified in 
normative rather than instrumental terms. In other words, was the popularity of 
BITs analogous to human rights treaties often signed primarily for normative 
considerations? Chapter six will evaluate the main functional argument in favor of 
developing countries entering into BITs based on inter-state competition, namely 
that the treaties were crucial in order to attract foreign investments. Chapter seven 
will trace what information was actually available about the costs of BITs during 
the decades where the global network of treaties expanded rapidly, and ask if a 
rational learning framework could explain developing countries’ evolving 
behavior in the international investment regime.  
 
The last two empirical chapters will ask if a bounded rationality framework 
provides considerable value-added to what has already been explained at this 
point. Chapter eight will offer insights from decision-makers themselves as well 
as an econometric test of a key expectation from the bounded rationality 
framework. Finally, chapter nine will ask how much a bounded rationality 
framework has to offer in explaining a detailed country-case study. Combined 
with evidence presented in earlier chapters it will illustrate that rather than the 
laws of statistics, developing country officials have often relied upon biasing 
heuristics when learning about the implications of BITs. In turn, this led many to 
entirely ignore the risks of the treaties until hit by a claim themselves.  
 
The final chapter will conclude. Apart from highlighting the theoretical 
implications of the study for the broader policy diffusion literature and 
international relations discipline, it will assess whether developing countries and 
other stakeholders in the investment regime can draw any policy implications 
from its findings. 
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2. A brief history of bilateral investment treaties 
 
Before embarking on the analysis of why developing countries have signed BITs, 
it is necessary to understand the historical context in which the treaties emerged. 
Later chapters will offer further historical analyses. But for readers which are not 
necessarily familiar with investment treaties, this chapter will offer a brief history 
of the BIT-movement.  
 
2.1. The imperial origins of the BIT-movement 
 
In the 17th century, the major European trading powers agreed to protect foreign 
persons and their property according to certain minimum standards. As in modern 
BITs, the treatment of foreign investors should not only be based on the laws 
guiding nationals of the host state, but also a further set of standards independent 
from domestic legal regimes. Interference or outright seizure of assets was 
prohibited during peacetime, and compensation was generally required if aliens’ 
assets were confiscated during war.1 These basic principles were accepted and 
guaranteed by every major European state, as well as the United States after its 
independence. They were incorporated in the precursors to BITs, Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation treaties (FCN treaties), which mostly dealt with 
commercial and navigation matters but also obliged treaty-partners to uphold 
certain minimum standards with respect to the treatment of foreign investors.2 As 
stated by John Adams in 1796, after having negotiated the FCN treaty between the 
United States and France: 
‘There is no principle of the law of nations more firmly established than that which 
entitles the property of strangers within the jurisdiction of another country in 
                                                          
1
 E. Borchard, 'The Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens,' 38 Michigan Law Review 445 
(1940); A. Roth, The Minimum Standard in International Law as Applied to Aliens (Leiden: A. W. 
Sijthoff, 1949).  
2
 J. Salacuse, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on 
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ 24 International Lawyer 3 (1990).  
30 
 
friendship with their own to the protection of its sovereign by all efforts in his 
power.’3 
But whereas this emerging doctrine of investment protection was agreed upon by 
relatively equal parties aiming to ensure reciprocal arrangements, extending its 
principles to territories outside of Europe or the United States, changed its 
political foundation.4 Through a combination of treaties, concessions, political 
pressure, military intervention, or outright colonial occupation, foreign investment 
law, as stated by Kate Miles, ‘moved from a base of reciprocity to one of 
imposition.’5  
For the United States the favoured legal instrument was FCN-treaties. Gradually, 
these expanded their provisions on investment, such as providing for ‘full and 
perfect protection’, ‘equitable’ and non-discriminatory treatment, as well as 
compensation for expropriation of property. They also typically included national 
treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment of foreign investors 
generally, or particularly for the transfer of currency out of the host state.6 
However, in order to ensure the property rights of its citizens and companies 
abroad, the United States was not shy to resort to military instruments if legal 
protections were not available or effective.7  
European investors in the developing world were typically ruled by the courts and 
administrations of European imperial legal systems. Yet, even in the absence of 
direct colonial rule, similar arrangements were made with control and 
enforcement secured by giving local European consuls the right to supervise or 
even determine disputes and, if necessary, use armed intervention to impose their 
decisions. Often, the pursuit of European interests would be delegated to selected 
trading companies, which were granted sovereign powers to be applied on behalf 
of their home states. These companies therefore became key players in imperial 
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politics – including the politics of international law - and the alignment between 
power politics and economic interests were as such instrumental in the initial 
development of international investment law.8  
Eventually, foreign investment protection became part of the 19th century legal 
doctrine on the diplomatic protection of aliens.9 Just as citizens, companies abroad 
had to be treated and protected according to international minimum standards – 
such as the right to compensation for expropriation - a breach of which could 
justify home state intervention. Again, this system did not necessarily depend on 
direct colonial rule. In their relationship with Latin American states in the 19th 
century, for instance, both the United States and European powers repeatedly 
imposed these legal principles through treaties and international arbitration10 and 
applied the political and military tools necessary to enforce them.11  
Dissatisfied with the constant threat of foreign interventions triggered by trade or 
investment disputes, however, Latin American countries began in the mid-19th 
century to embrace a different set of ideas of a just international economic order. 
Named after the Argentinean legal scholar Carlos Calvo, the Calvo doctrine 
argued that the notion of state sovereignty made it illegal for foreign powers to 
intervene in the affairs of other sovereign states by diplomatic or more forceful 
means.12 Also, instead of being favoured with independent standards, aliens solely 
had a right to be treated as well – or poor - as citizens or companies of the host 
state. Apart from the substantive standards governing the affairs of foreign 
investors, this principle of national treatment entailed having investment disputes 
settled in the courts of host states rather than through international arbitration.13 
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These ideas were incorporated into laws, contracts, and even certain constitutions 
in Latin America,14 yet they were fiercely opposed by the United States and 
European countries.15 And by 1914, as the ‘long 19th century’ came to an end, 
Western powers continued to insist that the international law for foreign investors 
rested on the key principles of international minimum standards and diplomatic 
protection.  
 
The breakdown of the colonial order 
 
The reordering of global power relations after the First World War meant that 
Western states faced greater difficulties in the developing world, when trying to 
enforce their views on the proper treatment of foreign investors.16 In the absence 
of direct colonial rule, Western governments could no longer ignore the views of 
their developing country counterparts and they therefore had to compromise on 
key investment protection standards in several major investment disputes 
involving the expropriation of Western assets.  
An important example was of course the expropriations of foreign assets that 
accompanied the 1917 Soviet revolution. A further challenge came in 1938 with 
the Mexican nationalizations of American investments in several industries.17 Her, 
US Secretary of State Cordell Hull replied to his Mexican counterpart that the 
international minimum standards on expropriation required ‘prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation’.18 This later become known as the Hull-standard of 
compensation and is included in by far the majority of BITs today. Yet at the 
time, Mexico argued that as a matter of international law compensation was not 
required. While this response has often been presented as a natural extension of 
the 19th century Calvo doctrine - both by expropriation countries themselves as 
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well as academics19 - this was clearly a distortion: although the Calvo doctrine 
used the notion of national treatment to eradicate gun-boat diplomacy in favor of 
sovereign control, it never advocated the eradication of basic property rights.20 
Following Santiago Montt, the Calvo doctrine had in the early 20th century 
thereby begun to be ‘transmuted into a new and opportunistic one: expropriation 
without compensation.’21   
While both the Soviet and Mexican disputes were eventually settled (along with 
more modest disputes in Eastern Europe, Bolivia and Turkey in the same 
period22), they did force Western states to confront the lack of consensus 
concerning the international minimum standard.23 It was also clear at the 
multilateral level that capital-exporting and capital-importing states disagreed 
over the basic principles that should govern the treatment and protection of 
foreign investors. An important factor explaining the failure of the League of 
Nations to codify customary international law at the 1930 Hague Conference, for 
instance, was differences over the law on the ‘Responsibility of States for Damage 
Caused in their Territories to the Person and Property of Foreigners.’24 Whereas 
capital-importing states here argued in favor of the Calvo-doctrine, capital-
exporting states pushed for an international minimum standard. It also proved 
impossible to come up with a compromise within the League of Nations and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), where parallel efforts failed as well. 
The wide-ranging 1929 Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners was 
thus ultimately rejected as too ambitious by several capital-importing states,25 
which was to become the first of many failed efforts by Western capital-exporting 
states to install a multilateral investment agreement.26  
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With the fall of the imperial order after the Second World War, the institutional 
setup which until then had sustained the international regime for the protection of 
foreign investment collapsed completely. It was now up to the United States to 
defend the Western conception of international investment law. This was a 
difficult task indeed. Force and gunboat diplomacy was not only unfeasible in 
many parts of the world; it was also in direct contrast to the prevailing liberal 
ideas at the time. More benign means of enforcement therefore had to be found.  
Committed to construct an open international economy through multilateral 
means, the United States proposed an International Trade Organization (ITO), 
which would enshrine the international minimum standard for foreign investors,  
including the Hull standard of compensation.27 While this view appealed to 
capital-exporting states that was certainly not the case with many developing 
countries, primarily Latin American countries and India, who in turn associated 
forced compensation and international arbitration of investment disputes with 
continued foreign domination and control over their resources.28  
The resulting compromise on this and other issues was ultimately rejected by both 
protectionist interests in the United States as well as the proponents of an open 
international economic order.29 So with United States Congress refusing to ratify 
the ITO, the less ambitious General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
put in charge of managing international trade in the post-war era. Completely 
absent from the GATT, however, was issues pertaining to foreign investment, and 
the conflict between developed and developing countries over which legal 
principles should determine the treatment and protection of foreign investors 
therefore remained unresolved. 
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Table 2.1. Foreign capital stock in developing countries, 1870-1950 
 
Western investors nevertheless managed to expand their activities substantially 
(Table 2.1). In particular foreign direct investment (FDI) became a predominant 
form of international investment flows in the post-war period as multinationals 
increasingly set up wholly or majority owned subsidiaries in developing 
countries.30 But in large parts of the developing world the political environment 
towards foreign investors was more hostile than ever, and rigid industrial policies 
with discriminatory treatment of foreign investors became fashionable in large 
parts of the developing world. In the Soviet bloc, of course, foreign investors were 
seen as ‘the last poisonous flowers on the dung-heap of capitalism.’31 Yet, even 
outside the Soviet Union, economic and political theories of dependecia took their 
hold among many post-colonial states,32 which resulted in development strategies 
based on import-substitution. While not aiming to keep foreign investors out 
altogether, import-substitution strategies sought to carefully manage and control 
them in order to promote domestic industrialization. Dissatisfied with the ability, 
and willingness, of multinational companies in contributing to national 
development, foreign investments thereby often became subject to screening 
mechanisms, performance requirements, capital transfer restrictions, fierce royalty 
rates, and so forth.33  
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In response, capital-exporting states within the OECD initiated a new round of 
negotiations for an international investment treaty in 1962 after a series of failed 
non-governmental attempts during the 1940s and 1950s.34 Named after its lead 
drafters during the 1950s, the Abs-Shawcross convention proposed a text founded 
on the international minimum standard, including the Hull standard of 
compensation, and was particularly notable for allowing investors to submit 
disputes directly to arbitration against their host states.35 While efforts continued 
up through the 1960s, the convention eventually failed when it became clear that 
developing countries would never agree to its terms. For rather than Western 
perceptions of international minimum standards, developing countries 
increasingly relied upon the distorted version of the Calvo doctrine to legitimize 
their nationalist economic policies, which during the 1960s and 1970s culminated 
in a number of large scale expropriations of foreign capital with either little or no 
compensation (Figure 2.1).36 In the words of the United States Supreme Court in 
1964, ‘[t]here are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion 
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the 
property of aliens.’37  
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Figure 2.1. The rise of natural resource expropriations, 1960-1979 
 
As a group, developing countries pursued their strategies of ‘expropriation 
without compensation’ by taking advantage of their majority vote in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (UN). Encouraged by oil-producing countries’ 
successful establishment of control over their reserves in the 1970s, developing 
countries here proposed a New International Economic Order (NIEO),38 allowing 
them ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’.39 A cornerstone result of 
the NEIO was the 1974 ‘Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States’ 
(henceforth the UN Charter),40 which not only challenged the Hull standard of 
compensation but more fundamentally questioned the very concept of an 
international minimum standard by basing foreign investment disputes on 
domestic law to be settled in the courts of host states.41 With repeated resolutions 
by the General Assembly completely contradictory to Western perceptions of the 
international norm, the customary international law on foreign investment was 
thereby, if not in disarray, then clearly in dispute.42  
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2.2. The emergence of bilateral investment treaties 
 
What capital-exporting states lost at the multilateral level, they tried instead to 
obtain through bilateral negotiations. Parallel to its multilateral efforts in the 
period after the Second World War, the United States thus expanded and 
upgraded its existing network of FCN treaties.43 But whereas the treaties did not 
obtain as central a role in the international regime for foreign investment as 
intended by United States policy makers,44 they did provide important inspiration 
for European States similarly eager to obtain favourable and legally binding 
standards for their investors abroad.  
Having lost almost all its investments after its defeat in the Second World War, 
West Germany thus entered into a BIT with Pakistan in 1959, which intended ‘... 
to create favourable conditions for investments by nationals and companies of 
either state in the territory of the other State.’45 In contrast to FCN-treaties, the 
treaty dealt solely with investment and was specifically customized to be 
negotiated between a developed and a developing country. This was to be the first 
of a great number of BITs signed during the 1960s, particularly by Germany and 
Switzerland. 
BITs obviously differed from the investment regime during the colonial era as 
they were based on consent rather than force and referred disputes to international 
arbitration rather than imperial courts or foreign consuls. Their substantive 
provisions, however, were directly inspired by the failed OECD convention and 
thus very much in the line with the Western investment standards developed from 
the 17th century onwards. While they did not include obligations for foreign 
investors, with respect to human rights or corruption for instance, BITs granted 
them far-reaching protections. They thus set an independent standard on the 
treatment and protection of foreign investors by obliging the contracting parties to 
provide compensation for expropriation, whether expropriatory measures were 
direct takings of assets or indirect takings ‘tantamount to expropriation’. They 
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moreover insured investors the repatriation of their profits and other capital and 
typically included further standards independent from domestic law, such as so-
called ‘umbrella clauses’ obliging the contracting parties to observe their 
contractual obligations vis-à-vis foreign investors, as well as clauses providing for 
‘fair and equitable treatment’, ‘full protection and security’, and damages owing 
to war or conflicts. Finally, many included non-discrimination standards, such as 
national- and most-favoured-nation treatment. 
Initially, the settlement of BIT disputes had to be submitted by the contracting 
states to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or ad hoc arbitration. In the 
absence of contracts providing for international arbitration,46 foreign investors in 
the early post-colonial era therefore still depended on their home state being 
willing to risk diplomatic good-will and foreign policy objectives to fight for their 
interests abroad.47 Security, diplomatic or other reasons unrelated to the investor’s 
dispute could therefore withhold a state from making a claim. From 1969, this 
slowly began to change, however, when Italy entered into its BIT with Chad 
allowing all investors covered by the treaty to submit disputes to international 
arbitration directly against its host state.48 In theory, at least, this allowed the 
capital-exporting state (Italy) to de-politicize future investment disputes, as it 
would not be directly involved in the adjudication.  
The innovation in the Italy-Chad BIT followed a recommendation made by 
ICSID,49 which had been created under World Bank auspices three years earlier. 
Rather than incorporating substantive rules on the treatment and protection of 
foreign investors - which developing countries would anyways resist - the ‘father’ 
of the ICSID Convention, Aron Broches, found that one pragmatic way to move 
forward in the field of foreign investment law was to establish a set of impartial 
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rules for the settlement of disputes.50 Apart from allowing the application of 
international law to foreign investment disputes, and having awards directly 
enforceable within all contracting parties, the ICSID Convention was notable for 
allowing investors direct recourse to international arbitration against host states 
without, in principle, exhausting local remedies.51 This was in contrast to the 
usual procedure of international arbitrations, where foreign investors traditionally 
needed to go through domestic courts before international proceedings could be 
initiated.52 An equally notable feature of the Convention was its jurisdiction to 
‘any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment’,53 thereby extending 
investment arbitration beyond mere commercial claims to a very wide range of 
public regulatory disputes.  
Figure 2.2. Developing countries signing the ICSID Convention, 1965-1979 
 
Among developing countries, however, the ICSID Convention was primarily 
adopted by African countries in its early years (Figure 2.2). The same was the 
case with BITs. Given the opposition to BIT-like rules in the developing world, 
only few developing countries signed up to BITs at this time, and in the year of 
the UN-charter the international BIT-network therefore largely remained a 
phenomenon between Europe and Africa (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3. Countries with at least one signed BIT, 1974 and 1984 
 
 
Ten years after, however, a number of new developing countries had begun 
signing investment treaties, including Iran, Sri Lanka, and – importantly – China 
(Figure 2.3). The spread of BITs at this time was partly due to increasing activism 
of developed countries. For whereas the early years of the BIT-movement was 
dominated almost entirely by Germany and Switzerland, this changed with the 
NIEO. Urged by domestic business communities, and the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC),54 developing countries’ collective action in the UN made a 
number of developed countries begin, or accelerate, their BIT programs in this 
period.55 The United Kingdom, for instance, began its investment treaty program 
specifically to address the increasing investment protectionism in the developing 
world,56 and the same was the case in the United States, which revived its 
investment protection program – now in the shape of BITs rather than FCNs.57  
 
Apart from the rising number of BIT-programs among developed countries, the 
increase in developing countries signing up to the BIT-movement also reflected a 
changing policy-environment surrounding investor-state relations.58 The debt 
crisis in Latin America and successful growth strategies of a number of outward 
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oriented emerging markets led to a change in attitude towards multinationals. 
Occasionally prodded on by international financial institutions, many capital-
importing countries thereby began to encourage the influx of foreign capital by 
loosening rigid controls on the establishment and treatment of international 
investments.59  
 
The Washington Consensus 
 
The end of the Cold War completed the swing of the pendulum from scepticism 
towards foreign investors to full-fledged embrace.60 Foreign capital was no longer 
perceived as a threat to developing countries’ sovereignty, but now regarded as an 
opportunity for economic growth and development.61 An organization like the 
UN, earlier so sceptical about international investments, now saw multinationals 
as engines of growth which could provide critical ‘help [to] make the 1990s a 
decade of renewed economic development’.62 In John Williamson’s 10-point list 
summarising the ‘Washington Consensus’ towards development policies, a 
restrictive attitude towards FDI was now considered outright ‘foolish.’63 By and 
large, developing countries agreed and governments in practically all corners of 
the world began to liberalise their investment regimes (Table 2.2) and attracted 
increasing amounts of FDI flows (Figure 2.4).  
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Table 2.2. National regulatory changes in domestic investment regimes, 1992-
2000 
 
Figure 2.4. The rise of FDI flows into the developing world, 1970-2000. 
 
It was in this environment that the current regime for foreign investment was 
established.64 Although many had started slowly in the 1980s, former Communist 
countries now signed BITs in considerable numbers, and most of Latin America 
and Asia joined the bandwagon as well, making the BIT-regime a truly global 
phenomenon. Combined, this helped assure broad participation among developing 
countries, who by concluding BITs ‘affirmed a thousand times over that they 
[sought] a liberal investment regime.’65As importantly, this was also the period 
when BITs began to allow for direct investor-state arbitration as a general rule 
(Figure 2.5), and thereby put in place an adjudicate regime for investment disputes 
with a scope and potential for protecting foreign investors not witnessed since the 
height of the Imperial era.66 By contrast with assertions by some political 
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scientists,67 it was not until then that BITs – at least in theory – could provide 
investors with something akin to credible commitments. This will be dealt with in 
more detail later in the thesis.  
 
Figure 2.5. The recent emergence of modern investment treaties. 
 
Notably, BITs reached their ‘global era’68 in the 1990s despite the fact that 
developing countries continued to resist ‘multilateralizing’ BIT-like rules, 
whether under the auspices of the UN, the OECD, or the WTO. I will return to 
this in later chapters. For now, it suffices to say that the result has been that 
multilateral rules governing investment remain severely limited with 
comprehensive standards in the WTO only covering investors in the service sector 
and no options for direct investor-state dispute resolution. With the rise of cross-
border production-networks this is hardly optimal for international investors, as 
they are increasingly affected by a whole range of trade-rules not dealt with in 
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‘traditional’ investment promotion and protection treaties such as BITs. As a way 
to pursue more integrated approaches in investment rule-making, developed and 
developing countries are therefore increasingly signing preferential trade and 
investment agreements (PTIAs).69 PTIAs are broader in scope than BITs by not 
only imposing preferential treatment on investments but also, inter alia, on trade 
in goods and (often) services, and some - such as the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - follow modern 
BITs by authorizing direct claims by investors against their host states. NAFTA, 
in particular, has been notable as the BIT in its investment chapter, is the first to 
be signed among two Western capital-exporting states.70  
That said, with almost 3,000 signed BITs, they remain by far the most wide-
spread and important treaties to protect foreign investors. They have been adopted 
by practically all countries in the world, and many have signed dozens. In terms of 
content, most closely follow the original European models with few adjustments, 
and the vast majority thereby use remarkably similar terms with often identical 
provisions.71 Even disregarding the equalizing effect of the MFN standard, 
developing countries have thereby signed up to standards which often exactly 
mirror the models developed by capitalist-exporting states, despite actually having 
alternative models available with less wide-ranging protections.72 Explaining why, 
and how, they did this, is the subject of this thesis.  
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Conclusion 
 
Offering considerable and enforceable protections to foreign investors 
independent of national legal regimes, investment treaties reflect legal standards 
promoted by Western states since the colonial era. They emerged as a response to 
increasing hostility towards foreign investors in the developing world, and were 
therefore, not surprisingly, initially adopted by relatively few developing 
countries. This changed by the 1980s, and particularly 1990s, when foreign 
private investment was embraced by practically all countries in the world. This 
thesis seeks to investigate why. There are many ways to attract foreign investors, 
so why did these particular instruments become so remarkably wide-spread? Why, 
as posed by Salacuse and Sullivan, would developing countries ‘constrain their 
sovereignty by entering into treaties that specifically limit their ability to take 
necessary legislative and administrative actions to advance and protection their 
national interests?’73 And when doing this, why did they so closely follow the 
models of Western states based on extremely broad and vague treaty language, 
thereby giving private arbitrators considerable flexibility to determine their 
regulatory autonomy? 
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3. International policy diffusion 
 
This chapter will outline explanations for why, and how, international policy 
diffusion occurs. Traditional explanations will be grouped along four broad 
categories: coercion, norm emulation, competition, and rational learning. Suffices 
to say that in empirical work, several or all mechanisms are often found in 
different combinations, yet as analytical constructs they are distinct. On this basis, 
the second part of the chapter will outline a new explanation for policy diffusion 
based on notions of bounded rationality. As this model has rarely been applied in 
the literature, some level of detail in presentation is warranted compared with the 
traditional explanations.  
 
Before proceeding one point of clarification should be made, namely the 
understanding of ‘policies’ in this context. Here, a distinction can be made 
between diffusion of broad policy ‘principles,’ such as Keynesianism or 
mercantilism, and the spread of particular policy ‘models.’ Following Weyland:  
 
‘A principle is a general guideline for designing programs or institutions. Such a 
maxim provides a broad orientation for policy-makers that encompasses several 
specific design options. It charts an overall direction but not a specific course of 
action. By contrast, a model is one specific option from the menu offered by a 
policy principle; a model … prescribes a coherent, integrated way of organizing a 
policy program or designing an institution.’1  
 
In recent literature on democratization, for instance, both the spread of democracy 
as a policy principle has been studied from a diffusion perspective along with 
particular democratic policy models, such as constitutions with similar content 
and structure.2 In the context of this thesis, the distinction is also important, where 
the diffusion of neoliberalism as a policy principle has surely been important for 
the global spread of BITs as a particular policy model.3 But while references to 
diffusion studies on both policy principles and policy models will be made below, 
it is important to keep in mind that this thesis does not seek to explain the rise 
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investor friendly reforms as a policy principle, but rather the almost universal 
adoption of investment treaties as a specific and largely standardized policy model 
to promote and protect foreign capital. 
 
3.1. The ‘traditional’ explanations 
 
Coercion 
 
While at first sight policy diffusion appears to be a horizontal process between 
states, its source may occasionally be the de-facto hierarchical nature of the 
international system.4 Here weak and poor governments often have little choice 
but to enact policy templates promoted by powerful states. In the context of 
legalization of world politics, for instance, many of the defining features of 
international law were originally imposed on the developing world during the 
colonial encounter.5 We saw in the last chapter that international investment law 
was no different in this respect, and although diffusion cannot occur through 
outright imposition or force,6 more subtle coercive mechanisms may be used. So 
the question is, whether modern investment treaties can be seen as a coercive 
instrument unwillingly entered into by developing country governments?  
 
In studies of international policy diffusion, the clarification of what coercion is, 
and what it is not, often remains remarkably vague, if at all addressed.7 Surely, 
distinguishing between coercion and other concepts, such as power, authority and 
imposition, is bound to be difficult in real-world settings. Yet, some conceptual 
clarity is necessary before claiming, or refuting, that coercion has taken place. 
                                                          
4
 See generally; D. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2011). 
5
 The key contribution is; A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also; J. Gathii, ‘Imperialism, 
Colonialism, and International Law,’ 54 Buffalo Law Review 1013 (2007); B. Chimni, ‘An Outline 
of a Marxist Course on Public International Law,’ 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 1 
(2004).  
6
 See chapter one.  
7
 For an exception, see W. Henisz, B. Zelner, and M. Guillen, ‘International Coercion, Emulation, 
and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999,’ 70 American 
Sociological Review 6 (2005).  
49 
 
Lasswell and Kaplan note that coercion is ‘a high degree of constraint and/or 
inducement’,8 and coercion can thereby be understood conceptually as a form of 
power, which following Dahl’s classic exposition is the ability of A to get B to do 
something B would not otherwise do.9 In this sense, coercion is a particularly 
severe and material form of power, where A has to apply sanctions in order to 
seek compliance from B. Equally; coercion can also involve positive sanctions, 
such as dispersion of aid funds or other inducements.  
 
For coercion to have taken place, threats or actual coercive acts must be the main, 
or only, reason for developing countries to adopt BITs. As noted by Dobbin, 
Simmons, and Garrett, ‘[a]ll too often, evidence of the spread of policies that the 
United States or the World Bank supports is taken as proof of coercion, when 
other mechanisms may be at work.’10 So with respect to conditionalities attached 
to World Bank or IMF programs, for instance, it is important to note that they are 
actually rarely credibly enforced,11 which means that their impact has often varied 
considerably.12 While adhering rhetorically to conditions attached to loan 
programs, even weak and underdeveloped countries have managed to manoeuvre 
around them in practice.13 And in case of bilateral pressure, if the United States 
asks Bangladesh to sign an investment treaty and Bangladesh complies, this could 
only potentially be explained as a coercive event in so far as Bangladesh didn’t 
want to sign the treaty in the first place. Also, while it would be a strong 
indication of coercion, if the United States threatened to withhold aid funds to get 
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Bangladesh to sign the treaty, this is not in and of itself proof of coercion: in some 
cases such threats may in fact be welcomed by developing country governments 
to adopt policies they couldn’t otherwise pursue due to opposition from certain 
domestic stakeholders.14  
 
I thereby follow a behavioral understanding of coercion. This is also typically 
used when the diffusion literature discusses coercion, however implicit. It is, of 
course, a limited approach. For instance, even if dominant states or international 
financial institutions have not coerced developing countries into adopting BITs, 
they could still have prevented developing countries from withdrawing from BITs 
once signed.15 Although touched upon in the concluding chapter, this will be left 
for future studies to investigate. Also, broader understandings of power based on 
structural or discursive approaches would focus on how quasi-coercive forces can 
be involved in the constitution of developing countries’ state identities and 
thereby interests.16 For instance, while the hegemonic position of the United 
States may have been instrumental for the popularity of neoliberal ideas, which in 
turn provided the normative framework facilitating the spread of BITs,17 this will 
not be considered coercion in this study, although surely it would in others.  
 
On this basis, the following chapter will ask whether developing countries were 
coerced by powerful Western states and the international financial institutions to 
enter into treaties they would not otherwise have signed. From an econometric 
analysis, for instance, Alle and Peinhardt conclude that BITs’ legally binding 
consent to investor-state arbitration is often the result of coercion: ‘for many of the 
world’s weakest and most dependent countries, the inclusion of ICSID clauses 
within BITs is not so much a choice as it is a requirement.’18 Is this in fact the 
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case? More generally, might coercion also have been a general driver for 
developing countries to sign up to BITs? Did they join the BIT-regime to prevent 
getting cut off from much-needed aid flows or risking pariah status among 
international organizations for instance?  
 
Norm emulation 
 
An alternative, though occasionally related, explanation for diffusion, can broadly 
be described as norm emulation, with norms understood as ‘collective 
expectations about proper behavior for a given identity.’19 This framework is 
based on the assumption that norms of what constitute ‘appropriate’ means and 
ends for state identities can be essential for political strategies, which in turn can 
make certain policies and institutional innovations diffuse primarily due to their 
normative appeal.20 Similar policies across dissimilar contexts can for instance 
result from a need among decision-makers to show that they ‘belong’ in a certain 
social group.21 Just as ‘civilized’ nations had to adhere to certain standards during 
the imperial era,22 for instance, countries with widely different backgrounds also 
use a number of policy programs today to signal their commitment to the norms of 
political liberalism. 
 
Often, such programs are adopted for symbolic reasons without governments 
necessarily having the capacity, or even inclination, to implement them in 
practice. Developing countries sign up to human rights treaties, even if not 
intending or capable of following them.23 They invite international election 
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monitors, even when elections are rigged.24 They sign up to international 
obligations guaranteeing welfare rights, yet fail to increase welfare expenditures.25 
In such cases, it is primarily a ‘logic of appropriateness’26 that drives the diffusion 
of policies, rather than any material or other strategic goals. With respect to the 
spread of democratic norms the end-result is that today: 
 
‘... a proper nation-state has a proper human rights profile and that includes 
participating in the proper human rights organizations and conferences, signing 
the proper human rights treaties and conventions, developing proper human rights 
law and policy, and behaving as if adhering to the regime mattered.’27  
 
Along the same lines, the diffusion of market-oriented and rule-of-law reforms in 
recent decades could also constitute an international mimetic ‘isomorphism’ of 
sorts, where countries have adopted a number of programs mainly for symbolic 
reasons.  
 
Norm-based explanations typically see diffusion as a sequential process.28 In the 
first step, norms of what constitute appropriate state behavior are promoted by 
norm entrepreneurs. These could be international financial institutions, whose 
importance often stems much more from promoting norms of appropriate 
economic governance rather than arm-twisting and coercion. The spread of central 
bank independence, for instance, has been heavily promoted by the IMF as a tool 
to adhere with the norms of neoliberalism.29 Another set of norm entrepreneurs 
could be professions. Along these lines, Dezalay and Garth have shown how 
international lawyers played a key role in advancing international commercial 
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arbitration as a transnational adjudication mechanism,30 and together with 
economists31 promoted neoliberal policy norms in Latin American states.32 As 
will be clear from chapter five, Western private lawyers have also played a key 
role in promoting investment treaties in the developing world.  
 
Whether initially promoted by international financial institutions, professions, or 
other actors, a certain point comes after which a ‘critical mass’ of states have 
adopted a particular policy or institutional innovation. After this ‘tipping point’, a 
socialization process begins punishing states that fail to conform to international 
trends and rewarding those that do.33 In turn, this leads to a norm ‘cascade,’ where 
policies and institutions suddenly begin to spread like wild-fire. Studies of mass 
schooling, for instance, have found that once a tipping point was reached after 
1950, policies initially tailored to a particular context – in this case Western 
Europe after the Second World War – rapidly spread to entirely different corners 
of the world.34 The increased legalization of world politics after the Cold War 
could also be seen from this perspective. Here, states often adopted international 
law due to its normative pull as a governing institution,35 and policy-makers today 
have an inherent need to justify their actions according to international legal 
obligations - even when violating them.36 Certain environmental policies have 
similarly been observed to diffuse for normative, rather than strategic, reasons.37 
Finally, an example of economic policies is the diffusion of independent 
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regulatory agencies during the 1990s, which partly took place because it was seen 
as an ‘appropriate’ regulatory instrument for capitalist countries.38 
 
According to this framework, BITs may also have been signed by developing 
countries not because they were forced to do so, or it necessarily entailed any 
material benefits, but rather because it was one of those things (self-identified) 
liberal states were supposed to do. Yackee rightly points out that it is no 
coincidence that the diffusion of BITs occurred at the same time neoliberal policy 
principles were at their peak,39 which raises the question of whether BITs – as a 
particular policy model – have diffused due to norm emulation. Just as developing 
countries have often signed up to human rights instruments in order to signal 
membership of the ‘club’ of democratic nations, might BITs have become popular 
in the age of the ‘Washington Consensus’ merely to symbolize a commitment to 
the tenets of economic liberalism? Similarly, norm-based explanations for the 
adoption of international legal institutions are wide spread in legal scholarship,40 
so perhaps BITs could also have been justified as essential rule of law 
instruments. 
 
The question is, in other words, whether developing country governments signed 
BITs without any strategic goal in mind, but rather as acts of political symbolism? 
According to Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield, this was indeed the case during 
the 1990s.41 Following the standard approach in literature on BIT-adoption, 
however, their claim is based almost solely on econometrics and they rightly 
conclude that qualitative insights are needed to conduct a ‘validity check’ of their 
model specifications.42 One way to do this is to trace whether a ‘discourse trail’ 
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suggests that BITs have been justified in normative rather than purely 
instrumental terms.43 This will be investigated in chapter five.  
 
Competition 
 
Yet another explanation for policy diffusion is based on inter-state competition, 
which has been particularly popular with respect to economic policies. Wanting to 
increase exports and attract foreign direct investment or other scarce economic 
resources, countries have had strong incentives to pursue ever more liberal 
economic reforms over the last decades. Although individually, each sovereign 
may have preferred considerable market regulation and high levels of public 
expenditures, international competition can lead to ever greater market-friendly 
regimes.44 With global portfolio markets sensitive to inflationary pressures for 
instance,45 and multinationals often concerned with a battery of regulatory 
transaction costs,46 similar policies may stem from rivalries among countries 
wanting to reap the greatest material benefits from economic globalization. From 
this perspective, the appropriation of economic policies is a rational process 
explained - implicitly or explicitly - by the functions they perform in an era of 
high economic interdependence. Though results have varied, this has been a wide-
used explanation within IPE literature on tax policies,47 capital account 
liberalization,48 government spending,49 monetary policy,50 and environmental 
regulation.51   
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The competition thesis has also been used in literature on legalization of economic 
diplomacy. Here, a widely held view on why so many countries bind themselves 
to ‘the mast’ of international economic law is that it provides them a ‘credible 
commitment’. Following Schelling, ‘commitment’ refers to surrendering some 
control over one’s future behavior, and ‘doing so deliberately, with a purpose.’52 
This purpose could be to prevent a roll-back of reforms from future governments, 
for instance, or changing incentives due to time-inconsistency.53 From this 
perspective, international economic law is thereby seen as a rational solution 
designed by sovereigns to solve their problems.54  
 
This has also been the predominant explanation for the diffusion of investment 
treaties. In the most widely quoted account, Guzman uses simple game-theoretic 
reasoning to argue that developing countries have signed the treaties to become 
relatively more attractive investment-destinations.55 He argues that BITs 
overcome problems of ‘obsolescent bargaining’ by providing investors a credible 
commitment that their assets will not be expropriated, discriminated against, or 
otherwise maltreated post-establishment. They do this by (i) clarifying the legal 
obligations vis-à-vis foreign investors compared to customary international law; 
(ii) involving the home country as a treaty partner thereby exerting indirect 
diplomatic pressure on host countries to uphold their commitments; and (iii) 
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providing a powerful enforcement mechanism through investor-state arbitration.56 
As such, developing countries have signed BITs in a competitive race to attract 
capital: once one country started, others were inclined to follow in order to avoid 
losing much needed FDI. And this prisoner’s dilemma is why developing 
countries have not been able to push for a multilateral investment treaty as a 
group, which could be more aligned with their interests.  
 
In a sophisticated treatment of the subject, Montt presents a related argument 
focusing on the ‘network effects’ of BITs.57 In particular, Montt asks why 
developing countries have signed investment treaties with such remarkably 
similar substantive and procedural provisions. He argues that the diffusion of 
BITs - slow at first, then spreading like wild-fire – does not have to rely on norm 
cascades but can be explained with increasing returns. First of all, it became 
‘cheaper’ to draft and negotiate treaties, when standard templates were readily 
available – negotiators simply had to jump onto the BIT ‘bandwagon.’ Secondly, 
with a critical mass of similarly worded treaties already signed, developing 
countries could by the 1990s reasonably expect an efficient (quasi) jurisprudence 
to evolve. While the standards may have been broad and open-ended – and thus of 
little inherent value of themselves - the expectation was that tribunals would make 
them operative by interpretation, and thereby reduce the uncertainty of their scope 
and implications.58 Rather than having to spend considerable time and costs on 
agreeing to specific, as opposed to open-ended, investment rules, negotiators 
made a strategic bet that arbitrators would do the job for them in a way that suited 
their interests.59 Finally, the costs of standing outside the global BIT-network, or 
insist on different worded treaties, increased considerably once a reasonable 
number of countries had already joined, as investors and other market actors 
considered a country with no - or idiosyncratic - BITs to be more risky 
jurisdictions.60 The BIT-movement has thereby seen a lock-in effect due to 
increasing returns, which according to Montt is what explains explain why they, 
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‘fail to make any efforts to reach a new treaty that may be inherently 
superior.’61Although based on a sophisticated and important critique of the work 
of Guzman, Montt thereby shares the same fundamental premise: BITs are a 
rational instrument for developing countries to attract foreign investment, and the 
remarkable similarity among BITs is not surprising, as ‘one size’ does actually fit 
all.  
 
The functionalist nature of both accounts makes them more than difficult to falsify 
empirically.62 Yet, they do present one testable hypothesis. By ‘trading 
sovereignty for credibility’ BITs should have a non-negligible impact on 
investment flows. In particular, if BITs are crucial in the international competition 
for capital, then they should be important for market-actors assessing and pricing 
the risk of foreign investments, namely the political risk insurance (PRI) 
industry.63 I will address this question in chapter six. However, even if BITs have 
a considerable impact on investment flows, this would of course not be enough to 
sustain that they have diffused primarily due to competition. When seeing the 
global network of investment treaties as the result of rational design by far-sighted 
and highly informed policy-makers, explanations based on competition, risk 
conflating the intentionality of micro-level motives with (alleged) macro-level 
results.64 And instead of carefully investigating whether rational design has in fact 
been driving BIT-diffusion, it has typically been an assumption rather than 
empirical question.  
 
An important exception is a follow-up contribution by Guzman to his original 
work. Joined by Elkins and Simmons, the authors find econometric evidence that 
developing countries have signed BITs primarily in response to other countries 
signing them, and particularly those with which they compete for foreign 
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capital.65 Chapter eight will show that the results in this much-quoted disappear 
after slight, but justified, changes in model-specification. Yet, even without this 
empirical problem, it appears that one could easily make the opposite argument: 
the incentive to sign BITs should be highest for developing countries when none 
of their competitors have done so, as an increase in BITs among economic 
competitors will decrease the effect a BIT will have on winning investment 
projects. This is the basic finding of Yackee in his equally sophisticated analysis, 
which thereby questions the logic of competitive pressures presented by Guzman 
and co-authors and implies that the theory should be, if not rejected, then at least 
subject to greater testing.66 Also, if developing countries are engaging in a 
competitive race to attract investments, why haven’t more developing countries 
gone further by including liberalization provisions in their BITs? While more 
difficult to negotiate politically, legally binding liberalization provisions would 
arguably be the next logical step to become relatively more attractive to investors 
after other developing countries have signed up to BITs solely covering the post-
establishment phase. One can think of other innovations that would make BITs 
even more ‘investor-friendly’ – such as stringent standards on performance 
requirements67 - yet their content has remained largely constant. This questions 
whether the treaties can truly be considered a ‘race to the top’ from the 
perspective of investors.68 Finally, as the authors mention themselves the theory is 
entirely unable to explain the large number of South-South BITs, where the 
contracting parties do not exchange substantial, if any, investment flows.69 This is 
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unfortunate, and implies that the explanation should be subject to closer empirical 
scrutiny.  
 
At a minimum, functionalist explanations based on inter-state competition have to 
show that decision-makers actually anticipated the effects of the policies they 
promoted (as well as those of their ‘competitors’).70 For although unanticipated 
consequences are of course not inexplicable by rationalistic approaches, they do 
question the assumption of full information included in traditional competition-
based accounts of policy-diffusion.71 This leads us to a fourth explanation based 
on policy learning.  
 
Rational Learning 
 
Policy learning can be understood broadly as the process with which policy 
makers change beliefs as a result of observing and interpreting experiences, which 
in turn can – but does not have to - lead to policy changes.72 Within IPE literature, 
the most prominent learning-based explanation for policy-diffusion is derived 
from notions of Bayesian updating, where prior beliefs are weighted against the 
quantity and quality of observed experience (with ‘quality’ referring to the 
variability, or consistency, of available outcome information).73 As in competition 
based frameworks, diffusion is here a rational, goal-oriented and instrumental 
process, but unlike ‘pure’ rational-choice theories decision-makers are assumed to 
be imperfectly informed.74  
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Learning can be a horizontal process, where governments rationally seek and 
process new information about the impact of policies pursued in other states. 
Meseguer, for instance, argues that with respect to privatization policies, learning 
from other countries has played an important role for both developed and 
developing country governments.75 In particular, she showed in a panel setting 
that the adoption of market based reforms has been strongly associated with 
information about the outcomes associated with similar reforms abroad, measured 
both in terms of average outcomes and their variance. Similarly, Gilardi, Füglister 
and Luyet have showed that the likelihood of health-care reforms in OECD 
countries increased, if experience from health-care reforms in other countries was 
associated with expenditure decreases.76 Finally, with respect to BITs, Guzman 
and his collaborators have found a positive statistical association between 
countries’ decisions to enter into BITs and whether other countries experienced 
FDI inflows after having signed up to BITs.77  
 
Policy learning can also be a vertical process channeled through intermediaries, 
such as international organizations. Indeed, in the same volume as her work with 
Elkins and Guzman, Simmons points out that ‘international institutions are [a] 
natural conduit for learning and, especially, for organized pedagogy.’78 The 
research departments at the IMF and the World Bank, for instance, have been 
important for disseminating lessons on liberal economic policies.79 And with 
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respect to foreign investment policies in particular, the UN has been very 
important in generating knowledge of FDI regulation, but also World Bank 
institutions like ICSID and MIGA have played a role. This is likely to be 
important. When BITs proliferated, they were a novelty for most countries, and 
even international lawyers themselves were often ignorant about their existence. 
As the Dutch branch of the Committee on Legal Aspects of a New International 
Economic Order noted in 1984: ‘it is indeed surprising that so little attention has 
been paid in recent years to this body of bilateral investment treaties. Their 
significance, even their existence and certainly their abundance, seems to be 
largely unknown to international lawyers …’80 So since investment treaty 
negotiations were ‘unchartered territory’ for developing countries in particular,81 
most of their officials can safely be assumed to have shared the ignorance of even 
specialized international lawyers.  
 
Also, learning is not only important when ascertaining the benefits of BITs. 
Indeed, it is peculiar that while Guzman and his co-authors do not ‘assume that 
policymakers have Herculean powers of observation or analysis’82 when 
assessing the FDI impact of BITs, they actually do when it comes to the risks.83 
Nowhere in their framework do they allow for learning with respect to the 
potential costs of BITs: 
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‘…striking are the sovereignty costs associated with the delegation of adjudicative 
authority: virtually any legal change or rule that affects foreign investors is 
potentially subject to review by a foreign tribunal. The decision to sign a BIT 
always involves an assessment by the host of whether the expected benefit of 
attracting an additional increment of foreign capital outweighs these costs.’84  
 
For the sake of argument I disregard here that most BITs before the late 1980s did 
in fact not include legally binding investor-state dispute settlement clauses, which 
in and by itself makes the statement somewhat misleading, as the authors seek to 
explain the popularity of BITs from 1960 to today.85 What is important here 
instead is that the assumption of full information about the potential costs of BITs 
has been crucial in all significant contributions to date. While Montt, for instance, 
notes in passing that there was considerable uncertainty towards the benefits and 
costs of BITs throughout the 1990s,86 his theoretical model only allows for 
imperfect information concerning the strategies of other states.87 Information 
about the costs of BITs are assumed to have been known and accepted by 
developing countries when signing BITs, 
 
‘In joining the BIT system, capital-importing countries traded sovereignty and 
democracy for credibility. ... That was the cost of seeking additional FDI inflows, 
and these governments knew and accepted it when they decided to join the BIT-
network.’88 
 
In legal scholarship this assumption has also prevailed,89 and in political science 
contributions, the costs of investment treaties are explicitly regarded not as ‘an 
accidental by-product but intended by both sides’.90 Here, the costs of 
international arbitration are exactly what ‘explains [BITs’] popularity in the 
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developing world’91 as the treaties thereby send an important signal by ‘pointing 
to the commercial costs of noncompliance.’92  
 
Yet, this assumption has never been tested, which means that practically all 
contributions on BITs equate the results of the treaties with the initial intent of 
policy-makers without actually having any evidence to sustain it.93 And if 
information about the potential costs of BITs were not available at the time they 
diffused, it is likely that decision-makers have not been as informed about the 
implications of the treaties as standard accounts assume. So instead of assuming a 
priori that the potential liability of BITs were obviously intended and foreseen by 
policy-makers, chapter seven will investigate what information was actually 
available about the risks of BITs at the time they proliferated.   
 
This potentially opens up for yet another important but thus far overlooked insight 
in the study of BITs. Namely that if we relax the unitary actor assumption, then an 
environment of imperfect information would provide ample opportunities for 
agency-slip. Some officials in law ministries or regulatory agencies, for instance, 
may be worried of too haphazard a BIT-policy - they are, after all, binding 
documents under international law -  but lacking information about their risks 
would make it hard to stop certain actors from pursuing the treaties for their own 
benefits. Following the public choice literature, advancing BITs could be in the 
interests of some officials or institutions if it allowed them larger budgets,94 
augmenting discretionary power,95 and/or opportunities for leisure96 by facilitating 
frequent travels abroad for negotiations, participation in inter-governmental 
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meetings, training-sessions, etc.97 According to this logic, embassies or 
investment promotion officials, for instance, should be strong supporters of BITs 
as the treaties allow them to ‘show’ the results of their efforts to establish friendly 
diplomatic relations and ‘do everything in their power’ to increase investment 
flows, respectively.98 Also, if stakeholders with an incentive to take a cautious 
approach to negotiating BITs had no clear-cut examples of the treaties’ risks, they 
would have a hard time preventing them from being (mis)used for short-term 
purposes.  
 
3.2. A new understanding of policy diffusion: the role of 
bounded rationality 
 
I turn now to a fifth, and new, explanation for BIT-diffusion. It is based on the 
assumption that even if seeing policy-making as a goal-oriented process, and 
thereby rational in the broadest sense of the word, we cannot be sure that 
decision-makers seek and process information in ways rational-choice models 
predict. Studies in experimental psychology have consistently shown that people 
fail to meet the standards of comprehensive rationality, and have instead identified 
systematic - and thus predictable - patterns of reasoning and behaviour, which 
differs from the postulates of rational-choice models.99 As mentioned in chapter 
one, Weyland has argued this literature may be important to explain international 
policy diffusion processes.  
 
                                                          
97
 For similar considerations with respect to financial market regulation in governments with short 
time horizons, see; C. Way, ‘Political Insecurity and the Diffusion of Financial Market 
Regulation,’ 598 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 125 (2005). 
98
 With respect to embassies, this could explain why Alle and Peinhardt find that the existence of 
embassies considerably raises the likelihood of a BIT between two countries and Elkins, Guzman, 
and Simmons also find that host countries with a large diplomatic presence are more inclined to 
sign BITs; T. Alle and C. Peinhardt, ‘Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions,’ 54 International Studies Quarterly 1 (2010), at 
ftn. 37; Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, op. cit.  
99
 For an overview of this literature see the collection of papers in; D. Kahneman and A. Tversky 
(eds.) Choices, Values and Frames (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); D. 
Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds.) Judgment Under Uncertainty (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (eds.) Heuristics and Biases: 
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
66 
 
Outside experimental settings, however, insights on cognitive constraints present 
a considerably challenge in terms of identifying causal mechanisms. This is 
particularly the case since frameworks acknowledging non-zero costs of 
information (e.g. Bayesian learning) may often have converging expectations as a 
framework based on information processing biases. Meseguer, for instance, has 
shown that when Weyland uses bounded rationality to argue that policies will 
cluster geographically this can also be explained with a Bayesian model with 
positive costs on information gathering.100 So what may appear to be biasing 
heuristics may in practice be a function of imperfect information, and vice 
versa.101  
 
There are ways, however, to gauge the approximate value of a bounded rationality 
approach, also outside the confines of experimental settings.102 First of all, in 
some contexts a Bayesian framework and one based on cognitive heuristics will 
have diverging predictions, which will be further clarified below. Secondly, even 
when the two approaches may have converging expectations in terms of 
outcomes, there is no reason that an optimization framework is inherently 
superior, if it is starkly clear that the causal mechanism relied on biasing heuristics 
rather than Bayesian updating.103 So let us proceed by outlining an alternative 
explanation for policy diffusion based on experimental insights on bounded 
rationality, which could potentially be important to explain the popularity of BITs 
in the developing world.  
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The choice of policies 
 
Before choosing a policy, a decision-maker needs to allocate attention to 
information about the problem at hand and its possible solutions. But rather than a 
careful, rigorous and balanced search of information - as predicted by models 
based on comprehensive rationality - decision-makers tend to rely mostly on 
whatever information is salient at a given time. This follows from the availability 
heuristic, which refers to people’s tendency to rely excessively on information 
that is vivid and easily available.104 While obviously useful in many instances, it 
can also have a biasing impact on people’s judgments and behaviour, as it may 
lead to ignoring information that is relevant and attaching great value to some that 
is not.105  
This could be important when understanding why some policies diffuse. When 
seeking solutions, decision-makers may choose certain policies over others, not 
because of their inherent functional value or legitimacy but rather because, they 
are immediately available to adopt. This mechanism is likely to be particularly 
influential, if policies are based on a concrete and clear policy ‘model’, as this 
allows policy-makers to follow an already defined template rather than going 
through the ‘hassle’ of tailoring their own – however rational that may be.106  
This could be relevant, when understanding the political foundation of the 
international investment regime. BITs are short and standardized documents – 
typically less than ten pages – which provide a simple blue-print for developing 
countries worried that political risks are keeping foreign investors away. So might 
they have become popular amongst investment-hungry governments in the 
developing world, not because of careful cost-benefit analyses, but rather due to 
Western states, international organizations and other actors selectively promoting 
them as easy and clear-cut instruments to adopt? Might developing countries 
willingly have adopted BITs without investigating plausible alternatives? By 
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contrast with a rational learning perspective, for instance, this would imply that 
even stakeholders with an interest in a cautious BIT-strategy, would be much less 
inclined to seek alternative, and perhaps better, alternatives, before agreeing to 
sign of on Western states’ model BITs. If this is the case, then certain rules may 
have diffused throughout the global BIT-regime, not because developing countries 
have found them particularly representative of their national interests after 
carefully considering alternatives, but rather because they have been immediately 
available to adopt.107 
 
Cost-benefit considerations 
 
After a policy has been made ‘available,’ goal-oriented decision-makers will be 
interested in their likely consequences and outcomes. While rational-choice 
models assume that decision-makers will base their inferences on the laws of 
statistics, this simplifying assumption is often inherently unrealistic and, as such, 
not always analytically useful.108 Instead, individuals tend to follow the heuristic 
of representativeness by quickly extrapolating trends based on extremely small 
amounts of information, or even detecting patterns from completely random series 
of events.109 In his study of Latin America, for instance, Weyland found that 
officials focused excessively on short-term indicators, when making inferences 
about the quality of an underlying policy.110 If a policy showed early signs of 
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success – even for entirely random reasons – it speeded up the diffusion 
process.111  
Along the same lines, the representativeness heuristic could convince decision-
makers that BITs are in fact powerful instruments to attract foreign investors 
based on exceptionally limited information. Similarly, the availability heuristic 
could systematically skew decision-makers’ attention towards confirming, yet 
anecdotal, information that BITs are important for investors’ decision-making 
process, but ignore the equally important – but less vivid - information that stems 
from all those investors that do not call for BITs to be signed. For although 
information about ‘non-events’ has diagnostic value it is typically used less in 
judgments, as it is less salient than information about events.112 This could have 
led developing countries to further overestimate the benefits of BITs. 
One can of course also think of the opposite pattern: if a policy shows early, or 
more vivid, signs of failure, this could slow down the diffusion process. Yet, apart 
from the considerations above, heuristics could have played an important role in 
making BITs seem successful policies in the early stages of their diffusion. For 
while investment treaty claims can have massive implications for the host state, 
they actually rarely occur. For such low-probability risks, people tend to show 
bimodal responses: some greatly exaggerate them, and others assume they can 
ignore them completely. The availability heuristic implies that the choice between 
the two reactions depends on the extent to which people can bring specific 
instances to mind.113 If they can, it can lead to inflated concerns. But if they 
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cannot, it can lead to the opposite. And since risks with a low probability are per 
definition not very likely to be part of the decision-makers immediate past 
experiences, they often fail to be considered fully until the ‘lightning strikes.’114 
So while a Bayesian framework would be able to explain if a lack of disputes 
perhaps led to an underestimation of the risks of BITs, the availability heuristic 
would expect that it let many officials to ignore them entirely until they 
themselves got hit by a claim. Just as people tend to insure themselves against 
low-probability events such as earthquakes after they have already taken place,115 
countries may also have relied excessively on their own experiences with BITs. 
This will be further discussed in chapter eight.  
 
Anchoring 
 
One thing is that policies spread across borders due to their immediate availability 
and decision-makers may misjudge their practical implications, but why do we 
often see so little adaption of policies to local circumstances? One answer could 
again come from the cognitive literature, if decision-makers apply the heuristic of 
anchoring and adjustment.116 This refers to the tendency to rely excessively on 
their point of departure for future judgments and actions, even when it does not 
suit their interests to do so. It corresponds to the general finding that individuals 
tend to value the status quo much higher than rational choice models would 
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predict, even if the status quo was initially determined randomly.117 The heuristic 
of anchoring and adjustment therefore shares predictions with much of the 
institutionalist literature within political science - namely that modifications to 
existing policies are likely to be few and limited.118   
‘While anchoring by no means precludes ... modifications, it keeps their range 
limited and preserves the basic nature of the imported model. Comprehensive 
rationality would often call for more profound adjustments, including alterations 
of a model’s fundamental design.’119 
This implies that the content of a developing country’s past BITs may function as 
a de facto model for future negotiations, even if it was initially agreed to for 
random reasons and information is available that alternative provisions would be 
more prudent. Rather than network effects (see Montt above), the anchoring 
heuristic could therefore potentially be the reason for the incredible similarity 
among BITs over time.   
 
Institutional conditions: expertise and experience 
 
As most of the experimental literature on bounded rationality, the sections above 
takes individuals as the unit of analysis, yet international relations is typically the 
study of organizations, firms, and other aggregate actors. Unfortunately, we still 
don’t know much about whether, and how, observed patterns of individual 
decision-making can be aggregated to the collective level.120 Yet, the institutional 
conditions under which countries consider, decide, and implement policies are 
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likely to co-determine the extent to which distortions and biases will be present. 
For while organizations’ ‘divisions of labor’ generally allow them to process a 
larger stock of information than individuals,121 the bureaucratic and political 
structures in many developing countries could possibly augment the role of 
cognitive heuristics in officials’ judgment and inferences about their task 
domain.122 
First of all, developing countries often lack legal expertise on international 
economic law.123 And while acknowledging that experts are also prone to biased 
judgments and inferences,124 their prior knowledge may make them less 
influenced by the biasing effects of heuristics.125 For instance, whereas experts 
may not necessarily agree on the magnitude of risks associated with BITs – 
indeed there is much disagreement on this within legal scholarship – they are 
better able than generalists to understand the plausible implications associated 
with BIT-provisions.126 Generalists tend to have a much broader and more 
multidimensional perspective on risks than experts.127 For many purposes this can 
be healthy to avoid too narrow conceptions of risk within a given area,128 but it is 
commonsensical that an incomplete understanding of key causal mechanisms at 
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play is problematic for any policy-maker. For instance, non-expert officials may 
have vague notions of risk associated with not signing BITs, such as what it 
would do to the country’s international image, and while not refuting such risk-
perceptions as irrational or irrelevant, they hardly provide a complete picture. This 
would need to  consider more technical questions, such as how certain regulatory 
conducts can expose a country to BIT-claims or, more fundamentally, what 
investor-state arbitration actually is in the first place. In the absence of experts 
such knowledge is not necessarily immediately available for the decision-
maker(s) in charge of a developing country’s BIT-program, which could have an 
impact on their quality of decision-making.129 As noted by a Korean official, for 
instance,  
‘Until recently most Korean experts of international litigation ... were found only 
in the private sector and not in the government. ... negotiators were often unable to 
adequately address the complex procedural issues surrounding investor-State 
dispute resolution. As a result, they often resorted to using the same simple 
provisions as in previous investment agreements.’130 
In the absence of expertise, officials can nevertheless develop a level of 
experience through learning and feed-back.131 Yet, bureaucratic realities in many 
developing countries make this difficult. To again quote from Weyland’s study of 
policy-reforms in Latin America: 
‘Since many bureaucracies in the region diverge starkly from Weberian principles, 
political appointees and even technical experts often face uncertain tenure. In 
many social agencies, turnover in the upper, decision-making echelons is 
exceedingly high …They therefore design reform projects under tremendous time 
pressure and cannot afford a comprehensive, proactive search for relevant 
information.’132 
Such conditions are not unusual in developing countries.133 They obstruct learning 
and specialization as those officials actually gaining some level of experience are 
transferred to other departments before being able to take advantage of it. More 
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Journal of Transnational Law 281 (1988), at 301; Robinson, op. cit.; UNCTAD (2008), op. cit..    
130
 J. Kim, ‘Korea’s Development of a Better Investor-State Dispute Resolution System,’ in: in: 
UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II [unedited draft] 
(Geneva: United Nations, forth.), at 68. 
131
 Neale and Bazerman, op. cit., at 86-7, 90. There will of course be inherent dangers in relying on 
learning from experience compared to relying on expertise, see; ibid., at 93.  
132
 Weyland (2006), op. cit., at 46-7.  
133
 In the context of trade negotiations, see e.g.; M. Busch, E. Reinhardt, G. Shaffer, ‘Does legal 
capacity matter? A survey of WTO members?,’ 8 World Trade Review 4 (2009). 
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fundamentally, officials shifting in and out of departments may be more inclined 
to rely on inferential short-cuts to learn about their task domain: risk perceptions 
tend to be associated with personal experiences of risk,134 which implies that a 
high turnover of officials could make the chances of ‘risk-neglect’ considerable. 
So while acknowledging that experience – just as expertise - is not a guarantee 
against biased judgments and inferences, we would nevertheless expect that 
bureaucratic conditions that prevent officials from gaining domain-specific 
experience are likely to limit the rationality in decision-making.   
Finally, as actors are considered goal-oriented and strategic within a bounded 
rational framework, we need to consider the range of motives among officials or 
government departments that could impact their propensity to push for certain 
policies. But while public choice literature focusing on ‘agency slip’ could also 
explain such preferences within governments (see above), experiments remind us 
that pre-determined incentives are likely to impact people’s basic processing of 
information in ways they may not themselves realize. As stated by Kunda: 
‘ ... people do not realize that the [inferential, ed.] process is biased by their goals, 
that they are only accessing a subset of their relevant knowledge, that they would 
probably access different beliefs and [inferential, ed.] rules in the presence of 
different goals, and that they might even be capable of justifying opposite 
conclusions on different occasions’.135  
For instance, the general finding that people tend to subject evidence they want to 
believe to much less scrutiny than evidence that goes against their preferences,136 
implies that decision-makers who have an individual interest in promoting a 
certain policy will be less inclined to question the ‘representativeness’ of perhaps 
dubious claims that the policy has positive welfare effects, yet they will be much 
more sceptical of claims that they don’t. Similarly, the finding that not only the 
amount but also the nature of information people consider varies systematically 
                                                          
134
 N. Weinstein, ‘Effects of personal experience on self protective behaviour,’ 105 Psychological 
Bulletin 31 (1989); Keller, Siegrist, and Gutscher, op. cit., at 632.  
135
 Ibid., at 485.  
136
 E. Dawson, T. Gilovich, and D. T. Regan ‘Motivated Reasoning and Performance on the 
Wason Selection Task’ 28 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1379 (2002); T. Gilovich 
Motivated skepticism and motivated credulity: Differential standards of evidence in the evaluation 
of desired and undesired propositions. Address presented at the 12th Annual Convention of the 
American Psychological Society, Miami Beach, Florida, June, 2000. 
75 
 
with their preferences,137 implies that officials and institutions who gain from 
pursuing certain policies will tend to focus solely on their benefits.  
Outside experimental confines it is of course difficult to disentangle, whether it is 
rational learning, biasing heuristics or individual agendas that make officials 
promote BITs. One way to approach this methodologically, however, is to exploit 
the fact that there are government stakeholders, who should have an incentive to 
take a much more cautious approach in negotiating BITs than those with an 
individual interest in promoting them. A public choice perspective would expect 
that law ministries, for instance, show some interest in shaping BIT-policies, as 
they will be blamed once the claims begin. Similarly, regulatory agencies whose 
discretion will be curtailed from BITs should also have an interest in somewhat 
cautious BIT-strategies. If inferential biases have been at play, however, such 
actors may nevertheless have been uninterested in spending too much effort on the 
treaties, if they ignored their risks. Key interests of government actors would 
therefore not necessarily be realized, and as a result BITs could have become 
completely ‘de-politicized’ in national policy-making processes before a country 
was hit by its first BIT-claim. This would not be the prediction of a public choice 
framework, whether based on perfect information or not.  
A note of caution 
 
Through a range of mechanisms, cognitive heuristics may thereby have influenced 
the diffusion of investment treaties. If so that would offer strong support to 
Weyland’s suggestion that bounded rationality plays an important role for policy 
diffusion. That said; Weyland seems to overstate his case, when presenting 
bounded rationality as the superior approach to explain policy diffusion. He 
dismisses norm-based explanations a priori, for instance, based on the 
understanding that if norm-emulation is the driver of diffusion, then policies 
should spread like wild-fire almost immediately after they have emerged. Yet this 
is a peculiar misrepresentation of the literature, as Finnemore and Sikkink 
explicitly argue that it takes time for norms to emerge, and only after a tipping 
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 Z. Kunda, ‘The Case for Motivated Reasoning,’ 108 Psychological Bulletin 480 (1990).  
76 
 
point can norm cascades begin (they mention adoption of one third of all states). 
Similarly, Weyland dismisses rational learning models because he argues they 
can’t explain geographical clustering of policies, yet as mentioned above, this is 
not necessarily the case.138 Finally, explanations based on coercion and norm-
emulation also appear intuitively helpful to explain many of the defining 
characteristics of the BIT-diffusion process. So before exploring the bounded 
rational model, this thesis will engage with traditional explanations for policy 
diffusion to get a better understanding of whether, and to what extent, a bounded 
rational framework adds value.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented five main hypotheses to explain the diffusion of BITs. 
First, it asked whether developing countries have been coerced into adopting 
BITs. Secondly, it asked whether BITs can be compared with various human 
rights instruments adopted by many developing country governments for 
symbolic reasons. Third, it presented the standard accounts of BIT-diffusion based 
on competition, where the treaties were presented as rational instruments for 
developing country governments to attract foreign investments. Fourth, it pointed 
to the potential importance of imperfect information, and asked whether BITs may 
have become so popular partly because little information was available about their 
costs at the time they proliferated. Finally, it presented a new theory of policy 
diffusion based on notions of bounded rationality. Here, it was argued that the 
combination of cognitive heuristics and institutional conditions in developing 
countries could have led them to systematically overestimate the benefits of BITs, 
and ignore their costs. A key hypothesis was that not until a developing country 
got hit by an investment treaty claim itself did officials carefully seek and process 
information about the risks involved. 
                                                          
138
 Meseguer (2006), op. cit. 
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 4. A product of coercion?  
 
This first empirical chapter will address the coercion hypothesis. While the 
content of BITs clearly has roots in the imperial era, and developed countries have 
been successful in promoting their favoured templates, does this mean that BITs 
themselves are the product of coercion? Have developing countries been coerced 
into signing investment treaties with the threat of economic or other sanctions? To 
address this, I begin with the international financial institutions, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The second section will focus on 
dominant capital-exporting states. Finally, the last section will address the fact 
that BITs to a considerable extent have been signed without developed countries 
involved, i.e. between developing countries themselves. 
 
4.1. The International Monetary Fund 
 
In statistical analyses, developing countries’ propensity to sign BITs has 
occasionally been related to whether they have received IMF programs.1 Elkins, 
Guzman, and Simmons note that, ‘[t]his may mean that states seeking assistance 
from the IMF are encouraged to enter into BITs. Alternatively, it may be that the 
conditionality of IMF loans overlaps with the obligations of the BIT, reducing the 
costs of the latter.’2 Following the discussion in the last chapter, the first of these 
two explanations implies at least a potential for coercion, yet the role of the IMF 
in the BIT-movement has never actually been investigated.  
Considerable overlaps exist between IMF’s work and BITs. One is with respect to 
capital account liberalization, where BITs’ transfer provisions typically give 
investors the right to freely transfer capital out of the host state.3 In that sense, 
                                                          
1
 Z. Elkins, A. Guzman, and B. Simmons, ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,’ 60 International Organization 4 (2006).  
2
 Ibid., at 840.  
3
 See; A. Kolo and T. Wälde, ‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment Treaties,’ 
in: A. Reinisch (ed.) Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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BITs are relevant for the Fund’s work with capital controls, for while IMF’s legal 
obligations relate only to transactions on the current account,4 the Fund has been a 
staunch promoter of capital account liberalization as well.5 So perhaps the Fund 
has pushed for BITs as tools to ‘tie in’ capital account liberalizations in the 
developing world.  
Secondly, while promoting foreign direct investment has never been part of IMF’s 
core functions, Kalderimis notes that the organization’s ‘expansive view of its 
mission has led it to focus on investment as an important engine of economic 
growth.’6 Up through the 1990s, the IMF thus strongly encouraged developing 
countries to promote FDI,7 and in the second half of the 1990s FDI liberalization 
was explicitly promoted as the first stage of a sequential approach to full scale 
liberalization of capital flows.8 And while only few BITs include liberalization 
commitments, they are potential tools to promote FDI,9 so for this reason as well 
it would perhaps not be surprising if signing BITs have been among IMF’s policy-
recommendations.  
                                                                                                                                                               
Note that while important, transfer provisions have rarely been addressed in BIT-claims except for 
a few related to the Argentinean financial crises in 2001. See e.g.; Metalpar S.A. y Buen Aire S.A. 
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award, June 6, 2008. 
4
 Art. 8.2(a) of the IMF Articles provides, ‘ ... no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, 
impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international 
transactions.’ By contrast, art. 6.3 provides that, ‘Members may exercise such controls as are 
necessary to regulate international capital movements, but no member may exercise these controls 
in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions ...’. See also Art. 30(d) for 
IMF’s definition of payments for current transactions. 
5
 See; IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), The IMF’s Approach to Capital Account 
Liberalization (Washington DC: IMF, 2005).  
6
 D. Kalderimis, ‘IMF Conditionality as Investment Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis,’ 13 Social 
and Legal Studies 103 (2004), at 105.  
7
 IMF IEO, op. cit., at 32, 34, and 73. Eichengreen and Mussa also note, for instance, that in 
Central and Eastern Europe ‘almost all IMF-supported programs entailed measures to facilitate 
inflows of foreign capital, foreign direct investment in particular.’ B. Eichengreen and M. Mussa, 
‘Capital Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects,’ IMF Occasional Paper 172, 
1998. 
8
 See, e.g. IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1995 (Washington DC: IMF, 1995). Through a 
multi-method approach, Jensen finds that IMF programs have had little impact on FDI flows; N. 
Jensen, Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), ch. 7.  
9
 See the next chapter.  
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Finally, the IMF has vigorously promoted liberalization of state-enterprises, often 
with the argument that this would increase inflows of foreign investment.10 This 
has been important for the BIT regime, as many treaty-based investment disputes 
have arisen due to large-scale liberalization programs. One notable case in point is 
Bolivia, where a condition for both IMF and World Bank loans in 1999 was to 
privatize its water utilities.11 The following year, the public utility, SEMAPA, was 
sold to a local subsidiary of the American firm Bechtel, Aguas del Tunari (AdT). 
But after massive public protests in response to considerably price increases, AdT 
had to withdraw from the concession and subsequently filed a BIT claim against 
Bolivia for more than US$25 million.12 This illustrates yet another way in which 
BITs have underwritten IMF’s policy-advocacy work, which again would make it 
unsurprising if the IMF encouraged developing countries to enter into BITs.  
However, there are few signs that FDI protection has played an important part of 
IMF conditionalities or even policy recommendations. Kalderimis, for instance, 
argues that IMF’s role in the regime for FDI protection is considerable in theory, 
but presents no empirical evidence that investment protection has played any 
tangible role in IMF programs.13 As importantly for our purposes, there is no 
indication that BITs or investor-state arbitration have played any direct role for 
IMF’s loan programs or policy advice. One indicator comes from looking at 
IMF’s ‘Letters of Intent’ and ‘Structural Adjustment Facility Framework’ papers 
which comprise the specifics of its structural adjustment programs. While neither 
constitute actual conditionalities linking compliance with fund dispersal, they are 
useful indicators of the Fund’s priorities. Table 4.1 provides a sample of countries 
subject to IMF programs from the late 1990s, when BITs were proliferating 
rapidly. 
                                                          
10
 See e.g. ‘Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the 
government of Moldova,’ IMF, July 29, 1999 (‘ .. accelerated large-scale privatization, should 
also encourage foreign investment ...’). 
11
 See, ‘Bolivia: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Policy Framework Paper, 1998-2001,’ 
IMF, August 25, 1998.  
12
 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3. Note, that after 
considerable controversy AdT’s parent company, Bechtel, later withdrew its claim.  
13
 Kalderimis, op. cit. See also; M. Goldstein, ‘IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much is Too 
Much?,’ Institute for International Economics Working Paper, 2000. 
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At the time, the countries in Table 4.1 had some of the most risky ‘investment 
climates’ and/or fewest BITs ratified with developed countries. Yet, one 
conclusion stands out: only to the extent national investment codes included 
protections to foreign investors, or arbitration reforms allowed for international 
arbitration, did IMF programs target FDI protection. As a general rule, IMF does 
not appear to have included specific recommendations to protect foreign investors 
against expropriation for instance. Also, not once do the extremely detailed and 
comprehensive policy-programs mention investment treaties, or investor-state 
arbitration for that matter. This illustrates that while FDI liberalization was 
important for the IMF agenda during the time BITs proliferated in the 1990s, FDI 
protection was probably not. 
Also, it is worth noting that investment treaties have hardly ever been mentioned 
by official IMF reports (unlike in World Bank reports, see below),14 and only in 
very few instances have they been mentioned by the IMF as part of countries’ 
investment framework.15 Furthermore, when BITs on a rare occasion in 2006 
were in fact discussed by IMF Directors, they noted that by contrast with capital 
account issues, where the Fund had a key role in policy advice, BIT were seen as 
agreements ‘negotiated voluntarily by country authorities when considered to be 
in the national interest.’16 So while potentially important for the IMF, the 
implication was that they should not be part of its arsenal of policy-
recommendations.  
Surely, this does not rule out that IMF staff on occasion have encouraged 
developing countries to sign BITs. But although the IMF has promoted investment 
regimes overlapping with BIT-obligations, and therefore perhaps made the treaties 
appear ‘cheaper’ instruments as suggested by Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, 
nothing implies that the IMF has conditioned its loan programs on recipient 
                                                          
14
 For an exception, see; IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1999 (Washington DC: IMF, 
1999), at 135 (‘Clearly, bilateral investment treaties leave scope for discrimination and country-
specific provisions.’) 
15
 One rare case has been the Uruguay BIT with the United States. See; IMF, Uruguay: Letter of 
Intent and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, November 12, 2004; IMF, Uruguay, IMF 
Country Report No. 04/172, June 2004.  
16
 IMF, Annual Report for the Executive Board, 2006 (Washington DC: IMF, 2006), at 55.  
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countries’ adoption of BITs, or that the treaties have played any considerable role 
in the Fund’s policy work.  
 
4.2. The World Bank 
 
The picture is murkier with respect to the World Bank. In its Articles of 
Agreement, one of the Bank’s main purposes is to promote foreign private 
investment.17 And apart from playing a key role along with the IMF in advancing 
privatization and liberal economic policies in the developing world since the 
1980s, the World Bank has also been the most important international financial 
institution promoting investment protection reforms.  
In its work, the Bank has always subscribed to ‘traditional’ (i.e. Western) views of 
the proper treatment and protection of foreign investors. Its Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Investment (henceforth the Guidelines) are based on 
international minimum standards, such as fair and equitable treatment, and make 
reference to the Hull standard of compensation for expropriation.18 In the drafting 
of the Guidelines, BITs played a very influential role as inspiration,19 and were 
specifically mentioned in the preamble,  
‘... these guidelines are not the ultimate standards but an important step in the 
evolution of generally acceptable international standards which complement, but 
do not substitute for, bilateral investment treaties...’20 
When the Guidelines were adopted in 1992, the World Bank Development 
Committee similarly noted that they were an instrument to, 
‘... promote fair and equitable international standards for the general treatment of 
all foreign direct investment in the absence of applicable treaties, and should be of 
particular value for developing countries. Ministers expect the Guidelines to serve 
                                                          
17
 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
Art. 1.ii.  
18
 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (World Bank 
Guidelines), Art. 3(2) and 4(2).  
19
 See; I. Shihata, Legal treatment of foreign investment: The World Bank Guidelines (Washington 
DC: World Bank, 1992).  
20
 World Bank Guidelines, Preamble. This sentence was inserted at the request of the United 
States, Shihata, op. cit., at 140. See also infra note 89.  
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as an important step of the progressive development of international practice in 
this area and hope that they will facilitate further developments through bilateral 
treaties and similar instruments.’21 
Developing countries welcomed the non-binding and adaptable instrument, but 
repeatedly stressed that the Guidelines ‘should not lead to an additional Bank 
lending conditionality.’22 This, however, has not been followed, as also predicted 
at the time by the architect of the Guidelines, Ibrahahim Shihata,  
‘Although the Guidelines were not intended to be used for the purposes of the 
Bank’s lending conditionality, it is a fact that such conditionality often included 
measures, which exceeded the Guidelines’ requirements in terms of their 
advocacy of the liberalization of investment and trade markets in borrowing 
countries.’23  
While specific information about the Bank’s conditionalities is difficult to come 
by, and no one have systematically studied the role of investment protection 
reforms in its structural adjustment programs, we do know that the World Bank 
has occasionally provided loans during the 1990s on the condition that borrowing 
countries adopt legal reforms to protect foreign investors.24 So while no-one has 
found tangible evidence that BITs have played a considerable role in the Bank’s 
adjustment programs,25 perhaps its agencies have applied more subtle coercive 
measures to get developing countries to sign BITs. And since ‘investment climate’ 
                                                          
21
 Development Committee, ‘Communiqué of the Development Committee,’ in: Presentations to 
the 44th Meeting of the Development Committee (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992).  
22
 Statement of the Chairman of the Group of Twenty-Four, Mr. Alhaji Ahmadu Abubakar, 
Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Nigeria, in: Ibid. See also; Group of Twenty-
Four, Communiqué of the 46th Meeting of the Ministers of the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-
Four (Washington DC: World Bank, 1992) 
23
 Shihata (1992), op. cit., at 148.  
24
 While it is difficult to obtain precise information on the circumstances of these programs, but as 
an illustration, see e.g.; World Bank, Development Credit Agreement between Republic of Zambia 
and International Development Association, Jul 13, 1992; World Bank, Development Credit 
Agreement between Republic of Zambia and International Development Association, Sep 30, 1993 
(requiring Zambia to implement its investment act). See the associated, Zambia Investment Act, 
1993, VII(1) and (2) (‘No property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired, and no 
interest in or right over property of any description of an investor shall be compulsorily acquired, 
except for public purposes under an Act of Parliament … which provides for payment of 
compensation in respect thereof. Any compensation payable under this section shall be made 
promptly at the market value and shall be fully transferable…). On Gabon, see; World Bank, 
Technical Annex to the Memorandum and Recommendation on a Proposed Loan to FF 56.7 
million to the Gabonese Republic for Privatization and Regulatory Capacity Building Technical 
Assistance Project (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997), at 1-4 (requiring Gabon to adopt a 
Charter on Investment). See the associated, Charte des investissements du Gabon, 1998, art. 2. 
25
 In no publication on World Bank aid programs and conditionalities that this author is aware of 
are BITs mentioned as a factor. See e.g.; S. Koeberle, H. Bedoya, P. Silarszky, and G. Verheyen 
(eds.) Conditionality Revisited (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005). 
 85 
projects became ever more important in the Bank’s strategic focus when BITs 
proliferated up through the 1990s,26 the World Bank agencies involved with 
investment protection did have the opportunity to strongly induce the developing 
world to adopt the treaties. Let me start with ICSID.  
 
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
 
Apart from substantive principles for investment protection, as in the Guidelines, 
the World Bank has also been important with respect to the adjudication of 
investment disputes. Already in its 1969 ‘Blue Book’, it was stated that the 
organization had a: 
‘... direct interest in the creation and maintenance of satisfactory relations between 
member countries and their external creditors. Accordingly, the normal practice is 
to inform governments who are involved in such disputes that the Bank or IDA 
will not assist them unless and until they make appropriate efforts teach a fair and 
equitable settlement.’27 
Particularly in the early history of the Bank, this policy not only involved it in 
settling investment disputes, but also to withhold aid from developing countries 
not providing foreign investors adequate compensation for expropriation for 
instance.28 Of particular relevance in this respect has been ICSID, which entered 
into force in 1966 and was created specifically to address concerns about 
investment protectionism.29  
Since hardly any claims were raised under ICSID in the first decades of its 
existence, the organization instead became deeply involved in drafting model 
arbitration clauses30 as well as commenting on investment laws and treaties.31 
This included, of course, the World Bank Guidelines, where states are encouraged 
                                                          
26
 World Bank Operations Evaluation Unit (OEU), An Evaluation of World Bank Investment 
Climate Activities (Washington DC: World Bank, 2004). 
27
 IBRD, The World Bank, IDA and IFC, Policies and Operations (Washington DC: The World 
Bank, 1969), at 31 
28
 E. Mason and R. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution,1973), ch. 11. 
29
 See chapter two.  
30
 See e.g.; ICSID, Annual Report 1973/1974 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1974), at 4.  
31
 See e.g.; ICSID, Annual Report 1995 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1995), at 9.  
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to submit disputes to ICSID,32 as well as the MIGA Convention, which I will 
return to below.  
While most of the organization’s policy work has been urging developing 
countries to sign up to the ICSID convention itself,33 it has also promoted BITs. 
The founding father of the ICSID Convention, Aron Broches, was always clear in 
his support for the treaties.34  Also, in the closest the organization ever came to an 
actual ‘handbook’ for BIT-negotiators - the much-delayed 1995 book ‘Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’35 – the treaties’ investment promotion potential for 
developing countries was stressed repeatedly, 
‘…the negotiation and conclusion of a BIT by a capital-importing country may be 
said to send an important signal to the international business community, to the 
effect that that country not only welcomes foreign investment but will also 
facilitate and protect certain foreign ventures.’36 
Similarly, the book told developing countries that, 
‘the availability of insurance under such programs [bilateral investment insurance 
programs, ed.] is in most instances conditioned on the existence of a BIT between 
the insuring State and the host country of the insured investment. … the BIT 
should help reduce the ‘risk profile’ of a covered investment to a level where it 
can be prudently insured by the investor’s home State or investment guarantee 
agency.’37 
I will show in chapter six that this message was not entirely accurate. For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, it is important to note that partly due to a lack 
of staff; ICSID has not been as involved with policy reforms as other branches of 
the World Bank group. ICSID itself has been in no position to coerce developing 
countries to enter into BITs, or indeed the ICSID Convention, as it has had no real 
                                                          
32
 World Bank Guidelines, art. 5(3). 
33
 See e.g.; I. Shihata, ‘Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment - A General Account, with 
Particular Reference to the Role of the World Bank Group,’ 6 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 486 (1991), at 505-507; I. Shihata, ‘Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the 
Role of the World Bank,’ Paper presented at the Seminar on Justice in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the 1990s, Inter-American Development Bank, San José, Costa Rica, February 1993, 
at 33. 
34
 See e.g.; A. Broches, ‘Multi-national Corporations in World Development,’ address to the 
Council on Religion and International Affairs, Aspen, Col., 26 April 1974, reprinted in: A. 
Broches (ed.) Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and Private 
International Law (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), at 522; R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), at 12 and 156.  
35
  The book was initially planned to be released already in the mid-1980s, see; ICSID, Annual 
Report 1985 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1985), at 5 and 11.  
36
 Dolzer and Stevens, op. cit, at 12.  
37
 Ibid., at 156. Italics added.  
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leverage apart from being part of the World Bank family. It is notable, for 
instance, that although ICSID was successful in its early years in advocating to the 
value of international arbitration to developing countries,38 it largely failed to 
convince key audiences in Latin America and the Arab world until they 
themselves began subscribing to such views.39 So while ICSID has indeed become 
a focal point of the investment regime after the surge of investment treaty claims, 
and may as an organization have an important indirect impact on the adjudication 
of claims based on its authority to appoint presiding arbitrators,40 its impact on the 
formulation of investment policies has been less prominent than other World 
Bank agencies, such as the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS). 
 
The Foreign Investment Advisory Service 
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, between ten and twenty percent of the World 
Bank’s project lending was to so-called ‘core investment climate’ projects relating 
to investor-friendly judicial and legal reforms.41 Managed by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), FIAS here played a key role. When engaging with 
developing countries it strongly encouraged them to give foreign investors access 
to international arbitration to settle their disputes.42 And with respect to 
substantive investment standards, FIAS followed the World Bank Guidelines 
                                                          
38
 E. Denza and S. Brooks, ‘Investment Protection Treaties: The British Experience,’ 36 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 4 (1987), at 911.  
39
 H. Ruttley, ‘Lawyers and Development in the Arab World: The Role of Idli,’ 1 Arab Law 
Quarterly 4 (1986); Broches (1974), op. cit., at 524. See also chapter two.  
40
 G. Van Harten, ‘Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration,’ in: M. Waibel, A. Kaushal, 
K.-H. Chung and C. Balchin (eds.) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Alphen Aan den 
Reijn: Kluwer Law, 2010). 
41
 World Bank OEU, op. cit., fig. 4.3.  
42
 By default, FIAS reports are confidential except if released by the host state, but see e.g.; FIAS, 
Rwanda: Mini-diagnostic analysis of the investment climate (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005); 
FIAS, Liberia: Mini-diagnostic analysis of the investment climate (Washington DC: World Bank, 
2006). Note that independently of FIAS, the IFC has also promoted international arbitration in its 
loan agreements, and in one investment treaty claim before ICSID, the IFC – itself a World Bank 
Agency – had shares in the investment enterprise pursing the claim; Suez, Sociedad General de 
Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, Petition for transparency and participation as amicus curiae, available at: 
www.ciel.org/Publications/SuezAmicus_27Jan05_Spanish.pdf (accessed 5 Jan, 2011). The 
petition mentions a range of other multinationals funded in part by the IFC, which have also 
pursued claims under ICSID; Ibid., at 14, ftn. 39.  
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encouraging non-discrimination, protections against expropriation, free transfer of 
capital, etc.  
However, FIAS does not appear to have had the leverage to coerce developing 
countries into following its recommendations in case they resisted. With Brazil, 
for instance, FIAS noted that in order to attract further investment, it ‘may 
require’ that Brazil signed up to the ICSID and New York conventions as well as 
BITs.43 Yet today, ten years after, Brazil still remains outside the ICSID system 
and has yet to ratify any of its BITs. Similarly, in its 2004 report to Sierra Leone, 
FIAS was highly critical of the fact that the government had not followed several 
of its recommendations on its draft investment code.44 Yet, in the final investment 
code, Sierra Leone kept several of the provisions, despite FIAS’ objections.45  
Even if, on occasion, FIAS (and the IFC) has successfully managed to pressure 
developing country governments to pursue policies they would not otherwise have 
pursued, it would be surprising if it tried to coerce BITs onto developing 
countries. Because apart from the promotion of ICSID, there is no indication that 
FIAS has engaged in any sustained and systematic effort to promote investment 
treaties. In fact, although FIAS occasionally has encouraged countries to enter 
into BITs, like in the case of Brazil,46 FIAS has mostly focused on BIT-like 
obligations only in so far as they could be enshrined in domestic laws.47 In fact, 
BITs have often not even been mentioned by FIAS. A country like Grenada, for 
instance, only had 2 BITs when FIAS reviewed its investment climate, but while 
considerable comments were made about Grenada’s international trade 
                                                          
43
 FIAS, Brazil: Legal, policy and administrative barriers to investment in Brazil, vol. 1 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2001), at 37.   
44
 FIAS, Sierra Leone: Diagnostic Study of the Investment Climate and the Investment Code 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2004), 19-20.  
45
 Government of Sierra Leone, The Investment Promotion Act, 26 August, 2004. 
46
 See also; see e.g. FIAS, Slovak Republic: Legal, Regulatory, and Tax Improvements for 
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999), at 27-29; FIAS, 
Albania: Diagnostic Study (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001), at 14; FIAS, Reducing 
administrative barriers to investment: lessons learned (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006), at 7.  
47
 This was confirmed in interviews with FIAS officials. See in this respect also e.g. FIAS, Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Improving the Environment for Foreign Direct Investment 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 1998) (BITs not mentioned); FIAS, Honduras: The Climate for 
Foreign Direct Investment and How It Can Be Improved (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001) 
(BITs not mentioned). 
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commitments, not a word was mentioned about investment treaties.48 Similarly, in 
the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, FIAS noted that while the country had 
indeed adopted attractive investment laws, including laws on expropriation, it did 
not have an effective judiciary system to enforce them in practice.49 Yet, FIAS did 
not encourage the government to expand its small investment treaty network.50  
So while many of FIAS’ investment policy reviews still remain confidential, those 
that are public suggest that the agency has had a rather haphazard and non-
systematic approach towards investment treaties.51 Although FIAS has advised 
developing countries to adopt BIT-like standards in their domestic investment 
regimes, the treaties appear to have played a negligible role in and of themselves.  
 
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
 
This takes me to the third main World Bank Agency dealing with investment 
protection regulation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 
Unlike FIAS and the IFC, BITs have always been of critical importance to MIGA, 
not just since its inception in the 1980s, but also in the decades of discussions 
leading up to the MIGA Convention.  
The idea of a multilateral organization providing investment insurance against 
political risks in developing countries, such as expropriation, had been on the 
World Bank agenda since the 1950s.52 Yet during the 1960s and 1970s, Latin 
American countries objected to the project fearing that it was nothing but an 
investment protection treaty in disguise.53 Interestingly, several developed 
countries also had objections, fearing that if such an agreement were to include 
                                                          
48
 FIAS, Grenada: A diagnostic review of the investment climate (Washington DC: World Bank, 
2004). 
49
 FIAS, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Institutional Framework for Foreign Investment Promotion 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 1999), at 5.  
50
 Ibid.; FIAS, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Commercial Legal Framework and Administrative 
Barriers to Foreign Investment (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001). 
51
 Note also, that in recent years, when FIAS’ successor, the Investment Climate Advisory 
Services (ICAS), began to assess ’investment climates’, it has acknowledged the importance of 
BITs, yet they have not been used as an indicator in ICAS’ assessments. ICAS, Investing Across 
Borders, 2010 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2010), box. 7.2.  
52
 See generally; I. Shihata, MIGA and foreign investment (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988). 
53
 Ibid., at 40, 54-55.  
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substantive investor protections, they would become too weak and thereby 
undercut BITs as well as attempts at pursuing multilateral investment treaties.54 
During the 1980s, however, when the debt crisis had hit and official aid flows 
stagnated, the World Bank tried once again to overcome these divisions. The 
resulting compromise was to establish an agency, which was not a lending 
institution, nor a treaty-based framework for substantive standards on investment 
protection. Rather, it was to have two purposes. First, and foremost, the 
organization should of course issue guarantees to foreign investors against non-
commercial risks, and secondly it should carry out complementary activities also 
assisting in promoting investments into the developing world.55 As noted by the 
architect of the Convention, Ibrahim Shihata, to the Latin American World Bank 
directors in 1985, 
‘The draft Convention does not deal with the substantive standards of treatment of 
foreign investors or with the method of settlement of disputes between them and 
their host countries. ... The arbitration referred to in the draft Convention applies 
only to disputes between the guaranteed investor and the Agency and between the 
Agency and the host government.’56 
Ultimately, this appeased the former opponents of the project. And with respect to 
the fears of developed countries, a compromise was reached that while the 
Convention did not oblige its parties to provide BIT-like standards to investors, 
the Agency had a duty to ‘promote and facilitate the conclusion of agreements, 
among its members, on the promotion and protection of investments.’57 In the 
words of Shihata, this meant that instead of undermining BITs or other investment 
treaties, the Agency was ‘to play a catalytic role in enhancing such attempts.’58 
MIGA could do this through its investment advisory functions provided to 
developing countries,59 but a much more important instrument could of course be 
to withhold investment insurance in case developing countries didn’t sign up to 
BITs. Political risk insurance (PRI) is essentially a subsidy to foreign investors, 
and if that subsidy depends on the adoption of BITs, then the World Bank would 
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 Ibid., at 47,54,81, 200, 228. See also chapter two.  
55
 MIGA Convention, art. 2(a)(b).  
56
 Quoted in Shihata (1988), op. cit., at 82.  
57
 MIGA Convention, art. 23(b)(i). 
58
 Shihata (1988), op. cit., at 228. 
59
 See e.g.; MIGA PAS, Industrialized Countries' Policies Affecting Foreign Direct Investment in 
Developing Countries, Volume I (Washington DC: World Bank, 1991a). 
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de-facto include investment treaties as part of its conditionalities. Indeed, 
developing countries expressed concerns in the 1980s that MIGA would 
potentially pressure them into signing BITs.60 Whether MIGA has done this has 
never been studied, but it has been suggested by Kaushal, for instance, who notes 
that IMF and World Bank conditionalities,  
‘...embrace broad aspects of a country’s economic development: creditworthiness 
and compliance measures are linked to a country’s level of openness to investment 
and the availability of foreign investment insurance is linked to the existence of a 
BIT with the host state.’61   
If this is true, it would perhaps not be surprising, since BITs are of relevance to 
the underwriting process within MIGA, both directly and indirectly.62 The direct 
relevance of BITs arises because the Operational Regulations stipulate that if the 
investment is covered by a BIT then it has adequate legal protection for MIGA to 
insure it.63 If the investment is not covered by a BIT, however, it can nevertheless 
still be covered by MIGA, if the agency can ‘satisfy itself as to the investment 
conditions in the Host Country, including the availability of fair and equitable 
treatment and legal protection for the investment.’64 Indirectly, BITs could be 
relevant for this condition too. If the country has signed BITs with countries other 
than the investor’s home country that could potentially still provide a signal that 
investment conditions in the host country are adequate, particularly since ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ is a key standard in most BITs.  
This raises the question, whether MIGA has actually favoured investment projects 
covered by BITs, or reversely withheld guarantees from developing countries if 
they didn’t enter into the treaties. Figure 4.1 below summarises investment 
projects with MIGA guarantees from 1990 to 2009, distinguished by whether they 
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 Shihata (1988), op. cit., at 220.  
61
 A. Kaushal, ‘Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the 
Foreign Investment Regime,’ 50 Harvard Journal of International Law 2 (2009).  
62
 MIGA, Operational Regulations, as amended by the Board of Directors through October 1, 
2007 (MIGA Operational Regulations). Note also that article 23(b)(iii) of the MIGA Convention 
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 MIGA Operational Regulations, Par. 3.16.  
64
 Par. 3.15. Finally, if none of these conditions are fulfilled, par. 3.17 stipulates that MIGA can 
still provide coverage if it has a special agreement with the host country, assuring that with respect 
to guaranteed investments, MIGA ‘has treatment at least as favorable as that agreed by the 
member concerned for the most favored investment guarantee agency or State in an agreement 
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had BIT-coverage or not. This is not a clear-cut exercise. First of all, the figure is 
likely to underestimate the projects with investment treaty coverage, as it doesn’t 
include other investment treaties, such as the ECT or PTIAs. At the same time, 
however, it is likely to overestimate whether the investors in the projects have 
access to treaty-based investor-state arbitration, as I do not distinguish between 
BITs with and without a binding consent to investor-state arbitration. Nor have I 
engaged in a detailed analysis of the substantive provisions and the specific 
conditions for investor coverage, as MIGA officials would have to do on a project 
by project basis.  
Figure 4.1. BIT-coverage of MIGA projects, 1990-2009 
 
Overall, however, the picture is nevertheless clear: MIGA does not appear to have 
systematically favoured investment projects covered by BITs. In fact, it has 
tended to provided guarantees for more projects without BIT-coverage. The 
exception is the early 2000s, yet at that time the vast majority of BITs had already 
been signed, so if MIGA wanted to indirectly promote BITs it was not necessary 
at that point. Also, while there is a tendency for BIT-covered projects to have 
been larger, the differences do not suggest any systematic bias. Finally, if we 
break down the projects by sector, we don’t see any clear tendencies either 
(Figure 4.2). In fact, in some areas where investments are typically made for the 
very long term, such as mining or the power sector, the share of projects covered 
by BITs is less than one third. Yet, these are the same sectors where investors to a 
considerable extent have availed themselves of BIT-protections in recent years.  
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2007).
Sources: Compiled by author from MIGA and UNCTAD.
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Figure 4.2. BIT coverage of MIGA projects, selected sectors, 1990-2009 
 
As MIGA’s contracts are not publicly available, it is not possible to more 
carefully investigate exactly what role BITs play in MIGA’s underwriting 
decisions. The extent to which they do, however, is largely up to MIGA 
underwriting staff themselves. For although they are obliged to take BITs into 
account in the underwriting process, they are not forced to make the treaties 
crucial determinants for either coverage or pricing. With respect to coverage, a 
BIT is a sufficient but far from necessary condition, and with respect to pricing, 
MIGA is advised to consider almost sixty rating factors when determining the 
underwriting premium rates for expropriation, for instance, and only one of these 
relates to the existence of an ‘investment protection agreement’ (Table 4.2).65 This 
itself is a rather broad term, which apart from BITs for instance covers 
preferential trade agreements with investment chapters, the European Convention 
of Human Rights, and the ECT.  
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Table 4.2. Rating factors when MIGA considers expropriation risks  
 
A. Investment
1. Form of investment, especially equity/non-equity. 
2. Size of investment, including its size relative to the (i) Investment Project, and (ii) Host Country’s gross 
national product. 
3. Investment agreement with Host Government, especially dispute resolution mechanism  (international 
arbitration), fairness to Host Country, clarity, flexibility (renegotiation clauses). 
B. Investment Project
1. Sector, especially hydrocarbons, mining, public utilities, natural  resources, manufacturing, services. 
2. Importance of sector for host economy. 
3. Size, including size relative to: 
(i) Host Country’s gross national product; and 
(ii) pertinent sector in host economy. 
 4. Position in host economy, e.g., monopoly or part of an oligopoly. 
5. Relationship to locally or state-owned enterprises. 
6. Contribution to host economy, especially generation of export revenues, import substitution. 
7. Economic viability. 
8. Dependence on incentives or trade restrictions. 
9. Dependence on Host Government, e.g., as monopoly supplier or  monopoly purchaser. 
10. Exposure to Host Governmental regulation, such as price controls, export and import quotas, 
performance requirements, tax regime, environmental protection, labor legislation, capital market 
regulation.  
11. Vulnerability to adverse economic developments. 
12. Importance to labor market in Host Country. 
13. Potential for disinvestments, especially mobility of assets. 
14. Profitability, including lead times and volatility of profits. 
15. Ownership and control, especially joint venture, wholly-owned subsidiary or sole proprietorship of 
Guarantee Holder, majority/minority  participation, management contract. 
16. Joint venture partners, e.g., Host Government, domestic investors, investors of different nationalities, 
third country institutions, international institutions.
17. Providers of long-term financing, including the duration of their exposure in relation to the period of 
guarantee. 18. Visibility as foreign-owned enterprise. 
C. Guarantee Holder
1. On-going contributions to Investment Project, especially ongoing control over key technologies, 
technical processes employed in Investment Project, or channgels for marketing of goods and services 
produced, or provided, by Investment Project.
2. Interest in Investment Project, e.g., profit maximization, export promotion, raw material procurement.
3. Overall interest in Host Country, especially other investments, export interests.
4. Overseas experience, reputation, record. 
5. Reasons for seeking coverage. 
RATING FACTORS FOR MIGA WHEN CONSIDERING RISK OF EXPROPRIATION 
AND SIMILAR MEASURES
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D. Host Country
1. Legal protection of guaranteed investment under domestic law, especially specific legal assurances 
covering particular vulnerability of Investment Project, likely stability of protective law (constitution, 
statutues, decrees, etc.), enforceability of protective laws (judicial and administrative procedures).
2. Judicial system, especially independence, predictability, efficiency.
3. Investment protection agreement with home country of Guarantee Holder including its extension to 
coverage of investment under consideration against the risks to be covered.
4. Agreement with the Agency on the treatment of the guaranteed investment under Article 23(b)(ii) of the 
Convention.
5. Record of interventions in foreign investments, including settlement record.
6. Pending investment disputes, especially those involving the Agency itself or national or regional 
investment guarantee agency.
7. General attitude of Host Government toward foreign investment.
8. Relationship with Guarantee Holder’s home country, including Host Country’s interest in cooperation 
with home country.
9. Dissident elements inclined toward expropriatory action, including their strength at present and over the 
period of guarantee, as well as degree of hostility to foreign investment.
E. Terms and Conditions of Guarantee
1. Amount of compensation, especially its computation on basis of net book value or fair market value and 
applicable accounting principles.
2. Covered loss, especially limitation to total loss or extension to business interruption cost.
3. Period(s) between first expropriatory action and payment of claim.
4. Delimitation of “indirect” and “creeping” expropriation, especially any exclusions of potential events 
from coverage. 
5. Point in time for determining loss in case of “creeping” expropriation. 
6. Required nexus between expropriatory measure and loss, especially delimitation of measure from 
deterioration of business environment.
7. Undertakings of Guarantee Holder to avert or minimize loss. 
8. Remedies required to be pursued by Guarantee Holder, especially requirement to pursue arbitral 
proceedings.
9. Responsibility for documenting claims and burden-of-proof rules. 
10. Level of coinsurance by Guarantee Holder. 
11. Period of guarantee. 
12. Reductions of amount of guarantee over time. 
13. Rights of Agency to premium increase or adjustment of other terms in case of change of circumstances. 
14. Reference rate of exchange for compensation and date for its determination. 
F. Potential for Recoupment
1. Agreement between Agency and Host Country under Article 23(b)(ii) of the Convention. 
2. Concurrence between the Agency’s rights as subrogee of Guarantee Holder and its obligations toward 
Guarantee Holder under contracts of guarantee. 
3. Liquidity position of Host Country and its likely development over period of guarantee. 
4. Capacity of Host Country to compensate from earnings of Investment Project.
5. Record of Host Country in honoring arbitral awards.
6. Interest of Host Country in relations with Agency.
7. Co-exposure of third country agency or international institution in Investment Project, especially as joint 
or parallel underwriter with Agency.
8. Level of Guarantee Holder’s coinsurance and home country’s investment protection policies.
Source: MIGA Convention Annex A.
RATING FACTORS FOR MIGA WHEN CONSIDERING RISK OF EXPROPRIATION                               
AND SIMILAR MEASURES (CONTD.)
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MIGA staff has thereby had considerable discretion to determine just how 
important BITs should be in their underwriting decisions. And as a general rule, 
they haven’t been as important as often assumed. Current and past MIGA officials 
thus noted in interviews that while they naturally follow the operational 
regulations by reviewing relevant BITs before issuing guarantees, the absence of a 
BIT has never in itself been a sufficient reason for MIGA to withhold a guarantee. 
As one former high-ranking official stated, ‘BITs were of marginal importance 
within MIGA, and of no practical importance when covering political risks.’66 In 
his experience, BITs were far from crucial when determining whether an 
investment was eligible for MIGA insurance or the pricing of such insurance. 
Similarly, a current senior official there mentioned that, ‘BITs are naturally 
important to our underwriting process, as we would like to know which rights we 
have in case of subrogation, but they are not at essential to underwrite an 
investment.’67 Others concurred: ‘while we have to look to BITs, they are not 
important determinants to our perception of the risk of an investment project’ and 
‘it is very rare that BITs become crucially important for us in practice.’68   
Suffice it to say that if countries engage in conduct that signals a scale-back of 
investor protections – such as violating existing BIT-obligations or withdrawing 
their consent to submit investment disputes to international arbitration - that 
would naturally be factored into MIGA’s underwriting decisions.69 The relevance 
of this practice for countries such as Bolivia, which recently withdrew from 
ICSID, is obvious. However, for developing countries that are not planning to 
expropriate or otherwise maltreat its foreign investors, the message is clear, 
‘provided we can expect a country to remain committed to foreign investments 
and the rule of law, cancelling all its BITs would not have a substantial impact on 
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 MIGA official I. 
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 MIGA official II. Note that just as government agencies, MIGA does not have standing under 
ICSID. In case benefits are paid out to investors, MIGA will typically recover its losses by 
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 MIGA official III. 
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 Ibid. Note also Annex A(f)(5), where the pricing of expropriation insurance is dependent on the 
‘record of host state in honoring arbitral awards.’  
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whether, and to what extent, MIGA would be willing to underwrite investments to 
that country.’70  
 
It is indeed notable, that in 2009 more than 10% of MIGA’s total outstanding 
portfolio was with countries with less than five ratified BITs (Table 4.3). Djibouti, 
for instance, was not a member of ICSID and had only ratified one BIT, yet it 
retained the fourth largest exposure of MIGA’s portfolio. Brazil was not an ICSID 
member either and had no BITs ratified, yet it had the seventh largest portfolio 
exposure.71 Combined with the observations above, this indicates that even if 
MIGA has encouraged developing countries to pursue BITs, it has not used its 
most obvious leverage to pursue this aim, namely withholding insurance.  
Table 4.3. Outstanding MIGA portfolio among countries with less than five 
ratified BITs, 2009 
 
None of this is to say that the Bank has not been instrumental in the spread of the 
treaties. It undoubtedly has. Charles Brower has noted about Shihata, for instance, 
that, 
‘…since he arrived on duty in Washington, no less than 1,235 bilateral investment 
treaties have been concluded around the world ... the masterful missionary, 
Ibraham Shihata, may disclaim responsibility, but the world knows better.’72 
Yet, while this may be true, the World Bank has not forced developing to sign the 
treaties through conditionalities or otherwise. Like in the case of the IMF, the 
Bank has been instrumental in promoting enabling conditions for the treaties, but 
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 MIGA official IV. 
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 MIGA, Annual Report, 2009 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2009). 
72
 C. Brower, ‘Ibrahim Shihata and the Resolution of International Investment Disputes: The 
Masterful Misionary,’ 31 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 79 (1999) at 82-83.  
Gross exposure, ($M) %  of Gross ICSID member BITs signed BITs ratified
 Djibouti 407.4 5.6 No 7 1
 Brazil 244.2 3.4 No 14 0
 Afghanistan 77.3 1.1 Yes 3 3
 Central African Republic 33.9 0.5 Yes 4 2
 Nepal 30.0 0.4 Yes 4 3
 Guinea Bisseau 24.1 0.3 Yes 1 1
 Sierra Leone 10.7 0.1 Yes 3 1
 Total 827.6 11.4 - - -
 Sources: MIGA and UNCTAD
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when it has advanced BITs it has done so primarily through persuasion rather than 
coercion. In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, the United Nations has been 
equally, or even more, important in promoting investment treaties, despite not 
having the same sanctions at hand. 
 
4.3. The role of dominant Western states 
 
Even if the international financial institutions have not coerced developing 
countries into signing BITs, dominant western states may have have done so on a 
bilateral basis. Let me here start with the ‘usual suspect’, the United States, which 
many argue played a hegemonic role in international economic relations in the 
decades where BITs proliferated.  
  
The United States 
 
Using coercive means to obtain investment protection is no stranger to American 
foreign policy. In fact, a developing country expropriating American assets 
without providing adequate and effective compensation or submitting the dispute 
to international arbitration will not only get bilateral aid flows suspended, but the 
American President is also obliged to instruct his Executive Directors of the 
international financial institutions to vote against multilateral loans.73 The 
American business lobby has explicitly asked for the administration to make use 
of such instruments,74 and we know of at least one instance, where a multilateral 
loan was delayed until an (unrelated) investment dispute involving an American 
investor in Costa Rica was referred to arbitration.75 In turn, this led Costa Rica to 
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 United States Foreign Aid Act of 1961. On American use of foreign aid sanctions in relation to 
investment disputes, see; C. Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), ch. 4. 
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 U.S. Policy Toward International Investment, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
International Economic Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, July 
30, Sept. 20, and Oct. 28 1981, at 173.  
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 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1. 
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join ICSID in order to stop the American pressure.76 Also in 2011, the United 
States began to decline most aid spending to Argentina – bilateral or multilateral; 
in part because of the country’s refusal to comply with investment arbitral awards 
related to its financial crisis.77  
Surely, this mechanism will make aid-dependent countries in the developing 
world think twice before expropriating American assets. So perhaps similar 
coercive means may also have played a key role in the American BIT program? 
Alvarez noted in the early 1990s, for instance, that,  
‘BIT partners turn to the U.S. BIT with the equivalent of an IMF gun pointed at 
their heads. … A BIT negotiation is not a discussion between sovereign equals. It 
is more like an intensive training seminar conducted by the United States, on U.S. 
terms, on what it would take to comply with the U.S. draft.’78  
While this refers to the power of the United States in bilateral negotiations, its 
hegemonic role may also have been important in developing countries’ propensity 
to adopt the treaties in the first place. An example is Grenada, where talks about a 
BIT with the United States began two years after the American invasion in 1983 
and concluded after one hour of ‘negotiations’ with the Grenadian prime minister, 
while he was getting medical treatment in a Washington DC hospital.79 But while 
anecdotes like this may raise suspicions that the United States has imposed BITs 
on the developing world, this has generally not been the case. 
First of all, it is important to keep in mind that the United States was not 
responsible for the emergence of BITs. It started its BIT-program much later than 
many European countries after business interests feared they were losing out to 
their European counterparts. Both the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
and the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Transnational Enterprises 
thus explicitly referred to the European success, when encouraging the BIT 
program during the 1970s.80 Also, even after the United States had begun its BIT 
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 Interview with Costa Rican official II. 
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 See; J. Finkman and J. Morgenstern, ‘US voting ‘NO’ on new multilateral lending to Argentina,’ 
HSBC Global Research Note, 22 September 2011.  
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 J. Alvarez, ‘Remarks,’ 86 ASIL Proceedings 551 (1992), at 552-553.  
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 K. Vandevelde, ‘The BIT Program: A Fifteen-Year Appraisal,’ 86 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 532 (1992), at 539.  
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program in the 1980s and BITs generally began to spread worldwide, the 
American preference for multilateralism meant that instead of advocating bilateral 
treaties it focused considerable attention on including comprehensive investment 
rules into the GATT (which largely failed).81   
Secondly, coercion does not appear to have been an important mechanism in the 
United States’ own BIT-program. In fact, the United States has been relatively 
unsuccessful in signing BITs - despite its hegemonic status (Figure 4.3). Already 
in the early 1980s, Gary Hufbauer noted in front of a Congress subcommittee that, 
‘we haven’t been able to negotiate treaties with either Singapore or Egypt to this 
day, and one would have thought if we could negotiate treaties anyplace it would 
have been with those two countries.’82 In later years, the United States has also 
had difficulties in expanding its BIT-network. The combination of a rather 
uncompromising negotiating approach and a far-reaching BIT-model - which 
unlike European models includes liberalization provisions - has made some 
developing countries wary of entering into BITs with the American government.83 
Also, and perhaps most importantly, due to American economic and political 
influence in most corners of the world the politics surrounding any international 
agreement with the United States is bound to raise considerably attention – and 
criticism – by host state stakeholders compared to agreements with most other 
countries. Combined, this means that many developing countries have been much 
more careful, when negotiating BITs with the United States, as will become 
clearer from later chapters. In any event; such relatively poor BIT-‘performance’ 
of the United States surely does not correspond well with a view that American 
hegemony has been a deciding factor for the spread of investment treaties.  
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 See, P. Christy III, ‘Negotiating Investment in the GATT: A Call for Functionalism,’ 12 
Michigan Journal of International Law 743 (1990-1991). It should be noted that during the 1950s, 
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arbitration provision. In turn, this made European BITs look far more benign.  
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Figure 4.3. The small BIT-network of the United States. 
 
Third, to the extent the United States has signed BITs, it has often been 
developing countries themselves that have initiated negotiations. A veteran 
American BIT negotiator notes that the changing investment climate in the early 
1990s meant that for ‘many developing countries, the BIT represents a tangible 
way of signalling their receptivity to foreign investment, and thus may seem to 
assist in attracting capital from the United States and other developed 
countries.’84 In some cases the United States has even declined such invitations,85 
which again does not fare well with an explanation for the BIT-movement based 
on American hegemonic imposition.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the American PRI agency, OPIC, does not 
condition provision of investment insurance to American multinationals on the 
adoption of BITs. Instead, OPIC has its own set of inter-governmental 
agreements, which provide for international arbitration and allows OPIC to 
subrogate covered investors’ claims. Accordingly, a former high ranking OPIC 
official noted in my interview with him that ‘the existence of BITs was entirely 
                                                          
84
 Ibid., at 638. 
85
 As an example, talks over a BIT between Pakistan and the United States began already in the 
1980s. But when in the 1990s, Pakistan asked the United States to take these talks further, the 
Clinton administration refused. The American government told Pakistan that in order to sign an 
investment treaty, the two countries first needed to sign a treaty on protection on intellectual 
property (IP) rights. See; ‘United States no to talks to investment treaty before IPR record,’ 
Business Recorder, March 19, 1995. See also;  Private Sector Investment Climate Assessment of 
Balochistan, United States AID report, July 1990, available at: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABU894.pdf (accessed 12 April 2011), at 17. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160 1969
1979
1989
1999
2009
Source: UNCTAD
Bilateral investment treaties signed
Selected developed countries
 102 
inconsequential when underwriting risks …’86 A current official there concurs, 
noting that ‘in OPIC we don’t pay much attention to BITs.’87 In other words, even 
if one would want to portray a linking of a (Western) government’s PRI and BIT 
programs as a quasi-coercive tool to get developing countries to sign BITs (see 
also below), this is not how United States’ policy has proceeded. 
This is not to say that the United States has not played an important role in 
advancing neoliberal investment reforms bilaterally or via its influence in 
international organizations.88 Also, once developing countries negotiate a BIT 
with the United States, in many cases the unequal bargaining power puts them in a 
disadvantage if they want to depart from the American model BIT. Similarly, and 
as mentioned in the preceding chapter, once the United States has signed a BIT, 
coercive forces may still be involved in making sure the other contracting party 
doesn’t cancel it later on.89 But when the American government has signed BITs, 
it has often been on the initiative of developing countries themselves, and there 
are no indications that the decision has been driven by fear of political or 
economic repercussions if they didn’t.  
 
Germany 
 
With most major European countries having signed around 100 BITs, or more, 
Europe has played a considerably greater role in the diffusion of BITs than the 
United States. In a sense, the BIT-movement mirrors the global financial system, 
where Abdelal has found that rather than the United States, it was in fact 
European countries – and particularly France – which promoted capital account 
liberalization.90 The question is, however, whether European countries have 
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 See e.g.; ‘Czechs face uphill battle to cancel United States investment treaty,’ Czech Position, 7 
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promoted BITs through coercive means. The most notable country in this respect 
has been Germany.  
Going back to the 1950s, the then chairman of the Deutsche Bank, Herman Abs, 
initiated the German Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investments, 
whose prime aim was to gather support for an investment protection treaty based 
on international minimum standards and investor-state arbitration. 91 He moreover 
urged the six European Common Market members to initiate a common policy on 
investment protection, which should serve ‘first and foremost [as] an instrument 
of pressure for inducing third countries’ to accept Western notions of 
international investment law.92 This proposal was particularly remarkable as it 
suggested that the parties to such a convention should take collective measures 
against any country violating its principles, ‘whether that country has adhered to 
the Charter or not’ (i.e. also non-members).93 In particular, it suggested that 
countries should have official loans or investment guarantees withheld if they 
didn’t execute arbitral awards, or if they refused to submit investment disputes to 
international arbitration in the first place.94 Ultimately, Abs’ suggestions were 
watered down before he presented a draft multilateral investment treaty to the 
OECD along with a group of British lawyers, led by Hartley Shawcross. As 
mentioned in chapter two, this initiative failed, however, as developing countries 
refused to accept its wide-ranging scope, and Abs’ suggestion for a common 
European investment protection policy never materialized either.95  
It was therefore up to Germany itself to develop a network of investment treaties, 
which for the German administration was a major priority due to its lack of formal 
or colonial ties with the developing world, which it felt left its investors with 
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weaker safeguards.96 Germany was thus the first country to ever enter into BITs 
and has since developed the largest BIT-network in the world. Its model BIT 
closely followed the Abs-Shawcross draft, which subsequently has become the 
standard reference for the vast majority of BITs in existence. In this sense, 
Germany has been a much greater force in the BIT-movement than the United 
States.  
Independently of its own negotiations, Germany has also strongly encouraged 
developing countries to sign BITs. In its development aid program, for instance, 
the German state has repeatedly told developing countries that in order to attract 
investment they need to sign BITs.97 In these efforts, the German government has 
occasionally used coercive means. In an ongoing dispute over an airport terminal 
between a German investor and the Philippines, for instance, Germany decided in 
early 2011 to withhold US$61 million in development aid to fight HIV/AIDs and 
tuberculosis until the dispute was solved.98 Moreover, in the recent negotiations 
over the ‘update’ of the fifty-year old BIT between Germany and Pakistan, 
Germany asserted considerable pressure on the (very few) elements of the 
Pakistani bureaucracy that objected to its terms.99 In fact, when a legal officer 
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within the Law Ministry objected to the treaty, Germany is reported to have 
threatened with withholding aid if the BIT was not finalized.100 The extent to 
which Germany would have withheld financial assistance had Pakistan’s Law 
Ministry successfully blocked the treaty in its current form is unknown. Also, 
while this is the closest anyone have come to a ‘smoking gun’ indicating outright 
coercion for a developing country to adopt an investment treaty, it doesn’t 
actually sustain this conclusion: the Pakistani embassy in Berlin strongly 
promoted the BIT, and so did the Pakistani Board of Investment (BOI),101 both of 
which must have welcomed the threat in so far as it could assist in silencing 
protests from the Law Ministry. In fact, the BOI pushed to have the BIT vetted by 
another officer in the Law Ministry less critical towards the treaties.102 So while 
Germany had applied pressure for almost ten years, it was primarily a shift in staff 
within the Pakistani bureaucracy that led to the BIT being finalized. 
It should also be stressed that this is likely to have been unique event, given the 
symbolic importance of having the treaty finalised at a major celebration in 
Frankfurt of the fifty-year anniversary of the BIT-movement.103 For while 
Germany has indeed used what some would characterise as a coercive instrument 
to get developing countries to sign BITs, it has not been aid conditionalities. 
Instead, the German BIT program has been tied to its investment guarantees – as 
initially suggested by Abs in the 1950s. So if developing countries cannot be 
expected to offer German investors BIT-like protections, they must sign a BIT in 
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order for the German state to issue investment guarantees.104 As noted by a 
current German official,  
‘Since the guarantees have a BIT as a precondition, we look at the conditions of 
the BIT which in turn will impact the condition of the guarantee. So limited 
substantive provisions will limit the risk the guarantee is covering.’105  
One reason for linking the BIT and the PRI program is that BITs allow Germany’s 
PRI agency to subrogate insured investors’ claims against host countries, thereby 
providing a legal basis for the government’s insurance agency to recover benefits 
paid out to investors.106 Another reason, however, is of course the one suggested 
by German bankers initially, namely that it can act as a strong incentive for 
developing countries enter into a BIT with Germany, not because they necessarily 
found it to be in their general interest, but rather because it is set as a condition by 
the German government to insure its investors there.107  
However, the linking of the BIT and PRI programs does not in and of itself 
indicate that developing countries would not have pursued BITs with Germany 
otherwise. When in 1959 Germany signed its first ever BIT, it was presented to 
Pakistan as a condition for German investors being able to obtain Federal 
guarantees of their investments.108 Yet, there were no indications that Pakistan 
signed it under duress. ‘We shall be taking big steps in the economic field,’ 
Pakistan’s Finance Minister said at the time, and ‘from the first day of 
independence we have been very keen to develop economic relations with 
Germany.’109  
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 German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
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Also, even if PRI coverage has been offered to developing countries as a ‘bribe’ 
to sign BITs with Germany, 110 it is not likely to have been particularly effective. 
German investors have many other options of getting PRI coverage than their 
state-sponsored program: MIGA is available, and in recent decades a considerable 
private market for PRI has also developed.111 This should make any implicit 
German threat of withholding PRI rather toothless.  
 
Other European countries 
 
With respect to other European governments, there is no indication that they have 
coerced developing countries into signing BITs either, through aid conditionalities 
or other means. As mentioned above, European countries have entered into trade 
agreements as a group, yet most matters of investment protection have until 
recently been exclusive member state competence. For Eastern European 
countries, for instance, this means that they were not forced to grant BIT-like 
protections to investors from the ‘old’ member states as a condition for EU 
membership.112 It also implies that while EU has been successful on promoting 
strong intellectual property rights regimes in its FTAs with developing countries, 
for instance, questions of expropriation or investor-state arbitration has never been 
part of EU’s external negotiations until the recent Lisbon treaty.113 
It has therefore been up to member states themselves to use bilateral aid and loans 
to promote investment treaties. Yet, it is difficult to see how the small European 
countries should have been capable of doing so with major developing countries 
like Venezuela, India, Russia, Iran, and China, (Table 4.4). Surely, such countries 
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would not have signed investment treaties with countries like Denmark and 
Portugal, if they didn’t support the BIT-movement themselves.  
Table 4.4. Year for BIT-signature between small European countries and 
major developing countries 
 
Indeed, like in the case of the United States, it has often been developing countries 
themselves that have initiated BIT-negotiations with European countries. A 
former Danish negotiator notes, ‘often it was actually developing countries, and 
not us, that asked if we wanted to sign these agreements.’114 This is also the 
response from negotiators from the major European countries. One experienced 
negotiator from Switzerland notes that ‘most often it is the other country that 
takes the initiative. Developing countries quite often contact us.’115 Similarly in 
the Netherlands, the treaties were initially seen as a favour to developing 
countries, so during the 1990s, developing country governments had to initiate 
negotiations themselves – which they often did.116  
Such eagerness amongst many developing countries to develop wide-ranging 
BIT-networks corresponds with the statistical finding of Elkins, Guzman, and 
Simmons, that developing countries’ BIT-signing activity has been considerably 
more clustered than that of developed countries.117 They take this to imply that 
‘while the major capital exporters stand ready with model treaties in hand, the 
decision whether and when to sign is left to a large extent to the host.’118 Given 
the feedback presented here, their observation appears to be correct.  
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Argentina China Egypt India Indonesia Iran Mexico Russia Venezuela
Denmark 1992 1985 1996 1995 2007 - 2000 1993 1994
Finland 1993 2004 2004 2002 2006 2002 1999 1989 -
Sweden 1991 2004 1978 2000 1992 2005 2000 1995 1996
Portugal 1994 2005 1999 2000 - - 1999 1994 1994
Source: UNCTAD
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Also, even if the German government should have been successful on occasion in 
using its PRI program as a quasi-coercive tool to get developing countries to sign 
BITs, this would be an exception, in that most other European programs do not 
incorporate BITs as a precondition for coverage.119 And as in the case of MIGA 
and OPIC, officials there generally take less notice of BITs than has often been 
assumed in the literature (including the ICSID publication mentioned above):120 
‘The existence of a BIT may provide us with comfort, but they are not 
specifically taken into account when we are considering investment 
projects.’ (UK)  
‘BITs can perhaps simplify our analysis in some cases if taken as an indicator that the 
legal regime is favorable towards the protection of investment. But in practice they are 
hardly ever decisive.’ (Netherlands)  
‘BITs do not play a great role in our work. … In some cases, if we are dealing with a 
particularly risky country, we do look to BITs and their provisions. But it is very rare.’ 
(Denmark) 
‘I could perhaps speculate that for a certain very risky economy we may want the treaty 
in place, but that has never actually been the case.’ (Finland)  
‘In some rare cases we may look at BITs. But they are no precondition for getting the 
insurance and don’t actually impact the pricing. So while we might look at them, they 
don’t really play a role in the underwriting process.’ (Austria)  
‘While it is in our formal guidelines that we should look towards BITs as a risk-
mitigating factor, their existence is unlikely to have had any impact on our pricing.’ 
(Sweden)  
‘The availability and pricing of our insurance is pretty much unrelated to whether there 
is a BIT or not. ... We regard them simply as signals of good relations between the two 
countries, but they don’t actually provide a safety net for us in practice.’ (Italy)  
Again, since details of the agencies’ projects are typically not publicly available, it 
is not possible to corroborate these statements further. However, unless PRI 
officials are being systematically dishonest, it appears there is a general 
disconnect between European countries’ political risk guarantee agencies and their 
BITs.121 This is important when assessing the investment impact of the treaties, as 
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discussed in a later chapter, but it is also important in this context: an obvious 
instrument available to European governments to get developing countries to sign 
BITs has not been used to any considerable extent. So while the PRI agencies are 
somewhat akin to ‘tied aid’ programs, where indirect subsidies are granted to 
investors for pursing projects in developing countries, it appears that they do not 
tend to operate with the adoption of BITs as an implicit condition for issuing 
guarantees.  
All in all, it is difficult to see BITs as the product of Western imposition. In fact, 
developing countries themselves have often seen investment treaties as an 
alternative to having their economic policies dictated. In 1992, a judge from Sri 
Lanka’s Court of Appeal thus noted that, 
‘Although substantial aid is given by the developed countries and their agencies to 
the Third World countries, the latter are unhappy about the conditions attached to 
such aid programs. Thus, they prefer foreign direct investments, in which they are 
equal partners with the investors ... The concept upon which [BITs, ed.] are based, 
namely reciprocity, accords well with that thinking; the principle of reciprocity is 
in conformity with the concept of sovereignty.’122  
 
4.4. South-South BITs 
 
Also, if developing countries have been coerced into signing BITs, why have they 
entered into so many BITs among themselves? While the process started in 1964 
with the Kuwait-Iraq BIT,123 the share of South-South BITs out of the global BIT 
landscape remained rather small until the mid 1990s, after which an increase in 
South-South investment flows and revived efforts to improve South-South 
cooperation began a pro-active effort of many developing countries to expand 
their BIT-networks with other developing countries.124 Today, almost 40% of all 
BITs are between developing countries; an astonishing share given that BITs were 
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initially tailored to protect Western investors in the developing world (Figure 
4.4).125 With only few exceptions,126 these treaties are very much similar to 
‘normal’ North-South BITs in their provisions on treatment and protection of 
established foreign investors.  
Figure 4.4. The rise of South-South BITs 
 
That said, BIT-negotiations between developing countries do of course not 
preclude coercion from having taken place. When a country like China negotiates 
an investment treaty with small investment-hungry African states, surely this must 
be expected to be largely on China’s terms. However, even among South-South 
BITs, a remarkably high share involves parties with hardly any commercial links 
at all and therefore with less possibility for bilateral coercion. Table 4.5 illustrates 
this trend by listing South-South BITs signed in 1996, where none of the parties 
are large capital exporters, such as Mexico, China, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
Russia, or India. Large developing country capital exporters are here defined as 
countries, whose outward FDI stock were either in the top 10 in a given year 
among developing countries, or top 10 using average and median shares from 
1980 to 2009. The table shows that countries like Bulgaria and Morocco, Uruguay 
and the Czech Republic, and Lebanon and Ukraine have signed investment 
treaties with each other. In such cases, it is difficult to see how coercive 
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mechanisms should have been in play, which illustrates yet again that in recent 
decades in particular, developing countries have themselves strongly supported 
the BIT-movement.  
Table 4.5. BITs among developing countries which are not major capital 
exporters, 1996  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the origin of BIT-standards might have been imposed on the developing 
world during the colonial encounter, this does not appear to be the case in recent 
decades. Here, developing countries have typically been more than willing to sign 
up to broad investor protections in BITs, whether with Western countries or 
among themselves. Clearly one cannot reject the possibility that unequal 
bargaining power have led certain developing countries to sign a BIT in order to 
avoid diplomatic or economic repercussions from capital-exporting states or the 
international financial institutions. In fact, after considerable efforts I was able to 
find an example of somewhat coercive means being used to finalize a BIT-
Country I Country II Ratified ID ID II Ratified ID ID II Ratified
Algeria Jordan 1997 Cuba Venezuela 2004 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan .
Algeria Mali 1999 Czech Rep. Kazakhstan 1998 Lao Vietnam 1996
Algeria Vietnam . Czech Rep. Uruguay 2000 Latvia Lithuania 1996
Armenia Georgia 1997 Egypt Jordan 1998 Latvia Uzbekistan 1997
Armenia Turkmenistan . Egypt Lebanon 1997 Lebanon Ukraine 2000
Azerbaijan Georgia 1996 Egypt Sri Lanka 1998 Macedonia Poland 1997
Azerbaijan Iran 2002 Egypt Turkey 2002 Nigeria Turkey .
Azerbaijan Kazakhstan . Egypt Yemen 1998 Pakistan Syria 1997
Azerbaijan Uzbekistan 1996 El Salvador Peru 1996 Pakistan Tunisia .
Barbados Cuba 1998 Estonia Latvia 1996 Paraguay Venezuela 1997
Belarus Bulgaria 1997 Georgia Kazakhstan 1998 Peru Venezuela 1997
Belarus Czech Rep. 1998 Georgia Turkmenistan 1996 Romania Uzbekistan 1997
Bosnia Iran 2000 Iran Kazakhstan 1999 Sri Lanka Thailand 1996
Bulgaria Croatia 1998 Iran Kyrgyzstan 2005 Syria Yemen 2005
Bulgaria Moldova 1997 Iran Turkey 2005 Tajikistan Turkey 1998
Bulgaria Morocco 2000 Iran Turkmenistan 2004 Turkey Ukraine 1998
Bulgaria Vietnam 1998 Iran Ukraine 2004 Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 1996
Croatia Macedonia 2002 Iran Yemen 2000 Uzbekistan Vietnam 1998
Cuba Romania 1997 Kazakhstan Romania 1997
Notes: The table lists South-South BITs signed in 1996. It excludes BITs signed by large developing country 
capital exporters: Argentina, Brazil, China,  Chile, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
Source: UNCTAD
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negotiation. As a general explanation for the BIT-movement, however, coercion is 
entirely unconvincing. As will become clear in later chapters also, the spread of 
investment treaties is a process which to a considerable extent has been driven by 
developing countries themselves, particularly in recent years. Here, practically all 
developing country governments have rushed to follow international trends, even 
those which are neither weak nor structurally dependent on aid flows.
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5. A quest for legitimacy? 
 
Policies typically diffuse when they ‘resonate’ with already accepted normative 
frameworks.1 One explanation for the spread of BITs could therefore rely on norm 
emulation, with norms understood as ‘collective expectation about proper 
behavior for a given identity.’2 Of course, one could argue that unlike human 
rights treaties, for instance, BITs were actually rather poor public relations 
instruments, as they were typically signed entirely under the radars of public 
discourse and received little attention by parliaments, the press, or the public at 
large. As noted by Montt, BITs have been one of those ‘supranational governance 
activities’ that ‘go virtually unnoticed’.3 As will also be clear from later chapters, 
only few paid much attention to BITs before the early 2000s with the possible 
exception of treaties entered into with the United States. That said, BITs did not 
go unnoticed by the World Bank, for instance, and practically all developed 
countries had BIT-programs during the 1990s, so they could have been one of a 
range of instruments used by developing countries to adhere to prevailing global 
norms. 
This is the argument of Jandhyala, Henisz, and Mansfield, who conclude that 
BIT-adoption during the 1990s reflected a ‘norm cascade’.4 But while based on a 
sophisticated analysis, the authors rightly conclude that their: 
‘… empirical tests have relied on inference rather than direct examination. Instead 
of directly examining the motivations of adopters, we have tended to infer these 
motivations from other characteristics …. A more granular approach … would 
greatly enhance our understanding of micro-processes and mechanisms.’5 
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 E.g.; M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy networks in international 
politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), at 204. 
2
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3
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Publishing, 2009), at 143. 
4
 S. Jandhyala, W. Henisz, and E. Mansfield, ‘Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of 
Foreign Investment Policy,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution (forth., 2011.). 
5
 Ibid., at 22. 
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One way to do this is to investigate the actual justifications given for investment 
treaties during this period. For if, as the authors argue, BITs were signed less for 
instrumental than normative reasons, then this is also how they should have been 
justified.   
This will be investigated in this chapter, which will be in three parts. The first will 
briefly address two norms potentially important for the spread of BITs in the 
1990s, neoliberalism and legal internationalism. The second section will ask, 
whether we can identify a considerable effort on the part of some actors 
promoting BITs in normative terms. While I have already addressed a number of 
BIT-advocates in the last chapter – the World Bank, the United States, Germany, 
etc. – they all primarily promoted the treaties in instrumental terms.6 However, 
when the diffusion of BITs reached a ‘tipping point’ after which they began to 
spread like wild-fire, i.e. the early 1990s, it follows from the norm emulation 
model that external actors could have assisted in a socialisation process, justifying 
BITs in highly normative terms. This could take place both through ‘strategic 
framing’ of BITs, where some actors may attempt to achieve their ends by using 
norms manipulatively, or through bona fide persuasion, where actors have 
promoted BITs without any inherent gains involved.  
I will focus on two potential norm-entrepreneurs. The first is the United Nations 
(UN) and the second is the Western community of private investment lawyers and 
arbitrators. Unlike many of the actors investigated in the last chapter - which of 
course were crucial for the spread of neoliberalism as the broader policy 
framework for the BIT-movement (see below) - neither had the opportunity to 
coerce developing countries into signing BITs. Yet, both were important in 
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 With respect to the United States, only its Eastern European BITs and the BIT with Argentina 
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Intergovernmental agreements relating to investment in developing countries (Paris: OECD, 
1985), par. 89; OECD, User Guidance for the PFI investment policy questions (Paris: OECD, 
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spreading support for the treaties and they are thereby useful to isolate the 
potential role of normative persuasion. Finally, if state identity has been an 
important explanatory factor for BIT-diffusion, we should also be able to trace a 
‘discourse trail’ among developing countries themselves justifying BITs in 
normative terms. This will be investigated in the third and final part of the 
chapter.  
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the aim is to investigate, whether 
signing investment treaties as a particular and specific policy model was 
promoted, and justified, as a normative rather than instrumental choice. A broader 
question will not be dealt with here, namely the role of state identities when 
liberal investment regimes and legal internationalism became popular norms in 
the 1980s and, particularly, 1990s. This opens up for the possibility that norm-
entrepreneurs could have been instrumental in persuading developing countries to 
embrace neoliberalism as a policy norm, for instance, yet not justified BITs in 
normative terms. Similarly, while a commitment to international law could 
potentially be explained with a normative framework, governments’ decision to 
sign BITs may nevertheless have followed a logic of consequences based on their 
(socially constructed) interests, such as attracting international investors.7 In other 
words, even if BITs have been promoted and justified in instrumental terms, this 
does not rule out that a constructivist framework has value in explaining the 
broader contours of international investment policies, where BITs are only one 
constituent part, albeit an important one.  
 
A second caveat is that while the chapter points to the need for further reflection 
on the role of ‘epistemic communities’ and ‘advocacy networks’ in the 
international investment regime, the primary focus here is on discourse, rather 
than the actors themselves. Some basic reflections on the background and ideas of 
organisations advising developing country governments is necessary, but the 
intent is not to investigate their motives in any detail.   
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 Suffice it to say, this raises the more than thorny question about the relationship between interests 
and ideas, rationalism and social constructivism. For a useful (and pragmatic) discussion, see; J. 
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5.1. Which norms? 
 
Neoliberalism 
 
Kathryn Sikkink noted in her innovative study of development policies in Brazil 
and Argentina that ‘international investment [can] be perceived as an opportunity 
or as a danger, depending on the ideas held by policymakers.’8 In this respect, a 
key norm – or ‘causal belief’9 - underlying the modern BIT-regime is undoubtedly 
that international investments are in fact desirable for development.10 Surely, it is 
no coincidence that the BIT-movement was at its peak when the neoliberal ideals 
underlying the Washington Consensus were the predominant development 
discourse.11  
 
In fact, attracting FDI was perhaps the most widely accepted part of the 
Washington Consensus agenda. Compared to short-term capital flows, for 
instance, direct foreign investments were considered the ‘safe’ source of finance 
for developing countries irrespective of political outlook.12 Fair and equitable 
treatment of foreign investors, compensation for expropriation at fair market 
value, and non-discrimination – all are principles that were not just enshrined in 
BITs, but also in the vast majority of national investment codes and practices 
during this period.13 And while domestic investment reforms could of course in 
some circumstances have been directed by Western pressure, this has not been the 
main driver. When the World Bank Guidelines were adopted, there was wide-
                                                          
8
 K. Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), at 19. 
9
 J. Goldstein and R. Keohane, ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,’ in: J. 
Goldstein and R. Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political 
Change (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993). 
10
 Vandervelde (1998), op cit. 
11
 J. Yackee, ‘Are BITs such a bright idea? Exploring the ideational basis of investment treaty 
enthusiasm,’ 12 U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 195 (2005). 
12
 Note that liberalization of short-term capital flows was actually not on Williamson’s initial list 
comprising the Washington Consensus, yet it was promoted by the Washington Institutions.  
13
 J. Alvarez, ’A BIT on Custom,’ 42 New York University Journal on International Law and 
Politics 17 (2009), at 52-56.  In fact, whereas the first modern investor-state arbitration was based 
on rights similar to those enshrined in BITs, its jurisdiction was based on the Egyptian investment 
law; Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/84/3. 
 118 
spread consensus on their value, and the Chairman of the Third World Forum 
wrote to Shihata at the time, that ‘for once, I will be defending the views of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions.’14 So even though later chapters will show that many 
countries have been distressed when realizing the potentially broad scope of some 
BIT provisions - or even the very fact that they could be taken to international 
arbitration - most BITs reflected broader simultaneous changes in national 
investment policies from the late 1980s onwards.15 In turn, this means that it is 
actually not too surprising that there has been no marked ‘partisan bias’ in BIT-
adoption during the time they proliferated (Figure 5.1).16 
 
Figure 5.1. The (lacking) partisan bias of BITs 
 
Yet, for countries wanting to truly display their commitment to economic 
liberalism not just in domestic laws but also when meeting with foreign leaders, 
BITs could have been useful as they presented themselves, ‘as quintessentially 
liberal documents.’17 In their preambles, BITs almost always cite the creation of 
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favourable investment conditions as their main goal. In fact, based on the belief 
that foreign investments are crucial to promote economic prosperity, this is often 
the only purpose cited, and typically no qualifications are made that such 
investments such be ‘sustainable’ for instance. As an example, the Sri Lankan 
model BIT used during the 1990s simply stated that, 
  
‘Desiring to create conditions favourable for greater investment by investors of 
one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party;  
 
Recognizing that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under international 
agreement of such investments will be conducive to the stimulation of individual 
business initiative and will increase prosperity in both States;’18 
 
As noted by Peterson, investment treaties have thereby typically ‘been drafted in 
narrow, uni-dimensional terms, with treaty preambles hailing the need to enhance 
economic cooperation and create a favourable investment climate, and often little 
else in the way of broader policy objectives.’19 
 
But while BITs may have been an important ‘institutional partner’ of 
neoliberalism,20 this doesn’t necessarily mean this is how they have been justified 
in practice. The question here is not whether neoliberal norms have been 
important for the spread of BITs. They undoubtedly have, but this is not a 
surprising or particularly informative point in and by itself. Rather the question is 
whether, as Vandevelde suggests, the treaties have in fact been signed ‘because 
they symbolize a commitment to economic liberalism’.21  
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Investigating this question admittedly takes us into a methodological grey area. 
On the one hand, justifying BITs by their potential to increase foreign investment 
simultaneously signal that developing countries belong to a group of states 
believing foreign investments are in fact worth pursuing. Yet, as noted by 
Gurowitz,  
 
‘Spotting identity as a constraint means looking for statements like: ‘we cannot do 
X because we are a liberal democracy,’ and ‘we must do Y because we are a 
global power.’22 
 
Translated into our context: if participation in the BIT-movement became one of 
those things (self-identified) market-oriented governments were supposed to do, 
we should be able to identify a communication trail, where advocates of the 
treaties and developing countries themselves justified BITs not just by their 
potential for attracting investments, but in more normative terms. If state identity 
has played crucial roles, we should be able to find statements along the lines of 
‘as a state committed to economic globalization we sign BITs’ or in the case of 
BIT advocates, ‘as a state committed to economic globalization you should sign 
BITs.’ 
 
Legal internationalism 
 
Investment treaties did not just match neoliberal ideals after the end of the Cold 
War, following the terminology of Razeen Sally they also represented a 
‘liberalism from above’, i.e. the belief that inter-governmental treaties are 
effective and crucial instruments in achieving a liberal international economic 
order.23 Rather than alleviating domestic root-causes of investment protectionism, 
BITs give international investors rights that often go over and beyond domestic 
laws. The most important right, of course, is that rather than relying on domestic 
courts, investors can sidestep them and instead rely on an adjudicative mechanism 
on the international plane. This fitted well with the growing prominence of 
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international law as a governing institution during the 1990s.24 Here, augmented 
levels of interdependence and the growth of transnational regimes and institutions 
made it increasingly difficult to uphold the domestic/international distinction, 
facilitating what Koh observed as ‘the era of global law in which we now live’.25  
 
Nowhere was the move towards international law as predominant as in the 
economic sphere. Here, the WTO not only established a legalized dispute 
settlement mechanism but also moved far ‘behind the borders’ subjecting 
domestic regulation to international disciplines in areas such as intellectual 
property rights, service provision, and technical standards. Indeed, a former 
chairman of the Appellate Body of the WTO saw one of his functions as moving 
the world a little closer to Grotius’ ideal international legal order.26 So in this 
sense, Montt reminds us that the ‘BIT generation is not a completely unique case 
in the history of modern international law and institutions.’27  
 
In fact, the arbitration mechanism in modern investment treaties went 
considerably further than the WTO, or indeed any other international adjudicative 
mechanism. If investment treaty arbitration was to become a guiding principle for 
international law, surely a number of pertinent questions would arise. Van Harten 
is worth quoting at length,  
 
‘For what reasons and in what circumstances should individuals [then, ed.] be 
allowed to make such claims? Should foreign migrant workers be able to claim 
damages against states that deny them access to the same benefits and protections 
as domestic workers? Should refugees be able to initiate claims against states that 
unlawfully refuse to accept them? Should indigenous peoples be treated as 
subjects of international law with the right to make claims against states that 
expropriated their lands? … With the notable exception of the European Union, 
states have resisted allowing individuals to make international claims against them 
and, since states are the only actors with the authority to change customary rules 
of international law, such reforms have not been forthcoming. This is why the 
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 E.g.; H. Koh, ‘Review Essay: Why do nationals obey international law?’ 106 Yale Law Journal 
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authorisation by states of international claims by investors is so 
groundbreaking.’28 
 
Yet this unique feature of BITs in a public law context is also what makes them 
symbolically useful. BITs had the potential to send a very strong signal that 
adopting countries belonged to the group ‘law abiding’ nations, and they could do 
this without having to grant all the legal rights Van Harten mentions above, which 
in many cases would – right or wrong - be much more politically sensitive.   
 
This raises the question, similar to the one above, whether developing countries 
have signed BITs not so much to attract foreign investment or achieve other 
strategic goals, but rather to signal their adherence to an international rule of 
law.29 Surely, from a functional perspective rule of law institutions can be critical 
to promote foreign investments, or indeed any market-based transactions.30 But 
taking a limited perspective focusing solely on discourse, the question is whether 
the (instrumental) aim of attracting foreign investment has been at the forefront, 
or the treaties have been presented as part of broader normative endeavor to 
establish a ‘just’ and ‘fair’ international legal order.  
 
5.2. Were BITs framed in normative terms by BIT-advocates?  
 
As a first step to investigate these questions, I will focus on the UN as a BIT-
advocate that could have assisted in a socialisation process by framing BITs in 
ways that fitted with underlying policy norms.  
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5.2.1 The United Nations  
 
UNCTC and the shifting norms towards multinationals 
 
The UN has played a central role in the modern international investment regime, 
starting with its Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC).31 Established in 
1974, UNCTC evolved directly out of the NIEO movement and was as such 
primarily concerned with protecting the interests and sovereignty of the 
developing countries in their engagement with foreign investors.32 High priority 
was given to achieve a multilateral investment agreement in the shape of a Code 
on Transnational Corporations,33 which apart from standards on the rights of 
multinationals vis-à-vis their host states (as in BITs) was intended to incorporate 
standards on investors’ own obligations (as many investor-state contracts, but 
unlike BITs).34 BITs, however, were not on the agenda within the first years of 
UNCTC’s existence, and delegations noted in 1983 that the treaties appeared to 
have been overlooked in the organization’s work on international investment 
rules.35  
 
This prompted UNCTC to initiate an annual update to its member states on issues 
pertaining to international investment agreements, including BITs. But while the 
first report was somewhat sceptical towards BITs, 36 and criticised by some UN 
delegates to be unduly biased against the treaties (undoubtedly from OECD 
countries),37 its message began to change in subsequent years. Both in 1986 and 
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two years later in the first UNCTC report dedicated solely to BITs, the treaties 
were still considered only one of several factors influencing investors’ decision-
making process as in its report two years earlier, but for some countries they were 
now presented as a ‘decisive element in attracting foreign capital to a country 
where it would not otherwise go.’38 Yet, this conclusion was based solely on an 
OECD report, which didn’t actually present any evidence to sustain it.39 Similarly, 
while the first report stated bluntly that BITs were not ‘balanced’, since they 
didn’t include obligations for foreign investors,40 later reports were much softer in 
tone, raising considerable counterarguments to this allegation despite no 
additional information about the implications of the treaties compared to the early 
1980s.41   
 
The background for UNCTC’s emerging change in attitude towards BITs was the 
larger shift within the UN system trying to reestablish itself at the centre of the 
international investment policy-making after having been associated with the 
NIEO since the 1970s.42 As the attitude towards FDI became increasingly positive 
in development-circles during the 1980s, any staunch opposition to investment 
treaties would have placed the organization outside the mainstream on this issue 
compared to its stakeholders.43 This was reflected internally in the organization as 
well. As one who contributed significantly to its work put it: 
 
‘Within the UNCTC there were very different views as to how favorable these 
treaties were for developing countries. But the earlier skepticism of the 
organization gradually subsided up through the 1980s, partly because of changes 
in staff.’44  
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Similarly, in the early years of UNCTC the organization always had its Code of 
Conduct to compare the treaties with to stress that the lack of investor obligations 
in BITs made them much less attractive to developing countries. As discussions 
over the Code stalled, however, a long-standing staff member notes that ‘BITs 
were all that was left, so this is where we focused our attention.’45 The head of the 
organization at the time concurs: ‘it became increasingly difficult for us to advise 
against the bilateral treaties, as we suddenly didn’t have much of an alternative to 
offer.’46 So while BITs – or BIT-like standards – had earlier been contested in the 
UN on occasion, and UNCTC staff had the necessary expertise and information to 
document the potential downsides of the treaties, the shift in attitude meant that 
opposition to BITs lost its organizational platform towards the late 1980s.  
 
A few years later, the UNCTC report ‘The Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment’ thus stated that:  
‘it seems unnecessary, perhaps undesirable, for developing countries to attempt to 
present distinctive unilateral policies on political risk, beyond perhaps a normal 
embracing of bilateral investment protection treaties and comparable multilateral 
programs. This should serve as a routine backdrop to a more positive focus on the 
economic environment for foreign direct investment.’47 
 
While the report rigorously analyzed the survey and econometric evidence on FDI 
determinants, no analysis or new studies were used to conclude that BITs 
provided a positive economic environment for FDI.48 So even though no new 
information had become available on the investment impact of BITs, the message 
to developing countries from the key international organization involved in 
information dissemination on BITs was nevertheless clear: while not quoting any 
surveys, investor interviews, or quantitative studies, BITs had by the early 1980s 
gone from being legal instruments without any real economic benefits for 
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developing countries to ‘a routine backdrop’ stimulating a favorable economic 
environment to attract foreign capital.  
 
But although the shifting normative framework towards international investments 
made UNCTC change its position on investment treaties, it never evolved into an 
actual norm-entrepreneur. UNCTC was never responsible for the emergence of 
BIT-movement, as this happened well before the agency got involved. So while 
UNCTC may have been important in spreading support for BITs, it only speeded 
up a process that was already underway. Also, rather than advocating BITs, as 
norm-entrepreneurs would be expected to do, UNCTC hesitantly supported them 
in order to conform to international trends.49 It didn’t have an actual ideological 
commitment to the treaties and therefore also never tried to persuade developing 
countries into signing them. In fact, when offering to produce a model BIT, some 
members strongly opposed it so as to limit UNCTC’s influence.50 While it is not 
clear from public records, it was almost surely the United States, which had a 
long-standing resistance towards the UNCTC.51 Finally, it is important to note, 
that when the organization occasionally gave its cautious support for the treaties, 
it was always in instrumental and somewhat mundane terms, in that they could 
assist in promoting investment flows and make PRI more readily available. In 
1986, for instance, UNCTC noted that access to (cheaper) PRI was a key 
economic benefit of BITs, ‘the existence of a bilateral agreement with the 
respective host country is very often a pre-condition for political risk insurance by 
the investor’s home country.’52 We saw in the last chapter that this message was 
not exactly accurate.  
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UNCTAD as a BIT-advocate 
 
In the early 1990s, the United States managed to facilitate an organizational shift 
within the UN system, with the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) taking over from the UNCTC to handle all research and capacity 
building activities pertaining to FDI promotion and protection.53 Like UNCTC, 
UNCTAD had no resemblance to international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank or the IMF. It was explicitly created as developing countries’ 
organizational platform in the global economy and therefore also historically 
associated with the NIEO. For this reason, it had not been an instrument of power 
of the United States, which during the 1980s was not only critical towards 
UNCTC but also blamed UNCTAD for being ‘ideological’.54 Yet, while the 
United States successfully managed to install a new management within 
UNCTAD in the end 1980s/early 1990s, which was more attuned to neoliberal 
ideas,55 it would be an exaggeration to see it as an instrument of Western 
hegemony to the same extent as some may argue the World Bank has been. 
Finally, UNCTAD wasn’t even a formal organization in that it only had status as a 
permanent forum, a ‘conference,’ and therefore only had expertise and persuasion 
as instruments to encourage developing countries to follow its advice.  
 
To an even greater extent than UNCTC, UNCTAD had also moved away from its 
earlier skeptical stance towards FDI. By the early 1990s, UNCTAD fully 
endorsed the Washington Consensus view on foreign investments, seeing them as 
engines of growth for developing countries.56 As mentioned, this view was partly 
due to a change in staff, but also based on the realisation that this was the only 
way the organization could survive.57 The organization quickly became the 
leading international agency dealing with FDI regulation in developing countries. 
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Skeptics even began referring to UNCTAD as the ‘Global OECD’,58 and the 
ongoing discussions for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the 
actual OECD made its services and expertise particularly relevant for the 
developing world.59 For although developing countries were not part of the MAI 
negotiations several participated as observers and all were eventually intended to 
sign up to the treaty.  
 
Partly due to NGO pressure, however, developed countries failed to agree to the 
MAI,60 which led UNCTAD to shift its focus to BITs. At this time, UNCTAD 
was the only organization, which offered extensive capacity building services 
pertaining directly to BITs. Through numerous courses and publications from the 
latter half of the 1990s, its investment treaty secretariat thereby became 
instrumental in alerting developing countries of the importance of various 
provisions, understanding the nature of investor-state arbitration, and so forth.61 
Yet, this is not its only legacy. In a 2005 external evaluation report, for instance, 
two thirds of developed country negotiators noted that because of UNCTAD’s 
work over the years, they had witnessed ‘a positive change in their developing 
country negotiation partners’ ability to engage in discussions and/or negotiations 
of IIAs over time.’62 And they were not only referring to greater quality of 
decision-making, but also a more positive attitude towards BITs.  
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In fact, UNCTAD itself actively facilitated the signing of BITs. While not itself 
participating in negotiations, UNCTAD promoted the process by bearing the costs 
of travel, full board and lodging for developing country officials as well as 
organizing the necessary facilities and substantive support.63 Between June 2000 
and July 2005, nine such events led to 160 BITs signed between 60 developed and 
developing countries - almost one fourth of all BITs signed between 2000 and 
2005 - and several countries noted that many of them would not have been signed 
without UNCTAD’s assistance (see Table 5.1).64  
 
Table 5.1. UNCTAD’s BIT facilitation rounds and signing ceremonies 
 
 
‘In our two weeks here we managed to finalize five agreements,’ said the head of 
the Philippine delegation during the ‘Sapporo round’ for instance, ‘which is far 
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64
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Date Activity Place Participating countries
19 - 30 June 2000 Facilitation round Sapporo, Japan Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Lao, Myanmar, Peru, Phillipines
15 - 19 January 2001 Facilitation round for Kyrgyzstan Geneva, Switzerland Austra, Denmark, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Sweden
24 Januar - 3 
February 2001
Facilitation round for 
Francophone LDCs
Geneva, Switzerland
Beglium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, 
Comoros, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Madagaskar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, South Africa, Switzerland, Zambia
29 - 28 February 
2001
Facilitation round for 
India New Delhi, India China, Croatia, India, Ethiopia, Yemen
19 - 28 April 2001 Facilitation round for Croatia Dubrovnik, Croatia Belarus, Croatia, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, Pakistan
18 May 2001 Signing ceremony Brussels, Belgium
Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Chad, Comoros, Croatia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius
1 - 6 October 2001 Facilitation round for LDCs Bonn, Germany
Belgium, Cambodia, Eritrea, France, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Netherlands, Sudan, Sweden, Uganda, Zambia
4 - 13 Novermber 
2002
Facilitation round for 
LDCs
Geneva, Switzerland
Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Canada, Chad, Egypt, France, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bisseau, 
Korea, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Netherlands, Senegal, Togo
20 June - 4 July 
2003
Facilitation round for 
LDCs
Geneva, Switzerland
Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, 
France, Ghana, Italy, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe
2 - 6 February 2004 Facilitation round for 
Francophone LDCs
Brussels, Belgium N/A
15 June 2004 Signing ceremony Sao Paulo, Brazil Benin, Chad, Guinea, Lebanon, Mauritania, Switzerland
Source: Compiled from; O. Karsegard, P. Bravo, and H. Blom, UNCTAD work programme on capacity building in developing 
countries on issues in international investment agreements: Final in-depth evaluation report  (New York: United Nations, 2006).
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more than we could otherwise have done in two years.’65 Not only UNCTAD,66 
but also its external evaluators highlighted these sessions as a great success at the 
time due to the economies of scale involved in having BIT negotiations 
centralized leading to considerable cost-savings for the countries involved.67  
 
But while UNCTAD was thereby instrumental in speeding up the diffusion of 
BITs, this does not in and by itself make it an actual socialising agent, as 
understood by Finnemore and Sikkink. Its positive attitude towards the treaties 
was almost always based on the assumption that they were useful instruments to 
attract foreign investment and only on rare occasions were they justified in 
normative terms. In its World Investment Reports, for instance, UNCTAD 
occasionally presented the treaties as part of an ‘appropriate FDI framework’68 
for developing countries, but this was an exception. Mostly, BITs were described 
as instruments that did not necessarily have much to say about FDI incentives,69 
but which could nevertheless contribute to a successful FDI ‘performance.’70 As 
in other of its publications, UNCTAD presented BITs as ‘important signals 
concerning a country’s investment climate,’71 and as such partly responsible for 
‘the strong growth of FDI.’72   
 
The first major UNCTAD study to test the credibility of such statements came in 
1998 with what was the first (publicly available) econometric attempt to estimate 
the impact of BITs.73 The results were discouraging, though, as they found no real 
impact. UNCTAD must be credited for publishing an analysis that apparently 
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contradicted some of its statements with respect to the investment promotion 
potential of BITs, yet the report did go to great lengths to stress that BITs 
probably could be important drivers of investments nevertheless, for instance by 
facilitating the purchase of PRI.74 Also, in the press release to the first BIT-
facilitation event in Geneva, UNCTAD commented on the (undoubtedly 
uncomfortable) fact that the organisation had just released a study showing no 
great causal link from BITs to FDI:  
 
‘While an analysis of FDI flows between signatory countries shows that the 
influence of BITs on FDI is, in fact, weak, BITs are nevertheless increasingly 
regarded by foreign investors as an expected component of a country´s investment 
environment. In many cases, they have become a sine qua non for the availability 
of political-risk insurance. An international comparison of FDI determinants leads 
to the overall conclusion that other determinants of FDI flows such as the size of 
the host country´s market are more decisive than BITs in influencing FDI flows. 
But as countries around the world compete for FDI as part of their development 
efforts, all other conditions being equal, the presence of a BIT can help tilt the 
balance in investors´ locational decisions.’75 
 
Similarly, UNCTAD noted in the same context that by ‘signing BITs between 
themselves, developing countries are sending a strong signal of their commitment 
to provide a predictable, stable and reliable legal environment for foreign direct 
investors, to stimulate investors´ confidence, and boost FDI flows.’76 This 
understanding of the treaties was shared by participating countries as well. In the 
same press release, a representative from Jamaica noted about the initiative that 
the’conclusion of BITs will facilitate FDI between member countries of the G-15, 
in the mutual interest of promoting our development.’77  
 
In recent years, UNCTAD has also strongly encouraged developing countries to 
enter into BITs with the same argument. Table 5.2 below lists a sample of 
UNCTAD’s recommendations to developing countries in its Investment Policy 
Reviews.  
                                                          
74
 Ibid., at 142. 
75
 UNCTAD, ‘UNCTAD hosts bilateral investment treaty negotiations by group of fifteen 
countries,’ press release, 7th January, 1999.  
76
 Ibid.  
77
 Ibid.  
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Where justification for its encouragement to sign BITs is given, it is again based 
on the argument that they can contribute to investment inflows.78 So although 
UNCTAD has indeed been an important facilitator of BITs, this has primarily 
based on the instrumental reasoning that BITs could assist developing countries in 
attracting FDI. Although more detailed studies of the organization’s work with 
investment treaties may very well reveal a normative commitment to the treaties 
as a governing institution, UNCTAD’s discourse has been consequentialist: ‘sign 
BITs to get FDI’. 
 
5.2.2.  Private lawyers  
 
I turn now to another potential category of norm-entrepreneurs in the international 
investment regime, namely Western private lawyers. Lawyers have of course 
always been at the heart of the regime. As noted in the last chapter, the content of 
the almost 3,000 investment treaties as well as the generally recognised rules and 
principles of investment arbitration cannot be understood without reference to the 
work of civil servants like Lord Shawcross, Aron Broches, and Ibrahim Shihata, 
for instance. Today, however, it is increasingly private lawyers, rather than public 
officials, that are having a transformative impact on the architecture of the 
international investment regime. In the increasing number of investment treaty 
claims over often sensitive areas of public regulation private lawyers often play a 
dual role. By acting as both legal counsel and arbitrator, controversy has erupted 
over the potential conflicts of interests involved, when arbitrators themselves may 
have a vested interest in promoting a legal regime favourable to foreign 
investors.79 While still controversial, this point is beginning to be accepted, and 
                                                          
78
 See also; UNCTAD, The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign 
Direct Investment to Developing Countries (Geneva: United Nations, 2009), (‘[BITs, ed.] add a 
number of important components to the policy and institutional determinants for FDI, and thereby 
contribute to enhancing the attractiveness of countries. In particular, they improve investment 
protection and add to the security, transparency, stability and predictability of the investment 
framework… Developing countries have concluded BITs as part of their desire to improve their 
policy framework in order to attract more FDI and benefit from it.’, at xii and 29). 
79
 G. Van Harten, Investment treaty arbitration and public law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007); D. Hranitsky and E. Romero, ‘The ‘Double Hat’ Debate in International Arbitration,’ New 
York Law Journal, June 14th 2010.   
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acted upon, amongst the international legal community.80 But yet another 
potential conflict of interest appears to have gone almost completely unnoticed. 
Because apart from interpreting investment treaties, when representing clients or 
serving as arbitrators, prominent investment lawyers from private firms often also 
advise governments on whether, and how, such treaties should be drafted in the 
first place.  
Private lawyers have been not only been used as experts UNCTAD’s technical 
assistance programs, for instance, they have also acted as advisors to developing 
countries on their investment treaty policies.81 This delegation of a public service 
is notable. Because the more countries signing investment treaties allowing 
investors recourse to international arbitration, the more claims will be brought, 
and the more contracts will be available for counsellors and arbitrators alike. So 
although this has never actually been subject to considerably scrutiny, the triple 
role of investment lawyers – as counsel, arbitrator, and government advisor – is 
potentially important, since prominent lawyers working with investment treaties 
may have been co-architects of an international legal order, which in turn provides 
the market for their own legal services.82 
When advancing BITs, the legal industry has occasionally presented the treaties as 
part of a broader, and legitimate, movement towards international law as a 
governing mechanism. The late Thomas Wälde is a case in point. Before he 
became a leading investment lawyer and arbitrator, Wälde advised over 60 
developing countries on their investment policies during his career at the UN.83 
He was always clear in his support of investment treaties, and this support was 
                                                          
80
 For instance, having noted this conflict of interest, one ICSID arbitrator has decided not to 
accept new instructions to act as counsel in ICSID cases; see homepage of Philippe Sands, at: 
www.matrixlaw.co.uk. 
81
 See below as well as chapter nine. It should also be noted that a well-known phenomenon within 
the field of international arbitration is private lawyers seeking academic teaching positions and 
publications as a way to cultivate an intellectual image, which in turn can assist them in getting 
appointed as arbitrators. Also there, lawyers have been in a unique position to shape the causal 
beliefs and normative positions of the future guardians of the investment regime within 
governments and international organizations; see here generally; M. Larson, The Rise of 
Professionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
82
 For a parallel development in the field of international commercial arbitration, see; Y. Dezalay 
and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a 
Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996).  
83
 See, www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/staff/twalde.php (last accessed 5 January 2011). 
 135 
occasionally justified with the argument that investment protection treaties were 
part of a broader international law effort, ‘to create equal rules for all, to tame the 
natural asymmetry of sheer power with rules and procedure’ and ‘to create 
prosperity and peace to prevent a new Hitler or Stalin from emerging.’84  
Judge Stephen Schwebel is another example. While serving for the American 
government, Schwebel was deeply involved in the American opposition towards 
the NIEO movement playing out in the UN, and after having served at the 
International Court of Justice, Schwebel has acted as arbitrator and counsel in 
numerous investment treaty claims.85 Schwebel has moreover been used recently 
by the American government in work on its BIT-model, where he deplored the 
‘regressive’ development, when the model was weakened from the perspective of 
foreign investors.86 More generally, Schwebel has referred to BITs as ‘an ideal 
law for foreign investment.’87 And in an article called ‘The Overwhelming Merits 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties’, he argues that the institutionalization of 
investor-state arbitration in BITs has been, 
‘…one of the most important progressive developments in the procedure of 
international law in all its history. It is a development that is consistent with the 
advancement of human rights internationally, including the right to own and enjoy 
the use of property. It is consonant with broader international trends that have 
dethroned the State as the sole subject of international law.’88 
Finally, Judge Charles N. Brower is another case in point. Brower also has a 
background in the United States government, and he has served as a judge in the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal as well as in numerous investment treaty 
arbitrations as both counsel and arbitrator. Like Schwebel, Brower has argued that 
                                                          
84
 T. Wälde, ‘The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-Speaking Section of the 
Centre for Studies and Research,’ in P. Kahn and T. Wälde (eds.) New Aspects of International 
Investment Law (Hague: Martinus Neijhoff, 2007).  
85
 Note that considerable controversy erupted when Poland challenged Schwebel’s impartiality as 
an arbitrator in the Eureko case; D. Vis-Dunbar and L. Peterson, ‘Belgian Appeals Court Rejects 
Poland’s Challenge to Arbitrator in Eureko Case,’ Investment Treaty News, Nov. 15, 2007.  
86
 Schwebel’s comments are available at: www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/131118.htm#9 (last 
accessed 11 January 2010). See also; S. Schwebel, ‘The United States 2004 Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law,’ in: G. 
Aksen, K.-H. Bockstiegel, M. Mustill, P. Patocchi and A. Whitesell (eds), Global Reflections on 
International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resoluition: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert 
Briner (Paris: ICC Publishing, 2005). 
87
 S. Schwebel, ‘The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Costumary International Law,’ 
98 American Society of International Law Proceedings 27 (2004), at 28.  
88
 S. Schwebel, ‘The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment Treaties,’ 32 Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review 263 (2008-2009), at 267.  
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BITs are inherently legitimate instruments. Based on Thomas Franck’s work on 
legitimacy in international law, he has portrayed investment treaties as advancing 
the role of arbitrators, who ‘through their independent and impartial application 
of the governing law, foster the international rule of law ...‘89 In another context 
Brower has similarly noted that subjecting public regulation to international 
investment arbitration means that, ‘the rule of law will be realized, and thus 
strengthened for the future.’90 Also here, BITs are presented as much more than 
mere mundane economic instruments to promote investment flows.91  
 
That said, even within the legal industry, BIT-advocacy has often been based on 
at least some element of economic instrumentalism. Jan Paulsson is a good 
illustration. Paulsson is, or has been, president for several arbitration 
organizations, including the International Council for Commercial Arbitration and 
the London Court of International Arbitration. He is a university professor, for 
instance at the London School of Economics, and has advised several 
governments on their investment treaty policies.92 And whereas Paulsson has also 
promoted the view that BITs are essential rule-of-law instruments,93 he ultimately 
states that ‘[t]he occasional costs of having offered international protection of 
investors’ rights appear miniscule compared to the macroeconomic effects of the 
treaty overall.’94 While he is not of the view that BITs will promote investments 
in and of themselves, they are essentially justified as being part a broader effort of 
                                                          
89
 C. Brower and S. Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International 
Investment Law,’ 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 471 (2009), at 497.  
90
 C. Brower and L. Steven, ‘Who Then Should Judge? Developing the International Rule of Law 
under NAFTA Chapter 11,’ 2 Chicago Journal of International Law 193 (2001), at 202. 
91
 Note that among the younger generation of arbitrators, the same view is being promoted on 
occasion. One example is Zachary Douglass, who along the same lines argues that the guiding 
principles of investment treaty arbitration should not just be the ’the promotion of foreign 
investment or respect for sovereign authority in the abstract’ but rather ‘the principles of justice 
and fairness and the international rule of law...’; Z. Douglas, ‘Nothing if Not Critical for 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and Methanex,’ 22 Arbitration International 27 
(2006), at 27. 
92
 Paulsson advised Mexico on the negotiation of NAFTA’s chapter 11, and officials in both 
Pakistan and South Africa note that he gave advice on their BIT-policies as well after having acted 
as counsel in investment treaty disputes.  
93
 J. Paulsson, ‘The Power of States to Make Meaningful Promises to Foreigners,’ 1 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 2 (2010), at 346. 
94
 J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), at 240 
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investment protection, which can ‘convince investors to invest for the longest time 
possible and for the lowest possible return.’95  
Daniel Price is another example. Before joining private practice as both counsel 
and arbitrator in investment treaty disputes, Price was USTR’s lead negotiator of 
NAFTA and Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for 
International Economic Affairs in the George W. Bush administration. Price has 
always been clear that BITs are crucial instruments to sustain large levels of 
foreign investment flows.96 Any weakening of BIT standards, according to Price, 
create:  
‘… no discernible benefits but imposes real costs. Our standard of living and 
economic growth are increasingly dependent on cross-border investment. Our 
companies, entrepreneurs, workers and shareholders have billions of dollars at risk 
abroad and are thus the principal beneficiaries of current investment rules. Any 
dilution of these rules may simply result in U.S. multinationals moving economic 
activity to other jurisdictions ‐ e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, the 
Netherlands ‐ whose treaty network retains strong protections.’97 
 
Dolzer – another noticeable figure in the arbitration industry with a background in 
the German government – argues that, ‘bilateral investment treaties are an agreed 
set of rules that serve to attract foreign investment ….’98 So while BITs may 
reflect broader norms of legal internationalism, they are essentially commercial 
instruments to promote FDI. Finally, it is worth noting that the same view has 
come out of professional legal organizations. The ICC - which apart from being a 
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business organization also provides arbitration services - has primarily advocated 
in favour of the treaties on the basis that they are strategic instruments to protect 
and promote investments,99 and so has the American Bar Association (ABA).100  
 
So from their unique position in the international investment regime to promote 
the popularity of BITs, private investment lawyers have thereby used both 
normative and instrumental arguments in favor of the treaties. On the one hand, 
the treaties have been presented as part of a broader, and just, movement towards 
the protection of individual rights under international law. This is reflected also in 
their role as arbitrators, where the fair and equitable treatment standard, for 
instance, has occasionally been presented as allowing for ‘justice to be done’101 or 
‘serving the purpose of justice’.102 On the other hand, many tribunals have also 
ascertained the basic purpose of BITs in highly instrumental terms. Rather than 
lofty ideals of international justice, the tribunal in Siemens A.G. v. Argentina 
noted for instance that the BIT: 
‘… is a treaty ‘to protect’ and ‘to promote’ investments. The preamble provides 
that the parties have agreed to the provisions of the Treaty for the purpose of 
creating favorable conditions for the investments of nationals or companies of one 
of the two States in the territory of the other State. Both parties recognize that the 
promotion and protection of these investments by a treaty may stimulate private 
economic initiative and increase the well-being of the peoples of both countries.
 
The intention of the parties is clear. It is to create favorable conditions for 
investments and to stimulate private initiative.’103  
 
This approach has been followed by other tribunals as well,104 and follows the 
instrumental discourse of many prominent arbitrators, presenting BITs in similar 
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terms as UNCTAD, namely as useful to assist developing countries in attracting 
foreign capital.  
 
The case of CEELI 
 
A notable and illustrative example took place in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, 
where the United States became deeply involved in promoting BITs in the former 
Communist bloc.105 The process was backed up by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), which played a key role in promoting 
investment protection reforms through the Eastern European Democracies 
program106 and its funding of the Commercial Law Development Program run by 
the Commerce Department.107 More important in this context, however, was 
USAID’s support to the Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI), 
organized by private lawyers of the ABA. While a massive effort to promote 
investor-friendly reforms in the former Communist bloc, it has unfortunately been 
completely overlooked in existing accounts of the international investment 
regime.108  
Eastern and Central European countries were desperate for CEELI assistance on 
how to introduce the rule of law after communism,109 and CEELI analyses were 
all extremely detailed and competent, which was helpful for legislators and 
government officials lacking expertise in drafting laws and regulations to promote 
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FDI. And while some recommendations were clearly inspired by for instance 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, others were careful not to simply ‘import’ investment laws 
and regulations into economies with different legal traditions and capacities.110  
FDI promotion was an explicit goal of CEELI, and the organization repeatedly 
argued that in order to stimulate inward investment, governments would be well-
advised to enter into BITs and, more generally, give investors access to 
international arbitration clauses, for instance with reference to ICSID.111 But 
although one lawyer promoted BITs explicitly to spread ‘libertarian ideas and 
practices’,112 and on at least one occasion included references to libertarian writers 
such as Hans-Herman Hoppe and Murray Rothbard,113 this was an exception. 
Another lawyer used by CEELI notes that, ‘in order to attract investments from 
abroad, developing countries need to enter into BITs and be signatories to the 
ICSID convention. So this naturally played a role in the advice I gave.’114 For 
instance, in the input given to the Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, CEELI therefore noted that in order to ‘be successful in attracting 
foreign capital’, Lithuania should ‘enter into BITs with the U.S. and other 
Western States.’115 Also the Albanian government was urged to negotiate BITs by 
CEELI lawyers,116 who forwarded the text of several US BITs for inspiration.117 
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While not mentioning CEELI directly, Philippe Sands notes about the foreign 
legal advisors at the time that: 
‘To encourage foreign investment, Albania was told it would be necessary to 
promulgate various national laws and investment protection treaties. … Until the 
1990s Albania had no treaties to protect the investments of foreigners. It signed its 
first one, with neighboring Greece, in August 1991. Twenty-one more were signed 
within four years.‘ 118 
Generally, it appears that the intense efforts of CEELI bore fruit. In the early 
1990s, Eastern European governments rushed to enter into BITs with both the US 
and other Western states (Figure 5.2).119 So whereas the Communist bloc earlier 
had been particularly sceptical towards the foreign (Western) investments, its 
former members now suddenly represented ‘the most fertile source of new BIT-
partners.’120  
 
Figure 5.2. The rush to BITs by former communist states. 
 
This is notable. For while the lawyers involved in CEELI worked on a pro bono 
basis, it is not difficult to see the potential conflicts of interest: by promoting 
extensive rights for foreign investors in the region and advising in favor of having 
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disputes settled through international arbitration rather than in domestic courts, 
lawyers working for private firms simultaneously carved out a market for their 
own legal services to governments or private clients in the future.121 So while the 
presence of CEELI and similar organizations was clearly justified by their 
expertise in capitalist legal systems and most lawyers involved had, and still have, 
impeccable reputations, the foreign investment reforms - including the 
encouragement to sign BITs - cannot be said to have been promoted without a 
degree of vested interest. Whether this conflation of interests was real, as opposed 
to merely potential, is outside the scope of this study to determine, but as the 
literature on American legal assistance pointed out long ago: 
‘International and national interests, professional and self-interests, developmental 
and humanitarian interests – the various motives for American legal assistance 
worked together … Potential conflicts between interests were overlooked, pushed 
aside by the implicit celebration of American legal ways.’122 
However, what is again important to note is that while some CEELI lawyers may 
have been involved for ideological reasons, the primary argument presented to 
Eastern European countries was instrumental in nature: without BITs, it will be 
difficult to attract foreign investment. As we shall see below, this view of BITs 
has also been shared by developing countries themselves when justifying their 
participation in the BIT-movement. 
 
5.3. Developing country justifications for signing BITs 
 
Although there are few records available from the time, the recollection of 
officials involved in countries that began signing BITs during the 1980s does not 
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suggest that state-identity was particularly important. One interesting case was Sri 
Lanka, which after liberalising its economy in the late 1970s began negotiating 
BITs.123 Sri Lanka is notable, as it was not only the first country to ever be subject 
to a BIT-claim,124 it was also somewhat unique among developing countries in 
having a very targeted and informed BIT-strategy, which for instance gave its 
BITs the force of law directly through its Constitution (once approved by a two-
thirds Parliamentary majority).125 The reason for signing the treaties, however, 
was primarily based on economic reasoning. A senior advisor involved at the time 
notes that ‘we began signing BITs as we sought a stable legal environment, and 
wanted to attract foreign capital.’126 Similarly, a former judge of the Sri Lankan 
court of appeals noted in the early 1990s that developing countries like Sri Lanka:  
 
‘... beset with economic difficulties, have come to realize that one of the best ways 
in which their economies can be developed is by encouraging foreign investments, 
and that the bilateral investment treaty is a fine instrument to achieve that 
objective.’127 
 
Other, in fact most, countries had less coordinated BIT-strategies.128 There, the 
decision to enter into BITs often relied on individual agencies or bureaucrats. In 
Ghana, for instance, a representative who was involved in starting the country’s 
BIT-program, recalls that in the 1980s: 
 
‘… we realized the need to enter into BITs, because we had much interference in 
ownership of companies, expropriations, and so forth, which became an image 
problem, we wanted to address with BITs. The treaties were intended to push 
forward reform, keep politicians on their toes to tell politicians to refrain from 
doing things, and to assure foreign investors.’129 
 
Ghana’s spurt to sign investment treaties in the late 1980s was thereby also 
justified in instrumental terms. Another example from Africa is the report from 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee on BITs, which also presented the 
treaties as ‘effective’ instruments to promote investments:  
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‘Even though several countries offer such safeguards under their constitution or 
laws, there is a better psychological impact when the investment is made under 
government to government umbrella agreements. This method has proved to be 
very effective in recent years and many developed countries accordingly consider 
such bilateral investment protection agreements to be of considerable 
importance.’130  
Also a country like Turkey, which too began to sign investment treaties during the 
1980s, is on record stating that: 
 
‘Turkey began to negotiate BITs with a view to creating and maintaining 
favourable conditions for foreign investment to foster its economic growth in the 
second half of the 1980s, when a liberal and flexible foreign investment policy 
was adopted as part of the programme of economic transformation which was 
launched at the beginning of that decade.’131 
 
Many socialist states also began BIT-programs at this time. While this reflected 
domestic developments in countries like China and the Soviet Union gradually 
opening up their economies to foreign investors and accepting international law as 
a governing institution,132 there is no indication that the treaties were justified in 
normative terms. At least in the case of China, BITs were regarded as useful to 
convince foreign investors that the opening up of the Chinese economy was ‘real’, 
because by ‘committing to international obligations through bilateral agreements, 
the trust and foreign investors [could] be won.’ 133 Secondly, compared with other 
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international instruments, BITs were seen as allowing ‘particular conditions with 
respect to each party’ and ‘quite efficient in securing full implementation by the 
parties of the various provisions set out.’134 Third, the treaties provided 
protections for Chinese investors investing abroad. Finally, they allowed China to 
strike the right balance between granting investor rights but at the same time 
preserving state sovereignty, as the Chinese insisted on having investment 
disputes adjudicated primarily through domestic remedies.135  
 
Although obviously not exhaustive, this indicates that instrumental rather than 
normative considerations were probably the primary driver, when countries signed 
BITs during this period. While the broader movement towards neoliberal 
investment policies may have been justified in normative terms, the discourse 
surrounding BITs was highly instrumental – ‘we sign BITs to get X.’  This does 
not rule out, of course, that state identities played an important role in the 
diffusion of BITs in later years. Although not entirely corresponding with the 
model of Finnemore and Sikkink, Checkel reminds us that policies initially 
pursued for instrumental reasons can, over time, be pursued without any 
conscious cost-benefit calculus but primarily due to socialisation and normative 
internalization.136 Yet also during the 1990s - when Jandhyala and collaborators 
suggest norm-emulation was behind much of the BIT-movement - the 
‘communication trail’ suggests that material rather than normative arguments 
were the main reasons developing countries pursued BITs.  
 
Let us begin with Asia, where in Thailand, for instance, an official involved with 
the country’s BIT-program notes that ‘the idea in the 1990s was that we would 
have more investment if we negotiated those bilateral instruments.’137 And both in 
Cambodia and Lebanon, BITs were used not so much to signal adherence to 
global norms but rather as strategic instruments to comfort investors in post-war 
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environments.138 Also, even while spear-heading opposition towards multilateral 
investment rules in the context of the WTO,139 India negotiated numerous BITs 
with one primary aim in mind: to ‘boost investor confidence’ and thereby 
facilitate investment inflows.140 Finally, even in the case of Pakistan, BITs were 
not just seen as fashion trends – as claimed by Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield – 
but there was also a sincere belief among key policy-makers that the treaties 
would be important in attracting foreign capital. As one senior official there noted 
about negotiations during the 1990s, ’during the period we signed the treaties a 
good amount of investment also came, so the BITs worked.’141 Among some key 
officials, this perception is still present: ’BITs do provide an incentive for foreign 
investments. They are a commitment to the investor from the state that they can go 
to arbitration, and it is thereby an investment incentive that we can provide 
quickly.’142 
In Latin America the discourse was largely similar. The Venezuelan UNCTAD 
representative noted in 1997, for instance, that while BITs should include further 
FDI-promotion provisions, they ‘could contribute to attracting FDI’ even in their 
traditional form.143 In Ecuador as well, officials involved notes that the country 
began signing BITs during its transition to a market-based regime because ‘we 
thought these treaties were very important to attract investments.’144 Similarly, a 
senior Costa Rican representative who negotiated BITs during the 1990s recalls 
that ‘we started signing BITs in the mid-1990s because we thought they would be 
very important tools to attract investments.’145 And just as UNCTAD and other 
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organizations stressed that BITs were important for the provision of PRI, this was 
also one of the main instrumental arguments for Chile to initiate its BIT program 
for instance. In the traveaux préparatoires for the Statute approving the ICSID 
Convention, the President of Chile noted lower insurance premiums as a primary 
reason not just to sign up to ICSID but also to BITs, 
 
‘[Concluding BITs and the ICSID Convention, ed.] will permit foreign investors 
to obtain lower insurance premiums than those actually obtained in the normal 
situation [without a BIT, ed.]. Therefore, the accession of Chile to this type of 
treaties would permit the country to keep an advantaged position in order to attract 
foreign investment.’146  
 
This view was shared by Chilean negotiators as well.147 Another example is 
Jamaica, which apart from its 1989 BIT with the UK, began signing numerous 
BITs in the 1990s. A BIT-negotiator from the time notes that what prompted 
developing countries like his to agree to BITs was, ‘the pragmatic consideration 
that they will receive foreign investment from their treaty partners which are 
usually developed capital exporting States.’148 Morover, even Cuba began signing 
numerous BITs after Castro embraced foreign investments in the early 1990s.149  
So despite hardly being an easy target for neoliberal propaganda or famous for 
wanting to ‘look good’ vis-à-vis Western governments, Cuba has today signed 
even more BITs than its archrival, the United States (Figure 5.3).  
Figure 5.3. Cuba’s BIT-rush 
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Finally, in the case of Eastern Europe discussed above, there was also a 
perception that BITs were important in attracting foreign investments. Although 
officials in a country like Croatia are reported to have seen BITs purely as 
instruments to promote diplomatic relations150, in Estonia, for instance, BITs were 
signed in the beginning of the 1990s to ‘promote Estonia as an investment 
destination’.151 Similarly, in Czechoslovakia – and later the Czech Republic - 
officials were even of the view that BITs were a ‘prerequisite’ for Western 
investors committing capital there.152 
 
All in all, this suggests that not only (most) external advocates, but also 
developing countries themselves mainly justified BITs in instrumental terms, with 
the primarily – though not only – argument being that the treaties could assist 
them in attracting foreign investors. This is not to suggest that all developing 
countries had exactly the same reasons for adopting investment treaties over the 
last many decades, and surely normative considerations have been relevant on 
ocassion. But it does appear that the most important driver of the BIT-movement 
was the perception that the treaties were critical to attract FDI. A veteran 
American BIT-negotiator thus also notes that although the United States did not 
try to promote the view that BITs were crucial for developing countries to attract 
foreign investments,153 developing countries initiated BIT-negotiations with the 
United States during the 1990s primarily because they thought it would help them 
attract foreign capital.154  
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Recent BIT-adjustments as a reflection of protectionism? 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that while some lawyers have presented recent 
adjustments of BITs in favour of host states as a general move towards investment 
protectionism,155 this is a questionable analysis. Although outright opposition 
towards investment treaties has overlapped with anti-capitalist sentiments in parts 
of Latin America, the gradual rebalancing of the regime has not followed partisan 
or ideological lines. This will be further discussed in later chapters, but a few 
remarks are worth making here. A country like South Africa, for instance, has 
become exceptionally sceptical towards BITs in recent years despite no real 
change in overall policy outlook vis-à-vis international investments.156 Others, 
such as Mexico and the Czech Republic, have continued to sign BITs but been 
much more careful in clarifying and restricting their scope, again despite no real 
change in their commitment to international investments. Similarly, not all 
countries sceptical towards neoliberal investment policies have followed the path 
of countries like Ecuador and Bolivia. A country like Russia, for instance, has 
become much more wary of international investments,157 but although some 
restrictive changes in its BIT-strategy can be traced, Russia has not denounced 
existing BITs or asked to have them renegotiated.158 A parallel development has 
taken place in developed countries. Here, the United States and Canada have 
scaled back key protections in their BITs, despite a continued commitment to 
international investments.159 By contrast, a notable rise in anti-FDI sentiments in a 
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M. Olcott, ‘The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy: Vladimir Putin and the Geopolitics 
of Oil,’ Paper prepared for the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, October (2004). 
158
 Russian Bilateral Investment Treaties, presentation by L. Poulsen, European Center for 
International Political Economy, November 20, 2008. 
159
 Alvarez, op. cit., at 31-9; K. Vandervelde ‘A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model 
BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests’, in: K. Sauvant (ed.) Yearbook of 
international Investment Law and Policy 2008/2009 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
at 283. In recent years, concerns about foreign acquisitions have risen in United States and 
Canada, particularly when target firms were considered strategic industries or when investment 
was facilitated through sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities. Overall, however, this cannot be 
construed as an outright backlash against multinationals. See; K. Sauvant, ‘Driving and 
Countervailing Forces: A Rebalancing of National FDI Policies,’ in: K. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook 
on International Investment Law and Policy 2008/2009 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
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country like France has not been associated with any tangible restrictions in its 
BIT-policy, which continues to rely on protection provisions, which in some ways 
are more far-reaching than those of the United States.160 Such variation is difficult 
to explain with changing norms towards neoliberalism, and later chapters will 
show that rather than ideology, the availability and processing of information 
about the risks of BITs have played a key role.  
 
Conclusion 
 
While norms may have played an important part of the overall shift in investment 
policy principles during the 1980s and 1990s, investment treaties as a particular 
policy model were most often justified in instrumental terms. By and large, 
developing countries have joined the BIT-movement in pursuit of self-perceived 
(and perhaps socially constructed) material interests and in particular in order to 
attract foreign investments. Similarly, while some corners of the international 
legal community have presented the treaties as part of a broader movement 
towards an international rule of law – a ‘liberalism from above’ – such 
justifications are difficult to find among developing countries themselves.  
 
So while surely a logic of appropriateness must have played an important role in 
some cases, with BITs signed merely as part of a broader attempt to conform with 
a neoliberal development agenda or a move towards legal internationalism, this 
cannot be said to have been the main driver of the BIT-movement. Instead, a 
competition based approach appears intuitively better to adequately capture the 
broader dynamics of the diffusion of BITs. So let us proceed by asking whether 
existing accounts of the BIT-movement are correct, when assuming that by 
entering into BITs, developing country governments were able to attract or retain 
greater levels of foreign investment, directly or indirectly. This is an important 
                                                          
160
 Here, calls for ‘economic patriotism’ has led to sustained efforts to prevent foreign firms taking 
over its national champions (Sauvant, op. cit., at 243), yet French treaties signed over the last 
couple of years still closely follow the structure and content of BITs as they have been signed over 
the last several decades. See e.g. BITs with Kenya (2007) and Syria (2009). 
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question. For as noted by Alvarez in 1992, ‘Countries are now turning to BITs in 
hope of economic benefits; if the benefits fail to materialize, there is the danger of 
a potent backlash.’161 
                                                          
161
 J. Alvarez, ‘Remarks,’ 86 ASIL Proceedings 551 (1992), at 553. 
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6. A rational competition for capital (or trade 
agreements)?  
 
The overarching theme in literature on BIT-diffusion has been that without the 
treaties developing countries would attract considerably less FDI. Recall, 
Guzman, for instance, arguing that without BITs, developing countries are not 
able to make ‘credible commitments’ to foreign investors, and will therefore be 
less attractive investment destinations.1 A slight variation of this argument is that 
even if imperfectly informed investors cannot rely on a BIT for protection, they 
may nevertheless take them into account as a ‘signal’ that the government is 
generally committed to treat all investors fairly.2 As Montt argues, signing BITs 
with all the risks they entail was the ‘cost of seeking additional FDI inflows …’3  
So whether it is by ‘trading sovereignty for credibility’ or providing a general 
signal to foreign investors, BITs could in theory make developing countries more 
attractive investment destinations. If so, then it could be perfectly rational for 
them to sign the treaties to prevent losing out in the race to attract foreign capital. 
To investigate this claim, the chapter is structured as follows. The first section 
will review the econometric literature, and the second will review the surveys on 
the role of BITs for investors’ investment decisions and provide further insights 
by discussing my interviews with BIT-negotiators from capital exporting 
countries. The third section will review the claim that BITs provide a ‘stepping 
stone’ to broader economic integration agreements, which in turn may lead to 
FDI. The fourth section will discuss the role of BITs for private PRI agencies, 
again with substantial interview feedback from practitioners. On this basis, the 
fifth section will compare the role of BITs to alternative risk mitigating 
                                                          
1
 A. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties,’ 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639 (1998). 
2
 E. Neumayer and L. Spess, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment 
to Developing Countries?’33 World Development 1567 (2005). 
3
 S. Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009), at 128. 
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instruments for multinationals, such as investor-state contracts; and finally, the 
last section will conclude.  
 
6.1. Econometric evidence 
 
That BITs can be important for some investors establishing investments abroad is 
indisputable. This is confirmed by reports of treaty shopping, for instance, where 
investors choose to invest from countries that have a BIT with the host country 
rather than investing from their home country.4 But the fact that BITs at times can 
impact how investments are structured does not necessarily imply that these 
investments would not have taken place in the absence of BITs. Similarly, 
anecdotal reports that some investors have postponed already planned investments 
until BITs were in place5 do not tell us much about the treaties’ impact on the 
decision to invest in the first place. For host countries wanting to attract 
investments, therefore, the relevant question is not whether BITs have an impact 
on the legal structure or timing of investments, but whether they have an impact 
on their destination and volume.  
Practically all studies investigate this question apply econometric techniques. Yet, 
while most authors may share a quantitative approach as their methodological 
foundation, many differ starkly in conclusions: some studies find that BITs have a 
strong effect on international investment flows, some find only a weak effect, and 
other still find no effect at all. In 2009, however, UNCTAD published a review of 
econometric studies on the impact of BITs and FDI and concluded that, 
                                                          
4
 K. Sauvant and L. Sachs, ‘BITs, DTTs, and FDI flows: an overview,’ in: K. Sauvant and L. 
Sachs (eds.) The effect of treaties on foreign direct investment: bilateral investment treaties, 
double taxation treaties, and investment flows (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), at lv. 
Some notable investment treaty claims have dealt with this issue, see e.g., Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. 
Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005; 
Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004; 
Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, award, 15 April 2009.  In 
practice, though, double taxation treaties will probably be much more important than BITs for 
most investors’ ‘choice’ of home country. A well-known case in point is the considerable 
investments into India made through Mauritius, due to the favorable double taxation treaty 
between the two countries. See e.g. Eduardo Baistrocchi, ‘The structure of the asymmetric tax 
treaty network: theory and implications,’ Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 1991 (2007).  
5
 UNCTAD quotes a report from Germany suggesting this to be the case; UNCTAD, ‘The Impact 
on Foreign Direct Investment of BITs,’ in: Sauvant and Sachs, op. cit., at 347.  
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‘recent studies published between 2005 and 2008 – based on much larger data 
samples, improved econometric models and more tests – have shifted the balance 
towards concurring that BITs do have some influence on FDI inflows from 
developed countries into developing countries.’6 
Whether this actually sustains the conclusion that BITs are in fact important for 
FDI flows is questionable. The most widely quoted recent study that finds a strong 
effect is the 2005 study of Neumayer and Spess who, based on their panel data 
analysis, conclude that BITs not only have a substantial impact on investment but 
can also provide a substitute for poor institutional quality in host countries.7 
According to them:  
‘The message to developing countries therefore is that succumbing to the 
obligations of BITs does have the desired payoff of higher FDI inflows … BITs 
fulfill their purpose, and those developing countries that have signed more BITs 
with major capital exporting developed countries are likely to have received more 
FDI in return.’8 
This naturally provides a strong argument in favor of signing the treaties and 
appears to back up the claim that BITs are useful legal instruments to attract 
investment. In his doctoral dissertation, however, Yackee replicates the analysis 
and shows that the results disappear after conducting slight, but justified, changes 
in estimation strategy.9 Similarly, using more comprehensive tests than that of 
Neumayer and Spess, Hallward-Driemeier10 finds little evidence that BITs have 
stimulated investment flows to developing countries. In contrast to Neumayer and 
Spess, as well as studies by Grosse and Trevino11 and Gallagher and Birch12, the 
results of Hallward-Driemeier are based on bilateral flows and bilateral treaties 
                                                          
6
 UNCTAD, The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries (Geneva: United Nations, 2009), at xiii. 
7
 See; Neumayer and Spess, op. cit.  
8
 Ibid., at 1582-3.  
9
 J. Yackee, Sacrificing sovereignty: bilateral investment treaties, international arbitration, and 
the quest for capital, PhD-dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007, ch. 4; 
see also J. Yackee (2009a) ‘Do BITs really work? Revisiting the empirical link between 
investment treaties and foreign direct investment,’ in: Sauvant and Sachs, op. cit.  
10
 M. Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do bilateral investment treaties attract FDI? Only a bit … and they 
could bite,’ in: Sauvant and Sachs, op. cit., at 349. Note that Hallward-Driemeier also rejects the 
suggestion by Neumayer and Spess, - that BITs ‘substitute’ for poor institutional quality in host 
countries. See; Neumayer and Spess, op. cit.  
11
 R. Grosse and L. Trevino, ‘New institutional economics and FDI location in Central and Eastern 
Europe,’ in: Sauvant and Sachs, op. cit., at 273.  
12
 K.  Gallagher and M. Birch, ‘Do investment agreements attract investment? Evidence from 
Latin America,’ in: Sauvant and Sachs, op. cit., at 295. Note that in a separate set of regressions, 
Gallagher and Birch do look at the impact of U.S. BITs on bilateral flows between Latin American 
countries and the U.S. (see infra note 31). 
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rather than aggregate flows and the total number of BITs. This is a superior 
econometric strategy for several reasons, the most important being that it allows 
for a more accurate separation of the effects of BITs from the strong upward trend 
in FDI over time. Finally, in a sophisticated study, Aisbett shows that Neumayer 
and Spess, as well as the 2005 study by Salacuse and Sullivan,13 fail to properly 
take into account the endogenous relationship between BITs and investment 
flows.14 When more carefully considering the possibility of reverse causality – 
that BITs may be signed among countries already exchanging large investment 
flows – developing countries do not appear to become more attractive investment 
destinations as a result of signing BITs. Indeed, a former U.S. BIT-negotiator, 
Kenneth Vandevelde, suggests that the priority by capital-exporting states to sign 
BITs with states that were already hosts to large stocks of investments mean that 
‘… BITs may be caused by investment flows and not the other way around.’15 
Also, in a Granger-type analysis, Aisbett changes the dependent variable from 
FDI flows to an index measure of expropriation risk and finds that while 
decreases in expropriation risk ratings are negatively correlated with the number 
of BITs a country enters into, the reverse is not true; BITs do not appear to 
decrease subsequent expropriation risk ratings.16 
BITs, however, can differ markedly in their substantive and procedural 
provisions. So perhaps ‘strong’ BITs may have a stronger impact on investment 
flows? For instance, one would expect that BITs with market access provisions 
would have a greater impact on investment flows than BITs covering only the 
                                                          
13
 J. Salacuse and N. Sullivan, ‘Do BITs really work? An evaluation of bilateral investment treaties 
and their grand bargain,’ 46 Harvard International Law Journal 67 (2005).  
14
 E. Aisbett, ‘Bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment: correlation versus 
causation,’ in: Sauvant and Sachs, op. cit.  
15
 K. Vandevelde, ‘Investment liberalization and economic development: the role of bilateral 
investment treaties,’ 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 501 (1998), at 524–25; See also 
D. Swenson, ‘Why do developing countries sign BITs?’ in: Sauvant and Sachs, op. cit. 
16
 It should be mentioned that in their equally refined contribution Egger and Pfaffermayr find 
BITs to have positive and significant effect on outward FDI stock from OECD countries; P. Egger 
and M. Pfaffermayr, ‘The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment,’ in 
Sauvant and Sachs, op. cit. However, the 30% effect of ratified BITs in their preferred model-
specifications appears exceptionally high, particularly in light of the above-mentioned studies of 
FDI flows and the qualitative evidence presented below. The same applies to Kerner’s result that a 
BIT between two countries should somehow increase their dyadic flows by more than US$620 
million each year (!); A. Kerner, ‘Why should I believe you? The costs and consequences of 
bilateral investment treaties,’ 53 International Studies Quarterly 73 (2009), Table 2.   
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post-establishment phase. Similarly, BITs which incorporate a legally binding 
consent to arbitrate a wide range of investment disputes with private investors are 
likely to be valued higher by investors than BITs where such consent is limited or 
absent. Both of these propositions have been tested, however, and none have been 
convincingly confirmed to date. While Haftel finds that U.S. BITs – which 
include liberalization provisions – do impact investments,17 Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman18 as well as Peinhardt and Allee19 come to the opposite result, and 
Gallagher and Birch20 find no effects of U.S. BITs on FDI inflows to Latin 
American and Caribbean countries.21 Similarly, in a particularly important result, 
Yackee shows that even BITs with ‘strong’ arbitration provisions do not appear to 
impact international investments,22 which is remarkable since arbitration clauses 
are the most attractive feature of a BIT from the perspective of foreign investors.23 
On the other hand, however, Berger, Busse, Nunnemkamp, and Roy, do actually 
find a considerable effect of both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ BITs in an equally 
sophisticated study.24 
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 Y. Haftel, ‘Ratification counts: U.S. investment treaties and FDI flows into developing 
countries,’ 17 Review of International Political Economy 2 (2010).  
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 J. Tobin and S. Rose-Ackerman, ‘Foreign direct investment and the business environment in 
developing countries: the impact of bilateral investment treaties,’ Yale Law and Economics 
Research Paper, No. 293 (May 2 2005).  
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 This is surprising as it would make intuitive sense if BITs are more likely to be considered by 
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concluding chapter). Finally, the U.S. has been on the respondent end of a number very 
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making. See; K. Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties (Deventer: Kluwer, 1992), at 32; 
K. Vandevelde, ‘Investment liberalization and economic development: the role of bilateral 
investment treaties,’ 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 501 (1998). 
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 Yackee (2009a), op. cit.  
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 T. Wälde, ‘The ‘umbrella’ clause in investment arbitration: a comment on original intentions 
and recent cases,’ 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade 183 (2005), at 194.  
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Effects on FDI? Not a Bit!,’ Economics Letters (forth.).  
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The econometric evidence is therefore largely inconclusive. This is primarily 
because of the limited data available, which precludes the quantitative literature to 
answer the most pertinent questions. BITs are, for instance, likely to be more 
important in certain sectors than others. Historical experience, as well as recent 
developments in parts of Latin America, shows that resource extraction sectors are 
particularly prone to discriminatory or even predatory government interference. 
Accordingly, natural resource investors may take more notice of BITs than 
investors in less politicized sectors. Similarly, the importance of BITs for 
investors’ decision-making process is likely to depend on the size of the 
investment, as the enforcement mechanism can involve significant arbitration 
costs for the investor should it come to a dispute with the host country. In turn, 
this may make the treaties more or less redundant for small investors.25 On the 
other hand, very large multinationals can often rely on diplomatic protection by 
their home country and are moreover able to bargain for investor-state contracts 
with similar or greater legal guarantees than those provided in BITs (see below). It 
follows that if BITs are important in the pre-establishment phase of foreign 
investment decisions, it would most likely be for medium-scale investors. 
Unfortunately, these hypotheses are inherently difficult to test using international 
investment data, which are too incomplete and often incomparable at 
disaggregated levels, whether measured as flows or stocks.  
 
These are not the only challenges for the econometric literature. For instance, the 
effects of BITs are likely to depend on a range of political and social conditions 
which can be difficult to measure. Irrespective of recent advances in quantitative 
indexes measuring ambiguous concepts such as governance or institutions, it 
remains a challenge to carefully control for such intangible variables. Another 
challenge is that developing countries have often entered into BITs as part of 
broader economic reform packages, which means the treaties often come into 
                                                          
25
 R. Daniño, Secretary-General of ICSID, Opening remarks at ‘Making the most of international 
investment agreements: a common agenda’ (December 12, 2005, Paris), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/8/36053800.pdf (last visited January 30, 2010); J. Coe Jr., 
‘Taking stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its tenth year: an interim sketch of selected, themes, issues 
and methods,’ 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1381 (2003), at 1400-1401. For a 
different view, see Wälde, op. cit., at 204-206.  
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effect alongside a number of other domestic and international economic instru-
ments. To the extent that simultaneous initiatives, such as preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) or reforms in domestic investment and taxation codes have an 
impact on investment flows, they would have to be taken into account. For 
instance, Berger and colleagues find that the effects of BITs is only considerable 
in so far as Eastern European countries are included in the sample, but while their 
model controls for host country liberalization trends, it is not able to account for 
demand-side factors among home countries.26 Indeed, we saw in the last chapter 
the intensive effort of public and private American organizations in shaping the 
regulatory framework for investment in post-communist Europe, and to the extent 
such efforts led to increase interest from Western investors – independently of 
BITs – this would make their results spurious. Similarly, with respect to PTAs, 
some literature suggests that they have a substantial effect on FDI flows between 
the contracting parties,27 which implies that studies on BITs could systematically 
overestimate their effects on FDI if PTAs are not taken into account.  
 
A related point is that developing countries often enter into BITs when heads of 
state meet at home or abroad. Such high level meetings typically involve many 
other bilateral economic cooperation initiatives however, and to the extent such 
initiatives lead to investment projects between the two countries, they could also 
result in systematic biases if not controlled for. In the case of Pakistan, for 
instance, most of its BITs were signed in the past as part of a ‘road-show’, where 
numerous other investment promotion activities also took place.28 Interviews with 
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 Berger, Busse, Nunnemkamp, and Roy, op. cit. I am grateful to Emma Aisbett for making this 
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 See e.g., E. Yeyati, E. Stein and C. Daude, ‘Regional integration and the location of FDI,’ Inter-
American development bank research department working paper 492 (2003); D. Medveved, ‘The 
impact of preferential trade agreements on FDI inflows,’ World Bank Policy Research Working 
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several projects in the oil and gas exploration, hydropower and chemicals sectors were signed with 
British investors); ‘Private investment from Singapore,’ Business Recorder, 12 March, 1995 (apart 
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firms were signed with a total expected inflow of investment into Pakistan of about US$500 
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current and past Pakistani BIT-negotiators confirmed in interviews that the BITs 
played no real role for these simultaneous initiatives. So if a considerable portion 
of the projects actually materialized, they would arguably have to be controlled 
for if one wants to estimate the impact of Pakistani BITs. Assuming this pattern 
holds for other countries as well, it is unfortunate that no studies have directly 
confronted it as a possible source of endogeneity between capital flows and the 
signing of BITs.  
 
Substantial data limitations as well as a range of possible omitted variables 
therefore continue to hamper the econometric literature. But given these 
constraints, it is noteworthy that very little work has tried to ask foreign investors 
themselves whether they take these treaties into account when deciding where, 
and how much, to invest. 
 
6.2. Survey evidence 
 
The few surveys that do ask about BITs appear to support the conclusion that they 
are not a particularly important factor in the establishment phase for the vast 
majority of foreign investors. One survey asked 602 corporate executives to what 
extent an international investment agreement, such as a BIT, influences which 
markets their company invests in (Figure 6.1). 
                                                                                                                                                               
million); ‘Turkey, Pakistan discuss setting up export zones,’ Business Recorder, 17 March, 1995, 
and ‘Protocol signed for creation of Turco-Pak Business Council,’ Business Recorder, 18 March, 
1995 (apart from the Turkey-Pakistan BIT, the two governments initiated talks on setting up 
export zones, and business representatives from the two countries agreed to set up a bilateral 
business council); ‘Benazir returns from Malaysia with investment pledges,’ Business Recorder, 
10 July, 1995 (apart from the Malaysia-Pakistan BIT, Prime Minister Bhutto received US$530 
million worth of investment pledges from Malaysian companies).  
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Figure 6.1.  The influence of international investment agreements on the  
locational decisions of corporate executives 
 
 
Around one fourth of the survey respondents replied that investment agreements 
did not at all affect their decisions to invest, slightly less than half said to a limited 
extend, and a little less than a fifth said investment agreements were very 
important. While UNCTAD takes this to imply that BITs are important when 
investors make investment decisions,29 Sachs questions whether some executives 
may have strategically overestimated the importance of investment treaties here 
‘in order to encourage the granting of such further protections international 
investment agreements may offer them.’30 For the purposes of this chapter it is 
moreover unfortunate that the survey did not distinguish between BITs and other 
international investment agreements, such as the ECT, investment chapters in 
PTAs, or double taxation agreements, and it is therefore likely to overestimate the 
importance of BITs.  
One survey that did ask directly about BITs, however, is the 2007 UNCTAD 
survey, which led the organization to conclude that BITs are ranked ‘among the 
most significant investment decision factors’ for transition economies in 
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 UNCTAD (2009), op. cit., at 51. 
30
 L. Sachs, ‘Bilateral investment treaties and FDI flows,’ World Association of Investment 
Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) Newsletter 5 (2009), ftn. 5.  
49%
23%
9%
19%
To a limited extent
Not at a ll
Don't know
To a very great extent
Notes: The survey asked: 'To what extent does the existence of an international investment 
agreement (for example, a bilateral investment treaty) influence your company's decision on 
which markets to invest in?'.
Source: M. Shrinkman 'The investors' view: economic opportunities versus political risks in 
2007-2011,' in: L. Kekiz and K. Sauvant (eds.) World Investment Prospects to 2011: Foreign 
Direct Investment and the Challenge of Political Risk (London: EIU, 2007)
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particular.31 Yet this remarkably strong conclusion was based on feedback from 
only 14 foreign affiliates.32 And when MIGA asked almost 200 investors about 
BITs, only 16 percent of service firms responded they played a role in their 
investment decisions, and the corresponding figure for manufacturing firms was 
as low as 10 percent.33 It is not clear from the report how many of these found the 
treaties to be very important as opposed to merely relevant, but it does list – not 
surprisingly - that BITs were not among the top 20 ‘critical’ location factors.  
Similarly during the investment-negotiations in the WTO, the European 
Commission asked about the role of BITs for European investors and here half of 
the 300 respondents had never heard of the treaties and only 10% had used them 
in their professional activity (Figure 6.2).34 Note, however, that these 10% cover 
both investors that take the treaties into account in their establishment phase as 
well as investors that have considered them in case of a dispute. That the later 
should be a far greater number than the former is supported by the World Bank, 
which suggests that ‘many investors are not aware that a BIT is in place at the 
time of considering an investment, and indeed investors may remain oblivious 
until some issue arises when its provisions may be relevant.’35  
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 UNCTAD (2009), op. cit., at 52. Note that this survey is also used by Berger and colleagues to 
sustain their conclusion that BITs were crucial to attract investments into Eastern Europe; Berger, 
Busse, Nunnemkamp, and Roy, op. cit. 
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 UNCTAD, Worldwide survey of foreign affiliates, Occasional Note (Geneva: United Nations, 
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 MIGA, Foreign Direct Investment Survey (Washington DC: World Bank, 2002).  
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 European Commission, Survey of the Attitudes of the European Business Community to 
International Investment Rules, conducted by T. N. Sofres Consulting on behalf of the European 
Commission, DG Trade, 2000. Note that like the MIGA survey, this survey is not mentioned in the 
2010 UNCTAD report mentioned above either.  
35
 World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A better investment climate for everyone 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), at 177.  
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Figure 6.2. Awareness of BITs among European investors 
 
Finally, in the most sophisticated survey to date, Yackee interviewed in-house 
legal counsel in American multinationals. His 2010 results were severely 
damaging to those convinced that BITs are crucial to FDI flows, as the survey 
reported that company officials are actually not particularly familiar with the 
treaties (Figure 6.3). Note for instance, that none of the lawyers thought that 
senior executives without a law-background were ‘very familiar’ with BITs, and 
only around 5 percent found them ‘very important’ in typical FDI decisions. So 
whereas American BITs are the most far-reaching in terms of liberalization 
obligations, American multinationals do not appear to be very affected by the 
treaties when determining where and how much to invest. This corresponds with 
an early 1998 survey on NAFTA and the ECT, which indicated that foreign 
investors were not particularly interested or influenced by these treaties, despite 
their considerably greater scope than stand-alone BITs.36 
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 M. Omalu, NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty (London: Kluwer, 1998), ch. 6.  
40%
10%
50%
General awareness
Working knowledge
No knowledge
Notes: In the survey, an enterprise with 'working knowledge' of BITs is one which know s of 
BITs and have already used it in its professional activity. An enterprise with 'general awareness' 
of BITs is one which knows of BITs but  have never had need of it in its professional activity. 
Finally, an enterprise with 'no knowledge' of BITs has never heard of BITs. 
Source: European Commission, Survey of the Attitudes of the European Business Community to 
International Investment Rules, conducted by T. N. Sofres Consulting on behalf of the European 
Commission, DG Trade, 2000.
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Figure 6.3. Response from general counsel within American multinational 
corporations about awareness and importance of BITs 
 
Notes: Histogram reports responses from 75 respondents to: (i) How familiar are lawyers in your 
office with the basic provisions of BITs; (ii) how family are non-lawyer senior executives in your 
corporation with the basic provisions of BITs?.; and (iii) how important is the presence or absence 
of a BIT to your company’s typical decision to invest in a foreign country? For the first two 
questions, 1 indicates ‘Not at all familiar’ and 5 indicates ‘Very familiar.’ For the last, 1 indicates 
‘Not at all important’ and 5 indicates ‘Very Important.  
Source: J. Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some 
Hints from Alternative Sources of Evidence,’ 51 Virginia Journal of International Law 2 (2010).  
 
Given this evidence, it may appear surprising that Büthe and Milner report that 
European BIT-negotiators have told them in interviews that investors and 
investment advisors contact them inquiring about the details about particular 
BITs.37 The authors construe this as indirect evidence that investors do in fact take 
BITs into account when determining where to invest; why would they otherwise 
inquire about them? But while qualitative inputs of this kind are welcome in a 
debate otherwise dominated by statistical discussions over often precarious data, it 
is questionable whether the interviews actually reflect what the authors claim. The 
relevant question for whether BITs attract investment is not whether they are 
relevant for investors - which they of course often will be in case of disputes or 
when contemplating how to legally structure a major investment - but instead 
whether, and how often, investors refrain from investing in a particular country if 
their investments cannot be covered by a BIT. Also, the relevant question for the 
signaling hypothesis is whether and to what extent the fact that host countries 
have not entered into a substantial number of BITs keep multinationals from 
investing there. And the fact that multinationals are often involved in the 
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 T. Büthe and H.Milner, ‘Bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment,’ in: Sauvant 
and Sachs, op. cit., at 209-213.  
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development of capital-exporting states’ BIT programs38 and may at times lobby 
for the signing of BITs39 does not in itself imply that the absence of BITs would 
make them invest less or elsewhere. When I interviewed BIT-negotiators in 
capital-exporting countries, all thus confirmed that while they receive direct 
requests from investors about BITs on occasion, such requests are relatively rare 
and investors typically inquire about BITs only after the investment-decision has 
been made.  The interviewees reported:  
‘Sometimes those dealing with incorporation of companies contact me to hear if 
we have a BIT with that country, but it is hardly the most important factor. What is 
probably really important, though, are double taxation treaties.’ (Netherlands)  
‘In some cases, where there is a major investment the company might approach us. 
But that is typically where a contract or other instrument has been signed, and 
therefore probably after the decision for the investment has been made.’ (Finland) 
‘We do get questions about BITs from investors themselves, but as far as I’m 
aware, they never contact us to get a treaty signed as a precondition for an 
investment.’ (Sweden) 
‘I don’t think many Danish companies have heard of these treaties, and it is highly 
unlikely that they will be taken into account when they make their investment 
decisions. … In the few cases I have been contacted over the last years, it is when 
a dispute has arisen.’ (Denmark)  
‘We’ve been told in general terms by business organizations that they value the 
assurance provided by BITs, but have no direct evidence as to whether or not the 
presence or absence of a BIT is an important consideration for British companies 
making investment decisions.  We tend to be contacted only by investors who are 
already established abroad and who have run into difficulties with the host state.’ 
(UK) 
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 See e.g., Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT), Letter to US Government 
concerning its model BIT, (December 18, 2003), available at: 
www.ecattrade.com/statements/content.asp?ID=408 (last visited January 30, 2010); ECAT, 
Written statement of the Emergency Committee for American Trade concerning the 
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Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, Modell for investeringsavtaler – høring, (January 7, 
2008), available at: 
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(last visited February 8, 2010)); not-for attribution interviews with BIT-negotiators, April-October 
2009. 
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 See e.g., ECAT, Business community welcomes launch of U.S.-China BIT negotiations and 
urges achievement of a high-standard agreement, (July 22, 2008), available at: 
www.ecattrade.com/statements/content.asp?ID=743 (last visited January 30, 2010); R. Hirdina and 
T. Jost, ‘German Outward FDI and its policy context,’ Columbia FDI Profile, Apr 9, 2010, at 5.  
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‘I think it is unlikely that even big German companies take BITs into account in 
their investment decisions. … The requests we get from German investors do not 
appear to be when they decide where to invest. … We do, however, get a lot of 
requests about double-taxation treaties, which are probably much more relevant for 
the investment decision.’ (Germany)  
‘It is the exception that investors contact us directly before making an investment, 
probably because our BITs don’t include market access. Once the investment is 
made, investors do contact us when they run into problems with the host state. In 
these cases, however, the existence of a BIT does not appear to have been the most 
important element of the investment decision.’ (Switzerland)  
‘It is usually once they have an investment in place or they run into regulatory 
problems with the host state that companies ask us to get BITs signed.’ (Canada)  
‘It is of course only the very big companies that are even aware of the treaties. ... 
But since we don’t have as many BITs as the Europeans, what usually happens is 
that investors first make the decision to invest, and then they lobby the Japanese 
government to sign a BIT. But even if the BIT doesn’t get signed, the investors 
will make the investment anyways because their decision has already been made.’ 
(Japan)  
So while investors, lawyers, and consultants, do occasionally inquire about BITs, 
this is generally not to decide whether a particular investment should be made or 
not. That is a decision which available quantitative and qualitative evidence 
suggest is unlikely to be driven by the presence or absence of whether a BIT is in 
place.40  
 
6.3. Indirect effects 
 
However, even if BITs tend to be ‘an overlooked tool’ by investors themselves,41 
there could be indirect channels through which they may nevertheless affect 
investment flows. One could be if BITs have an impact on credit rating agencies’ 
sovereign risk evaluations, as these might affect risk premiums and hence 
investment decisions. While I doubt credit rating agencies would pay much 
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 Note also that in the recent review of the Australian BIT-policy, the Australian Productivity 
Commission had asked for but received no feedback from the business community, despite 
suggesting to exclude investor-state arbitration from its future agreements; Australian Productivity 
Commission, ‘Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements,’ Productivity Commission Research 
Report, November 2010, at  270. 
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 D. Freyer, B. Garfinkel, and H. Ghavari, ‘Arbitration under bilateral investment treaties: an 
often overlooked tool,’ 13 Mealey’s International Arbitration Report 44 (1998).  
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attention to BITs, there are no publicly available studies on this question.42 Yet, a 
more likely indirect channel could be if BITs function as a ‘stepping stone’ for 
developing countries to enter into a PTA at a later stage, which has been 
suggested in a recent contribution.  
 
BITs as stepping stones to PTAs 
 
Using statistical techniques, Tobin and Busch analyze annual data on pairs of 
developing and developed countries between 1960 and 2004 and conclude that 
BITs ‘raise the prospects of getting a North-South PTA with all the deeper and 
reciprocal obligations that these entail.’43 If true, that would be an exceptionally 
important finding that may add weight to the argument that BITs have a positive 
effect on investment flows, since PTAs may have a stronger impact on where, and 
how much, multinationals invest abroad.44 BITs may in other words not impact 
investment flows extensively in and by themselves, but they might do so 
indirectly by increasing the likelihood of broader economic integration 
agreements.  
Tobin and Busch’s argument is in two parts. First, the authors posit that Western 
multinationals lobby their governments to sign both BITs and PTAs as a way to 
protect their investments and reduce trade costs, respectively. But for developed 
country governments, BITs are ‘easier’ agreements to conclude than PTAs, as the 
latter are often met with opposition from their own protectionist constituents. So 
whereas wealthy states willingly pursue BITs with developing countries, they 
only pursue a PTA when it provides exceptionally large benefits. And this, they 
argue, is when the PTA can provide home state multinationals advantages vis-à-
vis their foreign competitors. The twist to the argument, however, is that such 
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 The methodology of Moody’s, for instance, does not imply that international economic treaties 
can mitigate sovereign risks; Moody’s, Sovereign Bond Ratings, Rating Methodology, September 
2008.  
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 J. Tobin and M. Busch, ‘A BIT is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Preferential Trade Agreements,’ 62 World Politics 1 (2010), at 31.  
44
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advantages will be partly eroded if competing firms are also covered by BITs in 
the host state. This implies that support for a PTA will be greatest if the 
developing country has not already concluded too many BITs with other 
developed country governments.45 So to increase the likelihood of a PTA, Tobin 
and Busch therefore argue that ‘a BIT is better than a lot’.  
One of the key underlying assumptions is thereby that a BIT can give 
multinationals considerable preferential advantages when a developing country 
has not signed BITs with home states of competing firms. Yet, as intuitive as this 
may sound, it misrepresents investment treaties' practical implications. For the 
most part, BITs include broad and open-ended definitions of investments, and 
many expressly cover indirectly controlled investments. So if firms are seriously 
concerned that they do not have the same BIT-coverage as their competitors, they 
have the option of structuring their investment vehicles accordingly, for instance 
through holding companies in third countries. While the extent of ‘treaty-
shopping’ is not well understood, Barton Legum, the former head of NAFTA’s 
arbitration division, is probably correct in stating that:  
‘The reality that foreign capital is highly fungible and the breadth of the definitions 
of investor and investment thus combine to effectively transform the facially 
bilateral obligations of the BIT into an obligation that the host State must consider 
potentially applicable to all investors.’46  
The multi-layered corporate legal structure of modern multinationals thereby 
implies that while protections granted in BITs are perhaps preferential in theory, 
this is rarely the case in practice. Even a single BIT with the ‘traditional’ broad 
coverage of investors and investments should for all practical purposes be 
understood as involving obligations owed to every other state and investor.47 
Along the same lines, Schill notes in his study on the ‘multilateralization’ of 
international investment law that: 
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 Tobin and Busch also argue that too many PTAs with other wealthy states make them less 
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International 521 (2006), at 525.  
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 Ibid., at 524.  
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‘[i]nvestors are not only in a position to free themselves from bilateral inter-State 
relations, but corporate structuring also requires host States to treat BIT 
obligations as if they were part of a multilateral regime. … The protection of 
shareholders, therefore, de facto multilateralizes international investment 
protection even absent the operation of a treaty provision granting MFN 
treatment.’48 
In other words, the claim by Tobin and Busch that a multinational can retain 
future PTA preferences if developing countries do not sign BITs with other home 
states appears somewhat out of sync with the potential coverage of the global 
BIT-network.  
But while this questions the curve-linear relationship between BITs and PTAs 
suggested by Tobin and Busch—i.e. that a BIT is better than a lot—it doesn’t 
necessarily contradict their first proposition, namely that developed countries tend 
to couple their programs on BITs and PTAs. Indeed, there are pragmatic reasons 
for doing so. Modern PTAs often include investment protection chapters, so 
having already signed a BIT would make any subsequent PTA negotiations 
simpler. Also, a BIT negotiation could indicate whether the developing country 
partner is ‘mature’ enough to enter into the much more complex and time-
consuming PTA negotiations. Yet, while a country like Japan is in fact using BITs 
as ‘stepping stones’ to PTAs for these very reasons,49 does this really reflect a 
broader phenomenon? Should developing countries expect that by signing a BIT 
with a developed country, a subsequent PTA becomes more likely?  
Let us start with the United States. While the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) has occasionally mentioned that a BIT with the United States may lead to 
a PTA, it is doubtful that such a linkage has existed as a matter of policy.50  The 
                                                          
48
 S. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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 Japanese official I. See e.g.; ‘Japan, Columbia sign investment agreement to mull free trade 
pact,’ China Post, September 3rd, 2011; C. Sung, ’Taiwan, Japan sign investment accord in 
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veteran American BIT-negotiator mentioned above, Kenneth Vandevelde, fails to 
discuss any link between BIT and PTA negotiations in any of his extensive works 
on the US BIT program for instance.51 Also, no studies of US PTAs that this 
author is aware of can help sustain that BITs paved the way for American trade 
agreements in any substantial way.52 So when looking at the actual sequencing of 
US BITs and PTAs, it is no surprise that the pattern hardly provides strong 
evidence in favour of Tobin and Busch’s claim: out of the thirteen US PTAs with 
developing or transition economies (including NAFTA), only three were preceded 
by a BIT. These are the PTAs with Morocco, Panama, and CAFTA-DR (where 
BITs had been signed with El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua), yet Tobin and 
Busch provide no evidence that the BITs in question were in any way connected 
with the subsequent trade negotiations. 
However, even if American decision-makers have on occasion thought of BITs as 
potential stepping stones to a PTA, one should recall that the US has signed less 
than fifty BITs. While important, these constitute a miniscule share of the global 
BIT-network. EU15 countries alone have signed more than a 1000. So when 
suggesting a general pattern in BIT policy making among developed countries, 
Europe is clearly the litmus test. Also, since the pattern doesn’t hold in the case of 
the United States, it must be European investment treaties that are driving Busch 
and Tobin’s results. Yet, here the suggested linkage between BITs and PTAs is 
even harder to follow. Recall that at least until the entry into force of the Lisbon 
treaty (on 1 December 2009) EU member states negotiated BITs individually 
while entering into PTAs as a group. But although 61 percent of the developed 
countries in Tobin and Busch’s analysis are EU member states, they do not 
discuss what this implies for their theoretical model. Nor is it accounted for in 
their statistical analysis,53 which leads to a rather bold implicit claim: a 
                                                                                                                                                               
obstacles to BIT,’ INVEST-SD: Investment Law and Policy Weekly News Bulletin, October 13, 
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(hypothetical) developing country with no other investment treaties in place can 
increase its predicted probability to enter into an EU PTA from 0.01 to 0.05 
simply by signing a BIT with an EU member state. That the absence or presence 
of BITs has played such a crucial role for the choice of EU PTA partners would 
probably surprise most European policy-makers, and the authors quote no official 
reports, interviews, or any study of EU trade politics that can support it. Also, if 
we go back to their second proposition - a few BITs increase the likelihood of a 
PTA, whereas too many do the opposite - the implication in the European context 
is that a developing country with only one BIT, say with Finland, is more likely to 
obtain an EU PTA than one that has signed BITs with most EU member states. To 
the extent that BITs have played any substantive role in European trade politics 
thus far - which is more than questionable - this is a rather counterintuitive 
suggestion to say the least, and there again appears to be no additional evidence to 
support it apart from their statistical model.   
Overall, the econometric work of Tobin and Busch is thereby difficult to reconcile 
with realities on the ground. Their claim is based on a flawed understanding of 
BITs’ practical implications, and the statistical analysis is almost entirely 
contradicted by the politics of investment treaty rule-making in most developed 
countries. 
 
BITs and political risk insurance 
 
I therefore turn to another – and more likely – indirect channel through which 
BITs may impact investment flows, namely if PRI agencies take them into 
account when determining the availability and pricing of investment insurance. 
Recall from the last chapter, that this has been presented to developing countries 
as a key economic benefit of the treaties by organizations such as ICSID and, in 
particular, UNCTAD. It is also the primary (testable) hypothesis in Montt’s 
framework for BIT-diffusion.  
 171 
Some (but not all) of the risks covered by BITs are also covered by PRI.54 
Uncompensated expropriation, breaches of contract, restrictions on repatriation of 
profits and damages due to political violence are thus covered by most PRI 
providers. Accordingly, it would only be natural if they took BITs into account 
when assessing the risk of investment projects. If so, then BITs would indirectly 
decrease the transaction costs of FDI by lowering the price and increasing the 
availability of PRI. Unfortunately, there are practically no publicly available 
empirical studies investigating this question. The only exception is UNCTAD’s 
Investment Policy Review of Brazil, where UNCTAD asked PRI providers on 
their view of BITs, and briefly concluded that some find them important and some 
do not.55 However, the questions seem to have been limited to the case of Brazil 
and were only asked of six PRI providers.   
Recall, however, the findings from chapter four: neither MIGA, OPIC, or the vast 
majority of other public PRI agencies found BITs particularly important for their 
underwriting decisions. So while there should perhaps be a considerable link 
between public PRI and BIT programs that doesn’t appear to be the case in 
practice. And as a considerable part of the global market for investment insurance 
is offered by providers like MIGA and OPIC, this is yet another indication that 
BITs are not particularly important for investment flows. As an alternative to 
public PRI, however, private companies (mainly Anglo-Saxon) have offered 
investment insurance for the last three decades that complements or competes 
with those offered by government-sponsored programs.56  
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So perhaps firms have based their commercial decisions on whether developing 
countries have entered into BITs or not. Wälde noted in 2000, for instance, that 
while BITs were still largely ignored by foreign investors themselves, a country, 
‘… will attract a higher risk rating and therefore higher borrowing costs together 
with an expectation of higher investor returns for an infrastructure project if it has 
not concluded a BIT with the relevant investor home state… Therefore, it is 
advisable to encourage host states to negotiate BITs with relevant home states 
…’
57
 
Yet, the feedback from the private market largely corresponded to that from the 
public PRI agencies.58 That said, some firms did indeed factor BITs into their 
decision making. Apart from relying on BITs’ arbitration mechanism in case of 
disputes,59 a few innovative companies have also attempted to incorporate BITs 
into their products. For one major firm ‘the treaties play a role as a guiding tool 
to whether we want to take a risk or not,’ and another finds that over the long 
term, BITs are likely to have an impact on the industry, as investors who manage 
to obtain favorable arbitration awards through the BIT-mechanism will be more 
effective in making subsequent claims against their insurers (something that 
traditionally has been difficult for events that fall short of outright 
expropriation60). So even if the host country does not honor its award, an 
arbitration ruling could in itself increase the chances of a favorable result in a 
subsequent claim against an insurer.61 Finally, a few firms have begun to insure 
treaty-based arbitration award defaults, an idea that became the talk of the town 
among industry leaders after a 2006 MIGA-Georgetown seminar, where it was 
                                                          
57
 T. Wälde, ’Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment,’ 34 Journal of World 
Trade 2 (2000), at 16. 
58
 The following section is based on interviews with underwriters and senior managers from 
sixteen PRI providers and re-insurers accounting for almost 50% of the global private market 
capacity for Confiscation, Expropriation, and Nationalization’ insurance. See further in annex II. 
59
 As private insurance companies typically can’t subrogate BIT-claims directly, some have 
instead paid for investors’ legal expenses.  
60
 One example of an unsuccessful expropriation claim against an insurer arising out of the 
Argentinan financial crisis is; Sempra Energy v. National Union Fire Ins., Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 
not reported,F.Supat2d, 2006 WL 3147155, S.D.N.Y., 2006, (October 31, 2006).  
61
 However, the prospects of having to go through lengthy BIT-arbitrations before being able to 
lead a successful claim against an insurer is of course not a particularly attractive option for 
foreign investors.   
 173 
suggested by a private lawyer.62 While some firms continue to do so, the 
experiment was disappointing for others:  
‘While we initially thought this was a good idea, the problem we found was that in 
the case of Argentina the BIT-process just didn’t work. Arbitrations took much too 
long, and we were surprised there was not more World Bank pressure to honor 
arbitration awards. Naturally, this meant that investors are not particularly inclined 
to rely on the arbitration process, so now there is even less interest from those 
making FDI to buy such coverage. So in practice, BITs are not particularly 
important for us today with respect to either pricing or coverage.’  
Although such feedback is undoubtedly informative, what is perhaps particularly 
striking is that it is still the exception rather than the rule that insurance firms take 
BITs into account. Two experienced industry-representatives state:  
‘Just as extremely few investors seem to be aware of these treaties, most private 
insurers don’t make them part of their underwriting process.’ 
‘To take BITs seriously in insurance policies, as we do, is probably rather unusual 
within the industry.’ 
This impression is confirmed by interviews with representatives from large and 
medium-sized firms, Lloyd’s Syndicates, and re-insurers, few of which find BITs 
of much relevance when determining the risk of investment projects: 
‘If it is a country we are not that familiar with we will look if they’ve signed up with 
MIGA and OPIC regimes, but not so much BITs.’ 
‘While they should perhaps have a role to play, I would say they are likely to be 
considered completely irrelevant by underwriters today and thus irrelevant for the 
pricing of risk insurance. ... Rather than having a role in the investment decision, 
they are just an extra arrow in the lawyer’s quiver on the occasions where disputes 
arise.’  
‘We do not take the treaties into account, because we are not convinced that they 
will have an impact on countries’ willingness to pay out claims.’ 
‘We do look at BITs occasionally. However, they are one out of so many factors we 
take into account and we actually don’t have any real experience with them. … So 
the fact of the matter is that BITs most often don’t matter much.’ 
‘They are practically never incorporated into decisions concerning the coverage and 
pricing of risk insurance. … So while they probably should be taken into account, 
I’m not aware that they have in fact made any difference at all.’ 
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‘Do we look at BITs? Yes, but I have never experienced a risk not taken because the 
investment was not covered by a BIT, and they probably don’t impact pricing 
either.’ 
‘For major infrastructure investments in difficult jurisdictions, they could potentially 
signal that host states are willing to uphold their contractual obligations with the 
investor. But BITs are never a prerequisite for insurance and I have never 
experienced that they have factored into an underwriting decision in any material 
way.’ 
‘In theory, BITs should improve the risks, but in practice the jury is out on the actual 
value of these treaties, and they are certainly not a primary motivator for us.’ 
‘We have never taken a great deal of notice of them.  Governments wanting to 
expropriate will do it irrespective of their BITs, so they are not a primary 
consideration at all.’ 
‘While some of the major American firms may take them into account, I think this is 
the exception. For underwriters, BITs would typically be very far down their 
checklist, and they are therefore unlikely to play a determining factor in the 
underwriting process.’ 
‘I would be very surprised if out of a sample of 10 underwriters any of them would 
mention BITs as being directly relevant for their risk-evaluations. … While the 
treaties are part of the backdrop to the investment regime, and will be relevant if 
claims arise, they don’t play any direct role for the ranking or pricing of investment 
risks.’    
It appears that practitioners themselves find it unlikely that BITs have had a major 
impact on the private PRI market thus far. However, as with MIGA it is of course 
important to note that most industry representatives did mention that if cancelling 
or failing to honor existing BITs can be taken as signals that the host country 
plans to weaken its investor protections, then this would naturally be noted and 
taken into account in the underwriting process. But for developing countries that 
are otherwise in compliance with their international investment law obligations 
and treat foreign investors fairly and in a non-discriminatory way, BITs very 
rarely provide a ‘positive return’ in the private industry’s underwriting process.  
The conclusion arising from this review is therefore remarkable: BITs are 
basically aimed at reducing the risk of investing abroad, but the vast majority of 
not only of public but also private agencies that price the risk of foreign 
investments rarely take them into account to any serious extent. This contradicts 
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the hypothesis that BITs are fundamental instruments to decrease the risk of 
investing abroad.63  
 
6.4 BITs reconsidered 
 
All in all, it is therefore unlikely that BITs are crucial to the decisions of most 
foreign investors about where, and how much, to invest abroad. However, if the 
issue is simply a lack of awareness on the part of investors’, then the rising 
awareness of BITs that is likely to follow from the current increase in BIT-claims 
may make the treaties much more important in the future. The same follows for 
the insurance industry, where some of the ‘innovators’ in the industry expect that 
other firms may start taking the treaties into account after realizing their 
potential.64 BITs’ risk-reducing potential should, as suggested by Wälde, 
materialize only ‘over time and [only] once the application [of the treaties] is 
sufficiently well tested.’65 So perhaps econometric studies and surveys may soon 
conclude that while BITs were not important drivers of investment in past 
decades, they are today. On the other hand, there are reasons other than ignorance 
that may explain why BITs are not particularly useful for most developing 
countries to attract investments.  
First of all, it is doubtful that ‘obsolescent bargaining’ is as important a strategic 
problem for investors as is often assumed. Rather than regarding the bargaining 
relationship between foreign investors and their host countries as a two-step 
prisoner’s dilemma, a substantial body of evidence suggests that host countries are 
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typically aware of the long term reputational costs of mistreating foreign 
investors.66 While uncompensated expropriation (direct or indirect) as well as 
other regulatory abuses of foreign investors obviously still occur in the developing 
world, it is in many cases not as substantial a concern as is implied by obsolescent 
bargaining models. The premiums caused by regulatory risks are often 
surprisingly limited - even in ‘high risk’ sectors where investments tend to be 
sunk post-establishment.67 This suggests that the risks which BITs are intended to 
reduce may often be much lower than is often assumed.68 
Second, to the extent that BITs do cover risks that are of practical concern to 
investors, a range of market-based strategies are available to confront them. 
Entering into joint ventures with local companies, obtaining financing from local 
creditors, structuring investments over long time periods, or bringing in powerful 
partners such as major foreign banks, are options for investors to insure that a host 
country has a long-term interest in treating them fairly.69 Also, multinationals can 
finance their investments by borrowing from national or international agencies 
such as the IFC, OPIC, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
or the Asian Development Bank. Since many developing countries are dependent 
on these agencies for future funding, they will be deterred from interfering with 
the investor’s assets.70 Rather than using legal protections in treaties, the 
management of political risk is thus often handled through business strategies on 
the ground.  
                                                          
66
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Note that these considerations are also taken into account when MIGA underwrites investments, 
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 177 
Third, obtaining investment insurance as an alternative to reliance on BITs is 
often a more direct and straightforward option to protect investment against 
political risks, given that investors can obtain compensation even if the host 
country refuses to pay damages.71 The determination and payment of PRI 
recovery is also likely to be quicker than the BIT arbitration process. Moreover, 
just as financing by national or international agencies can provide host countries 
with a greater incentive to treat investors fairly, this is also the case with 
investments covered by agencies such MIGA.72 If developing countries fail to 
resolve disputes with MIGA, they may risk a suspension of both future aid and 
loans from the World Bank.73 Similar actions may be taken by national 
governments as well as private insurance companies if their insurance claims are 
not solved in a satisfactory manner. As a result ‘once the full cost of prospective 
action against an insured investor is realized, these disputes often become 
‘misunderstandings’ which are quietly and successfully resolved.’74 While MIGA, 
for instance, has issued guarantees for more than US$17 billion since its inception 
in 1988, it has only had to pay out five claims to investors, only two of which 
were based on expropriation.75 Similarly, while the German government grants 
guarantees for Euros 6 billion a year, it is exceptionally rare that it has had to pay 
out damages as the vast majority of disputes are settled diplomatically.76  
Finally, the idea promoted by Guzman and others that BIT’s are the only 
investment protection instruments that can ‘tie governments to the mast’ of 
international law is somewhat peculiar. For if various transaction strategies, 
insurance products or other instruments cannot provide sufficient protection 
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against political risks, investors still have the option of relying on investment 
contracts governed by international law.77 These can secure investments with the 
same standards as investment treaties, including recourse to international 
arbitration backed by the New York or ICSID Conventions.78 And while the 
question of whether, and to what extent, there exists an ‘international law of 
contracts’ has been subject to some debate,79 it is nevertheless indisputable that 
international tribunals have recognized their jurisdiction over the arbitration of 
investor contracts disputes throughout the post-war era and have relied, when 
necessary, on principles of law outside the host country to provide meaningful 
compensation for both expropriation and other contractual breaches.80 Even the 
adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States did not dispense 
with international tribunals’ willingness to treat investor-state contracts as 
enforceable, both in principle and in practice, as well as provide investors with 
compensation for their losses.81 One of the key assumptions of Guzman’s 
influential contributions, namely that ‘[t]he mechanisms for the enforcement of a 
contract between a state and a private firm is at best extremely weak and at worst 
altogether non-existent,’82 therefore appears doubtful. Even in the absence of 
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BITs, investors are quite capable of obtaining credible guarantees from their host 
countries through carefully drafted contracts.83  
In fact, from the perspective of many investors, contracts should be superior legal 
instruments to protect their assets compared to BITs. Apart from allowing the 
parties to use much more precise terms than the often vague provisions found in 
BITs, they also go further in specifying additional rights and obligations. With 
respect to substantial provisions, they thus typically deal with royalty and tax 
rates, customs regulations, stabilization of law, and other key issues not dealt with 
in BITs, and with respect to procedural rights, international law precludes host 
countries from revoking their consent to arbitrate contractual disputes if the 
investor does not agree.84 This is in contrast to BITs, where states’ can unilaterally 
revoke their consent to international arbitration, if investors have not yet formally 
provided their own reciprocal consent (which in the absence of a contract 
typically doesn’t happen before an actual dispute arises).85 
When considering whether contracts are good substitutes for BITs, it is naturally 
true that smaller investors may have less bargaining power when negotiating 
contracts with host governments compared to large multinationals. However, 
BITs are arguably of limited value to them anyway due to the expensive and time-
consuming mechanisms of international arbitration.86 Similarly, while it is 
important to note that the home government of an investor is of course not party 
to a contract; investors nevertheless often use their governments to assert pressure 
on the host country to uphold its contractual obligations. Lastly, while the 
difficulty of enforcing damages against sovereigns of course imply that 
contractual instruments cannot guarantee that host countries will uphold their 
commitments to investors, neither can BITs. 
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Apart from obtaining indirect protection through a range of market-based 
instruments, such as distributing shareholdings or obtaining lending from major 
lending institutions, PRI and investor-state contracts thus also provide investors 
with plausible and effective remedies when worried about political risk. The claim 
that BITs are the only instruments capable of convincing foreign investors that 
their assets will be safe post-establishment therefore appears somewhat detached 
from realities on the ground. Indeed, this is also the feedback from company 
lawyers themselves, who in Yackee’s survey quoted above generally find BITs of 
only limited value to protect international investors against political risks (Figure 
6.4). 
Figure 6.4. Response from general counsel within American multinational 
corporations about the value of BITs as protection instruments. 
Notes: Histogram reports responses from 75 respondents to: (i) ‘In your view, how effective are 
international treaties like BITs at protecting foreign investments from expropriation by a foreign 
government?’; (ii) ‘In your view, how effective are international treaties like BITs at protecting 
foreign investments from adverse regulatory change in the foreign country?.’ 1 indicates ‘not at all 
effective’ and 5 indicates ‘very effective.’ 
Source: J. Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some 
Hints from Alternative Sources of Evidence,’ 51 Virginia Journal of International Law 2 (2010).  
 
Implications 
While many actors in the investment regime still have somewhat inflated views 
towards the investment promotion potential of BITs, some developing countries 
are today reconsidering their belief that the treaties were important to attract 
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foreign capital.87 Instead, they are increasingly looking to include investment 
obligations in PTIAs. The broader context for the rise of preferential trade 
agreements is of course primarily the delay in multilateral trade talks in the Doha 
round, but the inclusion of considerable investment coverage is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. And the realization that BITs have failed to promote investments 
has played some part in this development. In Thailand, for instance, one official 
notes that in the past, ‘We may have perceived that to enter into a BIT would be a 
useful way to promote investments… [But, ed.] we found a survey which seems to 
show that BITs are not very important in comparison to other factors.’88 So 
whereas Thailand is increasingly entering into BITs to protect its own investors 
abroad, it is moving towards a greater focus on investment obligations in PTAs.89 
Similarly, in Costa Rica, a negotiator notes that that ‘we started signing BITs 
because we had an aggressive policy in attracting FDI. But experience shows they 
are not important tool in this regard. Now we feel that comprehensive FTAs with 
investment chapters, including market access, work better as they touch on more 
rules.’90 Also key officials in Ecuador share these views. One notes, ‘after the 
Central Bank did an economic analysis showing many of the treaties did not have 
an effect on investment flows, it was decided they should be cancelled.’91 Finally, 
a representative from Chile concurs, stating that ‘in the 1990s, the idea was that 
we would have more investment if we negotiated those instruments. But time 
proved that wrong.’92 Recall that a key reason Chile entered into BITs was to get 
access to cheaper investment insurance.93 Yet this expectation hasn’t materialized, 
so ‘today we prefer to adopt a more comprehensive approach, by focusing on 
investment chapters in free trade agreements.’94 So while not all governments in 
the developing world share these views,95 many are likely to have overestimated 
the benefits of BITs during the decades, when they proliferated rapidly. And 
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today, they are increasingly looking for alternative treaty-based instruments to 
attract foreign investment.  
 
Conclusion 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, there were strong reasons to expect BITs to impact 
investment flows and risk insurance premiums – after all, that was their main 
purpose. But while the preceding chapter showed that most developing countries 
entered into investment treaties expecting to attract foreign capital, data about the 
FDI impact of BITs was exceptionally scarce at the time. For instance, even 
though the link between BITs and PRI has historically been assumed to be 
considerable it was not until this chapter was published that anyone had 
systematically investigated the role of BITs for the PRI industry.96 However, the 
fact that hopes about the economic impact of BITs have been largely unfulfilled 
does not imply it was necessarily irrational to sign the treaties during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Recall, that if information about certain policies is scant, it is not 
irrational from a Bayesian perspective to give it little weight. The combination of 
strong prior beliefs and a lack of information could thereby be construed as the 
reason developing countries assumed that legally binding treaties promising to 
promote investment flows did actually work as intended. In fact, this is exactly 
what a Bayesian framework would predict since if, ‘experience is scant … and/or 
prior beliefs are strong, then observed experiences carry less weight in the 
formation of posterior beliefs. In such circumstances, prior beliefs may still 
dominate the revising process, precluding convergence on posterior beliefs.’97 
The next chapter will take this perspective further. For while it should now be 
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quite clear that many developing countries overestimated the benefits of BITs, 
they could also have severely underestimated their costs. 
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7. Learning about investment treaties 
 
The question addressed by this chapter is whether developing countries not only 
had overly optimistic views towards the benefits of BITs during the decades when 
they proliferated, but also underestimated their risks. If so, then even small 
expected benefits of BITs would have made them reasonable instruments from an 
economic perspective. And following a rational learning framework, we would 
expect that once clear information about the potential costs of BITs became 
available more hesitant BIT-policies would ensue.1   
To investigate this, I take a broad understanding of policy learning, assuming that 
developing countries learned about the implications of BITs not only from 
experiences of other states but also through intermediaries, such as international 
organizations. As mentioned in earlier chapters, particularly the UN has been 
important in this respect. On this basis, the chapter will be divided into three 
sections. The first will review what was written about the risks of BITs by 
international organizations and others around the time the treaties began to 
proliferate. The second section will review the first investment treaty claims to 
investigate, when the potency of BITs actually revealed itself through adjudicative 
awards. Finally, the third section discusses the current adjustments in the regime.  
 
7.1. What was written about the risks of BITs?  
 
In a rather controversial argument, Sornarajah conjectures whether investors’ right 
to bring international claims directly against host states under BITs – the 
manifestation of BITs’ risks for host states – was in fact ‘artificially’ created by 
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 Recall that I understand the ’risks’ of BITs in a ‘Knightean’ sense, i.e. that it is possible in 
principle to assign a measurable probability – or range of probabilities – to potential adverse 
outcomes of the treaties. See chapter three ftn. 81. 
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arbitrators themselves.2 According to Sornarajah, this implication of BITs was not 
realized by early commentators on - or drafters of – BITs. He notes the 
peculiarity: 
‘that the draftsmen and commentators on the investment treaties did not claim that 
the dispute settlement clauses in the treaties had the unique effect of creating 
unilateral rights in foreign investors, often unknowable to the parties.’3  
If true, that would be remarkable as it implies that arbitrators themselves 
generated the ‘bite’ of BITs. So although it may be true from a legal perspective 
that ‘much water has flown over the bridge and that it is futile to rake up this 
matter now,’4 it is very far from futile when investigating what developing 
countries knew, and were told, at the time they signed up to the BIT regime in 
large numbers. But while this chapter will otherwise be in general agreement with 
Sornarajah’s basic point that developing countries may not have entirely 
understood the implications of BITs when they began signing them, he 
nevertheless appears to overstate his case: already before the claims began, 
considerable literature and comments on investment treaties did in fact quite 
clearly state that ‘arbitration without privity’5 was the natural extension of 
properly drafted arbitration clauses.  
Sornarajah bases his claim on the comments by early British drafters of BITs. Yet, 
while he is correct that they are not exactly crystal clear about the implications of 
arbitration clauses, it appears farfetched to claim that they did not include ‘any 
reference’6 to the possibility of dispute settlement provisions granting foreign 
investors unilateral rights. In fact, they stated that the UK model BIT included a 
provision, ‘for compulsory arbitration of disputes between an investor and a host 
State under the Washington Convention machinery.’7 Similarly, Sornarajah notes 
that the first secretary general of ICSID, Aron Broches, was ‘cautious’ about the 
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effect of BITs’ arbitration clauses.8 If so, that would be crucially important as 
ICSID played a considerable role in information dissemination particularly in its 
early years. But is Sornarajah’s reading of Broches correct? This is what Broches 
wrote in 1982: 
‘a large and increasing number of investment protection treaties contain provisions 
which clearly establish host State consent to conciliation and/or arbitration before 
the Centre… Provisions of this kind, subject to the conditions stated therein and 
subject further to their compatibility with the Convention, will enable the investor 
to institute proceedings against the host State before the Centre, and may entitle 
the host State to avail itself of the same remedy.’9 
Such consent by the host state notes Broches, is ‘irrevocable’ once an investor has 
signified her own consent and does not require the exhaustion of local remedies 
except if clearly stated in the treaty.10 As such, BITs may ‘lay the foundation for 
the jurisdiction of the Centre in such a manner as to enable an investor to invoke 
it without requiring further consent of the host State.’11 These conclusions appear 
anything but cautious and clearly foresaw the possibility of investor-state 
arbitrations based on BITs. They were also followed in academic publications at 
the time12 and UNCTC. In its 1984 report, for instance, UNCTC told developing 
countries that the gradual inclusion of wide-ranging investor-state arbitration 
clauses in BITs meant that if investment disputes: 
‘… are not resolved by the two parties themselves of through local remedies 
within a certain period, then either party may submit the dispute for conciliation or 
arbitration … the standard provision is that such disputes shall be submitted to an 
ad hoc arbitration tribunal, if they cannot be resolved by diplomatic means. ... The 
award of the tribunal is binding upon both parties.’13  
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This was subsequently repeated by UNCTC in many of its various reports and 
comments on BITs.14  
Similarly, while the actual implications of BITs’ substantive provisions could not 
be completely known without having been interpreted by adjudicators, the wide 
range of protections granted to investors was noted by UNCTC and others. As an 
example, in 1988 - when only 10 percent of the current number of BITs had been 
signed - UNCTC made a comprehensive and detailed comparative analysis of the 
content of numerous BITs and BIT-models.15 It for instance noted the ‘very 
broad’ definitions of investment and – at times – investors, the curious fact that 
FET-standards were wide-spread in BITs even when the developing country party 
otherwise promoted the Calvo-doctrine, and the potential broad scope of 
‘umbrella clauses.’ It mentioned the inclusion of clauses covering indirect 
expropriation, and so on and so forth.  Also, all of UNCTCs reports noted that 
BITs did not include obligations for investors’ conduct pertaining to issues such 
as corruption, environmental protection, and restrictive business practices. In 
other words, while the legal analysis provided to developing countries in the 
1980s was naturally not as extensive as UNCTAD’s later work for instance, it did 
cover most of the key legal building blocks of BITs. So although the potential for 
treaty-shopping and expansive and/or inconsistent arbitration decisions was 
probably not foreseen, both early academic literature and the more accessible 
reports issued by organizations such as the UNCTC clearly reflected the view that 
BITs should not be considered merely as ‘toothless’ tokens of goodwill, but rather 
as serious legal obligations. 
But while the legal obligations enshrined in BITs were clearly communicated as 
binding and important in theory, another matter is whether they were actually 
thought to be effective in practice. Some thought they were. One view promoted 
by the ICC in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, was that the treaties had deterred 
investment disputes, which explained the lack of arbitration claims.16 Also, based 
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15
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on three anecdotes where BIT-obligations had been alerted to host states while 
settling expropriation disputes in the 1970s, OECD concluded that the treaties 
were indeed very effective in protecting foreign investments.17 At the time, 
however, such views were probably the exception rather than the rule. The 
comments made by the director of UNCTC in 1988 on this matter are worth 
quoting in length:  
‘… there is little empirical evidence that these treaties have actually been 
implemented or relied upon in live situations involving nationalisation and 
compensation. … There is hardly any evidence that the standards enunciated in 
these treaties have been applied to the computation of the quantum of 
compensation or the treatment of foreign companies generally. In this regard it is 
irrelevant to assert that the mere existence of these treaties has deterred 
nationalisation. Even if this were true, the issue is not deterrence but whether the 
standards for nationalisation have been applied, an issue which does not arise 
where there has been no nationalisation.’18 
 
Similarly, two years earlier a former legal advisor to the US State department 
questioned the view of the ICC, and noted that there was only ‘limited’ evidence 
that BITs had been invoked to successfully resolve investment disputes.19 In 
particular, he referred to doubts at the time whether the brief and simple European 
BIT-texts did in fact provide sufficient guidance to be useful in the enforcement 
context.20  Similarly, in 1980 it was noted that ‘bilateral investment treaties in 
practice seem to be of comparatively reduced significance either as an incentive 
or as a protective measure’21 and ten years after, in 1990, an academic 
commentator similarly noted that documented ‘use of BIT provisions to protect an 
investment appears to be slight.’22 It was perhaps for that reason UNCTC stated 
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that even though BITs’ ‘increasingly rigid’ clauses contrasted with investment 
policies in a great number of developing countries,23 this probably had limited 
implications in actual investment disputes since: 
‘… injured parties – both investors and their home State – do not necessarily insist 
in such cases on total compliance with the provisions of the agreement: treaty 
provisions would seem to lose their binding character to a certain extent and 
become arguments in a diplomatic debate or provide a basis from which 
negotiations can proceed.’24   
This is notable. Not only legal advisors and academics were unsure about the 
actual practical implications of BITs in protecting foreign investments, the key 
international organization advising developing countries on these matters was also 
hesitant in its view of whether BITs had much ‘bite’ in practice.  
So while developing nations may have been told repeatedly that the treaties 
entailed binding obligations under international law - which in principle could be 
adjudicated by international arbitral tribunals - the absence of disputes suggested 
that the actual potential of BITs to protect investments was fraught with 
uncertainty. It was therefore not until investment treaty claims began to arise that 
the importance of BITs could be comprehended. And as will be argued in the 
following section, it took as long as until the early 2000s for the real potency of 
BITs to truly reveal itself.  
 
7.2. The potency of BITs revealed 
 
The first claims.  
 
The first time an investor initiated a BIT-claim against its host state was in 1987.25 
The claimant was a Hong Kong firm - Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) - 
which had entered into a joint venture with a Sri Lankan company set up to 
cultivate and export shrimp. After an operation by Sri-Lankan security forces 
against Tamil rebels resulted in the destruction of the farm, AAPL argued that the 
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security forces had not taken sufficient precautionary measures to minimize the 
destruction of the farm. Following attempts to settle the dispute amicably, AAPL 
brought the dispute before ICSID claiming a violation of the Sri-Lanka-UK BIT. 
The stakes of this dispute were high - and not only for the parties involved. First 
of all, while I have argued above that commentators and drafters clearly saw BITs 
as giving investors a unilateral right to ‘arbitration without privity,’ this had never 
before been tested. In other words, had Sri Lanka given its consent to international 
arbitration with foreign investors as a group purely by entering into the treaty? 
Unfortunately, there was no negotiation history to clarify whether such a crucial 
departure from customary international law was really the intent of the parties. 
Secondly, what should be the applicable law of such a dispute: national law, 
customary international law, the BIT itself, or some combination of the three?26 
1987 was still a time where contemporary commentators found international law 
often to be ‘... irrelevant to the resolution of substantive issues involved in the 
disputes between foreign investors and the host state.’27 So did it, for instance, 
matter that the Sri Lankan constitution stated that international investment treaties 
were binding except if administrative or executive actions were taken in the 
interest of national security?28 Third, could a tribunal constituted to deal with 
investment matters have competence to decide on a crucial public law issue, 
namely the legality of force during times of war?29 These were not minor 
questions of interest only to a limited circle of international lawyers. On the 
contrary, they addressed fundamental issues of state sovereignty, and they were to 
be decided by an arbitral tribunal consisting of three individuals - none of which 
had a background in public international law30 - and with practically no possibility 
for appeal.  
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The tribunal decided largely in favor of the investor. Without hesitation, it agreed 
with the claimant that by entering into the BIT, Sri Lanka had allowed AAPL to 
initiate international arbitration without a specific arbitration agreement (such as a 
contract) or first having exhausted local remedies. Secondly, the majority of the 
tribunal held that as both the parties had relied heavily on the BIT during the 
course of the proceedings, an implicit ‘mutual agreement’ could be inferred that 
the parties agreed the BIT should have prominence over national law (such as the 
Sri Lankan constitution).31 On this basis, the tribunal proceeded to the merits of 
the case, where it also found in favour of AAPL and awarded compensation of 
US$460,000 plus interest. Given that the provision on which jurisdiction had been 
established was included in many BITs; one commentator noted at the time that 
the decision ‘appears to mark the beginning of a trend that will have to be 
carefully watched.’32 The extent to which developing countries followed that 
advice is doubtful. Even UNCTC failed to discuss the case in its reports on BITs 
the following years33 and no delegates as much as hinted to the dispute when BITs 
were discussed in UNCTC sessions.34 
  
However, from a purely economic perspective it is worth recalling that the award 
was rather limited; in fact it was less than a tenth of what AAPL had sought in 
compensation.35 So even if bureaucrats in developing countries read the 
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discussion of the award in the ICSID Review36 - or some of the few other 
comments on the case at the time37 - its limited (pecuniary) implications could 
hardly have provoked the same strong reaction as much more considerable awards 
did many years later (see below). Also, AAPL’s expansionary reading of the BIT 
to establish a strict liability standard higher than pre-existing rules of international 
law was not accepted by the tribunal, which combined with the small damages 
made Sri Lanka see the award as a great success according to Sri Lankan officials 
involved in the case.38 It therefore didn’t really hint at the potential for 
considerable costs of a BIT-based arbitration system. Developing countries would 
as such have been justified if they kept a view, along with for instance UNCTC, 
that entering into BITs entailed only limited practical implications for the 
resolution of investment disputes. Indeed, Vagts noted in the year the dispute was 
determined that ‘so far as the literature discloses, BITs have not yet been put to 
the test so that we do not know how much they enhance the security of foreign 
investment.’39 Similarly, while an organization like MIGA was continuing to push 
for the treaties, it noted in 1991 that only ‘[p]rofessional advisors, such as 
accountants or merchant bankers, would be people to concern themselves with 
such minutiae….’40  
 
The second award based on investment-treaty arbitration that we know of didn’t 
come until 1995. Here a tribunal found that Poland had applied its environmental 
protection laws in a way that was tantamount to expropriation of an investment 
made by a German paper company, Saar Papier.41 While the Polish government 
was aware that the Polish subsidiary of Saar Papier made use of used paper in its 
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production, Polish environmental authorities nevertheless halted imports of used 
paper classifying it as ‘waste’. As a result, Saar Papier could no longer produce its 
products and argued that the 1989 BIT between Poland and Germany obliged 
Poland to pay compensation for its losses. The tribunal agreed and awarded the 
German investor 2.3 million Deutchmark.42 Whatever the merits of the case, one 
would perhaps expect that this decision would have received considerable 
attention. After all, an ad hoc tribunal had just ruled on the legality of Polish 
environmental regulation and decided that the government had to pay 
considerable damages to a foreign investor – all outside the Polish legal system. 
Yet, it in fact received no attention at all because the dispute was kept completely 
confidential and basic information on the nature of the case is still not available 
today.43 For that reason, developing countries – or developed countries for that 
matter - had no way of knowing that BIT provisions on expropriation had been 
interpreted to circumvent regulation enacted to protect the environment.  
 
Today we know that around this time, an increasing number of BIT claims 
appeared before arbitral tribunals but as with the Saar claim, most were pursued 
under non-ICSID rules and thus kept secret.44 Poland was on the respondent end 
of several other claims, but also Russia,45 Kazakhstan,46 and a yet unknown Latin 
American country47 were involved in disputes. Some involved considerable 
claims - such as one by the American firm Ameritech against Poland of 
approximately US$500 million48 - and while several were eventually settled, there 
is no publicly available information on the terms of the settlement agreements. So 
except for bureaucrats in the countries in question, as well as legal practitioners 
with privileged access to information about the cases, the general perception by 
the mid-1990s was that there had in fact only been one BIT claim – AAPL v. Sri 
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Lanka. That some investors slowly started to realize the potency of BITs was 
therefore largely kept under the radars of most governments. Indeed, the two main 
textbooks on international investment law at the time only referred to the AAPL 
case49 and in 1997 experts at an UNCTAD meeting commented that ‘there is very 
little practical experience with the use of bilateral investment treaties and the 
information available on their application is mostly anecdotal.’50 Similarly, in an 
important article on investment treaties, Sacerdoti noted the same year that ‘major 
conflicts between host States and foreign investors tend to be rare,’ and he made 
no reference to the rising number of investment treaty claims pursued in private.51 
 
Also in 1997 - 10 years after AAPL brought its claim against Sri Lanka – the 
second award based on a BIT claim was made public. The dispute was brought by 
a US company, American Manufacturing and Trading (AMT), against Zaire (now 
Dem. Rep. of Congo).52 AMT’s property had been looted and damaged during 
riots in Kinshasa, and the company submitted that it was entitled to compensation 
under the US-Zaire BIT. The ICSID tribunal again found in favor of the investor 
and awarded AMT US$9 million plus interest.53 This was a considerable sum for 
one of the poorest countries in the world, but the award was provisionally stayed 
as per Zaire’s request, so it was not until the revision proceedings ended in 2000 
that the case was finally concluded. Perhaps, it is for this reason that UNCTAD, 
for instance, failed to mention it in its annual World Investment Reports at the 
time54 as well as its otherwise extensive 1998 report on BITs.55 Nor did the case 
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appear to have featured much - if at all - in the ongoing discussions on the 
proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).56  
 
In 1998, two ICSID awards were based on BIT disputes.57 The Fedax arbitration 
was notable, as it was the first ICSID case where the objection to jurisdiction 
concerned the notion of ‘investment’,58 and the tribunal applied a rather expansive 
reading of the term. It allowed the Dutch firm to bring a claim against Venezuela 
based on a dispute concerning promissory notes issued by the Venezuelan 
government, but which had been transferred to the Dutch firm by a Venezuelan 
company. No capital had actually flowed from the Netherlands to Venezuela, yet 
the tribunal argued that since the BIT in question – as most BITs – referred to 
investment as ‘every kind of asset’ and the ICSID Convention didn’t itself provide 
a definition, the loan instruments were protected under the BIT as well as the 
Convention. The decision showed that BITs allow investors to ‘…become foreign 
by a paper transfer of assets among companies without any commitment of new 
money to the host economy.’59 Even so, as with the other dispute finalized that 
year - Goetz v. Burundi - the actual damages were limited. In the Goetz 
arbitration, the parties agreed in a settlement agreement for damages of less than 
US$5 million as well as create a new free trade zone regime for the investors, and 
in the Fedax arbitration the award was less than US$1 million. So while 
particularly the Fedax dispute did hint at the considerable scope of protection 
provided in BITs, neither of the two disputes were particularly damaging in 
economic terms. UNCTAD thus noted the same year that it was ‘remarkable that, 
after nearly 40 years of BIT practice, information on the experience with the 
application of BITs still remains rather sketchy and anecdotal.’60 Similarly, 
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Wälde noted also in 1998 that as a method, the unconditional consent to investor 
state arbitration included in BITs was ‘very little tested and thought through ….’61 
 
A more notable dispute revealing the potency of the treaty-based investment 
arbitration system came the same year. It involved a claim under Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA brought by an American firm, Ethyl Corporation, which claimed more 
than US$250 million in compensation for an environmental regulation issued by 
the government of Canada.62 The Canadian health ministry had introduced an act 
prohibiting interprovincial trade of a specific fuel additive, one reason being the 
fear of health-risks when its by-products were released into the atmosphere. Since 
the substance wasn’t produced in Canada, the trade ban effectively removed it 
from Canadian gasoline. After the tribunal decided in July 1998 that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the claim, Canada settled the dispute by reversing the ban, 
paying US$13 million in legal fees and damages to Ethyl, as well as issuing a 
statement that available scientific information did not show harmful effects of the 
substance. One reason for the settlement was probably the considerable expenses 
Canada would have to incur had the arbitration continued, as well as the scope of 
the damages it would have to pay had Ethyl won the case. This decision attracted 
considerable media attention and became highly politicized in Canada.63 Western 
NGOs moreover began using it in their campaign not only against NAFTA but 
also the ongoing MAI negotiations.64  
 
Recall, that both AAPL, Fedax, and Goetz were relatively minor disputes, AMT 
had not yet been finalized, and the remaining claims had been kept secret. As 
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result, few - if any - noted at the time that Ethyl was in fact not the first 
investment treaty claim to rule on environmental regulations (Saar Papier) and 
larger claims had been brought against developing/transition economies 
(Ameritech). In discussions and publications by the end of the 20th century, Ethyl 
was often presented as the first major and controversial settlement of an 
investment treaty dispute. That said, even though both the dispute settlement 
provisions and expropriation clauses of NAFTA could be found in many of the 
more than 1,500 BITs signed by 1998, the case did not call too much attention to 
BITs. Although minor references were made in UNCTAD publications the same 
year to the fact that indirect takings were also covered in BITs, Ethyl was 
primarily presented as relevant to the NAFTA parties only,65 and there was no 
foreshadowing of the surge in claims that was about to begin.66  
 
The year after, yet another investor was awarded almost US$10 million in 
compensation under a BIT claim against Kazhakstan, yet this was not mentioned 
by UNCTAD at the time, probably because it was under SCC rules and thus 
pursued under public radars.67 The same year, UNCTAD noted that there, 
 
 ‘… is very little known on the use that countries and investors have made of 
BITs. They have been invoked in a few international arbitrations, and presumably 
in diplomatic correspondence and investor demands. The most significant function 
appears to be that of providing signals of an attitude favoring FDI.’68 
 
The 2000s 
 
Not long after, however, the ‘floodgates’ of investment treaty claims were 
opened.69 In the context of NAFTA, Metalclad v. Mexico, Pope and Talbot v. 
Canada, S.D. Meyers v. Canada, Methanex v. the United States, and Loewen v. 
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the United States were pending or partly completed by 2000. All led to concern 
among the NAFTA parties and NGOs that NAFTA might – right or wrong – be 
undermining the countries’ capacity to regulate in the public interest. Metalclad, 
for instance, raised questions of how to balance concerns of the environment and 
public health with the rights of foreign investors, when a permit to operate a 
hazardous waste site was denied by a local authority in Mexico. And many 
observers became concerned when arbitrators relied solely on the federal 
assurances given the American investor, ignoring that the Mexican municipal 
authorities were in fact allowed under Mexican law to deny the permit.70 Also, the 
tribunal based part of its award against Mexico on a somewhat idealized standard 
of ‘perfect governance’,71 by reading a far-reaching transparency obligation into 
the fair and equitable treatment standard:  
’[transparency is, ed.] the idea that all relevant legal requirements for the purpose 
of initiating, completing and successfully operating investments made, or intended 
to be made, under the Agreement should be capable of being readily known to all 
affected investors of another Party. There should be no room for doubt or 
uncertainty on such matters. Once the authorities of the central government of any 
Party . . . become aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion in this 
connection, it is their duty to ensure that the correct position is promptly 
determined and clearly stated so that investors can proceed with all appropriate 
expedition in the confident belief that they are acting in accordance with all 
relevant laws.’ 72 
This was a remarkable interpretation divorced from the realities of state practice, 
and was also later set aside by the British Columbia Supreme Court, which argued 
that the tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction.73 Subsequent discussions of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard in the aftermath of the award, however, 
demonstrated that even countries like Canada and the United States had not, 
‘…entirely grasped the real nature of the standard. Some had rarely given a 
second thought to its potential breadth ... As was the case with the majority of BIT 
provisions, second thoughts only began to arise when arbitral tribunals began to 
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shed light on these provisions.’74 This was also clear in the Pope and Talbot 
claim, where the tribunal held that Canada was wrong in arguing that the fair and 
equitable treatment clause did not entail obligations that went over and beyond the 
customary international law standard.75 According to the tribunal, it did.  
 
All this became too much for the NAFTA parties. With a number of other 
NAFTA-claims in the pipeline, American officials began to fear that such an 
understanding of the provision could mean that their government could be in 
breach of Chapter 11.76 So a few months after the interim award in the Pope 
dispute, NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission issued an interpretative note that the 
three governments did not intend the provision to go over and beyond what was 
expected from customary international law.77 Also, both the Canadian government 
and the American Association of State Attorneys General expressed further 
concern over the far-reaching nature of indirect expropriation provisions as 
interpreted by the NAFTA tribunals.78 Ultimately, the claims led to a change in 
the BIT-models of both the United States and Canada, which clarified and 
restricted the scope of the fair and equitable treatment standard, the expropriation 
provision, and MFN treatment.79 In one session, the US Intergovernmental Policy 
Advisory Committee (IGPAC) for instance noted that, ‘The Methanex and 
Loewen cases in particular have reinforced concerns that the provision [on 
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dispute settlement, ed.] will be abused by investors who simply hope to circumvent 
established legislative and judicial procedures.’80 Similarly, in Canada the 
NAFTA claims has meant that, ‘the level of legal focus is incomparable compared 
to 15 years ago,’ as one officials notes.81  
 
One thing is the lessons learned by the NAFTA parties, however, another is what 
role the claims played for developing countries. Luke Peterson observed in 2001, 
for instance, that while the NAFTA claims, the MAI, and the investment 
negotiations in both the WTO and the Free Trade Agreement for the Americas 
were extensively commented upon, this was still not the case with BITs.82 As 
mentioned above, due to the secrecy surrounding the earlier disputes there was an 
understanding at the time that BITs had not been used for similar purposes as the 
NAFTA claims.83 In WTO’s investment discussions that year, for instance, no 
mention of the disputes was made by any of the developing countries arguing in 
favor of BITs instead of multilateral investment disciplines.84 Also, in 
UNCTAD’s 2001 World Investment Report, none of the NAFTA claims were 
mentioned as being important for the BIT-movement.85 Given that this was by far 
the most important publication informing developing country officials about 
trends in the international investment regime,86 this is notable. Similarly, in the 
organization’s report on the relationship between investment treaties and 
environmental regulation the same year, which commented on the NAFTA 
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disputes, BITs were mentioned only twice and that too in passing.87 So while the 
early NAFTA claims were indeed noteworthy, they were not yet construed as 
particularly relevant for BITs. Indeed, 2001 was the year were the largest number 
of countries were involved in BIT-negotiations – 97 – and UNCTAD had a 
particularly productive year managing to facilitate the signing of more than 70 
BITs at its negotiation rounds.88  
 
It was not until 2002 that the debate began about the risks of investment treaty 
arbitration for developing countries. This is when a large number of BIT 
arbitrations had begun. Most notable were the cases against Argentina in the wake 
of its financial crises. Here, foreign utility firms like Enron and Vivendi sued the 
country after the government withdrew from a promise that their tariffs would be 
pegged to inflation-adjusted US dollars.89 This guarantee had been enshrined in 
investor-state contracts during the heydays of Argentina’s liberalization in the 
early 1990s, yet the financial crisis meant that the government had to restructure 
its finances rapidly and considerably in order to prevent a complete economic 
meltdown. As a result, foreign investors were no longer insulated from the losses 
associated with the crisis, which led to a surge of claims beginning in 2001, which 
by 2002 amounted to more than US$4 billion.90  
 
Also in 2002, news had come out on a peculiar set of events in the second half of 
2001, involving a dispute between Ronald Lauder, the American cosmetics 
billionaire, and the Czech Republic. Lauder pursued his claim involving a TV 
broadcasting station through two BITs simultaneously. Apart from the US-Czech 
BIT, where he was covered by being a US national, he also filed a claim under the 
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Dutch-Czech BIT, where he had incorporated a holding company, Central 
European Media Enterprises (CME). But despite the fact that the dispute was 
based on the same set of facts and two similarly worded BITs, the two tribunals 
came to completely opposite conclusions, and that too within 10 days.91 This 
confirmed a concern already pointed out in 1997, by then Secretary General of 
ICSID, Antonio Parra, that the broad definition of investors and the ad hoc nature 
of BITs’ adjudication mechanism increased the likelihood of multiple awards 
concerning identical events, where the ‘scope for inconsistent decisions in regard 
to essentially the same issues is obvious.’ 92  Furthermore, the decision did not 
lead to concerns about the predictability of the arbitration system, it also resulted 
in a massive compensation award the year after of US$350 million, which led the 
dissenting arbitrator, Ian Brownlie, to note that,  
 
‘[t]he Czech Republic should have the benefit of civilized modern standards in the 
treatment of States. Even States which have been held responsible for wars of 
aggression and crimes against humanity are not subjected to economic ruin. … It 
would be strange indeed, if the outcome of acceptance of a bilateral investment treaty 
took the form of liabilities ‘likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the 
livelihood and economic well-being of the population’ of the Czech Republic.’ 93 
 
On this background, a debate gradually began in 2002 over the potential risks of 
investment treaty arbitration for developing countries. In the context of the WTO, 
Argentina now provided detailed comments on the potential risks of investment 
treaty arbitration.94 In the same session, UNCTAD noted that the WTO delegates 
should be aware that treaty-based investor state arbitration could give rise to 
‘different – even conflicting - rulings on the same issue. This was due, for 
example, to overlapping membership of different agreements and had indeed 
become a real issue, as had been witnessed in recent arbitration cases.’95 
Similarly, in the UNCTAD’s expert meeting on investment treaties in 2002, 
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several experts commented that if future disputes followed some of the past 
rulings on expropriation and fair and equitable treatment it could place 
considerable burden on developing countries.96 Finally, 2002 was also the year the 
most important NGO in the area, the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) began to seriously discuss BITs,97 rather than almost solely 
focusing on NAFTA.  
 
2002 thus marked the beginning of the current debate about the risks for 
developing countries to consent to treaty-based investor-state arbitration. From 
that point onwards, investment treaty disputes were mentioned in every annual 
report of UNCTAD,98 and IISD began an intensive effort to report on the rise of 
BIT claims.99 So if developing countries sought information about the scope and 
potency of BITs, they had easy access to both by 2002, even if they had not been 
sued themselves. Despite being exceptional,100 the many cases against Argentina 
were a cause for worry and CME was for the BIT-movement what Ethyl and 
Metalclad had been for NAFTA.  
 
7.3. Adjustments 
 
The lack of disputes - or publicly available information about disputes - meant 
that it wasn’t until around 2002 that developing countries had clear information 
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available that BITs’ ability to expose host states to liabilities was very real and 
concrete, rather than merely vague and abstract.101 In fact, from 2003 onwards, the 
annual number of investment treaty claims much acceded that of WTO disputes. 
Yet at that point, by far the majority of the existing network of BITs had already 
been signed and ratified. So while  practically all contributions on BIT-diffusion 
to date assume that developing countries ‘knew what they got themselves into’ 
during the 1990s, this is surely questionable: the ‘costs’ of gathering information 
about BIT-claims during this period were high, and even international 
organizations concluded that the treaties were probably not very relevant for the 
settlement of investment disputes. Following a rational learning model, we should 
therefore expect that after the claims made the implications of the treaties more 
clear, developing countries would calibrate their BIT policies. And on the surface, 
this actually appears to be what happened. 
 
Rebalancing investment treaties  
 
In many, if not most, cases exceptionally broad and vague treaty standards were 
agreed upon not as a result of fully informed analyses, but simply because 
developing countries – and others - were not fully aware about the possible 
implications. As a result, some countries are today following the example of the 
United States and Canada in being much more careful in clarifying and restricting 
key provisions. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to document this 
development in much detail, but let me mention a few examples for the sake of 
illustration.102  
As its Northern American counterparts, Mexico, for instance, has begun to specify 
that the fair and equitable treatment provision does not go over and beyond the 
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customary international minimum standard.103 Similarly, the lacking 
understanding of BITs’ implications has today led Malaysia to be more careful: 
‘We learned our lesson with the arbitration cases, the treaties have to be balanced. 
… So we are also tightening up our provisions, just like the Americans. … And we 
are limiting the role of arbitrators making sure they don’t run wild favoring 
investors.’104  
As an example, Malaysia’s 2009 BIT with Syria – the only BIT Malaysia has 
signed since 2002 – guards against investors trying to construe MFN clauses to 
cover dispute settlement provisions. Article 3 therefore specifies that: ‘For 
greater certainty, this Article shall not apply to procedures regarding Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between a Party and an Investor of the Other Party which 
are available in other agreements to which either Party is a party.’105 This 
follows discontent among some countries with the expansive interpretation of 
MFN provisions by a few arbitral tribunals. In a footnote to the MFN provision in 
the 2003 draft Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, for instance, it was stated 
that: 
‘The Parties note the recent decision of the arbitral tribunal in Maffezini … which 
found an unusually broad most favored nation clause in an Argentina-Spain 
agreement to encompass international dispute resolution procedures. … By 
contrast, the Most-Favored-Nation Article of this Agreement is expressly limited 
in its scope to matters ‘with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.’ 
The Parties share the understanding and intent that this clause does not encompass 
international dispute resolution mechanisms ... and therefore could not reasonably 
lead to a conclusion similar to that of the Maffezini case.’106 
 
Statements like these reflect a broader trend. As noted by Schreuer, ‘[l]ooking at 
some of the reactions, especially of host States, one cannot help the feeling that 
treaty drafters did not fully appreciate the far-reaching repercussions of MFN 
clauses and somehow wish they could get the genie back in the bottle.’107 
 
Other parts of BITs are being revisited as well, for instance after the Lauder 
arbitrations illustrated the risks of ‘treaty-shopping’ due to broad definitions of 
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investors. In this respect, the Czech Republic and Croatia are examples of 
countries that typically included very wide definitions of investors in their BITs 
during the 1990s, but now tend to require a more substantial link to a state in 
order for it to be considered an investor of that party.108 One case in point is the 
2008 treaty between themselves, where a ‘legal person’ has to have a ‘permanent 
residence in the territory of one of the contracting parties.’109 Similarly, one 
reason the Czech Republic is reported to have initiated the renegotiation of its BIT 
with the United States (thus far in vain) is the perception that it fuels ‘speculative 
foreign investments and indirect investments made with the sole goal of later 
launching legal proceedings ...’110 
 
Dispute settlement clauses have also been adjusted by some countries in recent 
years, by for instance allowing for a consolidation of claims,111 or including ‘fork-
in-the-road’ provisions to preclude investors from pursuing claims both in 
domestic courts and under international arbitration.112 Finally, the broad scope of 
investment treaty arbitration has made some countries insist on provisions 
addressing environmental and health issues. Again, the United States and Canada 
have led the way, but some developing countries have also insisted on such 
provisions. One example is the 2009 BIT between Denmark and Bangladesh, 
where the Danish negotiator had to accede to a request by Bangladesh to specify 
that ‘investment objectives should be achieved without relaxing health, safety, and 
environmental measures of general application.’113 Moreover, the treaty stipulates 
that if either of the two countries suffers environmental or public health damages 
due to acts of investors of the other party, the governments are entitled to 
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compensation from the investor as per their laws or international law.114 This, of 
course, is unusual to include in BITs as it relates to the obligations rather than 
rights of investors, but such innovations were ‘insisted upon by the Bangladeshi 
team’, according to the then Danish negotiator.115 These are but a few examples of 
how the rise of investment treaty arbitration has, in the words of UNCTAD,  
 
‘... led numerous countries to realize that the specific wording of IIA provisions 
does matter, and that it can make a significant difference to the outcome of an 
investment dispute. ... the increase in investment disputes has tested the wisdom of 
negotiating IIAs with extremely broad and imprecise provisions.’116 
 
Improved implementation 
 
In other instances, the content of BITs has remained largely constant, yet their 
implementation has been improved. As noted by Wälde, ‘the negotiation of a 
treaty is usually accompanied by considerable excitement. Yet once it is finalized, 
its appeal often declines dramatically.’117 This is problematic for a host of 
reasons, one obvious being that while investors may not take much notice of BITs 
when they invest abroad, treaty-violations sends a signal – right or wrong – that 
host countries are unwilling to protect foreign capital.118 And the realisation that 
BIT-disputes very often relate to decisions taken by municipal or provincial 
government offices or sector-specific regulatory authorities, has made some – 
though still very few - governments engage in greater information sharing and 
coordination across government stakeholders to prevent or settle disputes before 
they are taken to arbitration.119 Peru, for instance, has put in place an ambitious 
dispute prevention system, where national, regional and local government entities 
are informed about BIT-obligations and provided facilities to solve disputes with 
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foreign investors amicably rather than through arbitration.120 Also Colombia, 
Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic are considering similar dispute 
prevention systems.121  
 
Politicization 
 
For  some developing (and developed) country governments, the disputes have 
thereby not led to a general backlash against investment treaties, or to a 
questioning of the fundamental principles enshrined therein, but rather made them 
better aware of the risks entailed by ‘incomplete contracting’ with overly broad 
treaty provisions or insufficient implementation. This is uncontroversial, generally 
accepted, and entirely possible to explain using a rational learning framework: 
after arbitrators ‘filled in the blanks’ of exceptionally vague treaty obligations, 
subsequent calibrations of treaty-practice and implementation ensued.  
In other cases, however, developing countries have continued to pursue BITs 
exactly as before, yet with a greater politicization in the decision-making process. 
To go back to the case of Pakistan from the preface, for instance, Mr. Khan 
managed to install a more careful BIT-policy in the early 2000s. But after he 
resigned and new staff also came to the Pakistani Board of Investment, Pakistan 
has signed BITs as before the claims begun. Recall, for instance, the recent 
‘upgrade’ of the German BIT mentioned in chapter four which almost completely 
follows traditional models used during the 1990s.122 Unlike in the past, however, 
at least government stakeholders like the Law Ministry went to great lengths to 
make negotiators aware of the risks involved in signing up to such standards.123 
Similar experiences will be discussed in later chapters. So even if we relax the 
unitary actor assumption and acknowledge the possibility that embassies, 
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investment-promotion officials still occasionally push for the treaties to promote 
their own short-term agendas, they have less of a carte-blanche than before, as the 
claims have led to a greater awareness among stakeholders with an interest in 
more cautious BIT-policies.124  
 
Slowdown in BIT-participation 
 
The learning process about the implications of BITs could also potentially explain 
the slowdown in BIT-signing activity seen in recent years.125 Figure 7.1 shows 
that the rush to sign investment protection treaties clearly slowed down after the 
‘floodgates’ of investment treaty arbitrations opened.126 Unlike the otherwise 
similar graph in chapter one, I have here identified BITs with European countries, 
as some EU member states put their BIT-negotiations almost entirely on hold in 
the early 2000s, when it became clear that the competence to enter into investment 
protection agreements might be delegated to the European Union (EU).127 So even 
if developing countries wanted to, they have not always been able to conclude 
BITs with EU member states in recent years. Yet we see that the trend holds for 
BITs with European and non-European countries alike.128 The slowdown is clear 
also if one considers that some countries today prefer PTIAs over BITs.129 For 
while important, one should not exaggerate this development: in 2008, for 
instance, only 7 investment protection treaties other than BITs were signed, 
bringing the total number of treaties with BIT-like protections up to 81 that year – 
which is still less than half of what was signed just ten years before.130  
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Figure 7.1. The rise of investment treaty arbitration and the slowdown in 
BIT-participation 
    
Part of the slowdown could of course have been due to saturation.131 By the late 
1990s, developing countries with 20 BITs or more had already covered most 
important destinations, or sources, of investment flows, so they had few 
significant BIT-partners left to sign with. In this respect, it is important to note 
that the drop in BIT-signing activity began already in the latter half of the 1990s, 
when claims had yet to take off. But saturation only explains part of the 
slowdown. By 2009, 25 percent of developing countries had still signed less than 
ten BITs, and between the 174 countries participating in the BIT-movement only 
around 20 percent of the total possible number of BITs had been signed.132 So 
when controlling for lagged BIT-participation the slowdown is still considerable. 
Table 7.1 thus shows the results of a simple negative binomial regression of 
developing countries’ BIT participation from 1990 to 2009 with country-fixed 
effects.133 I control for past BITs signed, including its square and cubic functions, 
as well as lagged ratification measures. The model will be extended and discussed 
further in chapter nine, but for now it suffices to say that it shows that after 2001 
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developing countries have indeed been much less inclined to sign BITs - also 
when controlling for the size of their BIT-networks. The BIT-claims appear to 
have reduced developing countries’ signing of BITs by between thirty and forty 
percent.134  
 
Table 7.1. Slowdown in developing countries’ BIT signing activity holds when 
controlling for past BIT participation 
 
 (I) (II) 
Period dummy:    
    
    2002-2009  -0.415*** -0.366*** 
  (0.053) (0.075) 
Participation measures:    
    
    L.Total Signed   0.071*** 
 
 
  (0.007) 
    L.Total Signed2   -0.001*** 
 
 
  (0.000) 
    L.Total Signed3   0.000*** 
   (0.000) 
    L4.Total Ratified   -0.045*** 
   (0.006) 
    L10.Total Ratified   0.008 
   (0.007) 
Constant  0.394*** 0.182 
  (0.053) (0.107) 
Observations  2640 2640 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed. Table reports coefficients from negative 
binomial fixed effects regressions. L refers to a one-year lag, L4 a four-year lag, and L10 a ten-year 
lag.   
 
Variability in experiences with BITs 
 
This indicates that developing countries have become less keen to sign what has 
been revealed as very potent legal instruments. Needless to say, this is a broad 
generalization but it does very much follow in line with a Bayesian learning 
framework. Yet, while the slow-down in BIT-signing activity is marked, and more 
and more countries are beginning to revisit the content of their treaties, very few 
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have actually abandoned BITs entirely. Only a few countries in Latin America 
have begun to renounce their BITs, and at least in the case of Bolivia this has been 
associated with a marked ideological shift towards multinationals.  
 
Yet, the fact that few developing countries have entirely stopped signing BITs, or 
renounced existing treaties, does not necessarily conflict with a rational learning 
framework. Recall that from a Bayesian perspective, actors are assumed to learn 
not just from outcomes, but also from their variance. And while governments may 
have learned from particularly egregious cases135 – e.g. the Argentina claims and 
CME – there has been considerable variability in experiences with BITs. The 
treaties may have had plausible material benefits in some cases, as developing 
countries themselves can use them to protect their own increasing stocks of 
outward investments, and in individual cases, they may lure investors to the 
country.136 While chapter four showed that the latter is likely to have been rare, 
just a single foreign investor can make a considerable difference, particularly in 
small developing countries.137  
 
Also, with respect to the risks of BITs, it is worth recalling that just about 6 
percent of the total BIT-network has been used as the jurisdictional basis for 
claims (Table 7.2). The corresponding figure for the North-South BITs network 
also remains less than 10 percent. So while a country like Argentina has been on 
the respondent end of more than 50 BIT claims, many developing countries have 
yet to experience their first. Among developing countries with ratified BITs, only 
around half have been hit by a BIT claim. 
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Table 7.2. Summary of BIT claims, 1999 and 2009 
 
 
Also, even when BITs have been used for disputes, tribunals have far from always 
come to politically sensitive conclusions. While some claims continue to lead to 
massive awards in favour of investors,138 particularly when seen in per capita 
terms,139 many have led to awards in favour of host states.140 And although some 
inconsistent and contradictory decisions continue to cause concerns,141 this is of 
course not unique for investor-state arbitration, and most awards on questions 
such as indirect investments, for instance, reflect the emergence of a somewhat 
consistent jurisprudence.142 Similarly, while egregious cases of ‘treaty-shopping’ 
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Appraisal,’ Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper No. 11-01, May 2011. 
140
 See generally, S. Franck, ‘Empirically evaluating claims about investment treaty arbitration,’ 
86 North Carolina Law Review 1 (2007). 
141
 On Argentina’s defense of necessity in connection with its obligations towards foreign 
investors during the crisis, compare e.g.; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May, 2005; and LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E 
International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award, 25 Jul, 2007. On 
umbrella clauses, compare e.g.; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance v Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August, 2003; and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance v 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 Jan, 2004. On whether MFN 
provisions cover dispute settlement, compare e.g.; Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 Aug, 2004; and Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade 
S.p.A. v. the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 29 Nov, 2004.  
142
 J. Paulsson, ‘Avoiding Unintended Consequences,’ in: K. Sauvant (ed.) Appeals Mechanism in 
International Investment Disputes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); J. Alvaréz and K. 
Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment 
Regime,’ in: Sauvant (2009), op. cit., at 467; C. Schreuer and M. Weiniger, ‘A doctrine of 
precedent?’ in: Muchlinski, Ortino, and Schreuer (eds.) op. cit., at 1198.  
1999 2009
Number of developing countries having experienced a BIT claim 19 66
Percent of developing countries with at least one ratified BIT having experienced a BIT claim 15.0 48.9
Total claims against developing countries, where jurisdiction was based on a BIT 26 270
  Average BIT claims per developing country with at least one ratified BIT 0.2 2.0
  Maximum BIT claims against one developing country 5 51
Share of BITs used as jurisdictional basis for investor claims 1.4 5.7
  Percent of North-South BITs used for one or more BIT claims 2.1 8.7
  Percent of South-South BITs used for one or more BIT claims 0.2 2.5
Source: own calculcations.
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continue to cause outrage in some corners,143 other tribunals have thrown out 
claims based on obvious abuses of process.144  
 
Indeed, it is tempting to conclude that part of the reason that tribunals may have 
been more moderate in their approach compared to the early years of investment 
treaty arbitration is the realization that the entire BIT-movement could unravel if 
they go ‘too far’ in their decisions.145 When commenting on the novelty of 
investment treaty arbitration, Paulson warned his colleague arbitrators already in 
1995 that states were likely to ‘take fright and reverse tracks’ if the system was 
pushed too far.146 So although none of this rules out that critics of the regime are 
necessarily wrong, when pointing to its potential for institutional biases147 or 
regulatory chill,148 the variability in the experiences with BITs does imply that 
while there may be information available now that BITs have considerable bite in 
practice, there is not overwhelming evidence to suggest that it would necessarily 
be inherently rational for all developing countries to withdraw entirely from the 
regime. Although the material benefits of the BIT-movement may have been 
oversold, the costs of the regime may similarly not be as great as sometimes 
claimed among its most ardent critics. And indeed, while we do see an adjustment 
of the content of BITs and a slowdown in the participation rate, very few 
developing countries have abandoned investment treaty arbitration as a governing 
institution.149  
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 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, Decision on jurisdiction, 29 April 
2004; Aguas del Tunari SA v. Republic of Bolivia, ICISD Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on 
jurisdiction, 21 October 2005. 
144
 Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 15 Apr, 2009, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/5.  
145
 This seems to have been a particular concern, when claims have been made against developed 
countries. For a remarkable account from one of the arbitrators in the Loewen case, see; Judge A. 
Mikva, Audiotape: Symposium on Environmental Law and Judiciary, Pace Law School, 6-8 Dec, 
2004; discussed in: D. Schneiderman, ‘Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: 
Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes,’ 30 Northwestern Journal of International Law 
and Business 383 (2010). See also; S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Separate 
Concurring Opinion, 13 Nov, 2000, par. 218 (‘a finding of expropriation might contribute to 
public misunderstanding and anxiety about both this decision and the wider implications of the 
investment chapter of NAFTA.’) 
146
 Paulsson, op. cit., at 257.  
147
 Van Harten, op. cit. 
148
 K. Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  
149
 On exiting investment treaties see further in the concluding chapter.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that even if we assume that developing country 
governments have been perfectly capable of seeking and correctly processing 
available information on BITs, it was in exceptionally short supply when the 
treaties proliferated. This point has not been taken seriously in any existing 
studies of BIT-diffusion, but it is important. For today, developing countries have 
learned from the surge in claims and are less keen to sign what has been revealed 
as very potent legal instruments, while at the same time being less important in 
promoting investment flows than many thought during the 1990s. While there has 
been no general opposition to principles enshrined in BITs – many of which are 
included in domestic investment codes already – the investment treaty claims 
have made many relevant agencies reconsider their unwavering support of BITs 
during the 1990s. Relaxing the assumption of full information is thereby crucially 
important to understand the historical development of the global BIT-regime.  
 
The question is, however, whether this takes us far enough. Have developing 
countries been surprised about more than just how arbitrators have interpreted key 
provisions? Did they in fact seek and process the information about BITs in ways 
predicted by rational choice models? Even with the information available, Van 
Harten, for instance, doubts whether developing countries in fact carefully 
weighed their costs and benefits ‘based on a sound understanding of the 
treaties.’150 This will be the subject of the next chapter, which will relax the 
assumption that decision-makers have followed the dictums of comprehensive 
rationality. 
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 G. Van Harten, ’Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion,’ 2 Trade, 
Law and Development 1 (2010), at 42.  
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8. When the claim hits: Bilateral investment treaties and 
bounded rationality  
 
The previous chapter observed that while ‘modern’ BITs have been signed since 
the late 1980s, information about their practical implications was in short supply 
until the early 2000s. When considering whether to sign investment protection 
treaties with often vague and broad provisions, developing country officials could 
therefore easily have underestimated the risks involved. And given the incomplete 
information available, such misperception of the treaties’ implications cannot be 
said to have been irrational, or indeed unexpected. This chapter will ask, however, 
whether developing countries did in fact learn rationally from the information 
available. Did developing country officials seek and process information about 
BITs in ways predicted by Bayesian models? Or have risk-assessments followed a 
‘threshold model’, like in Pakistan, where when the probabilities of risks were low 
they were not only underestimated but ignored completely?1 Similarly, did 
developing countries carefully learn from experiences abroad, or did rely 
excessively on their own experiences? Is it, for instance, a coincidence that the 
countries mentioned in the last chapter, which had recently adjusted their treaty 
practice had all been hit by BIT-claims themselves? Similarly, is it a coincidence 
that only developing countries that have been subject to disputes themselves, have 
established a body of specialized civil servants to address investment treaties?2  
 
To address these questions, the chapter is divided into two sections. The first will 
use econometrics to assess how important a country’s own experiences with BIT 
claims have been for their propensity to sign and ratify BITs. Furthermore, the 
results in the often-quoted article on BIT-diffusion by Elkins, Guzman, and 
Simmons will be questioned based on a reproduction of their analysis. The second 
section will present qualitative insights from a group of developing countries 
                                                          
1
 E.g.; G. McClelland, W. Schulze, and D. Coursey, ‘Insurance for low-probability hazards: A 
bimodal response to unlikely events,’ 7 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 95 (1993).  
2
 D. Khayat, ‘Bridging the investment claim gap between sophisticated investors and unprepared 
host states,’ in: UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II 
[unedited draft] (Geneva: United Nations, forth.).  
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spread over each major geographical region to triangulate the findings from the 
quantitative analysis.  
 
8.1. A large-N test of bounded rational policy learning 
 
With Emma Aisbett3  
 
We saw in the last chapter that there has been a marked slowdown in BIT-
participation after the claims began. The question addressed here is how 
developing countries have responded to these claims, and in particular just how 
important countries’ own experiences with investment treaty claims have been for 
their continued adoption of BITs. Recall from chapter three that given the low-
probability nature of BIT-claims, a Bayesian learner would be particularly careful 
to factor in the experiences of other countries, when learning about the 
implications of BITs, since the costs of ignoring information are considerably 
larger if it is the only information available.4 When learning about BITs, we 
would thereby expect that rational governments carefully considered the 
information revealed, when other countries became subject to investment 
disputes.   
An alternative explanation for the slow-down in BIT participation comes out of 
the policy learning literature based on bounded rationality. If the availability 
heuristic has biased risk-assessments of BITs, a key expectation here is that it is 
not until a country itself became subject to a claim that officials truly understood 
the implications of the treaties. Just as people tend to insure themselves against 
low-probability events after they have already taken place,5 countries may also 
                                                          
3
 Lecturer, Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University 
(emma.aisbett@anu.edu.au).  
4
 J. March, The Ambiguities of Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); P. Slovic, H. 
Kunreuther, and G. White ‘Decision Processes, Rationality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards’, 
in: P. Slovic (ed.), The Perception of Risk (London: Earthscan, 2000). 
5
 K. Steinbrugge, F. McClure and A. Snow, Studies in seismicity and earthquake damage statistics 
(Washington DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1969). See also;  
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have been ‘prisoners of their experience’ when it comes to BITs.6 This is an 
important difference in the predictions of the two hypotheses: whereas rational 
policy-makers are expected to learn from all relevant experiences, policy-makers 
that apply inferential shortcuts when seeking and interpreting information are 
expected to learn much more from their own experiences, as that information is 
more readily available.7  
 
Dependent variable(s) 
 
To test these two models of policy-learning in the international investment 
regime, our main dependent variable counts the number of BITs signed by a 
developing country in a given year. This is a standard measure for quantitative 
studies on the diffusion of BITs.8 It assumes that although each the result of a 
separate negotiation, BITs can nevertheless be conceived as comparable legal 
instruments. This is not unreasonable. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the 
content of BITs is largely similar, and even when differences exist, they are often 
leveled out by the most-favored-nation (MFN) provision.9 Moreover, the often 
broad definition of investors and investments combined with the complexities of 
corporate structuring makes differences between BITs even less relevant in 
practice.10 So while simply looking at BIT-participation rates is obviously not able 
to capture how countries have responded to claims with respect to the content of 
their treaties, it is a useful starting point, given that the few studies that have 
coded BITs’ content remain too restrictive or cover too few treaties to be useful 
for our purposes.11 
                                                          
6
 The term is from Kates’ classic study of risk-adjustments to low-probability hazards; R. Kates, 
Hazard and Choice Perception in Flood Plain Management (research paper no. 78), Uni. Of 
Chicago, Dep. of Geography, at 142. 
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 We address the difficulty of providing a rational baseline in the latter part of the paper. 
8
 See e.g. Z. Elkins, A. Guzman, and B. Simmons ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,’ 60 International Organization 811 (2006). 
9
 See e.g.; L. Poulsen, ‘The Significance of South-South BITs for the International Investment 
Regime’ 30 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1 (2010).   
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 See again; B. Legum, ‘Defining Investment and Investor: Who is Entitled to Claim?,’ 22 
Arbitration International 521 (2006), at 525. 
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 See e.g.; Poulsen, op. cit.; J. Yackee ‘Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ 22 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 405 (2008); D. Blake, ‘Thinking 
Ahead: Time Horizons and the Legalization of International Investment Agreements,’ working 
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One aspect where BITs do systematically and meaningfully vary, however, is in 
their dispute settlement provisions, since it wasn’t until the late 1980s that BITs 
began, as a general rule, to give investors access to investor-state arbitration.12 
Since it is unclear from arbitral decisions whether the MFN-clause also covers 
procedural provisions,13 this difference is crucial as investment treaties would be 
largely irrelevant for foreign investors without their effective and comprehensive 
consent to investor-state arbitration.14 We therefore restrict our sample to the 
period when the vast majority of BITs included a binding consent to investor-state 
arbitration, namely from 1990 onwards. Another reason for doing this is that our 
identification strategy (discussed in detail below) involves comparing behavior 
across countries in a given year. And since only one BIT claim had been filed 
prior to 1990, there were no claims to learn from and thus no identifying variation 
in our main explanatory variable in this period.  
To check the robustness of our results we include two further measures of BIT 
participation. The first alternative measure of BIT participation is the number of 
BITs that came into force in a given year (hereafter referred to as ‘ratified BITs’). 
Although signing a treaty has some legal implications - as the contracting parties 
are not allowed to take actions that defeat its object and purpose15 - it does not 
actually establish legally binding obligations upon the parties. While some BITs 
stipulate that they come into force upon signature, this is rare. The vast majority 
only come into force after the contracting parties have notified each other that 
their domestic requirements are met. Such requirements vary across countries, but 
in practice this often means that both national parliaments have to ratify the BIT 
                                                                                                                                                               
paper, available at: http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/17562/blake.pdf (last accessed 16 November 
2010); T. Alle and C. Peinhardt, ‘Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Bargaining over Dispute Resolution Provisions,’ 54 International Studies Quarterly 1 (2010). 
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 See chapter two. 
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 See, e.g., Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, January 25, 2005; and Vladimir & Moise Berschader v. Russian Federation, SCC 
Case No V(080/2004). See generally L. Hsu, ‘MFN and Dispute Settlement: When the Twain 
Meet,’ 7 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2006) 25. 
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 T. Wälde, ‘The ‘umbrella’ clause in investment arbitration: a comment on original intentions 
and recent cases,’ 6 Journal of World Investment & Trade 183 (2005), at 194. 
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 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 18. 
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before it enters into force.16 This doesn’t always happen: with 24% of the almost 
2800 BITs yet to come into force, a great number of investment treaties still 
remain mostly ‘pieces of paper.’ Brazil, for instance, has not ratified any of its 
BITs for constitutional reasons.17 So to capture the propensity to enter into BITs 
that are actually legally binding, we also check whether our base model holds 
when replacing signed BITs with the number of BITs that come into force for a 
developing country in a given year. The disadvantage of this measure is of course 
that idiosyncratic ratification processes may introduce measurement error.  
Our final measure of BIT participation is the number of BITs signed by a 
developing country in a given year that came into force (i.e. were ratified) within 
three years of being signed. Though novel, this measure combines the key 
strengths of each of the measures of participation commonly used in the literature. 
Like ‘ratified’ BITs, our novel measure of participation has the advantage of not 
counting BITs which countries sign without the intention of making them legally 
binding. Similarly to ‘signed BITs’, this measure avoids the measurement error 
introduced in the ‘ratified BITs’ measure by idiosyncrasies in the (often lengthy) 
ratification process in each country. We chose three years as our cutoff as, among 
the BITs that have entered into force, more than four-fifths did so within three 
years of signature.18 
 
Main explanatory variable 
 
As we are interested in what happened once developing countries were subject to 
their first BIT claim, this again raises a question of comparability: can BIT-claims 
reasonably be assumed to be comparable in their practical implications? Clearly, 
this will not always be the case. For instance, the availability heuristic would also 
imply that controversial claims discussed extensively in the media would have a 
much larger impact than other claims. But while we acknowledge this challenge, 
                                                          
16
 See; UNCTAD, ‘The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs),’ IIA Monitor No. 
3 (2006), at 2.  
17
 See e.g., D. Wei, ‘Bilateral investment treaties: An empirical analysis of the practices of Brazil 
and China,’ European Journal of Law and Economics, May (2010). 
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 UNCTAD (2006), op. cit.  
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it should make it more difficult to find an effect of the first claim. Similarly, 
although we do control for the size of investment treaty arbitrations in robustness 
tests (see below), we nevertheless refrain from distinguishing between claims that 
have been ‘won’ or ‘lost’ by respondent states. For while some quantitative 
attempts to scrutinize the outcomes of BIT arbitrations readily regard arbitrations 
where investors have been awarded compensation as a ‘win’ for the investor, this 
will in many cases be misleading.19 Did Sri Lanka really ‘lose’ the AAPL claim, 
for instance, when AAPL was only awarded a tenth of what it claimed, and the 
tribunal found entirely in favor of Sri Lanka on the key question on merits?20 
Legal officials in Sri Lanka didn’t think so, and the lesson learned was limited to 
one clause only.21 And what about settled claims? Did Pakistan really ‘lose’ 110 
million USD to Imbregilo in their settlement, given that the ruling on jurisdiction 
was so favorable for Pakistan that Imbregilo agreed to settle for less than a fourth 
of its claim rather than proceeding to the merits?22 That, at least, is not the 
perception among key legal officials in Pakistan.23 We therefore leave such thorny 
conceptual questions for others to resolve, and instead merely include a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one from the year a country was subject to its first 
BIT-claim – defined as the year the claim was registered by the arbitral tribunal - 
and zero otherwise (see Annex III for details).  
Our dataset of claims was created by merging BIT-participation data based on 
UNCTAD’s country-lists of BITs with information on arbitrations compiled from 
a range of different sources.24 Although comprehensive, this is no guarantee 
against some degree of measurement error. The secrecy of some disputes 
adjudicated under non-ICSID rules, means we actually do not know for sure when 
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 See e.g., S. Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration,’ 50 Harvard 
Journal of International Law 2 (2009). 
20
 Asian Agricultural Products Limited (AAPL) v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, 27 June 1990; A. Perera, ‘The Role and Implications of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties,’ 26 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1 (2000). The key question was 
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 Sri Lankan official I (‘We were mostly concerned on standard of liability and the 4.2 provision, 
and on those issues it ended on satisfactory terms for us.’). 
22
 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005. 
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 Pakistan official VI.   
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 See Annex III. 
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a country found itself on the respondent end of a BIT claim for the first time. As 
mentioned in the last chapter, it was not until recently that Luke Peterson 
‘uncovered’ a number of BIT-claims against Poland in the early 1990s for 
instance. Yet, while this is a legitimate cause of concern for our identification 
strategy, it should not be exaggerated, as it is reasonable to assume that the vast 
majority of investment treaty awards have in fact found their way to the public 
domain.25 Furthermore, to the extent that we are missing the first claims for 
certain countries, it would again tend to make our results more conservative, i.e. 
biased against finding an effect of the first treaty claim in our data. 
 
Our approach is conservative for another reason as well, since the year a country 
was subject to its first BIT-claim is not necessarily the year it was first threatened 
with a claim.26 This too is information that is typically not in the public domain. 
We know today, for instance, that Panama was notified as early as 1992 about a 
potential breach of its BIT with the United States, and changed its practice to 
avoid a dispute.27 Similarly, although Cambodia is listed as having its first 
investment treaty claim in 2009, reports indicate that a French investor threatened 
it with a dispute five years earlier.28 So while threats of arbitrations also have 
potential to ‘reveal’ the potency of BITs to the respondent government, we only 
include actual BIT claims in our analysis, which means our model is potentially 
underspecified.29 Again, however, this implies that only a particularly systematic 
and strong response to countries’ first claims would show up in the data. 
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 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), at viii. 
26
 See generally; K. Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting 
Foreign Investors at the Expense of Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), ch. 8; D. Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 120-129. 
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 K. Vandevelde, ‘U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave,’ 14 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 621 (1993), at 11. 
28
 L. Peterson, ‘French insurance firm alleges Cambodia violated investment treaty, ‘ INVEST-SD: 
Investment Law and Policy News Bulletin, May 5, 2005; D. Vis-Dunbar, ‘French investor 
criticizes governments’ handling of Cambodian dispute,’ Investment Treaty News, August 23, 
2006. Note that that at least among Cambodian negotiators; these threats have had no impact on 
their view on BITs (‘I don’t see any side-effects of BITs…. The cases have not changed our 
thinking at all. We are still very keen.’); Cambodian official I.  
29
 Note also that we limit ourselves to ‘pure’ BIT-claims, while acknowledging that investor-state 
arbitrations can touch upon BIT-obligations, even if their jurisdiction is based on other legal 
instruments - such as investor-state contracts, the laws of the host state, or other investment 
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Event study 
 
As a first-cut to address how important a country’s own experiences have been for 
its BIT-policies, Figure 8.1 uses an ‘event study’ approach to provide a 
preliminary visual assessment of the proposition that participation responded 
principally to claims against themselves. The y-axis shows the average annual 
number of BITs signed or ratified by developing countries which have had at least 
one BIT-based claim brought to arbitration. The x-axis shows time relative to the 
year of registration of the first BIT claim against the country. The pattern provides 
strong support for what we heard from Pakistan in the preface, namely that the 
rush to sign BITs slowed down considerably once countries became subject to 
their first dispute. We see that while signing rates were already decreasing on 
average prior to the time of first claim, this downward trend amplified 
considerably after the claim was registered. Even more notable is that the upward 
trend in number of BITs ratified per year reverses in the year of the first claim. 
 
Figure 8.1. Average BITs entered into by developing countries before and 
after their first BIT-claim. 
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This is surprising if countries were careful to factor in experiences from abroad. 
Yet as supportive of the bounded rationality approach as Figure 8.1 is, we may 
still be concerned that the correlation between experience of a claim and 
decreased BIT participation is a spurious one, driven by omitted variables such as 
global shocks, national political or economic environment, and participation 
dynamics (such as the exhaustion of treaty-partner possibilities). To address these 
concerns we turn to the tools of econometrics. 
 
Base regression 
 
We examine the statistical validity of this hypothesis by estimating the Negative 
Binomial fixed-effects model of Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (see below), with 
dependent and independent variables as in equation 1.  Our parameter of interest 
in equation 1 is ϕ . 
( ) ( ))exp(,|1 ittititititit XBITClaimgXBITClaimBITsf εηαϕ +++=+  (1)  
Where 1+itBITs  is the number of new BITs participated in year t+1, 
itBITClaim is a dummy variable which is zero in years before the first BIT 
claim was lodged against country i, and 1 otherwise, 
itX comprises FDI inflows, net FDI outflows, GDP, the investment risk 
index, and controls for previous BIT participation, 
tη are year effects, and 
itε are idiosyncratic errors, which we assume to be clustered by country-year. 
 
Control variables 
 
A key component of our identification strategy is the inclusion of a full set of year 
dummies to control for global shocks shared by all countries, such as business 
cycles, the global number of BITs, changing global norms towards foreign capital 
(e.g. the rise and fall of the Washington Consensus), the global number of BITs, 
or the global number of BIT claims. Controlling for global BIT claims in this way 
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means that the effects we observe are additional to any effect of claims against 
other countries. Thus if countries treated claims against other countries as being as 
informative as claims against themselves, we would expect to find zero effect 
from our (own BIT claims) variable of interest. As mentioned above, this would 
of course not be rational as idiosyncratic country differences do make claims 
against one’s own country somewhat more informative than claims against other 
countries. Yet from a rational learning framework we should not expect the effect 
of own claims to be particularly large.30  
 
Our base model also controls for a country’s FDI inflows and outflows as well as 
its market size/level of economic development proxied by GDP. We further 
control for investment risks, as a government with protectionist urges towards FDI 
may both be at higher risk of BIT-claims and at the same time less inclined to sign 
BITs. Think of Venezuela. A number of indexes are available to measure 
investment risks, but among those usually relied upon the assessment of the 
Political Risk Services (PRS) Group comes closest to the risks covered in BITs. In 
the PRS index, each country is given a score from 0 (very high risk) to 12 (very 
low risk), based on risks associated with (i) expropriation/contract viability; (ii) 
profits repatriation; and (iii) payment delays. All of these explanatory variables 
are lagged one year to reduce simultaneity.  
 
Finally, we include a range of indicators to control for saturation, i.e. the fact that 
a slowdown in a country’s BIT participation can be a function of the size of its 
existing BIT-network.31 Since a more extensive BIT network will also raise the 
probability of a claim (ceteris paribus) omitting previous participation would 
likely lead us to over-estimate the downward effects of claims. We therefore 
control for the cumulative number of BITs participated in (measured by signing or 
ratification according to the dependent variable in the regression) as well as its 
square and cubic functions. Additionally, since claims can only arise from ratified 
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 See below for the discussion on the inherent difficulties in providing a rational baseline outside 
the confines of experiments.  
31
 See chapter seven.  
 226 
BITs, in all estimations we control for the cumulative number of BITs ratified 
with four and ten year lags.   
Summary statistics and sources all raw and constructed variables used in our 
analysis are provided in Tables AIII.1 and AIII.2 in the Appendix. Missing data 
for some series means that our base regression uses around 1600 of the potential 
2740 observations.  
Choice of estimator 
 
Since our dependent variable is a count variable, an estimator based on a gamma 
distribution is likely most appropriate. While acknowledging that there may be 
some resulting lack of efficiency compared to a simple poisson model, we have 
opted for a high degree of flexibility and estimate the fixed-effect negative 
binomial model of Hausman, Hall and Griliches.32 Furthermore, lack of efficiency 
is not a major concern for us as our coefficients of interest are generally 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
The fixed-effect estimators are the workhorse of cross-country panel applications 
because they significantly reduce the influence of omitted time-invariant country 
characteristics. In our case, relevant characteristics include region, legal tradition, 
geographical size, and colonial history. Using a full fixed-effect model for our 
purposes, however, may cause bias as including lagged cumulative participation is 
akin to including a lagged dependent variable.33 Thus our base specification is 
something of a compromise, allowing for country-specific dispersion in a negative 
binomial specification, (thus allowing country-specific intercepts) but not being a 
pure fixed-effect model.34 In robustness checks we compare our results to those 
obtained in both a fixed-effect poisson model and a negative binomial model 
                                                          
32
 J. Hausman, B. Hall and Z. Griliches, ‘Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application 
to the Patents-R&D Relationship,’ 52 Econometrica 909-938 (1984). 
33
 For an excellent discussion of these sorts of issues in dynamic panel data models, see, M. 
Arellano and B. Honoré, ‘Panel data models: some recent developments.’ In: J. Heckman and E. 
Leamer (eds.) Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 5 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001). 
34
 P. Allison and R. Waterman, ‘Fixed–Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models’, 32 
Sociological Methodology 1 (2002). 
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without country-specific dispersion. The results (in Annex III) indicate that our 
choice of estimator does not qualitatively affect our findings. 
 
Additional robustness tests 
 
The immediately preceding subsections have described our checks for robustness 
to choice of estimator and specification of both the dependent and main 
explanatory variable. We also checked of the robustness of our findings to adding 
or removing other control variables as well as removing – one at a time - any of 
the controls in our base regression, which might potentially be endogenous or 
cause other forms of bias. Finally, we checked the robustness of our results to the 
inclusion of two additional controls. Firstly, using the World Bank’s database on 
political institutions,35 we captured possible partisan biases by including a dummy 
variable indicating whether a country’s executive and/or majority party was left-
wing.36 Secondly, we checked for whether a country’s BITs have been used to 
adjudicate claims against other countries: for while only few developing country 
investors have filed BIT-claims, the rising stocks of investment from developing 
countries mean they increasingly have an interest in not just attracting investment 
from the West but also protecting their own investors abroad. The obvious case in 
this respect is China. In the interest of space we do not present these results here, 
however, as neither control had any appreciable explanatory power or impact on 
other coefficients. 
 
Augmented models and ancillary questions 
 
As many countries experienced their first investment treaty claim around the same 
time, we include specifications that control for cross-border learning effects by 
including dummy variables for whether a country within the same region has been 
hit as well as the total number of regional claims. This is a much simpler approach 
than Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, for instance, who include complex (and data 
                                                          
35
 T. Beck, G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh, ‘New tools in comparative political 
economy: The Database of Political Institutions,’ 15 World Bank Economic Review 1 (2001). 
36
 See chapter five.  
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dependent) learning measures based on ambitious assumptions of highly advanced 
BIT-strategies.37 Not only will we show that their learning measure does not hold 
– even in their own dataset - we are also less optimistic about the sophistication of 
developing country strategies in the international investment regime and therefore 
limit learning effects to countries close by. Note again, however, that any 
observed impact of this variable is over and above the impact of the global 
number of claims (i.e. including claims far away).    
Finally, we studied specifications which distinguish between BIT partners. For 
although BITs are largely comparable in their legal content, hundreds of BITs 
have been signed between countries which exchange next to zero investment 
flows. While legally binding, and at times relevant through the MFN provision, 
these BIT are rarely important in practice. And since by far the majority of claims 
(still) involve Western investors suing developing country governments, we 
distinguish between North-South and South-South BITs. We also use an 
alternative classification, where only South-South treaties which do not have a 
major developing country capital exporter38 as one of the contracting parties are 
considered ‘frivolous’ BITs.  
 
Results 
 
 
Table 8.1 reports coefficients from our base specification. The dependent 
variables from left to right are respectively the annual number of BITs signed, 
ratified, and signed with ratification within 3 years. In all three columns the effect 
of having at least one BIT claim is negative and we are able to reject the null of 
positive or no effect at the 5% significance level or better.39 The experience of a 
                                                          
37
 Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, op. cit. 
38
 This measure is also summarised in chapter four: we took the country’s outward FDI stock as a 
share of the total developing country sample outward FDI stock and calculated the maximum, 
average, and median shares. Top 10 from each were then considered large developing country 
capital exporters. These were:  Brazil, Russia, South Africa, China, Argentina, Panama, Mexico, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Hungary, Chile, Panama, and India. An alternative would have 
been to use bilateral investment flows, yet these are in short supply and particularly so for south-
south flows.   
39
 The one-sided nature of the t-test for our null allows us to reject the null at a 5% level of 
significance even in the regression with ratification as the dependent variable.  
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BIT claim reduces signing by around 35% and ratification by somewhat less with 
around 17%.40 This provides strong support for our hypothesis that when a 
country is subject to at least one BIT claim it reduces its participation in BITs 
considerably; and that this effect is over and above any effect from observing 
claims against other countries. Note that, as expected, the results are weaker when 
‘ratification’ is the dependent variable due to the idiosyncratic differences.  
Table 8.1. Strong negative effect of first BIT claim on participation in BITs 
by developing countries. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Participation is measured by signing in column 1, ratification in column 2, and column 3 measures 
BITs signed in that year which where ratified within 3 years. Sample size varies across columns as 
countries for which dep. var. is always zero are dropped. Table reports coefficients from negative 
binomial, fixed effect estimation. Year dummies and cubic function of lagged total BIT 
participation as well as four and ten year lags of ratification also included but coefficients not 
reported. All other controls are lagged one year. 
 
In the interests of space we present results for all other regressions only for 
signing as the dependent variable. Signing was chosen over ‘Signed and Ratified’ 
since the two measures have very similar results but the former is more consistent 
with the existing literature on BIT participation. Annex III presents the results of 
checks of the robustness of our base signing regression to changes in the set of 
control variables as well as to the choice of count-data estimator. Our finding of a 
large significant negative effect of having a BIT-claim is robust to all these 
changes. 
                                                          
40
 E.g. 1-exp(-0.423)=0.34 
 Signing Ratifying Sign & Ratify 
L.BIT Claim -0.423*** -0.187* -0.463*** 
 
(0.107) (0.112) (0.144) 
L.Inward FDI -0.016 0.009 -0.030** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
L.Outward FDI -0.011 -0.006 0.016 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.020) 
L.GDP 0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.071*** 0.092*** 0.067** 
 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.028) 
Constant 2.260*** 2.467*** -2.021** 
 
(0.494) (0.555) (0.885) 
Observations 1604 1524 1448 
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Despite the robustness of our results, we may be concerned that they are driven by 
a tendency for first-claims to occur after BIT-participation has already started to 
decline. The graphical ‘event-study’ in Figure 8.2 provides suggestive evidence 
that – to the extent participation was already in decline – the first claim 
exaggerated this trend. Table 8.2 provides regression-based evidence to further 
support this and thus allay the concern that our results are driven by spurious 
correlation with some underlying trend toward decreased participation. Columns 
1-5 in Table 8.2 control respectively for 2 years prior to the registration of the first 
BIT claim through to 2 years after the BIT claim is lodged. If our BIT claim 
dummy were picking up some spurious trend, we would expect all the coefficients 
on the different leads and lags of BIT claims to be similar. Instead we find that the 
coefficients in the year of the BIT claim and the two subsequent years are roughly 
twice as large are those in the two years prior. Furthermore, the coefficients on 
BIT-claim one and two years prior (columns 1 and 2) are not significant at the 
10% level, while the coefficients in columns 3-5 are negative and significant at 
the 1% level. These results correspond well with Figure 8.2 and provide strong 
evidence that the structural break in participation behavior coincides with the 
registration of the first BIT claim. 
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Table 8.2. Timing of significant reduction in participation coincides with first 
BIT claim 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed. Table reports coefficients from negative 
binomial, fixed effect estimation. Year dummies and cubic function of lagged total BIT 
participation as well as lags of ratification also included but coefficients not reported. All other 
controls are lagged one year. 
 
Being confident of the robustness of our primary result, we now consider ancillary 
questions. Table 8.3 examines the impact of increasing numbers of claims against 
a host and of claims against countries in the same region. In all specifications in 
Table 8.3 we see that the total number of BIT claims (Cum. BIT claims) is only 
very weakly negatively correlated with participation, suggesting that learning 
about the potential of BITs occurs primarily in response to the first BIT claim. 
This corresponds well with the predictions of bounded rationality, namely that a 
single ‘vivid’ event often has a considerably greater impact than expected by 
Bayesian frameworks. The later would predict that each additional claim reveals 
further information about the risks BITs entail, yet this is not what we find. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
F2.BIT Claim -0.134     
 
(0.098)     
F.BIT Claim  -0.158    
 
 (0.010)    
BIT Claim   -0.325***   
 
  (0.103)   
L.BIT Claim    -0.423***  
 
   (0.107)  
L2.BIT Claim     -0.302*** 
 
    (0.110) 
L.Inward FDI -0.028*** -0.018* -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
L.Outward FDI 0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
L.GDP 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Constant 2.500*** 2.078*** 2.173*** 2.260*** 2.205*** 
 
(0.520) (0.493) (0.492) (0.494) (0.497) 
Observations 1518 1604 1604 1604 1604 
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Table 8.3. BIT participation reacts less to claims against other countries 
within same geographic region than to claims against itself. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed. Table reports coefficients from negative 
binomial, fixed effect estimation. Year dummies and cubic function of lagged total BIT 
participation as well as lags of ratification also included but coefficients not reported. All other 
controls are lagged one year. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8.3 examine the response to claims against other 
countries in the same region. Interestingly the pattern is reversed here: countries 
show little response to the first claim in the region, but do seem to respond to the 
cumulative average number of claims per country in the region. This could mean 
that policy-makers have learned rationally from countries close by, yet this is 
unlikely given the observations above and the qualitative evidence presented 
below. Instead, it probably indicates that claims against other countries in the 
region elicit significantly less of an emotional response for policy-makers than 
claims against their own country. Thus our result suggests that, consistent with 
theories of bounded rationality, policy learning is more ‘rational’ when the 
emotional content of the information is lower. 
Finally, Table 8.4 addresses the question of whether participation in ‘serious’ 
BITs responds in the same way as participation in more frivolous or ‘photo-
opportunity’ BITs. The perceived benefits of participation in BITs for countries 
can range from apparently minor ones such as ‘having something to do’ when a 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.Cum. BIT Claims -0.018 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 
 
(0.0191) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
L.BIT Claim  -0.419*** -0.416*** -0.393*** 
 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) 
L.Region BIT Claim   -0.015 0.010 
 
  (0.098) (0.097) 
L.Region cum.BIT Claims    -0.011*** 
 
   (0.004) 
L.Inward FDI -0.018* -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
L.Outward FDI -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
L.GDP 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Constant 2.036*** 2.253*** 2.272*** 2.808*** 
 
(0.497) (0.495) (0.509) (0.541) 
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 
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dignitary from another country visits through to the potential attraction of much-
needed high-technology investment. Similarly, the potential costs of BITs may 
appear negligible – for example if there is almost no inflow of FDI ever likely 
from the partner country – or they may be substantial – for example if there are 
substantial amounts of investment from the partner in high political-risk sectors. 
So if our results are purely driven by a slowdown in BITs with little, if any, 
material importance (except through the MFN clause) our analysis may have little 
relevance for the investment regime overall. Yet Table 8.4 shows that this is not 
the case. While participation in all types of BITs responses negatively to a claim, 
the impact is strongest for BITs with the largest potential economic implications.  
Table 8.4. Participation in BITs with potentially significant economic 
implications is more affected by claims than participation in 'photo-
opportunity' BITs. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable is the annual number signed of the type of BITs described in the column 
heading. Table reports coefficients from negative binomial, fixed effect estimation. Year dummies 
and cubic function of lagged total BIT participation as well as lags of ratification also included but 
coefficients not reported. All other controls are lagged one year. 
 
A final robustness test  
Evidence presented thus far provides good grounds to believe that the pattern of 
responses to BIT claims has been strongly ‘narcissistic’ - and thereby bounded 
rational. We find it unlikely that a rational learner would react so strongly to the 
first claim at home while completely ignoring the first claim in the region. Also, a 
rational learner should learn progressively from its claims rather than reacting so 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 North-South BITs South-South BITs Serious BITs Photo ops. 
L.BIT Claim -0.373** -0.257** -0.421*** -0.198 
 
(0.170) (0.125) (0.150) (0.136) 
L.Inward FDI -0.044*** -0.024* -0.030** -0.025* 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
L.Outward FDI -0.067** -0.018 -0.0505** -0.021 
 
(0.026) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) 
L.GDP 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.093*** 0.063** 0.059** 0.086*** 
 
(0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) 
Constant 3.114*** 3.186*** 2.890*** 2.974*** 
 
(0.778) (0.509) (0.664) (0.551) 
Observations 1558 1595 1558 1538 
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strongly only to the first. However, as is often the case in studies without the 
luxuries of the controlled experiment, we are unable to provide a clearly defined 
rational ‘baseline’ to compare our results with.41 Indeed, the difference between 
rational and bounded rational learning remains one of degree in our case, since a 
rational stakeholder should know that the probability of a claim depends on a 
large number of factors including the investment and governance profile of the 
country. She therefore knows that a claim against her own country, or a similar 
country (e.g. within same region), provides more information about the 
probability they will face future claims than a claim against a more ‘distant’ 
country. Thus a rational but imperfectly-informed policy-maker would also react 
more strongly to claims close by and stronger still to claims at home than they 
would to more distant claims. Skeptics might therefore argue that the reactions we 
observe to countries’ own claims are not ‘strong enough’ to indicate bounded 
rational learning. More generally, Meseguer argues that ‘bounded learning and 
rational learning yield the same results as soon as one drops the rational learning 
assumption that there are zero costs to gathering new information.’42  
While we do not disagree with Meseguer’s conclusion of observational 
equivalence in the context of her specific study, we are able to confront this 
argument – even without relying on the interview evidence below. For unlike the 
unilateral policies studied by Meseguer and Weyland, BITs are bilateral 
instruments. This means that there are potentially two dimensions of distance, or 
relevance, of a piece of information: one in relation to the ‘host’ country, and one 
in relation to the partner country. On their sensitivity to this second dimension of 
distance, Bayesian and bounded rational learners will differ. Analogously to the 
case of closeness for the host country, a fully-rational policy-learner will place 
more weight on cases brought by investors from the potential BIT-partner than it 
will on other cases. This would be rational since the probability that claims are 
brought by a certain country is likely to vary with the amount and type of outward 
investment of the country, the type of BITs they tend to sign, and the experience 
                                                          
41
 See generally; J. Conlisk, ‘Why Bounded Rationality?’ 34 Journal of Economic Literature 2 
(1996).  
42
 Meseguer, C., ‘Rational Learning and Bounded Rational Learning in the Diffusion of Policy 
Innovations,’ 18 Rationality and Society 1 (2006), at 35.  
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of the lawyers from that country in bringing BIT claims. In contrast, a bounded 
rational learner may ignore information about BIT claims brought by investors 
from the potential partner country. Furthermore, the availability heuristic will not 
apply in the same way as with claims against the host, since claims brought by the 
partner will not be as ‘vivid’, or readily available. Thus, on the question of how 
BIT participation responds to claims brought by potential partner countries, the 
expectations of bounded and full rationality models are not just different by 
degree, they are not observationally equivalent. To test these competing 
hypotheses require data with dyad’s as the unit of analysis. So in a final 
robustness test we merge our claims data with an updated dataset of Elkins, 
Guzman and Simmons (EGS),43 and run their main regression with the addition of 
the dummies for ‘first claim against host’ and ‘first claim by partner’.  
Recall, that the study by EGS is by far the most quoted work on BIT-diffusion. 
After its publication in International Organization44 it was subsequently reprinted 
in law publications,45 an important volume on international policy diffusion,46 as 
well as a main textbook in IPE.47 It is therefore interesting to note that when 
restricting EGS’ sample to the period in which BITs actually had some ‘bite’, i.e. 
1990 and onwards, their main result related to rational competition dynamics is no 
longer statistically significant (Table 8.5., column 2). This is the case even 
without our new measures. 
                                                          
43
 Z. Elkins, A. Guzman, and B. Simmons, ‘Replication data for: Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1959-2000 (August 2008 version)’. Due to a few 
missing variables, we were only able to reproduce their Models 2 and 3.  
44
 Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006), op. cit.  
45
 University of Illinois Law Review (volume 2008, no. 1); M. Waibel, A. Kaushal, K.-H Chung, 
and C. Balcin (eds.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International, 2010). 
46
 B. Simmons, F. Dobbin, and G. Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
47
 J. Frieden, D. Lake, and J. Broz, International Political Economy, 5th Ed. (New York: Norton, 
2010). 
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Table 8.5. In a bilateral setting, claims against host significantly reduce 
likelihood of BIT-formation while claims by investors from partner have no 
effect.   
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) from Cox proportional hazards model. Column 1 of this 
table reproduces the results of ‘Model 2’ of Table 2 in Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (EGS) 
(2006) with updated dataset provided by EGS. ‘BITs among export product competitors’ is 
defined in EGS’ article. Full set of controls included from EGS, but not reported. Column 2 of this 
table restricts EGS’ regression to 1990-2000. Columns 3 and 4 add controls from our data for BIT 
participation and claims for host and home/partner.  
 
For our purposes, however, the most important point is that columns 3 and 4, are 
clearly in favor of our hypothesis made above. While our ‘first claim against’ 
dummy is negative and significant just as in our main results, the ‘first claim by 
partner’ dummy is completely insignificant. Developing countries have in other 
words reacted strongly to their first claim, yet not seemed to be influenced at all 
by whether investors from their BIT-partners have filed claims, which further 
sustains the conclusion that developing countries have been bounded rational 
when learning about the implications of BITs. This will become even clearer in 
the section below.  
 
8.2. Country experiences 
 
Using econometrics to investigate the relationship between BIT-claims and BIT 
participation naturally involves a series of restrictive assumptions. First of all, the 
analytical unit has thus far been the state, rather than sub-national units 
(ministries, investment promotion agencies, etc.). As in so many econometric 
studies, this was for pragmatic reasons, as sub-national datasets on which 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BITs among export product 
competitors 
1.111*** 
(0.038) 
1.027 
(0.039) 
0.999 
(0.039) 
0.976 
(0.040) 
BIT claim   0.799* 0.744** 
 
  (0.101) (0.095) 
Host lagged BITs   1.022*** 1.043*** 
 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
BIT claim brought    0.964 
 
   (0.132) 
Home lagged BITs    1.051*** 
 
   (0.002) 
Years included 1960-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 
Observations 208610 63461 61222 60083 
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ministry, official, etc. promoted BITs are not available. Secondly, and crucially, 
questions of how decision-makers learn are essentially procedural in nature, as 
they focus less on the nature and substance of the outcome – as in the analysis 
thus far - but more on the process with which decision-makers arrive at their 
inferences and decisions. So while the quantitative analysis does support a key 
prediction of the bounded rational learning literature, it is clearly not sufficient 
without additional evidence tracing the actual processes whereby investment 
treaties have been contemplated and negotiated within, and between, government 
bureaucracies. This section will therefore proceed by investigating the underlying 
causal mechanisms for why these patterns are found. As mentioned in chapter one, 
this has unfortunately not been usual practice within quantitative studies on 
international policy diffusion.48  
 
Unique case approximating the rational ideal: Costa Rica 
 
I begin with an outlier difficult to explain with the results above, namely Costa 
Rica. By the early 1990s, the Costa Rican Central Bank and Treasury Department 
found that since the country had already liberalised its capital account and 
generally provided strong protections to foreign investors, it would be logical to 
also have a BIT program to complement those reforms.49 The task was given to 
the Ministry of Trade, where a small but highly skilled team were in charge of 
negotiations. Most of the staff had graduate degrees in international economic law 
from Western universities, and all coordination pertaining to both trade and 
investment agreements happened within that unit. This meant that Costa Rica 
pursued a coherent strategy pushing for investment treaty obligations not just 
bilaterally but also in the context of the WTO50  as well as the MAI, where Costa 
                                                          
48
 Among quantitative BIT studies not mentioned already, see also statistical attempts to apply 
‘rational design’ theory explain the content of BITs; T. Alle and C. Peinhardt, ‘Revisiting 
‘Rational Design’: Preferences, Power, and the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties,’ working 
paper, April, 2010; D. Blake, ‘Thinking Ahead: Time Horizons and the Internationalization of 
International Investment Agreements,’ working paper, April, 2010. 
49
 Costa Rican official I. Note, that although Costa Rica signed a few BITs during the 1980s, this 
was done on an ad hoc basis with no real strategy – unlike Sri Lanka for instance (see chapter 
five). 
50
 See e.g.; WTO WGTI, Report on the Meeting of 7 and 8 March 2001, WT/WGTI/M/14. 
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Rica was an invited observer. The staff occasionally rotated to stations abroad, 
such as the WTO, yet always returned to the same unit, such that the legal 
expertise and experience remained.51  
 
The team was clear from the beginning that unlike many other countries (see 
below), ‘we didn’t just want a BIT, whenever a President was visiting.’52 So 
although not all obligations were well-understood due to the lack of disputes,53 
Costa Rica’s negotiations were based on a sound understanding of the legal 
questions involved. Although in some cases, negotiators were unable to resist the 
pressure of politicians to use BITs as diplomatic photo-ops, these were exceptions 
as both key stakeholders (e.g. the Treasury) and negotiators themselves pursued a 
coherent and approximately rational BIT-strategy by engaging carefully in each 
negotiation based on the necessary expertise.54 So even though the CAFTA 
negotiations with the United States led to considerable debate in Costa Rica over 
the implications of investor-state arbitration, it did not lead to major changes in 
strategy apart from putting in place an appropriate defense team.55 Neither did the 
arbitration cases against Costa Rica starting a few years after,56 which one would 
also expect if a BIT-strategy was pursued realizing that the treaties potentially 
involved enforceable protections. Instead, it was the many cases against Argentina 
that led Costa Rica to make certain restrictive changes in the content of its treaties 
– which also follows the expectations of a Bayesian decision-making model.57 
 
As we shall see below, however, this appears to have been a rather unique case. 
Although some developing countries undoubtedly have pursued similar BIT 
                                                          
51
 Costa Rican official I. See again Annex II for details about the interview and sampling 
procedure. 
52
 Ibid.  
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Ibid. Throughout, I understand ‘negotiators’ broadly as officials involved directly in investment 
treaty negotiations, whether in BITs or other types of investment treaties with investor-state 
arbitration. ‘Stakeholders’ are similarly understood in a broad sense, as both regulatory agencies 
with a stake in investment treaties as well as politicians. 
55
 Costa Rican official II.  
56
 E.g. Alasdair Ross Anderson and others v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/3. 
57
 Costa Rican official II; see also last chapter.  
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policies approximating the Bayesian ideal – such as China perhaps58 - this is the 
exception rather than the rule, which is important to explain the correlations found 
above.  
 
Considerable impact of first claim, even in the presence of expertise 
 
A number of other countries have also been well endowed with expertise in early 
BIT-negotiations. Unlike in the case of Costa Rica, however, there was 
nevertheless a considerable impact on the politics of investment treaties, when the 
countries where hit by their first claim, since stakeholders of the treaties entirely 
failed to appreciate their importance until the first claim. Lebanon is an example. 
There, it was not before the country got hit by investment arbitrations in the early 
2000s that anyone but one or two officials took the treaties seriously. According 
to a key legal official, the first case59 did not attract much attention among 
stakeholders, as it wasn’t discussed in the media (and was thus less ‘vivid’), but 
the second case did.60 It was not until then, that politicians and concerned 
regulatory agencies realized that these treaties were not merely ‘ink on paper.’61 
So while Lebanon continues to sign BITs based on the understanding that they 
promote investments, the cases and subsequent inputs from UNCTAD seminars 
and publications has led to a much more careful engagement from more than just 
the negotiator in charge.62 
The experiences in Ghana have been very similar. Here, the legal architect of the 
BIT-program took the treaties very seriously, which was unusual on the African 
                                                          
58
 On the Chinese BIT-program, see e.g.; L. Shishi, ‘Bilateral Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreements: Practice of the People's Republic of China,’ in: P. De Waart, P. Peters, and 
E. Denters (eds.), International Law and Development (Dordrecht: Martinus Neijhoff, 1988); A. 
Berger, ‘The Politics of China’s Investment Treaty-Making Program,’ in: T. Broude, M. Busch, 
and A. Porges (eds.) The Politics of International Economic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).  
59
 Claim was pursued in 2000 based on the Egypt-Lebanon BIT under the Cairo Regional Centre 
for International Commercial Arbitration rules. Claimant is unknown.   
60
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continent.63 But despite the fact that Ghana actually had the expertise necessary, 
no one was able to convince politicians or other stakeholders that BITs were not 
just ‘tooth-less’ instruments along the lines of cultural collaboration agreements.64 
Moreover, like in Lebanon it was not until Ghana itself was hit by a claim65  that 
people ‘woke up’, as the Lebanese official put it:  
 
‘The cases allowed us to point out to policy makers that we have to be careful and 
proper in our approach. And when we had to settle some disputes it became clear 
to them that there are implications of these treaties.’66  
 
Finally, India is a similar case, and also particularly interesting given its long 
history of guarding its sovereignty in the post-colonial era. With respect to BITs, 
India has occasionally had very well-trained legal officials involved, who had a 
detailed understanding of the treaties.67 Yet, because of an almost complete lack 
of coordination between the Ministry of Finance, which negotiates BITs, and the 
Ministry of Commerce, which is in charge of negotiating PTIAs and other trade 
treaties with investment provisions, India has pursued contradictory policies in the 
investment regime.68 Based on extensive interviews and archival research Ranjan 
notes that, ‘India’s domestic regulations on foreign investment are completely 
oblivious of the international regulatory regime on foreign investment contained 
in BITs signed by India.’69 Secondly, India has pursued contradictory investment 
obligations when negotiating investment obligations in different types of treaties, 
simply because of lacking coordination. In fact, one may speculate that the failure 
of the Commerce Ministry to truly understand the scope of BITs70 was also part of 
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the reason for India’s refusal to include investment obligations into the WTO. 
There, it continuously argued against multilateral investment rules because it 
thought BITs were much more flexible than MAI-like rules.71 According to an 
official deeply involved in those negotiations, the perception appeared to be that 
since BITs did not include liberalization provisions they had to be flexible – 
thereby overlooking the most important innovation in BITs, the investor-state 
arbitration clause.72  In any event, what is important is that even if India’s BIT-
negotiators have had some level of expertise, it was not until recently that more 
than a few officials realized that the treaties offered wide and rigid protections.73 
The change in attitude towards BITs came not from the NAFTA arbitrations or 
claims against other developing countries in the past, but when India itself came 
on the respondent end of arbitration claims related to the Dabhol power project.74 
Based on this experience, the government decided to revise its model investment 
treaty.75 At the time of writing, the outcome of this is still unknown, yet it is clear 
that once again it was not until India itself was hit by a claim that the government 
decided to pursue a less haphazard investment treaty policy.  
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The typical case: BITs as tokens of good-will 
 
I turn now to a third and much more wide-spread group of countries, where 
lacking awareness of the basic implications of BITs did not just plague 
stakeholders but also negotiators themselves. Let us begin by revisiting the case of 
Pakistan from the preface. Here, negotiators involved during the 1990s, almost 
entirely failed to appreciate the significance of what they were negotiating. This 
meant that unlike the cases above, no one was in a position to make diplomats and 
politicians aware that the treaties were in fact more than diplomatic gestures. As 
one officer who was involved during the 1990s puts it, ‘earlier we didn’t take 
much notice of BITs. They were often signed in a hurry… Parliament never 
discussed these issues.’76 This was also his impression from signing BITs with 
other developing countries, since they did not have much expertise either.77 And 
the legal officer in Pakistan, who was supposed to vet the treaties, didn’t find this 
practice to be any cause for alarm.78 Inputs were limited to proof-reading, and at 
times, albeit rarely, some minor suggestions on the text.79 This all changed with 
the SGS claim, however, as already mentioned in the preface. As one official 
involved recalls, it was the SGS case that ‘made the Pakistani government 
alert.’80 After that, the Attorney General, who until then had never heard of BITs, 
initiated a learning process for all relevant stakeholders by inviting foreign experts 
and informing key offices about important aspects of investment treaties. This led 
to a considerable improvement in the negotiating capacity at the time. However, 
because of bureaucratic career rotations, staff changes meant that the expertise 
failed to institutionalize and instead diffused to other departments, and today 
negotiating expertise is almost back at the level before the SGS claim. As one 
official who moved to another department puts it, ‘a problem is the fast nature of 
the different jobs within the bureaucracy, they change all the time ....  all the 
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developed expertise gets repatriated.’81 This became clear from interviewing 
negotiators in charge of Pakistan’s BIT program in recent years. One key 
negotiator is today of the impression, for instance, that BITs allow investors to sue 
each other (which they don’t).82 Another official notes that, ‘..if the leadership of 
our countries meet at some point, we can show the public that: “Ok fine, we mean 
business with each other, since we are connecting with each other and doing so 
many agreements with each other”.’83 Unlike the time before the SGS claim, 
however, today at least parts of the Law Ministry are making negotiators aware 
that the treaties do in fact involve serious and far-reaching obligations. This is a 
first in the country’s history, but whether it is listened to, is another question. The 
long and detailed analyses from the ministry on the recent upgrade of the 
Pakistan-Germany BIT, for instance, were considered by negotiators as mere 
‘commas, full stops, and so forth.’84  
 
In the case of Thailand, an official from the Ministry of Foreign affairs notes that 
while Thailand had signed BITs since 1961, officials failed to appreciate the most 
important feature of modern BITs; the investor-state arbitration mechanism.85 
This lead to a gross misperception of the treaties practical implications, which 
persisted to as late as 2004 when plenty of other cases had already been filed 
against developing countries other than Thailand. Another official thus notes that 
before Thailand became subject to its first investment treaty claim in 200586, ‘few 
took BITs very seriously. We had very complex obligations on paper, but no one 
used them so that was fine.’ 87 Based on the understanding that the treaties were 
immaterial, the level of expertise going into the negotiations was minimal: ‘Most 
of the time we put the best people on the agreements with high priority such as 
FTAs rather than BITs. That has implications for the legal expertise going into 
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BIT negotiations.’88 It was not until Thailand itself got hit by the claim that 
officials realized this was not a rational way to engage with a serious set of 
obligations. ‘That shift in attitude came with the German claim.’89 So while the 
Thai Board of Investment is still very much in favor of BITs (‘their mandate is to 
promote investments, so they want BITs’90) other agencies are now much more 
careful than before. A Thai official notes that this learning experience is important 
for other countries to consider: ‘they must be careful, lest they inadvertently find 
themselves to be victims of their own creation.’91 
More or less similar examples are found in Eastern Europe. In the Czech 
Republic, officials lacked ‘any relevant knowledge of investment treaty 
protections’ when signing numerous BITs during the 1990s.92 As one key civil 
servant notes,  
 
‘Negotiators really didn't know that the treaties had any bite in practice. They 
were neither aware of the costs or the fact that it could lead to arbitration. Their 
potential implications were not known until around 10 years ago.’93 
  
Recall, that it was 10 years ago that the Czech Republic was hit by the Lauder 
arbitrations. In Croatia, the process was largely similar. When Eastern Europe 
rushed towards BITs - occasionally prodded on by CEELI and others - the 
importance of the treaties were not realised by Croatian officials, who merely saw 
them as a means to obtain ‘political cooperation’.94 And as in the case of the 
Czech Republic and other countries, stakeholders as well as negotiators 
themselves did not just underestimate the potential costs of the treaties, they were 
not even aware that BITs could potentially result in arbitration claims. ‘It took a 
few cases before we realized the importance. In the past, we didn’t have many 
disputes, when we did they were not brought to arbitration. And when there were 
no cases against Croatia, we didn’t think they were that important.’95 After 
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Croatia was hit by a claim in 2004,96 however, this changed and now the 
propensity to sign BITs has slowed down. Although there is still considerable 
pressure from diplomats and politicians to sign them as ‘just another cultural 
photo-opportunity’, officials are today able to better withstand that pressure since 
now they ‘understand the relevance and power of BITs.’97  
 
We find this pattern also in Africa. The Ghanaian official from above notes,  
 
‘We came across many countries that handled this in a very superficial level. .. We 
did not find capacity to negotiate in most places in Africa. It has to with an 
understanding and appreciation of what is involved. It is not just another 
cooperation agreement without teeth, yet most negotiators on the other side of the 
table didn’t actually negotiate.’98 
 
Even a country like South Africa, which was much better endowed with 
bureaucratic capacity, officials entirely failed to realize that the obligations they 
were negotiating went over and beyond the South African constitution in a 
number of crucial areas. As will become clear from the coming chapter, it was not 
South Africa itself became on the respondent end of treaty-based investment 
arbitrations that officials became aware that the treaties were serious indeed.  
 
Moving on to Latin America, Chile is a country which, like South Africa, has both 
considerable inward and outward investments to protect. Yet, one official notes 
that, ‘like most countries in the 1990s, we signed a lot of treaties not knowing 
sometimes what we were committing ourselves to. We didn’t know the scope of the 
treaties, and the arbitrations got started and the awards and interpretations came, 
we began to rethink our view.’99 Chilean officials did, in other words, learn from 
other countries’ experiences. Yet, the defining moment for the Chilean BIT-
program was when Chile itself was subject to a claim. ‘It is when we started to be 
sued, we understood the implications.’100 As a result, Chile is today reviewing 
approach carefully trying to learn from other countries’ experiences.   
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Also in the Dominican Republic negotiators failed to appreciate the significance 
of BITs. One official notes, ‘we never thought about disputes that may arise from 
the treaty. It was a marketing sign for the country, and also a diplomatic photo-
opportunity along with many other commercial treaties.’101 Again, however, this 
changed after the Dominican Republic in 2007 was sued. ‘The disputes changed 
the mind completely on the negotiations.’102 And while the learning that came 
from the CAFTA negotiations had led to a review process (cf. also Costa Rica 
above), it was the first claim against the Dominican Republic itself that made 
officials truly realise the implications of the treaties. Another official notes:  
The notice of arbitration from SGS created awareness among negotiators that we 
should look back and question whether we could actually adhere to these 
agreements. This led to a complete halt in negotiations as we became aware that 
we are legally liable.103  
So although no-one within the administration has considered cancelling BITs 
based on this experience, the Dominican Republic is today reevaluating its 
approach towards a more cautious BIT-policy.  
 
Even in Mexico, the experience of negotiating NAFTA with the United States and 
Canada didn’t lead to a particularly strategic approach towards BITs. Like in 
several countries already mentioned, two different government offices were 
negotiating investment obligations depending on whether they were included in 
BITs or broader economic integration agreements. Until the early 2000s, one 
branch of the government were therefore negotiating investment obligations based 
on NAFTA, whereas another were negotiating BITs based on the traditional 
European models.104 One official notes, ‘nobody really questioned whether the 
strategy had results.’,105 and another official remarks, ‘during the 1990s, BITs 
were a very different animal than FTAs, the WTO, and other globalization 
instruments. … By contrast with FTA agreements, there was no legal review, 
control, or scrutiny to the content. … Often BIT negotiations have been done by a 
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couple of guys; they sent it to parliament with no real discussion… Apart from a 
copy of the BIT in the negotiator’s office no one was even aware how many BITs 
the country had in the 1990s.’106 The reason for such risk-neglect again appears to 
be due to the biasing impact of the availability heuristic, 
 
‘Many here in Latin America thought it was harmless to sign these treaties, no-one 
had an idea what they meant. Many who negotiated were not lawyers, so they just 
signed them of within a few days, hours, or even over email because travels are 
too expensive. … Governments want to display corporation, and one way to do 
that is to sign promotion treaties that sounds nice. … No discussion, analysis, goes 
into it…. And even if it gets a legal review, the lawyers don’t have the experience 
what to check for. … No-one cares until the dispute comes.’107  
 
The learning process that resulted from the disputes against Mexico remained 
within a small circle of technical staff. A key official notes, ‘I would have 
expected reactions against BITs after the ICSID cases, but there has never been 
such discussion here, unlike with FTAs. No doubts or inquires by the Senate, 
which is a paradox. ... Also, no regulatory agencies are aware of the treaties at 
all.’108 Yet, due to the experiences of the claims against Mexico, negotiators at 
least have become more careful in their approach. As a recent negotiator remarks,  
 
‘At times, the treaties don’t make sense, such as the one with Belarus. ... But 
unlike many countries just recklessly writing BITs to get a picture in the 
newspaper – which we see with many countries who are not knowledgeable about 
the treaties or arbitrations – our approach is different.’109 
 
Finally, there is a case like Ecuador, which has recently withdrawn from ICSID 
and several of its BITs. One official involved in past negotiations noted that when 
Ecuador began signing BITs, a model agreement was more or less copied from 
those of developed countries. And while the international arbitration clauses were 
discussed among some officials, due to Ecuador’s long-standing opposition to 
such clauses, the treaties were ‘not politicized at all ... there was no idea that the 
risks of BITs were so substantial.’110 Other officials concur, stating that the way 
Ecuador consented to BITs was again not just based on an underestimation of the 
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risks of BITs, but a complete misunderstanding of their basic implications. One 
official notes, that when Ecuador was visited ‘by a president from another 
country, BITs were used to signify the event. So they started without 
understanding the responsibilities and obligations.’111 This approach persisted, 
and ‘we didn’t start to worry about it before we ourselves were sued. … After the 
claims, the ministry of finance affairs got involved and the legal offices also.’112 
Before then it was solely foreign ministry officials that were involved, but 
because of career rotations there was ‘no continuity. I don’t think we had one 
negotiator who participated in more than three negotiations, for instance.’113 
Another official notes, ‘often Ambassadors would sign BITs at the end of their 
stay at a country to ‘finish with a bang’ – not knowing the implications.’114 
However, after the claims against Ecuador - one of which led to an award 
translated into US$5.5 per capita115 - officials began taking UNCTAD reviews 
and other countries’ experiences seriously, and revisited its approach as a result. 
‘When we went to UNCTAD courses we realized other countries were in the same 
situation. Mexico had been sued but we didn’t realize that before the UNCTAD 
courses. Before that date I didn’t have any knowledge of it.’116 This experience 
also let to a study undertaken by the Central Bank investigating whether 
Ecuador’s BITs had actually had an impact on investment flows, which it 
concluded they didn’t. After an intensive hearing process, an inter-ministerial 
committee therefore decided to withdraw from a number of treaties and 
renegotiate others.    
 
These country experiences present a somewhat different picture of the way 
developing countries have contemplated and negotiated BITs than standard 
accounts of the BIT-movement. In fact, the misinterpretation of BITs even by 
negotiators themselves is reported also by their developed country counterparts. 
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An experienced Dutch negotiator notes that, ‘during the 1990s, developing 
countries often asked what even basic provisions meant. … But now that investors 
have invoked the treaties it has led to a greater understanding and, at times, more 
difficult negotiations.’117 A Swiss official concurs, noting that ‘the big question is 
of course whether developing countries actually knew what they signed. ... We 
have certainly seen a rising awareness of these issues in developing countries, 
and today they are much better prepared.’118 Similarly a Canadian official recalls 
that, ‘... in the past we actually had to drop some negotiations simply because the 
level of understanding was lacking.’119 Finally, even some senior investment 
lawyers accede that BITs have often been entirely misunderstood by adopting 
governments until the disputes began. In his expert testimony to one case against 
Argentina, for instance, Schreuer was asked whether, ‘he really believed that two 
sovereign States will negotiate, sign and ratify a Bilateral Investment Treaty 
without caring to consider what was put in it.’ He replied:  
 
‘… many times, in fact in the majority of times, BITs are among clauses of 
treaties that are not properly negotiated. BITs are very often pulled out of a 
drawer, often on the basis of some sort of a model, and are put forward on the 
occasion of state visits when the heads of states need something to sign, and the 
typical two candidates in a situation like that are Bilateral Investment Treaties, and 
treaties for cultural co-operation. In other words, they are very often not 
negotiated at all, they are just being put on the table, and I have heard several 
representatives who have actually been active in this Treaty-making process, if 
you can call it that, say that, ‘We had no idea that this would have real 
consequences in the real world’.’120  
 
 
Example of a country without a claim: Libya 
 
I end this brief review with a country that is not reported to have been on the 
respondent end of an investment treaty claim yet, and that is Libya. Based on the 
insights above, we would expect that Libya still has a much more haphazard BIT 
policy than developing countries, which have themselves been hit by claims. And 
there are indeed some indications of this. When Qadhafi recently visited Spain, 
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this is a Wikileaks report on the BIT signed between the two countries during the 
visit: 
 
‘… the Government of Libya (GOL) indicated … that it wished to quickly finalize 
language for an education and culture agreement, a defense cooperation 
agreement, a bilateral legal cooperation and extradition treaty, an investment 
security agreement and a double taxation-exemption agreement. … Spain had 
tried for some time to finalize several of the agreements, but to no avail. … [A 
Spanish official, ed.] lamented that the rush to finalize agreements for signature in 
time for Qadhafi’s visit had precluded meaningful bilateral discussions of what the 
two sides’ understanding of those accords would mean and how they would be 
implemented.’121 
 
If this report is reliable, the pattern is as expected: since Libya had not been 
subject to a BIT claim it still rushed through the treaties alongside all sorts of 
other diplomatic agreements, such as on education and cultural exchanges, 
without any ‘meaningful bilateral discussions’. As the Spanish official remarked, 
‘The form is more important to the GOL than the substance.’122 This was as late as 
2007.  
 
Learning from own claims 
 
These country experiences explain the quantitative findings from section one. By 
contrast with the expectations from a Bayesian framework, they show that key 
stakeholders in developing countries did not just slightly underestimate the risks 
of disputes or learn from claims abroad only if they were relevant for their own 
BIT-program. Instead, they ignored the risks entirely and did not even consider 
other countries’ experiences before they themselves were hit by a claim. In fact, 
even negotiators often failed to appreciate the most important aspect of BITs – the 
binding consent to investor-state arbitration. This is notable, as the countries 
above were generally richer and had greater inward and outward FDI stocks when 
the treaties proliferated than most other developing countries.123  They therefore 
did not just have a greater capacity to engage with BITs than many other 
developing countries, they also had a greater incentive to do so, given their stake 
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in the system. Yet, the availability heuristic appears to have made stakeholders 
and (often) negotiators entirely ignore the risks of BITs until their own country 
was hit by a claim. As an illustration, Figure 8.2 below shows a simplified version 
of this learning process.  
Apart from backing up the main econometric findings, these experiences add to 
our understanding of them. Recall, for instance, that the impact of the first claim 
was less with respect to ratification than signing patterns. While this may be due 
to idiosyncratic differences in ratification procedures, the country insights indicate 
that it is also likely to be because stakeholders – like parliaments – have often 
continued to neglect the importance of the treaties, even after the first claim. 
Recall also that the impact of the first claim was larger for ‘serious’ BITs rather 
than ‘photo-op’ BITs, which again is explainable by the fact that even when 
negotiators have started pursuing more cautious BIT-policies, they were not 
always capable of withstanding political pressure to continue signing ‘photo-op’ 
BITs. 
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Figure 8.2. Examples of countries learning from first BIT claims 
 
 
A potential counter-argument 
 
Suffice it to say, there are a range of methodological concerns in relying on 
negotiator and stakeholder interviews. For although the characteristics of the 
countries above indicate that the bounds of rational decision-making may well 
have been considerably more narrow in many other developing countries, there 
could of course be validity concerns. Policy-makers usually have an incentive to 
Notes: ‘Stakeholders’ is understood broadly as officials or politicians affected by, but not in 
charge of, BIT-negotiations. South Africa is included also in brackets in the first graph as one legal 
official with a deep understanding of the treaties did become involved for a short time before 
South Africa’s first claim. Pakistan is included also in brackets in the second graph as changes in 
staff a few years after the first claim meant that the expertise and experience gained from the first 
claim diffused to departments not directly involved in negotiations. Costa Rica is in brackets in the 
first graph as it was not the first claim that led stakeholders to engage more care with BITs, but 
rather FTA negotiations with the United States. Given that graphs are based almost solely on 
interview feedback, more in-depth studies may reveal individual country positions to be 
inappropriate in certain cases.   
Sources: Primarily interview feedback from one or more officials involved in the countries’ BIT-
programs, directly or from a management position. Countries included in the figure had all had at 
least one BIT-claim by 2009. See further in Annex II. 
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portray a ‘careful, multidimensioned process of policy-making’,124 yet this may 
not necessarily be the case here. One arbitrator argues that ‘negotiators in 
developing countries knew exactly what BITs were and the potential implications 
of signing them. The only reason they would say otherwise today, is that the 
disputes have led to political pressure to oppose the treaties.’125 Following this 
logic, a public choice explanation for the pattern observed in the regressions could 
be that while negotiators knew about the implications of BITs, the political costs 
of pursuing them for their own individual reasons (e.g. career promotion, travels, 
etc.) became too high once the claims began. This will be further investigated in 
the next chapter. As a general explanation, it appears unlikely; however, as it 
would imply a major conspiracy, given that all stakeholders and negotiators 
interviewed have stated independently of each other that most developing 
countries seriously misunderstood the implications of investment treaties. Also, as 
stated in chapter three, a number of stakeholders had an individual interest in 
pushing for more cautious BIT-strategies, yet they didn’t until the first claim hit. 
Finally, there are many other ways for ambassadors and politicians to get their 
‘photo-ops’, and for most countries BITs only entailed individual benefits for one 
or two bureaucrats in charge of the negotiations. So had stakeholders carefully 
sought and processed information about the risks of BITs, it should have been 
relatively easy to convince governments of more prudent BIT-policies. Yet they 
didn’t. The burden of proof thereby appears to be on those arguing that 
developing country officials are being systematically dishonest, disingenuous, or 
just generally self-serving, when stating that the implications of consenting to 
investor-state arbitration in investment treaties took many by complete surprise.  
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Conclusion 
 
Existing accounts of the BIT-regime have set out to solve a considerable puzzle: 
why would developing countries consent to investment treaties that potentially 
entail massive costs and constrain their ability to regulate foreign investors? 
Based on the assumption that developing countries actually understood the 
implications of the treaties, explanations have often been based on remarkable 
expectations about the sophistication of developing country policy-making. Yet 
this assumption does not hold in most cases. Indeed, it is telling that when 
political scientists and legal scholars have claimed that developing countries knew 
all along that BITs entailed potentially costly legal obligations, it has been stated 
as an assumption without providing any sustaining evidence. It may be tempting 
to think that developing countries ‘knew and accepted’ the costs of investment 
treaties,126 and that they constantly outweighed the expected benefits of BITs with 
the risk of having ‘virtually any legal change or rule that affects foreign investors 
is potentially subject to review by a foreign tribunal.’127 And for rational-choice 
accounts, it may be intuitive to assume that the considerable costs of investment 
treaties have been regarded not as ‘an accidental by-product but intended by both 
sides’.128 Yet, based on the insights of this chapter, these assumptions – and thus 
the basic foundation of all studies on BIT-diffusion this author is aware of - are 
largely misleading.129  
Instead, there is considerable evidence in support of a BIT-diffusion process 
characterized by bounded rather than comprehensive rationality on the part of 
developing country decision-makers. This was shown in an econometric setting, 
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which indicated that developing countries learned much more from their own 
claims than one would have expected if they sought to rationally optimize their 
BIT-strategies. To complement the statistical results, the second part of the 
chapter included insights from decision-makers themselves on how they arrived at 
their inferences and decisions pertaining to BITs. The interviews indicated not just 
coordination problems, which could potentially be explained by rational-choice 
models, but also risk-neglect and lack of learning from other countries – even 
when individual stakeholders had an interest in a more careful BIT-strategy.  
Mistaken inferences were particularly wide-spread when expertise and experience 
was absent. This is not surprising, for as mentioned in chapter three a lack of 
expertise and/or experience narrows the bounds of rationality by adding even 
greater constraints on information processing. So while future quantitative studies 
may consider taking this analysis further by conditioning on survey data on 
expertise, for instance, the combination of the qualitative insights and the 
econometric analysis is sufficient to show that Bayesian models do not take us far 
enough in understanding the political foundation of the international investment 
regime. 
The chapter limited itself to focus solely on the risks of BITs. It did not 
investigate how countries have learned in practice from information about the 
economic implications of BITs. Why is it that officials in Cambodia, Malaysia 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, still remain convinced that 
BITs are crucial for foreign investors and the provision of PRI?130 Might the 
representativeness heuristic have a role to play in such assessments?   
Also, while the chapter showed that the availability heuristic meant that 
governments often moved towards a new institutional equilibrium after 
themselves having been subject to claims, it did not discuss whether the often 
limited adjustments have been due to careful cost-benefit calculations or a status-
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quo bias. When officials in a country like Croatia and the Dominican Republic, 
for instance, have become concerned about the risks of BITs and are convinced 
the treaties don’t have much economic value, why is it they would not even 
consider withdrawing from the treaties?131  
Third, the analysis focused on the recent slow-down in BIT-adoption, and not the 
initial upsurge. Naturally, a general explanation of the BIT-movement would have 
to be account for both. Lastly, given the large-N nature of the chapter, it did not 
carefully engage with a final alternative hypothesis, namely that BIT-negotiators 
and certain stakeholders have been systematically disingenuous for decades by 
knowingly sacrificing national welfare to achieve higher personal benefits. As 
already mentioned this public-choice explanation appears unlikely, but a more 
detailed country-case study would undoubtedly be better able to disentangle 
whether decisions that were irrational for countries as a whole were also irrational 
for individual officials.  
The next and final empirical chapter will provide some potential answers to these 
outstanding questions by giving a much more detailed insight to how officials 
have contemplated and negotiated investment treaties both within and between 
government bureaucracies.  
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9. Bounded rational policy diffusion: A case study  
 
Focusing on South Africa, this last empirical chapter will provide the most 
detailed investigation into decision-making procedures surrounding BITs in a 
developing country to date. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
will briefly outline why South Africa was chosen as a useful case to further 
investigate the predictive qualities of a bounded rationality framework. The 
second will introduce South Africa’s economic reforms post-apartheid, and 
outline South Africa’s experience with its BITs. The third will provide an in-depth 
historical study of why, and how, South Africa entered into the treaties. In doing 
so, it will illustrate the mechanisms through which the politics of purpose interacts 
with imperfect information, lack of expertise and experience, as well as cognitive 
constraints. 
 
9.1 Why South Africa? 
 
A number of factors make South Africa a useful case-study to provide deeper 
insights into the bounds of rationality, when developing countries have engaged 
with BITs. First of all, South Africa is a relatively rich developing country with 
inward and, particularly, outward foreign investments playing a considerable role 
in its economy. This gives the country a greater stake in the investment treaty 
system than many other countries, and thus a greater incentive to carefully engage 
with the treaties. 
Secondly, studying South Africa allows us to distinguish between imperfect 
information and imperfect processing of information more clearly than in many 
other countries. For while the country was not hit by a major claim until the early 
2000s and information about other countries’ claims was difficult to come by 
before then, it entered into BITs during the 1990s that were in outright 
contradiction to politically sensitive elements of its newly enacted Constitution. 
So even if the risks of actual investment disputes were difficult to gage, the 
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government nevertheless had considerable incentives to carefully consider the 
content of BITs.  
Third, the country is endowed with a greater degree of expertise within its 
bureaucracy compared to many other developing countries. Stakeholders with an 
individual interest in cautious BIT-strategies were therefore in a better position to 
process information about BITs than stakeholders in some of South Africa’s 
regional neighbours, for instance.  
Fourth, with respect to the possible, but doubtful, counter-argument from the 
public choice literature,1 South Africa is a useful case, since like many other 
countries it had a very small negotiating team during the 1990s: often it was only 
a single relatively junior public official, who obtained significant individual 
benefits from promoting BITs through foreign travels, larger budgets, or just 
generally career promotion. So to the extent that just a few stakeholders had 
sought and processed information about the conflict between the country’s BIT-
obligations and the Constitution, there were amble opportunities to avoid ‘agency-
slip’. This was not just in the national interest, but also in the individual interest of 
legal advisors, for instance, to make sure they couldn’t later be blamed for 
incompetence and negligence.  
Combined, these characteristics make South Africa a particularly useful case for 
our purposes. It is, however, important to note that all the experiences of South 
Africa cannot necessarily be generalized to the population of developing 
countries. Indeed, no one country can be construed as being truly representative of 
the population of developing countries in the international investment regime. 
That would raise concerns over external validity due to geography for instance: 
Latin American countries have had distinct experiences with the international 
investment regime due to their affiliation with the Calvo doctrine, Western legal 
transfer played a particularly important role in Eastern Europe after the demise of 
socialism (see chapter five), and so on. If these geographically contingent 
experiences vary systematically with variables of interest – such as expertise, 
availability of information, level of politicization, etc. – the causal mechanisms 
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could look considerably different if another case study had been chosen. 
Similarly, very large economies – such as China, India, and Russia – or indeed 
very small and poor economies may have had discrete practices, which would 
have to be studied separately. So rather than suggesting that South Africa is a 
‘typical’ case, it is primarily intended to complement the survey findings in the 
last chapter by providing a more detailed investigation into how developing 
country officials have learned about investment treaties.2  
A second caveat should be mentioned as well. I managed to trace all BIT-
negotiators involved with the South African program since its inception, mostly 
through snow-ball sampling, and the analysis will almost exclusively rely on their 
interview feedback.3 While detailed documentation to corroborate interview data 
would naturally have been preferable, very little was available. Indeed, a recent 
report by the South African government - which I shall return to - notes about the 
many treaties signed during the 1990 that ‘no policy documentation informing the 
rationale for the conclusion of such BITs could be found.’4 This lack of written 
material forces the case study to primarily rely on ‘oral history’ with the risks that 
entails, such as interviewees having forgotten the events of interest or slanting 
their accounts to promote some hidden agenda. Yet as we shall see, the lack of 
extensive records actually sustains the overall conclusion of the chapter that BITs 
were not taken as seriously as a rational learning framework would predict: until 
recently the investment treaty program was not considered important enough to 
merit detailed official documentation.  
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9.2. The embrace of foreign investors and BITs 
 
The stage for South Africa’s BIT program was set in 1994, when the African 
National Congress (ANC) won the elections. This marked a new beginning for the 
South African polity. Not only could it begin rectifying deeply entrenched racial 
inequalities, South Africa could also reverse the disastrous economic management 
under Apartheid. To do this, the ANC’s economic platform aimed at providing 
basic welfare provision to South Africa’s poor. But rather than populist 
redistributive policies – such as wide-scale nationalizations - and booming rates of 
inflation and public debt, ANC governments pursued borderline conservative 
macroeconomic reforms, including liberalisation of commodity trade and the 
capital account. 
 
South Africa’s investment policy after Apartheid   
 
From the outset, attracting foreign investment was also an important component 
of the ANCs’ economic strategy. Due to the combination of international 
sanctions and tight capital controls, South Africa received next to no FDI inflows 
during Apartheid – a mere US$300 million from 1980 to 1993. This had to be 
reversed. ‘The rates of economic growth cannot be achieved without important 
inflows of foreign capital,’ Nelson Mandela told an audience of American 
business leaders in 1991.5 ‘We are determined to create the necessary climate, 
which the foreign investor will find attractive.’6 Going against the more socialist 
fractions of the ANC, the new government therefore welcomed foreign 
investment in the 1994 whitepaper on the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), and aimed to provide foreign investors national treatment.7 
Nelson Mandela assured investors that ‘not a single reference to things like 
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 Quoted in; H. Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change (London: Zed Press, 1998), at 123. 
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 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, ‘White Paper on Reconstruction and Development,’ 
Government Gazette, 23 November (1994), at 23.  
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nationalisation’ was present in his government’s economic policies and that his 
platform had been cleansed of ‘any Marxist ideology.’8  
South Africa therefore liberalised its investment regime in practically all sectors, 
allowing foreign investors 100 % ownership, dismantling earlier discriminatory 
taxes towards non-residents, losing restrictions on capital repatriation, provided 
cash incentives to invest in manufacturing, avoiding performance requirements, 
signing double-taxation treaties, ratifying the MIGA Convention, establishing an 
investment promotion agency, and so forth.9 In short, South Africa followed the 
international trend of the last couple of decades by replacing ‘red tape with red 
carpet treatment of foreign investors.’10 Yet, with sluggish economic growth and 
one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, the ANCs’ economic reforms 
had disappointing outcomes,11 and South Africa also failed to attract much FDI 
through the 1990s (Figures 9.1 and 9.2). 
Figure 9.1. FDI to and from South Africa. 
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Figure 9.2. FDI in South Africa compared with other developing countries.  
 
The limited interest of foreign investors in the early years of the post-Apartheid 
regime has been attributed to a range of reasons,12 but one thing is clear: it was 
not due to a lack of investment protection treaties. As part of South Africa’s 
strategy to attract foreign investment, it entered into almost 50 BITs from 1994 
onwards (Table 9.1). Although these are unlikely to have helped South Africa 
attract more FDI (see chapter six), the decision to develop a wide-ranging BIT-
network led to serious and far-reaching implications to which I will now turn. 
Some level of detail is necessary in order to understand the learning process South 
African officials went through. 
Investment treaty claims 
 
While we are only aware of one South African investor using a BIT to claim 
damages against its host state,13 foreign investors in South Africa have in recent 
years used BITs to question a wide range of regulatory actions, culminating in a 
compensation claim of more than quarter of a billion US dollars concerning South 
Africa’s constitutionally enshrined post-Apartheid program to redistribute wealth 
to the black population. 
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 The first known instance of investors using BITs to promote their interests vis-à-
vis the South African government was in 2001. After the 9/11 attacks in New 
York, South African policy-makers suggested a ban on foreign ownership and 
forced divestment among the approximately 5,000 private security firms in the 
country - one of the largest security industries in the world when seen relative to 
the size of the South African economy.14 Foreign firms objected fiercely and the 
British government let South Africa know that any such measure would breach 
the BIT between the two countries.15  Eventually, the foreign-owned security 
companies won the argument: kicking out firms who brought in close to 2 billion 
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Table 9.1.  South Africa's BITs
Partner Signed Ratified Partner Signed Ratified
United Kingdom 20-Sep-94 27-May-98 Greece 19-Nov-98 05-Sep-01
Netherlands 09-May-95 01-May-99 Russia 23-Nov-98 12-Apr-00
Switzerland 27-Jun-95 29-Nov-97 Czech Republic14-Dec-98 17-Sep-99
Korea, Rep. 07-Jul-95 06-Jun-97 Uganda 08-May-00 .
Germany 11-Sep-95 10-Apr-98 Nigeria 29-Apr-00 .
France 11-Oct-95 22-Jun-97 Turkey 23-Jun-00 .
Canada 27-Nov-95 . Algeria 24-Sep-00 .
Cuba 08-Dec-95 07-Apr-97 Rwanda 19-Oct-00 .
Denmark 22-Feb-96 23-Apr-97 Brunei 14-Nov-00 .
Austria 28-Nov-96 01-Jan-98 Tunisia 28-Feb-02 .
Mozambique 06-May-97 28-Jul-98 Libya 14-Jun-02 .
Italy 09-Jun-97 16-Mar-99 Yemen 01-Aug-02 .
Iran 03-Nov-97 05-Mar-02 Qatar 20-Oct-03 .
China 30-Dec-97 01-Apr-98 Eq. Guinea 17-Feb-04 .
Mauritius 17-Feb-98 07-Oct-98 DR Congo 31-Aug-04 .
Sweden 25-May-98 01-Jan-99 Israel 21-Oct-04 .
Senegal 05-Jun-98 . Angola 17-Feb-05 .
Ghana 09-Jul-98 . Tanzania 22-Sep-05 .
Argentina 23-Jul-98 01-Jan-01 Congo 01-Dec-05 .
BLEU 14-Aug-98 14-Mar-03 Madagascar 13-Dec-06 .
Finland 14-Sep-98 03-Oct-99 Sudan 07-Nov-07 .
Spain 30-Sep-98 23-Dec-99 Ethiopia 18-Mar-08 .
Egypt 28-Oct-98 . Zimbabwe 27-Nov-09 .
Chile 12-Nov-98 .
Source: UNCTAD and South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs.
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South African rand a year16 turned out to be too costly an endeavour – even 
without a BIT claim - and the government withdrew its plans. 
 
The risk of a treaty-based investment dispute materialised the same year, but in a 
different industry entirely. During the 1990s, South African negotiators had 
finalised a BIT with Switzerland in 1997. Around the same time, a farm in the 
northern parts of South Africa was being looted, vandalised, and later entirely 
destroyed. It was owned by a Swiss national, who in 2001 used the BIT to ask for 
compensation damages from South Africa.17 As the claim was pursued under 
UNCITRAL rules, it was kept entirely under the radar until 2006, when Luke 
Peterson managed to uncover some of its details.18 The Swiss investor made two 
arguments: first of all, the investment was subject to ‘creeping’ expropriation due 
to its destruction over time or, alternatively, due to the subsequent land-claims 
process by local black and other Historically-Disadvantaged South Africans 
(HDSA) seeking restitution for land takings under the Apartheid regime. This 
process was part of South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) regime, 
which based on the 1996 Constitution mandates redistributive efforts to rectify the 
vast economic inequalities as a result of Apartheid. Yet these fundamental social 
policies of the South African state were now argued to conflict with its investment 
treaty obligations (see also below). Secondly, the investor argued that a lack of 
effective policing of the investor’s property – or the lack of prosecution of 
apprehended looters – was a breach of the BIT’s provision on ‘full protection and 
security.’  
The expropriation claim was dismissed by the tribunal: the land-claims process 
was still ongoing and the outcome uncertain at the time – including the possibility 
of compensation under domestic South African law. However, by not having 
effectively protected the Swiss-owned property, the tribunal found South Africa in 
breach of its obligation to provide full protection and security. During the 
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proceedings, South Africa had argued that the obligation should be seen in its 
proper context: as a third world country, capacity constraints meant that it could 
not be expected to provide the same level of protection to the investor as he could 
obtain in developed countries. While the due diligence obligation may be a 
standard independent of national laws and regulations, it had to be modified to 
take into account the host state’s level of economic development.19 This 
reasoning, however, was entirely rejected by the tribunal. It argued that simply 
doing ‘the best it could in the circumstances’ based on the state’s capacity to act 
was not enough according to the obligatory minimum standards under public 
international law, as that would allow developing countries to ‘escape’ their 
investment treaty obligations.20 In 2004, the tribunal therefore awarded the 
investor almost 7 million Rand in compensation - approximately US$1 million – 
which the South African government paid the year after. 
Also in 2004, a letter was sent to the South African government from the Italian 
embassy. It indicated, in not-so-subtle terms, that a second BIT claim was 
underway.21 This time it concerned recently enacted legislation for the mining 
industry in South Africa. The legislation had been many years in the making. Up 
through the 1990s and early 2000s, various sticks and carrots in the BEE program, 
mentioned above, had led multinationals such as Deutche Bank, Merrill Lynch, 
and de Beers to sell off equity stakes to black-owned enterprises or black 
employees, appoint black managers, enter into joint ventures with black operators, 
etc.22 So after a long consultative process,23 the time had come to extend the 
program to the mining industry – the largest in Africa, and one of the largest in 
the world. To rectify the unequal access to South Africa’s natural resources as a 
result of the Apartheid regime, mining legislation was enacted in 2002 to replace 
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 See generally; N. Gallus, ‘The Influence of the Host State’s Level of Development on 
International Investment Treaty Standards of Protection,’ 6 Journal of World Investment and 
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 Quoted in Peterson (2008), op. cit.   
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the old Mining Act of 1991.24 The new Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA)25 – along with the ‘Mining Charter’26 - vested all 
mineral rights with the South African state and only allowed holders of ‘old order 
rights’ to obtain new licenses (‘new order rights’) if they divested a considerable 
percentage of their shareholdings to HDSA. This gave effect to the South African 
Constitution, where Section 25(4)(a) encourages ‘reforms to bring about equitable 
access to all South Africa's natural resources.’27 The act moreover obliged 
companies to provide special programs for HDSA employees - such as housing, 
training, and medical care – as well as reach 40% HDSA participation in 
management by 2009. Finally, ‘new order rights’ would be for a limited time 
period, they had to be exercised, and holders would be subject to thorough review 
of their social and environmental obligations.  
During discussions with the industry, South African law firms made the 
government aware that the new regulatory regime was likely to conflict with 
South Africa’s BIT-obligations,28 and so did foreign firms.29 And while there is no 
evidence that it was specifically due to the potential conflicts with investment 
treaty obligations, the fierce opposition from the industry led the South African 
government reduce the target HDSA ownership in the mining sector from 51% to 
26% to be achieved by 2014. Yet, this was still considered too high by the 
industry, which argued that BEE groups simply did not have the billions of Rand 
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necessary to pay ‘fair market value’ for the rights.30 Italian investors, in particular, 
continued to object strongly to the commercial losses they were bound to suffer, 
and tried to use their BIT to push the South African government to further water 
down the legislation. Given the political sensitivities of the affair it is perhaps 
remarkable that they were backed up by their government, which in 2005 sent the 
letter referred to above to the South African Minister for Minerals and Energy.31 
Arguing that the BEE efforts in the mining sector had gone too far, the Italian 
embassy’s ‘Aide Memoire’ noted that the MRPDA had ‘a significant and 
deleterious effect on Italian investors’ investments in the South African mining 
industry ...’ and by granting more favourable treatment to HDSAs, it essentially 
favoured ‘South African investors as a group.’32 As such, the ‘social upliftment 
objectives’ of the act ‘might produce a breach’ of the 1997 BIT between Italy and 
South Africa, which had no carveouts for affirmative action measures in any of its 
substantive provisions. 
If true, this was not to be taken lightly. Even if compensation was required for the 
mining act according to South African law – as a judge in an ongoing High Court 
case has alluded to33 - the 1997 BIT with Italy gave the investors a right to 
‘immediate, full and effective compensation’, rather than the ‘less than market 
value’ standard proscribed by South African law when compelling social 
objectives are involved.34 The following year the threat materialised: along with a 
group of Belgian investors, the Italian miners initiated a BIT claim arguing that 
the mining legislation was tantamount to discrimination and expropriation and 
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asked for US$350 million in compensation.35 This was a sizeable claim for the 
South African government: it translated into more than US$7 per capita and 
corresponded to 70% of its entire Strategic Health Programme for preventing and 
treating HIV/AIDS that year for instance.36 More importantly, it touched upon 
fundamental issues of concern to the South African polity. If successful, it had 
potential to open the flood-gates for similar claims questioning the re-distributive 
efforts of the post-Apartheid regime,37 which could result in ‘a significant – and 
potentially unquantifiable - liability for the South African government,’ as one 
South African lawyer put it.38  
 
Unlike the Swiss investor a few years earlier, Foresti et al. pursued their claim 
under ICSID’s Additional Facility Rules, which meant that its existence – if not 
actual proceedings - had to be made public. The immediate result was predictable: 
after ICSID had approved the claim in 2007, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in South Africa and abroad were quick to pick up on the politically 
charged case, and both the International Commission of Jurists, a Geneva-based 
NGO, and four additional NGOs led by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies in 
South Africa sought amicus curia status in the arbitration proceedings.39 Apart 
from the question of compensation to the claimants in question, the NGOs argued 
that the case touched upon ‘a wide range of issues of concern to the citizens of all 
countries.’40  
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In 2010, however, the investors eventually withdrew the case as they managed to 
negotiate rather favourable terms with South African mining regulators: instead of 
having to sell of more than a fourth of their investment to re-obtain their licenses, 
they were now allowed to sell only 5% - and that too as part of a share-ownership 
scheme to their own employees.41 Initially, the South African government 
objected to Foresti’s withdrawal as it was certain it would win on the merits.42 
Ultimately, South Africa agreed to discontinue the proceedings as long as it was 
on a res judicata basis and the Tribunal could determine the distribution costs. 
Much to its surprise, however, the Tribunal only made the investors reimburse a 
little more than half a million US dollars out of the almost 8 million spent by the 
South African government on legal fees and costs.43  
 
9.3. BITs as tokens of good-will 
 
These claims, and particularly the controversial Foresti dispute, raise a set of 
pertinent questions: why did South Africa enter into treaties that allowed foreign 
investors the right to claim millions of dollars in damages over as sensitive issues 
as its affirmative action policies? Also, why would South Africa offer protections 
to foreign investors that went over and beyond the South African Constitution, 
when the stated policy goal was merely to provide foreign investors national 
treatment? Even if we relax the unitary actor assumption and see the BIT-program 
from a public choice perspective, the questions still stand: while it would be 
understandable if negotiators pushed for the treaties for individual gains, why did 
politicians and other stakeholders agree? If embassies and politicians wanted 
‘photo-ops’, why not instead use some inconsequential agreements that didn’t 
contradict South Africa’s own Constitution and expose the government to 
liabilities? Going through the major South African newspapers from around the 
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BITs were signed indicates that with the exception of the first BIT with the UK, 
there was never much attention paid to the treaties.44 So while they provided some 
benefits in terms of diplomatic ‘photo-ops’, many other bilateral instruments 
could easily have been used for this purpose instead. Similarly, why would legal 
officers or regulatory agencies agree to treaties, which contradicted sensitive 
domestic social policies? Not being directly involved in the negotiations, the BITs 
entailed no individual benefits for these actors (e.g. foreign travels or larger 
budgets). Yet, if they did not make sure the treaties were carefully drafted, they 
exposed themselves to considerable criticism for neglect of their professional 
duties in case any disputes arose.   
 
The crucial first treaty45 
 
We begin in 1992. As the Apartheid regime was crumbling and South Africa was 
about to end decades of isolation from the international community, the United 
Kingdom (UK) approached the South African government to enter into a BIT.46 
Accounting for a third of South Africa’s inward FDI stock British firms were the 
largest investors in South Africa,47 and the Thatcher administration feared that the 
new ANC government – which partly relied on communist backing – would begin 
expropriating British assets.48 The proposed text was the English template BIT, 
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based on a 6-page ‘standard’ OECD model.49 In very brief terms it stipulated that 
foreign investors and their investments had to be treated fairly and equitably, there 
should be no discrimination or expropriation, contracts should be upheld, there 
should be no capital restrictions, and disputes could be adjudicated through 
international investor-state arbitration.  
But while perhaps sounding harmless at the time, it was serious indeed for South 
Africa. It granted a wide range of protections, which touched upon all government 
agencies administering the regulatory framework affecting foreign (British) 
investors at the national and sub-national levels. These protections were backed 
up by a general consent that allowed private investors recourse to international 
arbitration – which would be a first for South Africa. The draft also included a 
number of provisions that potentially conflicted with South Africa’s broader 
economic policies.50 For instance, a new Constitution was in the making, which 
expressly encouraged affirmative action measures in order to advance the black 
population’s ownership and participation in the economy, yet the national 
treatment provision in the BIT included no explicit provision affirming the state a 
right to give locals preferential treatment. So to the extent British companies and 
nationals would be structurally handicapped when competing with predominantly 
black-owned or managed local companies over licenses or acquisitions of state-
owned enterprises, this could violate the national treatment provision as enshrined 
in the UK model. Similarly, the interim Constitution of 1993 made a clear 
distinction between expropriation and mere deprivation. No compensation was 
due for the latter if the measures were pursuant to law and not arbitrary. This 
distinction was nowhere to be found in the British BIT, which covered both direct 
expropriation and measures having equivalent effect to expropriation (indirect 
expropriation), and the British draft therefore left up to private arbitrators whether 
British investors could be granted expropriation protections greater than those in 
the South African Constitution. Similarly, as was briefly mentioned above, the 
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new Constitution stipulated that compensation for expropriation had to reflect the 
balance of interests between those affected and the public - including ‘the nation’s 
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all 
South Africa’s natural resources’ – yet the proposed BIT did not allow deviations 
from ‘prompt, adequate, and effective compensation’ amounting to the ‘genuine 
value of the investment.’ If property was redistributed to the black population, for 
instance, the BIT could be construed as setting a stricter compensation standard 
than the South African Constitution.  
So while the regulatory agenda in the early post-Apartheid regime was obviously 
packed, this was clearly not a treaty to be taken lightly. With respect to the 
potential for costly investment disputes, it is important to recall that by the early 
1990s few could foresee the very serious risks such a treaty entailed. Decision-
makers did not have any way of knowing, for instance, that similarly worded 
expropriation provisions were being used in major claims over environmental 
regulations in Poland under non-ICSID rules. At the time, only one investment 
treaty claim had been made public – AAPL – which was very limited in scope and 
outcome, and one can therefore hardly blame South African officials if they did 
not foresee the risks of multi-million dollar investment disputes over sensitive 
areas of public regulation. But even the introduction of basic property rights in the 
new South African Constitution had been debated intensely, so a binding 
document under international law taking such protections further surely required 
some attention and deliberation, whether they were to be applied in investment 
disputes or not.  
This never happened, however, as no one seemed to realize the scope of what the 
British proposed. It was sent to the investment promotion agency, which was later 
to become the lead agency in South Africa’s BIT program. There, a key official 
did not find the BIT to be in any sort of conflict with South African laws, and he 
therefore saw it as: ‘a win-win situation without any risks or legal problems. ... 
BITs just established basic principles and we found nothing in there contrary to 
good common sense.’51 The only difference between the BIT and South African 
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national laws, he continued, ‘was the international arbitration clause. That’s it. ... 
It was very simple and straightforward. Europe had used these agreements for 
some time and had standard texts. When Britain came to us they presented the text 
and we did not have a problem with it.’52 So while the arbitration clause was 
discussed at the time,53 the risk of investment disputes was not only considered 
low, it was thought to be practically zero. As the officials did not have a specific 
instance of a major investment treaty claim ‘available’ on their radars, they 
followed the availability heuristic by almost completely disregarding the risks of 
such claims. ‘The risk of claims was not present. ... No departments raised such 
concerns at all.’54  
The bureaucrats charged with negotiating the treaties were not government 
lawyers however. Rather than having detailed legal and technical expertise in 
international law, their job was investment promotion. Yet, when they forwarded 
the draft for legal vetting, the responsible officials did not find any critical issues 
with the proposed British text either. It was sent to the small team of six lawyers 
in the Ministry of Foreign affairs, who dealt with everything from law of the seas, 
legal issues pertaining to Antarctica, customs unions, double taxation agreements, 
and now also BITs.55 The official who was eventually charged with vetting it was 
very junior in the department, and found the British treaty to be ‘clear and well 
drafted’ not breaching the country’s international obligations, and the state law 
advisor could not see ‘any’ problems pertaining to South Africa’s national law 
either.56 Also, while this was the first treaty for South Africa to provide a general 
consent to investor-state arbitration over a wide range of regulatory issues, the 
novelty of the arbitration provision in the British model was not realized at the 
time:  
‘Obviously we did not consider it [the arbitration provision, ed.] as an issue. From the 
legal position we did not have a problem because under our domestic legislation the state 
can be sued and under our Constitution discrimination based on ethnicity and nationality 
is also outlawed. So it would merely place a foreign investor in the same position that he 
in any case had. ... So why should we have a problem with it?’  
                                                          
52
 Ibid. 
53
 1994 DTI file on UK BIT. 
54
 South African official IV.  
55
 South African official III. 
56
 Ibid.  
 274 
 
Clearly, this was – and is – a faulty analysis: by consenting to investor-state 
arbitration, South Africa gave foreign investors access to a dispute settlement 
forum and enforcement mechanisms not available to South African investors. 
Also, while legal literature as well as UNCTC and UNCTAD reports were 
published at the time alerting officials that apart from the arbitration provisions, 
key protection standards – such as BITs’ expropriation provisions – often went 
over and beyond national laws, these were not consulted. Rather than rationally 
seeking and processing information about BITs, officials again followed the 
availability heuristic: important information was ignored as it was not readily 
available, and key officials involved with the proposed British BIT systematically 
neglected the fact that they were dealing with a set of very serious and far-
reaching legal obligations. According to a veteran BIT negotiator, one reason the 
officials so willingly accepted the British draft was evidently ‘due to ignorance or 
a failure to appreciate the significance of the provisions they ... accepted.’57 
This was also the reason hardly any relevant government stakeholders got 
involved in the process, despite the fact that their regulatory authority would 
potentially be restricted by the BIT. The impression that the treaty did not have 
any implications and its provisions corresponded completely to South African 
law, meant there was no reason for key stakeholders to spend precious time and 
resources on learning about these new and somewhat ‘exotic’ legal instruments. 
‘The only other department with a slight interest was the department of foreign 
affairs and they firmly endorsed what we were doing. They were the ones who had 
to get the thing legally ready, so they were firmly onboard’, one official recalls.58 
The departments responsible for resource exploitation, for instance, were not 
pushing to make sure the treaty would not undermine their right to regulatory 
takings otherwise legal under the Constitution; the Chief Law Advisor’s office did 
not alert decision-makers of the legal significance of the treaty, and so on. ‘For 
the British treaty I invited all government departments, mining, labor - everything 
around the table. And they all gave us the mandate, said they were fine with these 
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treaties and that they did not have to be present.’59 Apart from the reserve bank - 
which made sure South Africa’s foreign exchange policy were not undermined by 
the BIT (see below) - key interests of government stakeholders were evidently not 
realized.  
But what about political stakeholders? While bureaucrats may not have been too 
concerned about the proposed BIT, surely the political parties would want to 
thoroughly consider and insist on rigorous negotiations of a wide-ranging treaty 
with their former colonial power. Following much of the literature on why 
developing countries have entered into the BIT regime (see earlier chapters), one 
would expect that the economic rationale for entering into the treaty would be 
held up against its potentially serious legal implications. Yet, no critical questions 
were asked from politicians about the scale of the legal guarantees granted to 
foreign investors – not even from the communist factions – as the negotiator 
presented the treaty based on what was clearly a faulty analysis: ‘the agreement 
did not place British investors in SA in a better position than local residents 
because the agreement stated that SA law would apply.’60 Furthermore, based on 
this biased perception there was no reason for parliamentarians or others to ask for 
a survey to investigate its importance for investors: why go through the hassle, if 
the treaty could not hurt anyway? As the implications of entering into the BIT 
were thought to be miniscule and the legal analysis of the treaty was severely 
flawed, it did not really matter if it did not entail considerable benefits.  
 
Information about the risks of the treaty was thereby not just short in supply (due 
to few investment treaty claims) and somewhat costly to obtain (due to an already 
crowded political agenda) but also processed in a way few rational choice scholars 
would be able to explain. While organizations such as UNCTC and UNCTAD for 
years had told countries like South Africa that while entering into investment 
treaties would be in their national interest they had to carefully consider the legal 
implications, this was ignored completely and hardly any stakeholders took much 
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notice of the treaty, making it completely de-politicized in the national policy-
making process. As Weyland also found in his study of bounded rationality in 
bureaucratic decision-making,61 inferential shortcuts biased officials’ risk 
assessments and shaped who thought of themselves as a stakeholder in the 
process, and who did not. In this case, the risks and scope of the BIT were not 
understood, which meant hardly any departments realized the relevance of the 
treaty.  
The two-day negotiations over the British BIT were therefore amicable to say the 
least. In fact, ‘negotiations’ is hardly a representative term. When comparing the 
British model BIT from the early 1990s62 with what became the South Africa-UK 
BIT, it confirms that the treaty passed through both the bureaucracy and political 
system without any critical engagement from either. As an experienced negotiator 
has observed;  
‘A drafting formulation in the midst of negotiations, especially when it is in 
written form, takes on a life of its own, and more importantly, a kind of 
permanence; it becomes fixed in the minds of the other negotiating States and can 
give the author a clear psychological advantage as the negotiations then begin to 
centre around his proposal.’63  
The British model text was not just the centre around the negotiations, however, it 
was agreed to with hardly any changes: the only provision which seems to have 
been discussed was the transfer clause,64 where a protocol devised by the Reserve 
Bank on South Africa’s foreign exchange restrictions was included. Otherwise, 
the two texts matched up almost word for word, and the treaty was subsequently 
signed by Nelson Mandela and John Major, when the latter made his first visit to 
South Africa in 1994.  
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At the same visit, Major spoke of the need for liberalizing the South African 
economy and brought along pledges for 530 million Rand in development aid.65 
Yet, there is no indication that the aid package was specifically tied to the treaty: 
although officials at the time did find there was considerable political pressure to 
finalize the treaty,66 there are no signs of coercion from the British government, 
international organizations, or others. South African officials and politicians 
welcomed the British offer and no-one within the government or political 
institutions raised any critical voices at any point.  
 
The BIT program begins  
 
Based on this experience, an administrative decision was made by the new South 
African government to begin an actual BIT program. The government was 
adamant on opening the country up to trade and foreign investments to help 
rebuild an economy suffering from past populist economic mismanagement,67 and 
the type of treaty the British had brought to their attention seemed a useful legal 
tool to assist in that process.  
A few other treaties by major capital exporters were consulted,68 but the standard 
OECD-model enshrined in the British BIT was used as a de facto model for future 
negotiations. This was not as a result of a careful consideration of its provisions, 
however, but rather because it was the first that had come to the officials’ 
attention. ‘When Britain came to us they presented the text and we did not have a 
problem with it, so it was accepted by and large as the standard text to use.’69 
Another official remarks, ‘obviously the US and Canada have their own models, 
which we were confronted with at a later stage, and there were some South-South 
agreements, but the first treaty was with a European country so we gravitated to 
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those types of treaties.’70 Even though no one actually knew whether the treaties 
were considered important by investors themselves, as no surveys or hearing 
processes were initiated,71 this seemed immaterial: even if the treaties only 
marginally assisted in stabilizing the investment climate,72 there was no apparent 
reason not to go ahead signing them, as negotiators were of the (wrong) 
perception that they would only really matter in cases of outright expropriation: 
‘What you are trying to do is to think forward in eventualities when negotiating 
expropriation clauses, etc. But because of how our system works this was never 
going to happen. South Africa was never going to go and have a mass 
expropriation so given that it doesn’t really matter whether you include 
reservations on whether it happens for public policy reasons, or whatever – so 
there was really not much point in being so pedantic and difficult because it was 
never going to be an issue; so my take was that we might as well just get it 
done.’73 
Notably, the official now in charge actually had a graduate degree in international 
law. Yet, with the understanding that BITs were ‘no-sweat agreements’,74 South 
Africa rushed to spread out a web of investment treaties (see table 9.1), and the 
following year no less than seven BITs were signed.  
Apart from Korea, the first five were with other European countries. Initiatives 
typically came from the other side,75 and South African negotiators had no 
problem in relying on their model BITs during negotiations, as they did not depart 
significantly from the British text. The BIT with the Netherlands, for instance, 
almost exactly followed the Dutch model BIT of 1993 word for word.76 Just as in 
the British BIT, no carveouts were made for South Africa’s affirmative action 
policies, and future tribunals were given no hints in the preambles about the 
country’s aspirations to promote social and economic equality. The process, 
according to the negotiators involved, was ‘very much learning by doing,’77 and 
often negotiations only took a day or two.78 At no point did anyone object to the 
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process, and a review of South African newspapers around the time of signing and 
ratifying the treaties revealed that the press did not show much interest either.79  
Relying on the brief and simple but incredibly far-reaching British model made it 
easy to sign BITs with partners relying on similar OECD-based models. ‘We were 
trying to have as many agreements finalized as possible and because we used the 
European model we were quite effective with the European model, so there was a 
certain momentum’, one legal official noted.80 ‘This allowed us to finalize a lot of 
agreements in a short span of time. From the lawyers’ department, think of the 
amount of texts we finalized in so few months, just two people with many other 
responsibilities at the same time.’81 The understanding that BITs were agreements 
with no risks in other words meant that a criteria of success became to sign as 
many, as quickly as possible.  
 
Anchoring to the OECD-model  
 
Then along came Canada. As Schneiderman has observed, the Canadian model 
BIT was no different than earlier BITs in being ‘discordant with the stated goals 
of the South African property rights regime’ and it had the potential to ‘undermine 
constitutional objectives foundational to the democratic transition in South 
Africa’.82 In fact, it was in some ways more far-reaching than the European 
models. Based on NAFTA’s Chapter 11, it included extensive protections on 
intellectual property rights, for instance, legally binding establishment provisions 
and obligations on performance requirements. Unlike the United States model, 
however, its liberalization provisions were not subject to investor-state arbitration, 
and while some of the carveouts included in Canada’s current model were not 
included until Canada later got sued under NAFTA, it was still a somewhat more 
flexible text than those South Africa had already signed up to. Unlike the 
European models, it included carveouts for measures taken to protect the 
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environment or cultural industries, for instance. Yet, Canadian negotiators have 
had a very difficult time concluding BITs: 
‘Even if we find interested developing countries, it is always a challenge to 
explain why our model actually provides more flexibility than European models. It 
takes a long time to explain to them why our model is better than what they’ve 
done in the past. The liberalization provisions are not that difficult, but it is a big 
challenge to convince developing countries that they are not being tricked by the 
detail of the post-establishment and dispute settlement provisions, but that our 
model is actually more balanced in terms of preserving regulatory flexibility.’83 
Accordingly, when Canada initiated talks with South Africa over a BIT it was not 
so much the scope of the agreement that intimidated the South African negotiating 
team, as it was its lengthy and ‘legalistic’ appearance compared to the brief and 
vague European models. Also, whereas negotiations with European countries had 
proceeded as if the treaties were mere tokens of goodwill, the Canadian approach 
was intimidating.  
‘The Canadians were a nightmare. I think it was mostly an ego thing, but they 
took a very difficult stance. These were people who took BITs as real and serious 
legal instruments with teeth, rather than what they really are, namely pure signals. 
... The treaties are a symbolic gesture, so why be so pedantic and difficult in 
worrying so much about the legal details? It was very difficult.’84 
But despite of the ‘difficult and pedantic’ approach on the Canadian side, the 
South African negotiation team agreed to the text nevertheless. ‘South Africa was 
a junior partner in all these negotiations, so we were in no position to dominate, 
and would always give into their demands.’85 The result was curious. For 
instance, the agreed text expressly specified that the treatment and protection 
provisions did not apply to preferential rights and measures provided to Canadian 
aboriginal peoples, but the South African negotiation team did not make sure this 
carveout also covered their constitutionally enshrined affirmative action policies. 
South Africa therefore ended up agreeing to more stringent standards than the 
Canadians, not because they thought this would make the BIT a more ‘credible 
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commitment’, but rather because South African officials considered such 
differences in BITs to be ‘mostly about cosmetics.’86 
Apart from the fact that the Canadian treaty departed significantly from the 
‘standard’ OECD model, it also stood out as the only of the early treaties that was 
not eventually ratified. Yet, while the failing ratification process was a result of 
domestic ‘veto players’ blocking the treaty, it was hardly the way rationalistic 
accounts would have expected.87 For instance, although the treaty would arguably 
have allowed major Canadian mining companies to bring claims based on South 
Africa’s redistributive policies in the natural resource sector, there was no 
opposition from the responsible regulatory agencies, as they remained oblivious to 
the implications of the treaty.88 Instead, it came down to a single legal officer, 
whom I will return to below. 
The somewhat paradoxical situation of the negotiation team having difficulty 
accepting treaties, which in some ways were more flexible treaties compared to 
the European models was not a unique event. South Africa and Malaysia, for 
instance, had agreed to enter into a BIT,89 and during the negotiations South 
Africa was asked to exclude a national treatment clause from the agreement due to 
Malaysia’s infant industry protection policies and preferential treatment of its 
indigenous peoples (the bumiputra).90 Yet, while this would have made sense 
given South Africa’s own affirmative action measures – at least compared to 
national treatment clauses where such measures were not excluded - the South 
African negotiators did not want to depart from their initial OECD-based model. 
While a more careful consideration of the legal implications would almost 
undoubtedly have appreciated the Malaysian approach – particularly since there 
were no South African investors to protect in Malaysia – the treaty never 
materialised as South African officials were committed to stick with their OECD-
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based approach.91 While this may appear irrational – even for negotiators 
themselves who might have benefited individually from finalizing the treaty - the 
anchoring heuristic reminds us it was not unpredictable.   
 
Coordination concerns: multilateral v. bilateral investment obligations 
 
South Africa’s investment obligations were of course not just negotiated in BITs, 
and during the OECD-based talks for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI), a number of South African BIT negotiators occasionally went as 
observers, but as with many others, they were dismissive of the project. This was 
not so much because of the substance of the agreement, but rather the approach. 
‘The MAI was take-it-or-leave-it with the whole agenda set by the OECD without 
any sense of negotiating or hearing the views of developing countries. This 
annoyed us and many others out of principle.’92 The continued reliance on 
bilateral deals rather than support for a comprehensive multilateral investment 
treaty was not based on ingenious cost-benefit analyses, as expected by Guzman’s 
game-theoretic model. In the case of the MAI, it was more simple: ‘BITs at least 
give us a feeling that we are listened to. We are craving to be treated as equal 
partners with respect, and BITs do that; the MAI did not.’93 However, when in 
1996 it was suggested that the WTO – a more inclusive forum – should include 
investment protection rules, South Africa was also sceptical. While never at the 
forefront of multilateral investment discussions,94 including those in the WTO,95 
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an advisor to South Africa’s trade minister commented in the press about the 
possibility of investment protection rules in the WTO that:  
‘it is ‘absolutely clear’ that some of the proposed new measures ‘would be 
destructive to weaker economies’ whose domestic firms cannot compete with 
transnational corporations. ‘It would be unfair to impose such new rules before 
these countries have had a chance to engage in full economic reforms’.96 
Any new investment rules, he said, would ‘remove the last vestiges of national 
planning and pose a threat to national sovereignty.’97 Although the message 
might have been tailored to suit the audience (the general public), this was 
nevertheless a somewhat puzzling statement. While willingly entering into BITs, 
which included broadly drafted protections that went over and beyond South 
Africa’s new Constitution, a multilateral agreement negotiated in a forum where 
developing countries could act as a bloc was rejected as being a ‘threat to national 
sovereignty.’ But again, although the exact explanation remains somewhat 
uncertain, even for officials present at the time, the contradictory policies were 
clearly not a result of careful considerations of the negotiating dynamics at the 
bilateral and multilateral levels. Rather it happened for more mundane reasons.  
One the one hand, ignorance was unfortunately a deciding factor again. For 
instance, one official who was in a senior position at the time was of the view 
that: 
‘BITs did not go over and above WTO commitments. ... Generally we favor 
multilateral commitments – global rules – and WTO is the most appropriate 
forum, so you shouldn’t make commitments at the bilateral level in BITs that you 
haven’t made at the multilateral level in WTO. So until we had found a 
multilateral compromise we did not want to push BITs above WTO obligations. 
We did not want to further add to the WTO agenda, but were content with signing 
BITs as they did not have any risks. That was our position.’98  
He was, in other words, of the understanding that BITs did not go over and 
beyond existing investment obligations in the WTO after the conclusion of the 
Uruguay round (i.e. primarily the TRIMS agreement and some parts of the GATS 
agreement). According to this (severely mistaken) view, any further WTO 
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obligations, such as those discussed after the 1996 Singapore inter-ministerial 
meeting, would therefore go over and beyond BIT-obligations.  
Another reason for the paradoxical position was a complete lack of coordination, 
as we also heard from other countries in the last chapter. Within the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI), officials working on BITs were aware (to some 
extent) that they went over and beyond WTO obligations, but they had nothing to 
do with WTO negotiations, even if they touched upon investment. In fact, the 
multilateral and bilateral cells of the DTI’s international trade division had little, if 
any, contact. ‘People work almost entirely in silos,’ a senior official notes, ‘which 
at times lead to such contradictory policies. We had a WTO unit and a bilateral 
unit, and we never communicated so there was no coordination what-so-ever.’99 
‘In our unit, we decided to oppose investment protection as part of the Singapore 
issues, as we wanted to push WTO into a direction more in line with developing 
country interests,’ another official recalls ‘but during the time there was very little 
coordination between, and within, ministries. ... We had nothing to do with the 
officials negotiating BITs. This situation was quite normal for developing 
countries I think’100 As we shall see below, this was not the last time South 
Africa’s contradictory behaviour in the international investment regime was a 
result of poor coordination between, and within, organizational units.  
 
Minor, but inconsistent, adaptions 
 
So despite of the critical stance at the multilateral level, the bilateral trade 
relations unit of DTI’s international trade division continued the BIT program 
almost unabated. During 1997, however, they began thinking through the 
relationship between the Constitution and investment treaties and decided it might 
be prudent to make certain exceptions to safeguard South Africa’s affirmative 
action policies. The treaties with Iran, China, Mauritius, Ghana, Russia, and the 
Czech Republic therefore explicitly stated that provisions on national- and MFN 
treatment as well as fair and equitable treatment would not apply to measures 
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taken to promote equality or protection or advancing natural or legal persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. As the legal officer vetting many of the 
early agreements noted, ‘we were clear that we should not provide more rights 
than our Constitution, and created some wording to take that into account.’101 
After having signed twelve BITs already, the South African BIT negotiators had 
clearly become aware of the potential legal implications of an investment treaty 
program out of sync with their country’s constitutional priorities.  
Or had they? As is often the case in developing countries’ BIT programs,102 the 
adaption to the BIT-program remained entirely inconsistent. First of all, although 
exceptions to promote equality were included in the treatment provisions, the 
expropriation standards remained the same and had no such carveouts. In the BIT 
with the Czech Republic, for instance, the article on discriminatory and unfair and 
inequitable treatment exempted:  
‘... any law or other measure the purpose of which is to promote the achievement 
of equality in its territory, or designed to protect or advance persons, or categories 
of persons, previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.’103   
Yet, this expropriation provision still followed the ‘traditional’ OECD-model, and 
thereby remained discordant with the South African Constitution (see above).  
Secondly, in the Swedish and Finish BITs, for instance, no exceptions were 
included even in the treatment provisions, despite being signed during exactly the 
same period. The same was the case for the Belgium/Luxembourg BIT, which 
along with the Italian BIT was later to be used in the major investment treaty 
claim on this very issue. So while there might have been a better understanding 
that such exceptions could be important than during the first wave of treaties, it 
remained superficial. The key South African negotiators looked at it this way,  
‘Some people were like, my goodness; we can’t give them these provisions as 
others are going to invoke them through the MFN clause. As negotiators, we were 
much more pragmatic in our approach, understanding that it did not really matter 
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whether we included various reservations as it would never become an issue in 
practise.’104 
With a biased assessment of the implications of what they were negotiating, South 
African officials therefore continued to enter into BITs which, if they were to be 
honoured, could prevent measures to pursue South Africa’s developmental 
agenda, and if they were not, would subject the country to potentially costly and 
far-reaching investment treaty disputes.  
 
BITs as ‘apple-pie agreements’ 
 
Recall, that authors like Guzman, Elkins, and Simmons, for instance, argue that 
developing countries sign BITs with developed countries as a response to 
competitive pressures for investment with other developing countries. But if 
cognitive heuristics are at play, the choice of BIT-partners could very well be 
much more haphazard. If inferential shortcuts have led decision-makers in 
developing countries to systematically ignore the risks of BITs, officials would be 
less inclined to engage in careful consideration of which countries to sign BITs 
with. Failing to realize the substantial scope and implications of what they are 
signing, decision-makers may have chosen BIT-partners without any reasoned 
national or personal strategic calculus, but rather on the basis of which-ever 
government leaders meet with at a given point in time.  
This was surely the case in South Africa. While the first treaty with Britain was 
clearly intended by the British government to protect already existing investments 
and the economic rationale for some other BIT-partners also appeared somewhat 
sensible at the time, it did not reflect any agreed strategy on the part of South 
Africa. On the contrary. ‘Many foreign governments wanted to show interest in 
the new South African regime, and when they wanted to sign agreements with us, 
we pretty much always said yes – as it would be offensive to decline the offer.’105 
Cuba was an early example. The two countries had embarked on a number of 
cooperation projects in the area of health, for instance, where Cuban doctors were 
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assigned to South African hospitals and South African medical students sent to 
Cuba.106 Cooperation was also initiated in the education field, where Cuban 
teachers were invited to teach in South African rural schools.107 So while the two 
countries had hardly any economic links in terms of trade or investments, Cuba 
asked South Africa to also enter into a BIT to further seal their diplomatic 
relationship. On the way home from the Canadian negotiations, the negotiators 
therefore stopped over in Havana to quickly finalize an agreement.108 No other 
reasoned strategic calculus went into the agreement, apart from the observation 
that it would have been ‘offensive to decline the offer’. The systematic failure to 
appreciate the implication of investment treaties, thereby led to a haphazard 
choice of BIT-partners with no economic rationale. This is one, out of many, 
examples of a South-South BIT, which the rationalistic literature has had 
difficulties in explaining.109  
Cuba was no exception. While many of the first negotiations had primarily been 
initiated by Western capital exporting countries, South Africa produced its own 
template BIT – primarily based on the British model110 – and asked the foreign 
office to pass it out to all its embassies to see who would be interested in signing a 
BIT.111 The embassies were highly supportive of this new instrument. ‘The 
ambassadors used them as a possible achievement during their tenure, so we had 
requests from embassies all the time to sign these agreements.’112 Politicians were 
equally thrilled, and began using the treaties as photo-opportunities when going 
abroad or receiving international guests. 
‘A lot of South African politicians went all over Africa, in particular, and because 
politicians want to be seen doing something constructive, they would often 
suggest a BIT even if no investments were flowing between the countries. They 
considered the treaties as a mere piece of paper with no real implications, and they 
did not go through any channels. ... So when an inward or outward visit would 
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happen, politicians looked for something to put on their agenda and they 
suggested the BIT’113  
Recall that we heard of similar experiences in the last chapter. However, the fact 
that embassies and politicians acted upon their individual incentive to push for 
BITs should come as no surprise for public choice students of bureaucratic 
politics. It does not, in and by itself, signify limited rationality on the part of 
policy-makers. For without proper control and oversight mechanisms, domestic 
stakeholders can successfully pursue their own interests at the expense of broader 
national welfare concerns. Yet, the lack of information about the implications the 
treaties, and the imperfect processing of whatever information was available, 
meant that government agencies with an incentive to oppose the treaties did not. 
This was not because of lacking oversight or other factors - as principal-agent 
models point to when ‘shirking’ occurs - but rather because they remained 
oblivious of their own interests. The treaties remained:  
‘... very under-politicized. Apart from a few technical things in the reserve bank 
pertaining to exchange control, which were usually the hardest issues, there were 
no problems at all. One or two times we explained it all to the parliamentary 
committee, but even there it was acknowledged as a technical agreement. …The 
parliament never discussed it, the Justice department was fine, and so were other 
stakeholders. No one thought it was a bad idea to sign these treaties.’114  
So since no-one told politicians and embassy officials that BITs were in fact 
serious agreements, South Africa’s web of BITs began to spread even more 
quickly. The policy of finalizing investment treaties whenever there was a state 
visit somewhere meant the guiding principles of South Africa’s BIT policy was 
left almost entirely to chance. A somewhat bizarre example of this was Mali. 
During a formal visit there, the South African foreign minister presented his 
counterpart with the draft BIT, who agreed to it. The process went so fast, 
however, that the document sent back to the foreign office in Pretoria was just a 
copy of the South African model: it did not even have the two countries’ names 
on it, which made it impossible to submit for ratification.115  
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With a few exceptions - such as one treaty signed as preconditions for a specific 
investment project116 - BITs were thereby being (mis-)used based on a mistaken 
understanding of their basic implications. This ‘shot-gun approach’117 of 
embassies and politicians signing BITs as ‘merely pieces of paper’118 led to even 
further capacity constraints for the officials involved. In fact, at several 
negotiations only one South African official was present during this period. 
Initially, he was satisfied with this situation as it gave him the freedom to finalize 
a great number of agreements, not least because the expertise and experience in 
many other developing countries was even less than in South Africa.119 But 
eventually, the time pressure became tremendous. ‘I actually had to sit down and 
calculate: It took 15 minutes to walk to the department to get their opinion on it; it 
took 15 minutes to walk back put it all together – and I worked out how much time 
it took on average. It became too much in the end.’120 When telling this to his 
superiors, they realised that even though no one actually objected to the content of 
the agreements, this approach was perhaps too haphazard and chaotic. A targeted 
two-track approach was therefore agreed upon: South Africa should continue to 
accept invitations to sign with capital exporting states who were major trading or 
investment partners, but also actively pursue South-South BITs in countries where 
South African companies had, or were planning to conduct, investments – 
particularly on the African continent. In other words, rather than merely signing 
BITs, right, left, and centre – as would be predicted by a norm-emulation 
approach - there was an objective of pursuing a strategic and reasoned BIT-
strategy, an ‘intended rational behaviour’ as Herbert Simon would put it.121 Also, 
it is notable that the same official who suggested a more careful approach was the 
same official who had most to benefit from promoting BITs, as it allowed him 
extensive travel, perhaps larger budgets, or plainly career promotion. Yet, by 
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contrast with the predictions of a public choice framework, he was the one who 
slowed down the process.  
While this new strategy was more manageable, the perception remained that the 
treaties entailed only benefits, and no risks. Although investment treaty claims 
were beginning to pop up against other countries (see chapter seven), these 
remained outside the officials’ radar-screens. When asked whether they followed 
the ongoing claims against other developing countries, it became apparent that by 
2009 some former officials still did not know such claims existed: ‘We did not 
follow those arbitrations you are referring to. Personally, I do not know of any 
international arbitrations under BITs. Perhaps rogue regimes like Burma and 
North Korea have been hit.’122 Another official was more well-informed, yet he 
never sought information about the disputes as this was ‘the last thing people 
would think about.’123 So while the negotiators would participate in UNCTAD 
seminars, where nuances in various models would be discussed,124 there was not 
much reason to update the South African model since they were not ‘very serious 
legal agreements’ anyway.  
The targeted approach did not last long though. After South Africa’s sole 
negotiator was posted overseas in 1999, the responsibility to negotiate BITs was 
delegated to regional desk officers within the foreign office. This augmented the 
lack of expertise and experience that went into the actual negotiations even 
further. ‘All the negotiation skills, experience, and so forth were lost, which was 
unfortunate but I think the decision was made simply because the treaties were 
low on the priority list.’125 Accordingly, regional desk officers were allowed to 
negotiate treaties they, until then, had hardly heard of. As one senior official 
recalled:  
‘No one had any legal qualifications, but the BITs really gave the regional desk 
officers something to do. Do 10 agreements and you have been successful during 
that year. It also gave them an opportunity to travel. So BITs became used as 
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perks because no one informed them what the consequences of these agreements 
were about.’126  
Interviewing some of those officers, clearly confirmed this view. ‘We used to call 
them apple-pie agreements intended to give comfort to politicians: it was really 
nice for a politician to say they had signed a BIT, and the officers from foreign 
affairs also really liked to see the treaties signed under their tenure.’127 So based 
on the understanding that there was ‘absolutely no risk in signing BITs for South 
Africa as they were entirely consistent with the constitution and national 
legislation’128 the South African web of BITs proliferated, particularly in 2000. 
When embassies would request a BIT (‘they like photo-sessions and smiles, so 
they love to have a minister to come and sign an agreement, no matter how small 
the country’129) the regional desks did not find any problems in proceeding. 
Rather than serious and far-reaching legal obligations, they were considered as ‘a 
gateway to understand the other country. The agreements were important to 
create cultural and political relations.’130  
With that level of understanding of the treaties, South Africa gladly accepted the 
invitation from UNCTAD in 2001 to join one of their BIT-signing sessions. 
Recall from chapter five, that almost one fourth of all BITs signed between 2000 
and 2005 were signed at these UNCTAD sessions. For the 2001 session, a legal 
officer from the multilateral trade negotiations unit within the DTI went along to 
Geneva due to a cancellation at the last minute.131 This officer had specialized 
degrees in international trade and investment law as well as a background as a 
practicing lawyer. So although the fact that he was a legal expert - at least 
compared to his colleagues - did not make him less prone to inferential shortcuts, 
he was able to have a much more informed understanding of the treaties’ legal 
importance. And what he saw in Geneva took him by surprise. ‘The OECD model 
was actively promoted during this session, and no real negotiations actually took 
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place. Treaties were just signed off in a rush in two or three hours.’132 While 
puzzled about this process, he could not object at the time and South Africa 
signed four BITs at this one session alone (with Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and 
Mauritania).133  
 
A new approach 
 
Later that year, however, the same officer was put in charge of South Africa’s 
investment negotiations. So he began investigating just what South Africa had 
signed up to over the last six years, and he was shocked.134   
‘There was absolutely no consideration as to whether these agreements were in 
South Africa’s interest or not. In fact, I once talked to one of the negotiators from 
the time, and he had no clue what ‘fair and equitable’ treatment, national 
treatment, MFN, and so forth even meant. He actually had no understanding. ... 
And as a lot of other developing countries, people here appear to have fallen for 
the propaganda that the moment a BIT was signed with a country, capital would 
start flowing from there.’  
He urged the government to take a much more conservative approach. A policy-
decision was taken not to enter into any more BITs with developed countries, and 
BITs should only be signed with developing countries after a proper policy had 
been put in place. And under no circumstance should South Africa participate in 
UNCTAD ‘signing sessions’ again.  
This new, and more hesitant, approach had major implications for South Africa’s 
external investment policy. First of all, the officer blocked the ratification of 
numerous BITs - including the one with Canada - and renegotiated others, such as 
the treaty with Cuba. Secondly, FTA negotiations between the Southern African 
Customs Union135 and the United States began in 2003,136 yet already the year 
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after talks had stalled,137 and finally in 2006 the negotiations collapsed. Among 
the reasons was the American refusal to exclude comprehensive investment 
disciplines from the agreement, which South Africa thought conflicted with their 
BEE program.138 Particularly the establishment provisions in the US model were 
problematic. ‘[T]he South African government is unwilling,’ Karan Bhatia, 
Deputy USTR, complained, ‘to provide equitable access [to government 
procurement, ed.] for foreign firms as this could negatively impact on its black 
economic empowerment initiatives.’139 Eventually, the investment obligations in 
the FTA turned out to be a ‘major obstacle’140 and combined with other conflicts 
over intellectual property rights and trade in services, for instance, the 
negotiations collapsed.  
Third, South Africa refused to include investment obligations as part of an 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU. Starting in 2006, South 
Africa had joined the negotiations but was, along with Namibia, the only African 
country that did not give in to European pressure to include investment and 
services in the negotiating process.141 
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Finally, and crucially, South Africa is one of the only countries in Africa that is 
not a member of ICSID.142 When in 1998 the South African Law Commission 
made its recommendations concerning South Africa’s outdated arbitration law,143 
joining ICSID was one of them. After having obtained inputs from a number of 
experts, including Antonio Parra from ICSID144 as well as prominent arbitrators 
such as Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel and Jan Paulsson145 (who was later to become 
counsel to South Africa in the Foresti claim), the Commission recommended that:  
‘Ratification of the Convention would ... be another positive signal which South 
Africa could send out to indicate that the new government is eager to create the 
necessary legal framework to encourage foreign investment. ... On the other hand, 
South African companies are eagerly looking for investment opportunities in other 
African countries, virtually all of which are members of ICSID. Ratification of the 
Convention by South Africa would facilitate such investment and further the 
economic development of the region.’146 
It further noted the need to join ICSID now that South African BIT negotiators 
had included ICSID arbitration clauses in their BITs, which ‘created the 
expectation among potential investors in those countries that South Africa intends 
acceding to the Washington Convention.’147 But a few years into the hearing 
process after the Law Commission submitted its draft Bill to Parliament in 2001 
through the Minister of Justice, the DTI officer put in charge of investment 
negotiations objected. Although not taking issue with the broader arbitration bill, 
the experience with the Swiss and Italian/Belgium BIT claims led DTI to 
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conclude that it was not in South Africa’s interest to join ICSID.148 DTI was 
adamant on this point and eventually ICSID membership was removed from the 
proposed bill, which means that South Africa is likely to remain outside ICSID in 
the foreseeable future.149  
Coordination problems, again 
 
Yet at the same time as South Africa objected to investment obligations in the EU 
EPA, the US PTA, and in the context of ICSID, it is clear from Table 9.1 that the 
South African web of BITs continued to spread. As already mentioned, this 
appears to go against the predictions from the last chapter. Yet again, South 
Africa’s investment policy was plagued by poor coordination, as some of the 
regional desks continued their negotiations despite the imposition of the 
moratorium. One of the regional desk officers saw it like this:  
‘Taking a legalistic perspective on these treaties is a bit problematic because then 
they become very difficult to negotiate. When legal people meet, they have all 
their jargon, which is a bit boring. So since the other side was typically not very 
legalistic either, we did not always involve the South African lawyers.’150  
The leadership of the DTI therefore had to block the ratification of a number of 
agreements with North African countries, for instance, which took place behind 
their back. Similarly, when reading in the newspaper that a minister had travelled 
to Israel to sign a BIT in 2004, the leading official involved in the new BIT policy 
raised a red flag realising that since Israeli diamond cutters considered the South 
African export duty on rough diamonds to constitute expropriation, the BIT could 
have been used to initiate a claim.151 In short, the South-African BIT program was 
in disarray: different agencies with different agendas and levels of expertise 
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pushed the treaties right, left, and center, to the frustration of officials trying to 
analyse the complexities and potential liabilities involved.  
 
South Africa’s BIT program after Foresti  
 
This all ended with the Foresti claim, which was a major affair. In one of the 
hearings, for instance, South Africa not only sent its considerable legal team from 
Freshfields, one of the world’s leading law firms specialised in investment 
arbitration, but also: one ambassador, two senior officials from the State Attorney 
of Pretoria (incl. the State Attorney of Pretoria herself), the directors general of 
the DTI and the Department of Minerals and Resources, the Head of Legal 
Services at the Treasury, as well as senior officials from the President’s office.152 
Until the Foresti claim, few of these had ever taken BITs seriously.  
As stated by one senior official: ‘it was not until we got sued, we truly realized 
that we should have had red flags up when signing these treaties.’153 Similarly, 
DTI noted to a Parliamentary committee that: ‘... the real impact of BITs was 
brought to the fore for RSA in an investment-related dispute, which directly 
challenges RSA’s new minerals legislations ...’154 Upon DTI’s suggestion, the 
government therefore started a thorough review of its investment treaties - the first 
in the country’s history. In the words of the appointed ’Task Team’, the review 
‘was partly necessitated by various arbitral proceedings initiated against the 
Republic of South Africa ... and the need to conduct a comprehensive risk 
assessment.’155 The law firm which represented South Africa in the Foresti case – 
Freshfields – offered to assist in this process, which is noteworthy in light of the 
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policy-making role of private lawyers in the investment regime as reviewed in 
chapter five. Yet, the offer was declined by the South African official in charge.156   
As the policy review was finalised in late 2010, DTI made its concluding 
recommendations to Cabinet: South Africa should not sign any more investment 
treaties which allows investor-state arbitration clauses.157 Existing BITs should be 
renegotiated on these terms, or allowed to expire. Although in favour of providing 
the necessary legal guarantees to attract FDI at home and protecting South African 
investors abroad, investment treaties in their most potent form should no longer be 
used as a tool.158 Finally, it is worth noting that the draft report from the year 
earlier included a few comments on the past strategy as well: South African 
negotiators had been misguided when entering into BITs in the past, since ‘the 
risks posed by such treaties were not fully appreciated at that time.’159 It went on 
to say that ‘the impact of BITs on future policies were not critically evaluated ...’ 
and that ‘the inexperience of negotiators at that time and the lack of knowledge 
about investment law in general resulted in agreements that were not in the long 
term interest of [South Africa, ed.].’160 Similarly, with respect to the inherent lack 
of coordination between, or even within, departments the report mentioned that, 
‘the formal legal basis for FDI policy is scattered across various line function 
departments that do not always coordinate policy interventions ...’ and ‘there does 
not appear to be a consistent approach to bilateral policy-making and strategic 
planning.’161 
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These were harsh conclusions to include in an official report towards now retired 
South African officials. This is particularly the case, since no interviews were 
actually made with the BIT negotiators from the mid-1990s, as the authors of the 
report were not able to trace them.162 But I did, and my review above suggests 
that, while perhaps harsh, the report’s conclusions are clearly a fair 
characterisation of the time, when South Africa spread out its web of investment 
treaties.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a detailed study of the decision-making processes 
surrounding a BIT-program in a developing country, which had a considerable 
public policy incentive to engage carefully with investment treaties. Yet, officials 
failed to carefully seek and process information about the implications of BITs 
until the country itself was hit by a major claim. Combined with bureaucratic 
conditions, particularly the lack of expertise and coordination, biasing heuristics 
made officials entirely ignore the risks of BITs, and overestimate their benefits. 
Even officials with an individual incentive to advocate a cautious BIT-strategy 
didn’t do so based on the perception that the treaties were immaterial. The BIT-
movement was thereby joined not after careful consideration of costs and benefits 
of the treaties compared to alternative investment promotion instruments, but 
simply because it was readily available to adopt after a capital-exporting country 
had made the government aware of the treaties’ existence. On this basis, the BIT-
program anchored almost entirely to the first treaty signed, despite having been 
determined randomly and future BIT-parties introducing alternative BIT-models 
more in line with the national interest. Also, experiences with investment treaties 
abroad were ignored entirely, which meant that the BIT-program remained un-
politicized with no government stakeholders asking questions until the first claim 
hit.  
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This gives further credence to the conclusions from the quantitative and survey 
evidence in the last chapter, namely that the expectations in much of the literature 
about the sophistication and rigor with which developing countries have 
considered and negotiated BITs are often in stark contrast with realities on the 
ground. It also provides a building-block at the micro-level for future studies 
aiming to understand the sometimes irrational, yet predictable, patterns of 
international policy diffusion. This will be further discussed in the coming, and 
concluding, chapter. 
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10. Unanticipated consequences and bounded rationality  
 
For most developing countries, the BIT-movement has not been about lofty ideals 
of international justice or symbolic attempts to adhere to neoliberal ideals. 
Instead, it has been about something as mundane as increasing national welfare. 
And while a number of developing countries can today use investment treaties to 
protect their own investors abroad, most signed BITs to attract foreign capital. 
Yet, when the treaties proliferated in the 1990s their material benefits were often 
oversold and their risks largely unknown. These two simple facts, and particularly 
the latter, have not been taken seriously in any work on why developing countries 
joined the BIT-movement.  
Although a number of controversial treaty-based investment disputes were 
brought against developing countries up through the 1990s, few realized this as 
the claims were pursued in private. Also, to the extent developing countries took 
their cues from international organizations, such as UNCTAD, they were of the 
understanding that the treaties were not important for investment disputes until the 
late 1990s, or even early 2000s. This makes it difficult to sustain the claim that 
most developing country governments realized that by signing investment treaties, 
they were in fact restricting their sovereignty in practice. It also explains in part 
why officials involved in the process note that although many had high hopes for 
the treaties’ potential to promote investment – some indeed still do - few thought 
they actually had much ‘bite’. By counterfactual reasoning, one might speculate 
that had Saar Papier, for instance, become public knowledge earlier, or had the 
Lauder arbitrations taken place (and been made public) in the mid-1990s, the 
global network of BITs could very well have looked considerably different today 
and been much less wide-spread. It might even have convinced developing 
countries that it was in fact worth pursuing a multilateral investment treaty as an 
alternative to their bilateral deals.  
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10.1. Unanticipated consequences 
 
International legal regimes with unanticipated consequences are of course not 
unique to the investment area. Just as few were able to predict the current 
authority that investment arbitral tribunals have over governments’ regulatory 
discretion, few foresaw the wide-ranging role of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) for instance.1 States have also found their sovereignty constrained in ways 
they didn’t anticipate both in the WTO and the International Court of Justice.2 
Even in the context of human rights treaties, developing countries have 
occasionally been shocked to realise that what they thought were merely pieces of 
paper later permitted transnational actors to use them for effective political 
pressure.3  
 
But by contrast with human rights treaties, BITs have not merely been useful 
points of reference for transnational actors advocating investor-friendly policies; 
they are actually enforceable in practice. In the spectrum between diplomacy and 
legalism, the two types of treaties are at completely separate ends.4 Also, the 
unanticipated consequences of investment treaty arbitration is not (only) a case of 
tribunals strategically trying to expand their own jurisdiction, a principal-trustee 
problem.5 Tribunals may occasionally have exploited the vague terms of the 
treaties and few possibilities for appeal by expanding the scope of their authority, 
but their remarkable flexibility in determining fundamental questions of public 
law stems from the almost complete lack of attention by developing country 
negotiators in the 1990s. So although ‘incomplete contracting’ is of course seen in 
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many other areas of international law,6 the fact that private tribunals were given 
such considerable flexibility in ‘filling out the blanks’ of vague and broadly 
drafted treaties was not even considered at the time they proliferated. While most 
developing countries adhered to the principles enshrined in BITs, hardly any 
realised the power granted to third parties to determine the meaning of those 
principles in practice. 
 
This will undoubtedly sound paternalistic to some. Jan Paulsson, for instance, 
calls it outright insulting to negotiators;7 and another famous arbitrator, Francisco 
Vicuña, concurs;  
‘The guns are pointing … to the vast network of bilateral investment treaties. … 
The argument is based on the false assumption that developing countries have 
been ignorant of what they were actually signing and that this was not to their 
advantage. Thank you for that paternalistic thought, but with respect I must say 
that lawyers from developing countries are not dummies.’8 
 
Apart from the fact that Paulsson himself noted in 1995 that many governments 
‘may not have appreciated the full implications’ of the unique nature of BITs’ 
adjudication mechanism,9 the claim is not that officials from developing countries 
were necessarily ‘dummies.’ However, if Vicuña or others want to suggest that a 
great number of developing countries invested considerable expertise and 
bureaucratic resources to engage with BIT-negotiations during the 1980s and 
1990s, this is clearly out of touch with reality.10 Also, in an environment of very 
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limited information, even officials that did have an understanding of the legal 
implications were prone to make biased judgments on BITs’ costs and benefits. 
This is the case, even if we assume they rationally sought and processed 
information, as predicted by Bayesian frameworks. Also, in the few cases where 
legal officials actually argued for a careful engagement with BITs during the 
1980s and 1990s, it was difficult to convince politicians, embassies, and 
investment promotion officials not to use the treaties for short-term political 
purposes.  
 
Investment treaties with the United States and Canada were somewhat different. 
Along with the MAI, they included liberalization provisions the implications of 
which were quite clear to negotiators and stakeholders.11 Yet, the vast majority of 
BITs include only post-establishment provisions, so when the potential liabilities 
of investor-state arbitration were misunderstood, ‘traditional’ BITs appeared 
entirely benign. Hardly any cases could be used to illustrate their potential scope, 
and most expected the treaties to have an impact on investment flows. So while in 
some countries, officials did manage to prevent some of the most important legal 
instruments governing economic globalization from being used as diplomatic 
gestures of goodwill, they were the exception - not the rule. 
 
Yet, it was not only a lack of information that often made developing countries 
misjudge the character of investment treaties. Even when information was 
available, officials frequently failed to seek and process it in ways predicted by 
rational choice models of policy-making. This led them to not just underestimate 
the risks of BITs – as could potentially be explained by a Bayesian framework – 
instead they often ignored them completely. Based on the understanding that BITs 
were entirely immaterial, even stakeholders who should have had an interest in 
preventing too haphazard BIT-strategies failed to speak up. This is difficult to 
explain using rationalistic frameworks, including that of public-choice. And rather 
than fully factoring in experiences of investment treaty claims against other 
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governments, officials often relied excessively on their own experiences before 
adjusting their approach. So while some developing country governments are still 
using BITs as ‘photo-ops’ along the lines of cultural agreements and other 
diplomatic gestures, a key determinant for why some countries have adjusted their 
BIT strategies, and others have not, is whether they themselves have been hit by a 
dispute. 
 
10.2. Bounded rationality 
 
These crucial patterns can best be explained by a theoretical framework based on 
bounded rationality. This approach acknowledges goal-oriented behaviour, which 
is useful in this context as developing countries did mostly enter into BITs for 
instrumental reasons. But while not claiming that people are ‘dummies’, it is 
based on what we actually know about the capabilities of the human mind rather 
than abstract, hypothetical and unrealistic expectations of judgment. Herbert 
Simon notes:  
‘The classical theory is a theory of a man choosing among fixed and known 
alternatives, to each of which is attached known consequences. But when perception 
and cognition intervene between the decision-maker and his objective environment, 
this model no longer proves adequate. We need a description of the choice process 
that recognizes alternatives are not given but must be sought; and a description that 
takes into account the arduous task of determining what consequences will follow on 
each alternative’12 
Here the experimental literature on bounded rational decision-making is a 
valuable starting point. It provides a micro-foundation of hypotheses and 
theoretical ideas, which can then be tested when analyzing patterns of decision-
making outside the confines of experimental settings. While questions of external 
validity should of course be carefully considered,13 experiments on bounded 
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rationality were started not in a vacuum but due to the existence of biased 
judgments in the real world.14 Similar to the assertions of any other theoretical 
framework, studies may prove them wrong in various contexts, but at least they 
are derived through empirically grounded observations rather than hypothetical 
speculation. And in the case of the BIT-movement, they do indeed appear to have 
considerable predictive qualities. While a bounded rationality approach will 
naturally not be able to explain why, and how, every single developing country 
has signed BITs, this study has shown that in many, if not most, cases it offers far 
greater insights than traditional explanations. 
 
Bounded rationality and policy diffusion 
 
This has broader theoretical implications. For only recently did Weyland seriously 
engage with notions of bounded rationality in the study of international policy 
diffusion. By contrast with Weyland, however, I choose to focus on a particularly 
hard case for a bounded rationality framework. BITs have been signed over 
decades with many countries negotiating dozens. Also, even if feedback from 
actual disputes was limited, governments were repeatedly told by international 
organizations like UNCTAD that while they might be useful to promote 
investment flows, they should be taken seriously, as they entailed potentially far-
reaching obligations. This provided decision-makers more ample opportunities for 
Bayesian updating than the policy-choices studied by Weyland, such as 
revolutions or major social policy reforms.15 As such, the study also differed from 
international relations work applying bounded rationality insights to military 
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conflicts,16 which are fraught with even greater uncertainties and time-pressure 
and thereby make the application of biasing heuristics less surprising.  
Secondly, when investigating the necessity of a bounded rationality framework, 
the study distinguished itself from most other work on policy diffusion by 
refraining from relying exclusively on one theoretical framework, or treating other 
frameworks only in passing. While every study, including this one, is bound to 
give weights to certain aspects of diffusion and discuss others in less detail, I 
pursued a robust approach by carefully considering the explanatory potential of 
each main theoretical account of international policy diffusion processes. This 
brought about considerable insights in and of itself, which will hopefully lead to 
future and more detailed research. For instance, while it has occasionally been 
suggested that developing countries were somehow coerced into signing BITs, I 
showed in detail that developing countries themselves have often initiated 
negotiations. While a country like Germany may occasionally have used coercive 
methods, the treaties played no direct role for the IMF, for instance, and much less 
of a role than often assumed for a World Bank organization like MIGA. Indeed, it 
is notable that for all the critics of the BIT regime, no-one has actually found 
much ‘smoking-gun’ evidence for coercion. Secondly, while in the context of 
competition frameworks, BITs have been described as stepping stones to broader 
economic integration agreements or crucial for insurance premiums – and thus 
influencing investment flows indirectly – this was shown not to be the case either. 
Third, a normative perspective highlighted the role of an organization like 
UNCTAD in spreading support for the BIT-movement, and indicated that work 
should investigate the role of private lawyers in shaping and upholding the 
investment regime due to their occasional triple role as private counsel, arbitrator, 
and government advisor. This could be done from either constructivist or 
rationalist approaches, or in combination.17 Also, as will be discussed below, there 
is no reason to believe that lawyers themselves could not also have been bounded 
rational in some respects – despite their expertise. Fourth, and as mentioned 
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above, investigating what information was actually available to developing 
countries at the time the treaties proliferated showed that studies based on 
assumptions of full information about the risks of BITs are inherently unrealistic. 
Finally, I discussed the potential of public choice frameworks to explain, why 
some actors within developing country bureaucracies have been particularly 
supportive of the BIT-movement. 
Yet, even after having gone through these and other overlooked aspects of the 
BIT-movement, the study was still able to conclude that a bounded rational 
framework did in fact have considerable ‘value-added’ to explain important and 
systematic variation in developing countries’ behavior. Surely, future studies 
should consider more ‘analytical eclecticism’, by combining insights from 
different theoretical approaches rather than making them ‘compete’ up against a 
bounded rationality framework.18 More formal models of bounded rational policy 
diffusion would also help clarify the importance of the component parts of the 
theory. However, the approach taken in this study will hopefully convince 
skeptics that, when investigating why some policies diffuse and others do not, 
bounded rationality should no longer be considered an unorthodox explanatory 
framework.  
 
Mixed methods and policy diffusion 
 
One reason for the neglect of the bounded rationality in the diffusion literature is 
that in order to take its insights seriously, one need to discuss not only substantive 
issues of opportunities and constraints – including constraints on information - but 
also procedural questions essentially relating to human cognition.19 Traditional 
studies of international policy diffusion tend to include information solely on 
actors’ goals (e.g. attracting investment; or in the case of individual officials, 
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foreign travels) and the objective characteristics of their situation, namely the 
costs and benefits of the policy (e.g. to sign a BIT) compared to alternative causes 
of action.20 Yet, to understand if, and under what circumstances, cognitive 
constraints intervene between interests and contexts, one would often have to 
apply qualitative methodologies, which is not the typical approach in diffusion 
studies.21  
Based on more than one hundred interviews, this study provides an important step 
to rectify this gap, and it has closed a major gap in the literature on BIT-diffusion 
in particular. Here inputs from decision-makers themselves have been remarkably 
absent, which has let a number of scholars astray as to the sophistication of the 
BIT-making process. Suffice it to say that much more qualitative work is needed, 
particularly in terms of process-tracing case-studies, yet as a starting point this 
study has offered considerable country-specific insights for future studies to build 
on.  
Unlike the path-breaking work of Weyland, however, I did not rely solely on 
qualitative data. Rather, my conclusions stem from triangulating qualitative and 
quantitative research, including econometric analyses of one of the key 
expectations of a bounded rationality framework. And while high-quality 
statistical data is indeed in short supply and has nowhere near the level of 
disaggregation necessary to isolate many of the key variables involved in 
diffusion processes, it was reassuring that some broad and important contours of 
the BIT-movement followed the predictions of a cognitive heuristics framework. 
So while future studies should take this much further, for instance based on 
negotiator and stakeholder survey data, the study provided a more serious 
engagement with mixed-methods than past studies on international policy 
diffusion. 
 
                                                          
20
 See generally; H. Simon, ‘Human Nature and Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with 
Political Science’ 79 American Political Science Review 293 (1985), at 294; H. Simon, Models of 
Bounded Rationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), ch. 8.  
21
 F. Gilardi, ‘Transnational diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies,’ draft paper, March, 2010, at 6. 
 309 
Bounded rationality, international political economy, and international 
economic law 
 
What has been said about the neglect of bounded rationality in the diffusion 
literature applies to an even greater extent to the broader IPE discipline. For 
unlike economics and political science, IPE analysts ‘... have shown impressive 
resistance to the bounded rationality literature and its implications.’22 Odell 
writes, 
 
‘Political economy knowledge would be better empirically if we paid more 
attention to how economic policy decisions are actually made. ... Systematic 
acknowledgment of the limits on rationality can generate valuable contributions 
missed by other frameworks.’23    
To my knowledge, the only one to take up Odell’s call thus far has been Elms, 
who in 2008 reinterpreted important IPE contributions through the lens of 
bounded rationality, and concluded that it should be ‘the first of an avalanche of 
new explanations.’24 This study went further by not only reinterpreting the work 
of others but instead producing new insights based on detailed empirical work on 
the mechanisms of economic diplomacy. I showed that although architects of the 
institutional framework for economic globalization may have been strategic and 
goal-oriented, they have not always been as rational as traditional IPE scholars 
would have us believe.  
This naturally begs the question, whether similar patterns can be found in other 
areas of IPE? Could important aspects of international trade negotiations also be 
explained through a similar framework, both in the context of the WTO as well as 
regional trade agreements? What role has the availability heuristic played for 
regulation of ‘fat-tailed’ risks in the context of international financial markets for 
instance? Might the heuristic of anchoring and adjustment play an important role 
in the political economy of international environmental regulation? Does the 
representativeness heuristic have anything to say about governments’ regulatory 
                                                          
22
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24
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response to globalization? Whether nested into constructivist frameworks, 
traditional rational-choice approaches,25 or as stand-alone explanatory 
frameworks, these are but a few of the questions future IPE studies might 
consider.  
Similarly, the study raises questions whether insights from bounded rationality 
might not only enlighten the law-making functions of international investment 
law, as focused on here, but also the adjudicative process of investment treaty 
arbitration itself. Although it would probably be fiercely denied by arbitrators 
themselves, there is no reason to expect they are not also subject to predictable 
cognitive constraints, which could impact their law-applying functions in 
systematic ways. But while behavioral approaches has become an established 
tradition in (particularly American) domestic legal studies,26 they have yet to be 
applied to international economic law. Perhaps it is time to start.  
 
10.3. Expanding the bounds of rationality in the investment 
regime   
 
Apart from potentially advancing our understanding of political economy or 
adjudicative processes, the questions above naturally have little practical value for 
law-makers in the investment regime.27 Particularly the IPE discipline has 
unfortunately tended to exist in a vacuum with few paying much attention except 
for the research community itself.28 So theoretical and methodological 
implications aside, does the study have any repercussions for developing countries 
themselves? Might insights on the limits of rationality offer practical policy 
implications for the future of the investment regime?  
                                                          
25
 See generally, Katzenstein and Sil, op. cit. 
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There is (probably) no bounded rational version of pacta sunt servanda 
 
From a legal perspective, the answer is most likely no. Many developing countries 
may have misjudged the character of investment treaties, but as a matter of law, 
most arbitrators would probably find this more or less irrelevant. The intent of a 
treaty is almost only important for interpretation in so far as it is expressed in the 
treaty text.29 When adjudicating disputes in the investment regime or elsewhere, 
international dispute resolution bodies will have to assume that governments were 
goal-oriented in their behaviour and knew the implications of their actions when 
signing up to international obligations. So it may not be considered a legitimate 
argument during investor-state disputes if the responding (often developing) 
country claimed ignorance about the implications of signing and ratifying the BIT. 
In the absence of outright imposition, ratified treaties are binding upon states 
whether they like it or not. Loewenfeld notes, for instance, that while the reason 
so many developing countries suddenly rushed to sign BITs is not irrelevant from 
a legal perspective, it ‘is not dispositive’ either.30 After all, a fundamental premise 
of international law is that by granting its consent in a treaty, a state binds itself to 
certain obligations ‘even if it subsequently changes its mind about that 
behavior.’31 So while many treaty drafters did not appreciated BITs’ far-reaching 
repercussions and overestimated their benefits, most arbitrators are likely to find 
this irrelevant for the adjudication of investment disputes.  
But what about political implications? If we are all subject to systematic biases 
and erroneous beliefs, can developing country governments do anything but to 
give up, and let their investment policies continue to be determined more by 
chance than by rational design? Not necessarily. For accepting that flaws in 
judgment are a fact of life, in politics or elsewhere, does not imply that the bounds 
of rationality cannot be extended. In fact, one of the reasons IPE studies have 
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often failed to be considered by policy-makers themselves is that they tend to be 
based on entirely unreasonable expectations of decision-making. Odell is again 
worth quoting at length, 
‘Documenting – partly at the individual level – how past monetary and economic 
policy decisions went awry would bring findings down from the global level to the 
level at which lessons will be applied if at all. Information about two types of 
heuristics and biases would be useful to practitioners: biases at home that need 
offsetting and biases abroad that could constitute either opportunities or obstacles 
to strategies based on the assumption of unbounded rationality.’32 
So given that this study did actually document such decisions going ‘awry’, what 
might the lessons be for policy-makers? Can biases at home be offset by 
developing countries, and biases abroad be avoided or perhaps even exploited? 
 
Expertise, experience, and coordination  
 
First of all, while expertise is no guarantee against biased judgments, it does 
provide decision-makers better and more varied information-processing 
techniques useful to understand their task domain. Spending time and effort in 
‘learning how to think’ is nothing if not a response to cognitive limitations and 
thus bounded rationality.33 Unfortunately, however, many countries still lack 
sufficient legal capacity to engage carefully with investment treaties and investor-
state arbitration. The most skilled legal bureaucrats have often been put in charge 
of trade negotiations, which in many countries have had much higher priority, and 
particularly so if they have not themselves been hit by a claim.34 So for 
developing countries that have the resources, a key long-term strategy to pursue 
more rational BIT-policies would be to invest in at least a couple of ‘in-house’ 
experts. And for those that do not have the resources to attract highly skilled legal 
expertise, one can only hope that developed countries realize that an important 
instrument in enhancing the legitimacy of the investment regime would be to fund 
one or more independent advisory centers on investment law, as recently initiated 
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in Latin America.35 Unlike the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, these would have 
to not just assist developing countries in case of disputes, but also with respect to 
negotiations and implementation.   
Expertise can also be facilitated through experience. So although there may be 
good reasons why many developing countries promote generalist bureaucrats, it 
hampers specialized learning. This narrows the bounds of rational decision-
making for individual officials and thereby also for their organizations as a whole. 
Observers of the trade-regime have noted that diplomatic career rotations 
undermine the establishment of experienced trade negotiators,36 and the same was 
seen in this study in the context of investment negotiations in Pakistan, South 
Africa, and Ecuador for instance. Instead, developing countries should consider 
facilitating experience with investment treaties by establishing specialized units in 
charge of negotiations, dispute settlement, and inter-agency coordination (see 
below).37 This would also decrease the chances that individual bureaucrats 
promote BITs purely for private gain knowing they will not be around, when the 
claims hit.    
A third instrument to offset biases at home is to increase inter-agency 
coordination. A lack of bureaucratic coordination is a cause of concern even in 
many developed countries, yet the problems are amplified in developing countries 
due to capacity constraints. We learned from countries as diverse as India, 
Mexico, and South Africa that lacking coordination made officials fail to take into 
account policies and strategies pursued in other departments and organizations, 
which in turn led to contradictory policies pursued at different levels of 
government. In fact, that may explain one of the key puzzles identified by 
Guzman, for instance, namely that some developing countries have pursued BITs 
while at the same time rejecting BIT-like standards in multilateral negotiations. 
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For rather than unitary and rational decision-makers who pursue their economic 
self-interests by responding to changing incentives depending on whether they act 
as a group or individually, as hypothesed by Guzman, it is clear that some 
important developing countries in this process simply failed to realize the 
contradictory policies in the first place. Coordination problems can of course also 
be explained with rationalistic frameworks as long as they relax the unitary actor 
assumption,38 yet the fact that government stakeholders often failed even realising 
the contradicting policies is best explained by bounded rationality. For future 
negotiations, however, such situations can be avoided at relatively low cost, if 
developing countries charge one government unit with all negotiations pertaining 
to international investment obligations.  
Suffice it to say that these conclusions may appear mundane in and by themselves. 
Yet, when reading existing studies on the BIT-movement, the impression has thus 
far been that practically all developing countries naturally had the necessary 
expertise, experience, and coordination capacity, when engaging in the investment 
treaty movement. Unfortunately, such assumptions have been somewhat out of 
touch with realities.  
 
Avoiding myopia 
 
A key finding of this thesis has been excessive myopia on the part of developing 
country governments: while happily importing policy models from abroad 
(diffusion), they focused excessively on their own experiences with those models 
after they had been adopted. Although this has not been a subject of this thesis, 
there is no reason to expect that similar ‘tunnel-vision’ will not also hamper 
developing countries’ otherwise well-meaning external advisors. International 
agencies and other advisors play important and positive roles, particularly if they 
can alert countries not yet subject to disputes about the risks involved with BITs. 
Yet, developing countries should still be cautious of what Jervis has called the 
‘drunkard’s search’, where the drunk looks for her keys under the lamp, not 
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because that is where she lost her keys, but simply because that is where the light 
is.39  
For instance, when investment lawyers argue that BITs are crucial to attract 
investment and reduce risk premiums, governments should welcome such advice, 
but question just how representative it is. In particular, they should consider the 
diagnostic value of all the investment advisors, companies, and underwriting 
agents that hardly ever take the treaties into account (and therefore rarely talk with 
investment lawyers!). Incidentally, this goes for developing countries themselves 
as well: when embassies abroad or investment promotion officials are convinced 
that BITs have major economic benefits, they might very well be unduly 
influenced by a small and unrepresentative sample of investors. Particularly 
damaging is, of course, when officials equate correlation with causation and 
ignore investment flows from all the countries with which they do not have BITs. 
During my many interviews with developing country officials it was surprising, 
for instance, that hardly any governments had tried to ask representative samples 
of investors about the value of these treaties. So given their potential liabilities, 
perhaps it is time developing countries start investigating just how important BITs 
are to attract investors into their jurisdiction.  
Also, consider recent calls by international organizations and the arbitration 
community that developing countries should undertake large scale bureaucratic 
reforms to implement their BIT-obligations.40 Proper implementation of BIT-
obligations in their current form not only entails informing national and sub-
national agencies about the implications of the treaties, but would often also 
necessitate bureaucratic systems in place reducing the chance and scope of 
disputes. Only few examples exist of governments actively trying to avoid 
investment treaty disputes through various consultation and coordination 
schemes.41 But while such reforms may occasionally be prudent and have positive 
spill-over effects, they take up scarce bureaucratic resources, which in some cases 
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might be better spent elsewhere. Consider, for instance, the reforms tax-payers 
would have to pay for in developing (and indeed many developed) countries 
before being able to offer foreign investors, what one tribunal understood by fair 
and equitable treatment,  
‘The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free 
from ambiguity and totally transparent in its relations with the foreign investor, so 
that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative 
practices or directives ...’42 
 
While it may be tempting to argue that developing countries should initiate whole-
sale domestic reforms to be able to offer such assurances to foreign investors, this 
would rarely be a prudent economic development policy - even if we assume it is 
feasible in the real world. Hausman, Rodrik, and Velasco remind us of a simple, 
yet often overlooked fact, when otherwise well-intended laundry-lists of reforms 
are handed over to developing countries to implement:  
 
‘Governments face administrative and political limitations, and their policymaking 
capital is better deployed in alleviating binding constraints than going after too 
many targets all at once. So growth strategies require a sense of priorities.’43  
 
With respect to the investment regime, this implies that the question is not 
whether such reforms promote foreign investment or prevent future disputes. 
Rather, the challenge is to be aware that biasing heuristics may occasionally 
influence the judgments of the international investment treaty community, and 
governments therefore need to ask whether major bureaucratic reforms pertaining 
to BITs actually provide them with ‘biggest bang for the reform buck’?44 
Considering the costs and political capital required this will only be the case for 
countries, where the lack of (sustainable) foreign investment is in fact the most 
binding constraint on their economy. If it is not, then perhaps they should spend 
their scarce attention and resources elsewhere.  
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Avoiding status quo bias 
 
One may argue, of course, that although developing countries have joined the 
BIT-movement in a haphazard fashion, the absence of such reforms will continue 
to expose them to treaty-based investment claims. The transaction costs in 
renegotiating dozens of treaties can be prohibitive, and refusing to comply with 
arbitral awards is a risky option given the strong enforcement mechanism 
enshrined in the system. Also, even when it is feasible to prevent execution by 
hiding assets, few would want to blatantly violate their international obligations. 
So it might be tempting to assume that developing countries have no choice but to 
initiate far-reaching and expensive reforms to minimize the chance of disputes. 
This, however, leads me to the third point: beware of excessive anchoring.  
 
Experimental studies have consistently shown that individuals tend to value the 
status quo, even if it was initially determined randomly.45 Alternative, and better, 
choices are often discarded also when the transaction costs of departing from the 
status quo are not prohibitive. Indeed, most adjustments of investment treaty 
policies remain remarkably limited given the lack of consideration that often went 
into joining the BIT-movement in the first place. As mentioned above, this is 
partly due to some developing countries turning into capital-exporters. But when 
governments consider the value of future or existing BITs, they should always ask 
themselves, whether alternatives might in fact better suit their interests. Let me 
mention two examples for the sake of illustration.  
 
A multilateral investment treaty has proven difficult in the past, but as late as the 
recent WTO-discussions, many developing countries had yet to understand the 
true implications of BITs. This meant that opponents, like India, continuously 
praised the bilateral alternative to a WTO-negotiated agreement for their 
flexibility.46 Other countries opposed a WTO agreement on the (wrong) 
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impression that they hadn’t already given their consent to a de facto multilateral 
investment treaty regime with similar protections.47 In the meantime, relevant 
stakeholders in countries like India have learned the hard way, just how inflexible 
BITs can be, and other developing countries have had to realize that by signing up 
to BITs, they had already allowed investors the right to file claims against 
governments on the international plane. Yet today, the very option of a 
multilateral investment treaty - for instance based on the UNCTC Code - is hardly 
ever mentioned in discussions over the future investment regime.  
 
Anthea Roberts has presented an alternative way of ‘re-anchoring’ the investment 
regime without a multilateral treaty or large-scale renegotiation. She posits that 
apart from being actual or potential respondents in investment treaty disputes, 
states have another role as BIT parties, namely interpreting the treaties through 
subsequent practice.48 As affirmed by the International Court of Justice, 
‘subsequent practice … can result in a departure from the original intent on the 
basis of a tacit agreement between the parties.’49 This can happen in a number of 
ways, including updated model BITs, common internal practices, public 
statements, intervention as a non-disputing treaty party, or even coordinated 
efforts, such as the NAFTA Free Trade Commission’s intervention in the early 
2000s. Yet, with the exception of the NAFTA parties, few countries have been 
active or coordinated in asserting their interpretative authority to limit and clarify 
their treaties after realizing what they signed up to.50 Although information 
processing constraints have almost surely prevented developing countries from 
even considering this option, perhaps it is time they start.  
 
To be clear, the suggestion here is not that any of these proposals are necessarily 
more ‘rational’ than simply sticking with, and implementing, existing BIT-
                                                          
47
 See e.g. Egypt’s intervention in; WTO WGTI, Report on the Meeting held on 16 - 18 September 
2002, WT/WGTI/M/19 (2002), par. 207. Note that in other cases, like Malaysia, the opposition to 
WTO negotiations was simply because, they were found too long compared with BIT negotiations; 
Malaysian official I. 
48
 A. Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of 
States,’ 104 American Journal of International Law 179 (2010).  
49
 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), International 
Court of Justice, July 13, 2009, par 64. Quoted in Roberts, ibid. 
50
 Roberts, op. cit.   
 319 
networks. However, developing countries and other actors in the investment 
regime should carefully consider, whether a status-quo bias might be partly 
responsible for the neglect of ‘re-anchoring’ reforms in current debates.  
      
Voice from a position of weakness 
 
Although heuristics probably have a role to play in the very limited adjustments 
taking place in the investment regime, a number of developed countries are likely 
to resist alternatives as well. Roberts’ suggestion may work with the United States 
and Canada, for instance, who themselves have been subject to disputes, or 
Australia which was recently threatened by a controversial claim.51 Yet, the 
ongoing negotiations to establish a common European investment protection 
policy have made clear that many countries are still intent on pursuing 
‘traditional’ OECD-based models.52 Until Western Europe gets its own equivalent 
of an Ethyl claim, or is seriously threatened with such a dispute, it will be an 
uphill battle for developing countries to come to agreement that their old treaties 
need to be restricted through reinterpretation, that it is time to install a multilateral 
investment treaty, or indeed any other re-anchoring reforms.53  
 
If so, then developing countries should not underestimate their ability for ‘voice’ 
to assert pressure.54 They can join coalitions with each other as well as domestic 
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stakeholders in developed countries, including NGOs. Also, if rationality is 
limited, the power of the mass media and the use of framing symbols make 
powerful allies.55 Developing countries could consider exploiting the availability 
heuristic by mounting campaigns in international media: the more headlines in 
Western newspapers about environmental and health regulations being questioned 
under BITs, the greater the pressure on developed country negotiators to 
compromise. Recall that NGOs used the Ethyl claim to help bring down the MAI. 
Whether this was an outcome to be praised is subject to dispute, but it shows that 
even within the investment regime, we have seen clear examples of how 
particularly salient events have a remarkable impact on public opinion, whether 
they are representative for the regime or not.  
 
If some developing countries want to re-anchor the investment regime, another 
potentially effective, but often overlooked, strategy is to use their legally 
enshrined option of ‘exit’ (and threats of exit).56 Again, this can be considered 
both in isolation and along with like-minded countries. The practical implications 
of this approach will be limited over the medium term, given that ‘survival’ 
clauses included in many BITs bind the parties between ten or twenty years in 
respect to investments made before the termination. Still, the costs involved for 
home states would be considerable. Although many of their investors would 
remain protected, it would seriously question the legitimacy of the system if 
developing countries threatened, or actually began, to leave it in the absence of 
reform. As noted by Helfer, states can exit treaties,  
 
‘...to challenge or revise disfavoured legal norms or institutions ... Withdrawing 
from an agreement (or threatening to withdraw) can give a denouncing state 
additional voice, either by increasing its leverage to reshape the treaty to more 
accurately reflect its interests ... or by establishing a rival legal norm or institution 
together with other like-minded states. Exit thus sits at a critical intersection of 
law and power in international relations.’57 
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Indeed, governments do actually withdraw from treaties to a much greater extent 
than often asserted.58 So for those developing countries that joined the BIT-
movement in a disorganized, chaotic, and uninformed manner and today regret 
that decision, withdrawal from BITs (or threats thereof) is a potential instrument 
for ‘voice’ that should not be overlooked.  
 
This is not to say that it will necessarily be easy. There could be first-mover 
disadvantages in departing from the status-quo,59 and particularly so for very 
small developing countries. Yet, one should not exaggerate this hurdle. Chapter 
six showed that few developing countries would have lost considerable, if any, 
amounts of foreign capital if they refrained from joining the BIT-movement. So if 
developing countries make it painstakingly clear that their exit is not 
opportunistic, as perhaps exemplified by Venezuela, and they still adhere to the 
underlying principles of investment treaties as well as the rule of law, it is 
questionable just how harshly international markets would react. In fact, rather 
than continuing to violate their BIT-obligations leading to costly investment 
disputes, withdrawing from the treaties while continuing to adhere to their guiding 
principles would demonstrate respect rather than contempt for international law. 
Helfer writes,  
 
‘The most basic distinction is that a withdrawing state is actually adhering to the 
treaty’s rules by publicizing its decision to exit prospectively... The choice to 
denounce ... together with any explanation the state offers to justify its decision, 
may signal an intent to ‘play by the rules’ of future treaties as well. As a result, the 
harm to the withdrawing state’s reputation as a law abiding nation may be 
minimal.’60  
 
So instead of listening to the predictable outrage of the arbitration community, 
when such suggestions are considered,61 developing countries should perhaps 
instead recall the feedback from the senior MIGA official quoted in chapter four, 
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‘...provided we can expect a country to remain committed to foreign investments 
and the rule of law, cancelling all its BITs would not have a substantial impact on 
whether, and to what extent, MIGA would be willing to underwrite investments to 
that country.’62  
 
Given that MIGA has been much more concerned with investment treaties than 
many other market-actors, this is worthy to keep in mind. Also, to the extent some 
investors may react to withdrawals from BITs, developing countries can always 
offer them contracts with the same substantive rights as investment treaties and 
backed up by investor-state arbitration. 
 
To repeat, my study provides no insights on whether individual developing 
countries should actually pursue any of these policies. Particularly the (relatively 
few) developing countries who joined and stayed in the BIT-movement based on 
clear and informed decisions may have already considered some of the options 
above and decided not to pursue them. So the conclusion here is not that 
developing countries should necessarily withdraw from BITs or otherwise re-
anchor their investment treaty policies. But for countries which today regret not 
being more careful when negotiating investment treaties in the past, it is important 
to bear in mind whether anchoring to the status-quo is in fact less costly than 
sustainable alternatives. For while many may have developed their BIT-networks 
more by chance than by design, it is not too late to make their investment 
protection policies just a little BIT more rational.  
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Annex I: Country classification 
 
There is no official legal definition of a developing country, and different 
organizations use different classifications, which makes the distinction between 
developing and developed countries a difficult one. Particularly in studies over 
time, any classification is bound to be imperfect. 
I take as my starting point, the World Bank’s historical income classifications, 
which are listed at:  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,content
MDK:20487070~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSite
PK:239419,00.html (last accessed: 10 February, 2011). 
 
On this basis, I define a developing country as one, which the World Bank has not 
classified as a ‘high-income’ country for the majority of the period listed in its 
World Development Indicators, starting in 1987 and ending in 2009;  
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, DR 
Congo, DR Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, PDR Lao, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
Accordingly ‘developed countries’ include here not only Western countries but 
also countries like Korea and the United Arab Emirates. While these countries 
have signed numerous investment treaties with Western countries, their role in 
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BIT negotiations is arguably often that of capital exporters, and it is therefore not 
unreasonable to group them in the ‘developed country’ category, which includes;  
Andorra, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and 
United States. 
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Annex II: Interview information 
 
From January 2009 to May 2011, I conducted more than one hundred interviews – 
most of them over the phone. Many are quoted or otherwise referred to directly in 
the thesis; others were used solely for background information, partly due to 
anonymity requirements (see below).  
 
Private PRI industry 
 
All firms and Lloyds syndicates in table AII.1 below were contacted. Several did 
not respond and a few had policies of not disclosing information on their PRI 
policies. As a result, I interviewed representatives from syndicates accounting for 
almost 50% of Lloyds’ Confiscation, Expropriation, and Nationalization’ (CEN) 
capacity and representatives accounting for 50% of the listed firms’ CEN 
capacity. I moreover interviewed representatives from a few additional firms not 
mentioned on the list, but whose risk-capacity I have not been able to trace or 
quote (information on the private PRI industry is generally in short supply). The 
interviews covered firms spread over the three leading insurance centres: the 
United States (primarily New York), Bermuda, and London. In all cases, I 
interviewed only officials with an involvement in underwriting decisions, either 
directly or from a managing position. Interviews were semi-structured, but all 
were asked the question: ‘to what extent, if any, do BITs impact the pricing and 
coverage of political risk insurance of [company]’.  
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Table AII.1. Private providers of political risk insurance for foreign investors 
 
Public (or mixed private/public) PRI providers 
 
I interviewed one or more officials from public or mixed private/public PRI 
providers in table AII.2. I was not able to interview officials from the French PRI 
provider. Like with private providers, I interviewed only officials with an 
involvement in underwriting decisions, either directly or from a managing 
PROVIDER MARKET CAPACITY PER PROJECT
COMPANIES
  ACE European Group Ltd 80 mio USD, 10 years
  AIG 120 mio USD, 15 years
  Aspen 70 mio USD, 7 years
  Atradius 70 mio USD, 6 years
  Axis 100 mio, 7 years
  Coface 70 mio, 10 years
  Chubb 75 mio USD, 10 years
  HCC 35 mio USD, 5 years
  Sovereign 100 mio USD, 15 years
  Zurich 150 mio USD, 15 years
LLOYD'S SYNDICATES (syndicate no.)
  Ace Global Markets (2488) 80 mio USD, 10 years
  Amlin (2001) 12,5 mio USD, 3 years
  Ark (4020) 32 mio USD, 7 years
  Ascot (1414) 15 mio USD, 5 years
  Aspen (4711) 70 mio USD, 7 years
  Beazley (623) 30 mio USD, 7 years
  Catlin (2003) 90 mio USD*, 10 years
  Chaucer (1084) 20 mio USD, 5 years
  Hardy (382) 20 mio USD, 5 years
  Hiscox (33) 25 mio USD, 5 years
  Kiln (510) 60 mio USD, 7 years
  Liberty Syn Mgmt (4472) 15 mio USD, 5 years
  Limit (1036) 10 mio USD, 3 years
  Marketform (2468) 15 mio USD, 5 years
  MAP (2791) 20 mio USD, 3 years
  Novae (2007) 20 mio USD, 5 years
  C.V. Starr (1919) 15 mio USD, 7 years
  Pembroke (4000) 10 mio USD, 5 years
  QBE (1886) 50 mio USD, 7 years
  Talbot (1183) 20 mio USD, 5 years
Notes:
 
Figures are with respect to 'Confiscation, Expropriation, and Nationalization' (CEN) 
insurance. 
* Industry representatives state that in practise the maximum line of Catlin's London-platform is 
only 30 mio USD.
Sources:  Author's compilation based on publicly available information, industry inputs, and 
FirstCity, Political Risks Insurance: Report and Market Update, July 2009.
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position. Similarly, interviews were semi-structured and all were asked the 
question: ‘to what extent, if any, do BITs impact the pricing and coverage of 
political risk insurance of [provider]’.  
 
Table AII.2. Public providers of political risk insurance for foreign investors 
 
 
Individuals involved in developed country BIT programs 
 
I interviewed one or more individuals involved in investment treaty programs 
from:  
 
Canada (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) 
Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 Finland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
Germany (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) 
Japan (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry) 
Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs) 
 Sweden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 Switzerland (State Secretariat for Economic Affairs) 
United Kingdom (Foreign Office and the Department for Business, 
Innovation, and Skills) 
PROVIDER MARKET CAPACITY PER PROJECT
  Atradius Dutch State Business NV (Netherlands) 100 mio EUR (max. compensation), 15 years
  ECGD (UK) No stated limit, 15 years
  EDC (Canada) No stated limit, 15 years
  EKF (Denmark) No stated limit, 15 years
  EKN (Sweden) No stated limit, not found
  Finnvera (Finland) No stated limit, 20 years
  MIGA (Multilateral) 110 mio USD, 15 years
  NEXI (Japan) No stated limit, 15 years
  OeKB (Austria) No stated limit, not found
  OPIC (United States) 250 mio USD, 20 years
  PwC/Euler Hermes (Germany) No stated limit, 15 years
  SACE (Italy) No stated limit, 15 years
Sources:  Author's compilation based on publicly available information.
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United States (USTR, Department of State, Department of 
Commerce, USAID, Chamber of Commerce, Council for 
International Business, as well as one lobbyist) 
 
Three capital-exporting countries I contacted about their BIT-negotiations did not 
respond (Austria, France and Italy). All interviews were semi-structured with the 
overall theme being business input when contemplating and negotiating BITs 
(used in chapter six). Officials were also asked about their experiences with 
negotiations, but to the extent they had been involved in BIT-negotiators for an 
extended period of time, few were willing to give much input. In cases where 
negotiators explicitly said the comments were not to be quoted even on a not-for-
attribution basis, they have not been included. This includes all feedback from 
American officials and business representatives.  
 
Other organizations  
 
Semi-structured interviews were made with one or more officials, from the 
following organizations: 
 
The American Bar Association’s Central European and Eurasian 
Law Initiative  
The Foreign Investment Advisory Services  
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
 The International Law Institute  
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency  
The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
 
In some cases officials were retired, and in a few cases officials were only 
indirectly associated with the organization, such as lawyers used in training 
programs (when their feedback is in the thesis, this is made clear).  
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Developing countries 
 
Officials in developing countries were traced through a four-stage process. First, I 
gathered participation lists from UNCTAD seminars and other organizations 
involved in investment treaty politics. Secondly, I contacted countries’ WTO 
representations in Geneva to inquire about who to contact in home capitals about 
investment treaties. Third, I gathered other publicly available information (for 
instance from websites) on the agencies in developing countries responsible for 
investment treaty negotiations and contacted them directly. Fourth, I was assisted 
by the UNCTAD secretariat to trace officials involved, who were then 
subsequently contacted over email. 
 
In many countries efforts were in vain. In some cases, I traced officials involved, 
yet they did not respond to emails (e.g. Russia, Iran, Haiti, Nicaragua, Bulgaria). 
In some cases, officials responded that they were not willing to discuss such 
matters (e.g. Turkey and Brazil), or officials agreed to discuss, but then 
subsequently decided not to (e.g. India, Egypt, and Honduras). In other cases, 
language barriers prevented meaningful engagement (e.g. Morocco, Vietnam, 
Mongolia, and Cote d’Ivoire). Finally, I decided not to include some interviews, if 
it became clear that officials were not in fact involved in investment treaty 
policies themselves, either directly or from a managing position, but merely 
referred to hearsay (e.g. Yemen).  
 
Ultimately, I was left with the following sample of nineteen developing countries, 
among which I interviewed one or more officials in more than fifty interviews: 
 
 Cambodia (Council for the Development of Cambodia) 
Chile (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
China (Ministry of Commerce) 
Costa Rica (Ministry of Foreign Trade) 
Croatia (Ministry of Economy, Labour, and Entrepreneurship) 
Czech Republic (Ministry of Finance) 
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Dominican Republic (Export and Investment Center) 
DR Congo (Agence Nationale Pour la Promotion des  
Investissements) 
Ecuador (Solicitor General Office, Ministry of Industries and 
Competitiveness, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
Ghana (Investment Promotion Center) 
Estonia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
Jamaica (Jamaica Promotions Corporation) 
Lebanon (Ministry of Finance) 
Malaysia (Malaysia Industrial Development Authority and Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry) 
Mexico (Secretariat of the Economy)  
Pakistan (Attorney General’s Office, Board of Investment, Embassy 
in Washington DC, Ministry of Industries and Production, Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , Reserve 
Bank, Securities and Exchange Commission) 
South Africa (see below) 
Sri Lanka (Attorney General Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
Thailand (Bank of Thailand and Board of Investment) 
 
All interviews were semi-structured with the overall theme being the countries’ 
experiences with negotiating investment treaties. When individual bureaucrats 
seemed to not have a deep understanding of investment treaties, this was sought 
confirmed through a number of ‘control’-questions pertaining the content of BITs 
and very basic points from particular controversial aspects of the jurisprudence 
(e.g. that MFN clauses might cover dispute settlement provisions). Note that 
experiences of some countries are included, yet not discussed in detail if officials 
had only been involved for a short period of time, and particularly if they were not 
involved before the country’s first claim (e.g. Estonia and Malaysia). 
 
In some countries I interviewed officials more than once, and in others I was able 
through snowballing to interview more than one relevant official. Apart from 
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South Africa (see below), the later was particularly the case of Pakistan, which led 
to the ‘mini’ plausibility probe in the preface. Here, interviews were made in 
Lahore and Islamabad, January 2009 to August 2010, as well as over the phone 
until May 2011. Several interviewees were interviewed on numerous occasions to 
make sure Mr. Khan’s story was in fact a fair depiction of the Pakistani BIT-
program. Note that three officials strongly objected to Mr. Khan’s story, yet none 
of them were involved directly with the BIT-program in the past and had only a 
vague idea of the treaties’ implications.    
 
Table AII.3 lists some key sample statistics from the year, where the BIT-
movement resulted in the most amounts of treaties, 1996. It is clear that that while 
spread over each region, the sample is generally considerably richer than the 
population of developing countries. As importantly, they have much larger FDI 
stocks than most other developing countries and thereby represent a very large 
share of the total inward FDI stock (45% with China, 26% without) and outward 
stock (40% with China, 28% without). The sample covers six of the top fifteen 
developing countries in terms of both inward and outward FDI stock, and three of 
the top five in terms of inward FDI stock (China, Mexico, and Malaysia). This is 
important as the opposite pattern could have slanted the sample in favour of a 
bounded rationality explanation (e.g. lack of expertise, lack of stake in the system, 
etc.). Note that apart from these nineteen countries, the thesis uses additional 
insights from other developing countries based on publications, newspaper clips, 
statements in the WTO, etc.  
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Table AII.3. Descriptive statistics of developing countries where one or more 
officials were interviewed, 1996 
 
 
South Africa 
 
For the case study in chapter nine, I traced and interviewed all negotiators 
involved in South Africa’s BIT program since its inception in 1994 as well as a 
number of stakeholders. A total of fourteen interviews were made from April 
2009 to May 2011, with officials from: 
 
 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
 Department of International Relations and Cooperation  
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
 Export Credit Insurance Corporation  
Industrial Development Investment Center (within the DTI) 
Office of the Chief State Law Advisor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
  
Most interviews were very long (in many cases several hours) and several 
officials were interviewed twice or more. I also interviewed one investor involved 
in an investment claim with South Africa.  
    
A comment on anonymity 
 
Anonymity was a condition sine qua non for practically all interviewees, and for 
the private PRI providers few wanted their company name mentioned. Apart from 
Share of total Share of total, excl. China Average Average, excl. China Median
Inward FDI
  Sample 45.17% 25.98% 16.74 10.19 2.94
  Developing countries 100% 100% 4.60 3.74 0.55
Outward FDI
  Sample 40.14% 28.23% 4.19 3.14 0.45
  Developing countries 100% 100% 1.78 1.58 0.11
GDP
  Sample 33.28% 18.64% 102.44 60.57 21.28
  Developing countries 100% 100% 41.77 35.91 5.37
Notes: All figures are in current bn. USD. See annex I for developing country classification.
Sources: UNCTAD and World Development Indicators.
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Makhdoom Ali Khan, all interview feedback is therefore on a not-for-attribution 
basis. Many interviewees asked not to be quoted at all, even if anonymous, in 
which case they were used solely for background information.  
When the parts of the thesis related to PRI were published, it was criticized in 
strong terms by Susan Franck for relying on anonymous feedback. But while 
agreeing with Prof. Franck that this reduces the transparency of the research 
strategy, anonymity is a necessary evil if one wants to include comprehensive 
qualitative feedback, which as mentioned in chapter one is critical to get a deeper 
understanding of the investment regime.1  
Note also that while in the case study of South Africa, several interviewees did 
not ask to remain anonymous; I decided to keep their identities hidden 
nevertheless. For while the chapter includes critical comments on the role of key 
bureaucrats, the intention is not to slander individual officials but rather to 
illustrate a broader story about how studies based on too narrow assumptions of 
rational decision-making may have failed to account for when bureaucratic and 
political elites in developing countries have thoroughly misjudged the character 
and implications of BITs.    
                                                          
1
 See, comments made by Susan Franck on OGEMID (Oil-Gas-Energy-Mining-Infrastructure 
Dispute Management) mail service, 27 January, 2010.  
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Annex III: Background data and robustness tests  
for econometric analysis1  
 
Summary statistics and information on first BIT-claim 
Table AIII.1. Summary statistics for econometric analysis. 
 
                                                          
1
 The econometric analysis in chapter eight was conducted in collaboration with Emma Aisbett. 
Variable Description/measure Mean SD Min Max N Source
BIT claim
1 if country has been subject to a 
BIT claim, 0 otherwise (see; Table 
AIII.2).
0.19 0.39 0 1 2740 (I)
Cummulative BIT 
claims Cumulative BIT claims. 0.57 2.57 0 51 2740 (I)
Signed Annual BITs signed. 1.23 2.03 0 17 2740 (II)
Cummulative signed Cumulative BITs signed. 16.16 18.89 0 124 2740 (II)
Ratified Annual BITs coming into force. 0.90 1.74 0 15 2740 (II)
Cummulative ratified Cumulative BITs coming into force. 11.18 15.06 0 97 2740 (II)
Signed and ratified
Annual BITs signed which came 
into force within three years. 0.73 1.55 0 15 2740 (II)
Cummulative signed 
and ratified
Cumulative BITs signed which 
came into force within three years. 8.63 11.32 0 85 2740 (II)
FDI inflows Net inflows, BOP, bn. current USD. 1.64 6.90 -4.75 148 2471 (III)
FDI outflows Net outflows, BOP, bn. current 
USD.
0.44 3.21 -3.51 67.68 2101 (III)
GDP Bn. current US USD. 56.93 197.21 0.08 4330 2494 (III)
Investor protection
Investment risk profile index from 0 
(very high risk) to 12 (very low risk). 6.91 2.34 0 12 1949 (IV)
Regional BIT claim
1 if a country in same region has 
been subject to a BIT-claim, 0 
otherwise.
0.73 0.45 0 1 2740 (I)
Cummulative 
regional BIT claims Cummulative BIT-claims in region. 9.27 16.53 0 91 2740 (I) & (V)
North-South BITs 
signed
Annual BITs signed with 
developed countries. 0.47 0.96 0 8 2740 (II)
South-South BITs 
signed
Annual BITs signed with 
developing countries. 0.76 1.48 0 15 2740 (II)
'Serious' BITs 
signed
Annual BITs signed with 
developed countries or developing 
countries with large outward capital 
stocks.
0.62 1.16 0 8 2740 (II) & (III)
'Photo-op' BITs 
signed
Annual BITs signed with 
developing countries with small 
outward capital stocks.
0.60 1.29 0 15 2740 (II) & (III)
Sources: (I) unctad.org/iia-dbcases, worldbank.org/ICSID, ita.law.uvic.ca, and iareporter.com; (II) 
UNCTAD; (III) IMF IFS; (IV) PRS Group; (V) 
unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Data/RegionalGroupings.htm.                                                                                                                                                                                           
Notes: Sample covers 137 developing and transition economies from 1990 to 2009.
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Table AIII.2. First (known) BIT claim against developing countries. 
 
Host
Claimant in first BIT claim                                                                                            
(ICSID Case No./non-ICSID arbitration rules) Brought
Sri Lanka Asian Agricultural Products Limited (ARB/87/3) 1987
Congo, DR American Manufacturing and Trading (ARB/93/1) 1993
Albania Tradex Hellas SA (ARB/94/2) 1994
Poland Saar Papier (UNCITRAL) 1994
Burundi Antoine Goetz and others (ARB/95/3) 1995
Kazakhstan Biederman (SCC) 1996
Russia Franz Sedelmayer (ICC) 1996
Venezuela FEDAX N.V. (ARB/96/3(1) 1996
Argentina Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal (ARB/97/3) 1997
Chile Víctor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation (ARB/98/2) 1998
Egypt Wena Hotels Ltd. (ARB/98/4) 1998
Paraguay Eudoro Armando Olguin (ARB/98/5) 1998
Ukraine Joseph Charles Lemire (ARB(AF)/98/1) 1998
Czech Rep. Ronald Lauder (UNCITRAL) 1999
Estonia Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc (Arb/99/2) 1999
Latvia Swembalt AB (UNCITRAL) 1999
Malaysia Philippe Gruslin (ARB/99/3) 1999
Moldova Link Trading (UNCITRAL) 1999
Lebanon Eastern Company (CRCIA) 2000
Mexico Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed (ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2) 2000
Morocco Salini Costruttori and Italstrade (ARB/00/4) 2000
Guyana Booker PLC (ARB/01/9) 2001
Hungary AES Summit Generation Ltd. (ARB/01/4) 2001
Pakistan SGS (ARB/01/13) 2001
Romania Noble Ventures (ARB/01/11) 2001
South Africa Swiss investor (UNCITRAL) 2001
Trinidad & Tob. F-W Oil Interests, Inc. (ARB/01/14) 2001
Bolivia Aguas del Tunari S.A. (ARB/02/3) 2002
Ecuador Occidental Exploration and Production Company (LCIA Case No. UN3467) 2002
Jordan Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. (ARB/02/13) 2002
Philippines SGS (ARB/02/6) 2002
Turkey PSEG Global Inc. et al. (ARB/02/5) 2002
Algeria Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA (ARB/03/8) 2003
Bulgaria Plama Consortium Limited (ARB/03/24) 2003
El Salvador Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. (ARB/03/26) 2003
Ghana Telekom Malaysia (UNCITRAL) 2003
India Capital India Power Mauritius I and Energy Enterprises (Mauritius) 
(UNCITRAL)
2003
Peru Lucchetti S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. (ARB/03/4) 2003
Saudi Arabia Ed. Züblin AG (ARB/03/01) 2003
Mongolia Alstom Power Italia SpA and Alstom SpA (ARB/04/10) 2004
Tunisia ABCI Investments (ARB/04/12) 2004
Viet Nam Trinh Vinh Binh and Binh Chau Joint stock Company (UNCITRAL) 2004
Bangladesh Saipem S.p.A. (ARB/05/7) 2005
Georgia Ares International S.r.l. and MetalGeo S.r.l. (ARB/05/23) 2005
Lithuania Parkerings Compagniet AS (ARB/05/8) 2005
Serbia-Mont. Mytilineos (PCA) 2005
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Table AIII.2. First (known) BIT claim against developing countries (contd.) 
 
Robustness tests 
 
Table AIII.3 shows the robustness of the finding to the choice of estimator from 
within the set of count-data models which could potentially be used in the 
application. The strong negative impact of a BIT claim is detected by all the 
estimators. From left to right the estimators are a standard Poisson, fixed-effect 
Poisson, Negative Binomial (constant dispersion), Hausman, Hall and Grilichies’ 
‘fixed effects’ estimator (our base estimator),2 and a negative binomial model 
including country-dummies (as suggested by Allison and Waterman.3  
                                                          
2
 J. Hausman, B. Hall and Z. Griliches, ‘Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application 
to the Patents-R&D Relationship,’ 52 Econometrica 909-938 (1984). 
3
 P. Allison and R. Waterman, ‘Fixed–Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models’, 32 
Sociological Methodology 1 (2002). 
Host
Claimant in first BIT claim                                                                                           
(ICSID Case No./non-ICSID arbitration rules) Brought
Tanzania Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. (ARB/05/22) 2005
Thailand Walter Bau (UNCITRAL) 2005
Yemen Desert Line Projects LLC (ARB/05/17) 2005
Zimbabwe Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and others (ARB/05/6) 2005
Kyrgyzstan Sistem Muhendislik Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. (ARB(AF)/06/1) 2006
Nicaragua Shell Brands International AG and Shell Nicaragua S.A. (ARB/06/14) 2006
Panama Nations Energy, Inc. and others (ARB/06/19) 2006
Slovakia Branimir Mensik (ARB/06/9) 2006
Uzbekistan Romak (UNCITRAL) 2006
Armenia Global Gold Mining LLC (ARB/07/7) 2007
Azerbaijan Fondel Metal (ARB/07/1) 2007
Bosnia and 
Herz.
ALAS International Baustoffproduktions AG (ARB/07/11) 2007
Costa Rica Alasdair Ross Anderson and others (ARB(AF)/07/3) 2007
Dominican Rep. Société Générale (UNCITRAL) 2007
Nigeria Shell Nigeria Ultra Deep Limited (ARB/07/18) 2007
Iran Turkcell (UNCITRAL) 2008
Senegal Millicom International Operations BV et al (ARB/08/20) 2008
Belize Dunkeld International Investment Limited (UNCTIRAL) 2009
Guatemala Iberdrola Energía, S.A. (ARB/09/5) 2009
Macedonia Swisslion DOO Skopje (ARB/09/16) 2009
Turkmenistan Adem Dogan (ARB/09/9) 2009
Sources: unctad.org/iia-dbcases, worldbank.org/ICSID, ita.law.uvic.ca, and iareporter.com.
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Table AIII.3. Strong negative effect of first claim on participation is robust to 
choice of count-data estimator and treatment of country-effects. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed which will be ratified within 3 years. See 
text for description of estimators. Coefficients and standard errors reported. Year dummies and 
cubic function of lagged total BIT participation as well as lags of ratification also included but 
coefficients not reported. All other controls are lagged one year. 
 
Table AIII.4 shows the robustness of the strong negative impact of BIT claims on 
participation to plausible changes in the base specification. In column 1 the 
controls for FDI flows are omitted from the base specification. While chapter six 
showed that BITs are unlikely to have a considerable impact on investment flows, 
some scholars still disagree with this suggestion. And if BITs do affect FDI flows, 
it is possible that including FDI on the right hand side could bias all the 
coefficients in the regression. Furthermore, including FDI on the right hand side 
may cause bias due to non-random missing values in the FDI data. However, the 
economically and statistically insignificant difference between the coefficients on 
BIT claim in columns 1 and the base regression suggest neither endogeneity nor 
selection bias problems in the base regression. Column 2 omits all lagged BIT-
participation controls. The robustness of the result here confirms that the negative 
BIT claim effect is not a spurious time-series artifact due to the lagged 
participation controls. Column 3 omits the year dummies from the base 
specification and instead includes global BIT participation and claims. As we 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Poisson FE-
Poisson 
NegBin. Base NegBin-
FE 
L.BIT Claim -0.417*** -0.343*** -0.468*** -0.423*** -0.379*** 
 (0.101) (0.089) (0.117) (0.107) (0.139) 
L.Inward FDI -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.016 -0.028** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
L.Outward FDI -0.021 -0.015 -0.004 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
L.GDP 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.051* 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.026) (0.022) (0.029) 
Constant -1.972***  -2.166*** 2.260*** -0.774 
 
(0.293)  (0.304) (0.494) (0.480) 
lnalpha   -0.482***  -1.407*** 
   (0.123)  (0.198) 
Observations 1632 1604 1632 1604 1632 
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would expect the total number of BITs signed globally is positively related to 
participation, while the impact of increasing total global claims is negative. 
Table AIII.4. Strong negative effect of claims on participation is robust to 
different specifications, including controlling for large BIT claims and non-
BIT investor claims. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dependent variable is the annual number of BITs signed. Table reports coefficients from negative 
binomial, fixed effect estimation. Year dummies (except in column 3) and cubic function of lagged 
total BIT participation as well as lags of ratification (except in column 2) also included but 
coefficients not reported. All other controls are lagged one year. 
 
Columns 4 and 5 add to the base specification respectively controls for non-BIT 
investor-state arbitrations - i.e. with jurisdiction based on national investment laws 
or other investment treaties - and BIT claims where investors sought more than 
US$100 mio. in compensation. Controlling for non-BIT claims has negligible 
effect on the base regression. Controlling for large BIT claims (in column 5) 
substantially reduces the coefficient on all BIT claims. This makes sense as the 
coefficient on all BIT claims should now be interpreted as the response to small, 
medium or publicly unknown magnitude claims. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.BIT Claim -0.436*** -0.441*** -0.465*** -0.421*** -0.365*** 
 (0.102) (0.107) (0.110) (0.107) (0.120) 
L.GDP 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Invest.Protect. 0.073*** 0.064*** 0.046** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
L.Inward FDI  -0.018* -0.010 -0.016 -0.015 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
L.Outward FDI  -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Global BITs   0.001***   
   (0.000)   
Global Claims   -0.004***   
 
  (0.001)   
L.non-BIT 
Claim 
   0.182 
(0.188) 
 
L.Big BIT Claim     -0.169 
 
    (0.166) 
Constant 1.603*** 1.339*** 0.437** 2.234*** 2.203*** 
 (0.434) (0.318) (0.215) (0.494) (0.495) 
Observations 1832 1604 1604 1604 1604 
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